Robert Axelrod’s story of how cooperation developed between British and German soldiers in the trench warfare of World War I is so elegant few people have questioned it. Yet in a single sentence, Andrew Gelman says the emperor has no clothes and looky, looky, he’s right!
The crux of Axelrod’s story is that the soldiers were trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma: individual incentives were to shoot the enemy while the socially optimal outcome was cooperation. Axelrod then introduces his famous ideas of tit for tat etc. etc. to explain how cooperation could evolve even under these most hostile of conditions.
But Gelman asks why should we think that shooting the enemy was in a soldier’s best interest? Indeed,
…it seems more reasonable to
suppose that, as a soldier in the trenches, you would do better to avoid firing: shooting
your weapon exposes yourself as a possible target, and the enemy soldiers might
very well shoot back at where your shot came from.
I believe that on this point Gelman is totally correct [insert dope slap here]. But, as he continues, "If you have no
short-term motivation to fire, then cooperation is completely natural and
requires no special explanation."
Axelrod’s story and the large literature following it sometimes suggest that cooperation is always the thing to be explained. Cooperation is what happens when the natural order is overcome. Gelman reminds us that sometimes cooperation is the norm, it’s conflict that needs to be explained. In this case, we need to explain why the soldiers fought.
Comments are open.
Next Comments →
What this analysis misses, however, is that the soldiers on both sides DID fire — they just didn’t hit each other. From your Axelrod link:
“In trench war, a structure of ritualised aggression was a ceremony where antagonists participated in regular, reciprocal discharges of missiles, that is, bombs, bullets and so forth, which symbolized and strengthened, at one and the same time, both sentiments of fellow-feelings, and beliefs that the enemy was a fellow sufferer.”
So, both sides regularly fired and made themselves targets. The Prisoner’s Dilemma comes in specifically in the fact that the shooters did NOT become targets.
Gelman’s analysis would make sense if the phenomenon observed was “no firing.” The phenomenon, however, was “firing at place X at 7:01. No one goes to X until 7:02. Don’t shoot at source, as he won’t fire against until 7:01 tomorrow.”
There’s another possibility: they fired such that they weren’t targets (in other words, fired blindly). Check out David Friedman’s the Economics of War. I read in that essay that on average 100,000 shots are fired for every kill in modern warfare.
In response to your post on why the soldiers may have fought:
In the short term, they may well have lacked the incentive to fire the first shot, but man is restless. They fought due to the various incentives presented by time. The risk of the war ending with your squadron facing off the enemy with neither side having made a move is one incentive to fight. This creates the motivation to act because if you do not act and your teammates lose, then you lose based on the sheer size of your numerical disadvantage. Another incentive to fight may rest in the desire of the soldiers to go home to their families. As game theory suggests, this future reality works its way back to the current dilemma. If you can reason your way back to the present in this way, you are presented with a competitive bargaining game rather than a cooperation game.
Dixit and Nalebuff, in Thinking Strategically, Chapter 2 “Anticipating your Rival’s Response†, lay out the several situations which provide a context for understanding “why they fought† in WWI. “Rule 1: Look ahead and reason back. Anticipate where your initial decisions will ultimately lead, and use this information to calculate your best choice. In the case of our battle, we have two sides that know that the first party to move has a disadvantage because they have shown their hand.
While the two sides weigh this out, they apply differing probabilities to the possible scenarios that could play out. The German forces most likely reason that they have the incentive to wait it out. After all, they are the defender and the British/U.S. force the invader. They also may be questioning the strength of their opponent. If the opponent is stronger, then the Germans reason they need every advantage they can get. They reason that this either leads to a surprise first-move or a wait it out strategy. On the other side of the battlefield, the American/British forces are far from home, miss their families and the weather is uncomfortable. They want to get things over as soon as possible. They reason that they are in foreign lands and the advantage is naturally weighted toward the Germans so they are pre-disposed to fight.
But we still lack a strong catalyst. What is the solution to the statement you posed, “we need to explain why the soldiers fought.† At some point in the future, the benefit of not risking your life to rise from the bunker, not fully understanding who had the competitive advantage, and various other uncertainties would be outweighed by one important catalyst.
The answer I would say is wet socks!
Unsurprisingly, the military has developed a large body of knowledge on the topic of getting soliders to fight. For Americans the canonical reference is the WWII officer S.L.A. Marshall, a colorful figure whose methods have been questioned but whose results are widely believed. Basically, soldiers will act like soldiers, but generally are unwilling to kill others. To actually be soldiers(i.e. kill on command, and only on command) people need to be motivated. Cultural exhortation (eg “For King and Country,” “Smote the Infidels”) may have been the original method. As I noted above, another common tool historically has been the death penalty for desertion. During the middle part of the 20th century offiicers discovered two new effects: disintermediation and peer pressure. People are more willing to kill if there is a mechanical disintermediation between their own action (pulling on a lanyard) and the death of another human being (a shell exploding on the other side of the hill). I might pull a trigger on a pistol when I would hesitant to sink a knife into your chest. So fighting via mechanical means (artillery, UBoat, Cruise Missile) side steps the individual’s innate unwillingness to risk the self to kill another. The “peer pressure” is that individuals don’t want to be viewed as “slackers” by others they care about: no wants to be the fink who lets down this band of brothers. This is one of the reasons why the Wehrmacht was so fond of the half-track: all the infantry fought within sight of each other, and thus fought more effectively.
Following SLA Marshall the post-WWII US military developed another, even more effective paradigm: operant conditioning. Soldiers were drilled, drilled, and drilled again in environments as cognitievly similar to battle as possible. circular “bullseye” targets were replaced with silouhettes on the firing range, for example. Huge sums were spent on places like Ft. Irwin so soldiers could operate their weapons with live ammunition on almost-real targets. The result is a soldier thoroughly conditioned to operated his or her weapon effectivley, almost reflexively, without engaging in the kind of utility caclulations so valued in economics.
Which is all a long, roundabout why of saying that the analysis in the original post is specious becuase it completely ignores both the training and the social environment of the soliders. By careful design those men were not operating in a regime you or I would relate to as “normal.”
There were several good comments regarding the details of the actual situation in the trenches in 1914. Some of the claims, however, were incorrect in that the German Army was the aggressor/invader, while the French and the British were trying to hold them back. Training certainly is a factor in a soldier’s inclination to fight (or react in the desired way in a combat situation). Still, even with the training US soldiers get nowadays, the first time under fire induces a sort of paralysis that is broken only by the actions of more experienced soldiers, plus NCOs and officers. Also, the physical disconnect between action and result certainly lessens the sensitivity to killing, although you still know what your actions will accomplish.
Trench warfare devolved into a kind of defensive situation, excluding the various attempts at breaking through the other side’s lines — and which invariably resulted in massive casualties on both sides. In a defensive situation you are generally waiting to repel an attack, rather than initiating one. In addition, the sheer massiveness of the armies facing each other made for a rather slow-motion form of combat. Still, that doesn’t explain the behavior of line soldiers on both sides.
My best guess is that not shooting, aided and abetted by little training and almost no combat experience, was a survival method employed by men who were caught up in a massive conflict. Once the grim reality of kill or be killed set in, that live and let live behavior more or less stopped.
Here’s another puzzle for everyone: The American Civil War is regarded as the first war in which massive firepower directed against massed troops was a reality. It is regarded as the first war in which 20th Century armies had to operate. There are, as far as I know, no such behaviors recorded in the American Civil War.
re George: the civil war puzzle.
I’ll take a stab: before smokeless gunpowder became widespread (after 1900) most units spent most of the battle waiting for the smoke to clear — literally. The actual time in active combat was typically a few hours at most, and often much less, because individual units could not see through the smoke long enough to make sustained attack possible. Thus one of the key premises of Axelrod’s cooperation theory, that one knows the identity of the other player in the “game,” was generally not met on most civil war battlefields.
The exceptions would be extended sieges, like Vicksburg. Perhaps your example is lurking there. But it’s going to be hard to find becase I doubt the reporters of the day would have reported this kind of cooperation even if it had emerged.
I don’t buy Gelman’s argument insofar as we’re trying to explain the absence of effective artillery shelling rather than just rifle fire. I think you do have to explain why artillery (which presumably would be able to target the other side without directly exposing itself) would fail to try to maximize casualties on the other side.
FYI Ken Binmore, who accepts the conflict paradigm as a given, has also questioned Axelrod’s approach, arguing that the tit-for-tat model does not really explain the emergence of cooperation:
“Axelrod (1984) gives one striking example of the emergence of such co-operation. In the First World War, there were several fleeting outbreaks of implicit collusion between units of the British and German armies, in which each side ceased to shell the other. Axelrod (1984) attributes this behaviour to tit-for-tat reasoning, but such an explanation overlooks the obvious fact that the players didn’t begin by being nice to each other. I agree that it is vital to understand how such co-operation between groups who treat each other as outsiders can get off the ground, but there seems no point at all in seeking to analyse the emergence of co-operation using a model that takes the conclusion for granted.” (JASS 1997 – see http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/1/1/review1.html)
“[A]rtillery [was] able to target the other side without directly exposing itself.”
True and false. True if by direct exposure one means viewable by eyesight or binoculars by enemy infantry or artillerists. False if one includes airplanes, dirigibles, spotters and deductive reasoning, i.e. presuming they must be within X meters of the falling of the shells, where could they be firing from? Both sides, given the high stakes, developed some skill at finding out where the shells were coming from. Indeed, in response to French developed expertise, the Germans in the late stages of the war took to short barrages, without taking the time to “register” their guns, before infantry follow-up.
Thus there exists a possible non-cooperative reason for cease fire: Jesus Christ man you’ll give our position away!!!
Information about global offshore outsourcing market.
we are IT Offshore Consulting Company India
We are expertise in Offshore IT Outsourcing India
we are leading IT Outsourcing Solutions Service Provider India
We are leading Offshore Software Development Company India
Kama Sutra Sex Position Sex Picture Video Sexual Position Kama Sutra Sex Kama Sutra Position Sex Kama Sutra
Know more about nude beach and find more nude beach picture Nude Beach Picture Photo Nude Beach Sex Video Movie
Easily Prepare the Most Guarded Restaurant Recipes in Your Own Kitchen.
we are leading Offshore Software Development Outsourcing Services India
We are leading Software Development India Company
We are leading Offshore Software Outsourcing India
IT services in India A premier global software outsourcing provider of offshore development services
WorldGreatRecipes will help you Recepies, Recipes, Cooking Recepies, Thanksgiving Recepies, Chili Recepies, Indian
SeoPark is leading SEO India Firm of India, we are leading service provider in SEO India, Search Engine Optimization
Recipes Cookbook Holiday Recipes Crock Pot Recipes Chicken Recipes Slow Cooker Recipes
Recepies Cooking Recepies Thanksgiving Recepies Chili Recepies Weight Watchers Recipies Copy Cat Recepiess
Home Loan
Personal Loan
Business Loans
Real Estate Loans
US Real Estate
Australian Real Estate
Westwood Real Estate
Health Insurance
Car Insurance
Dental Insurance
Pet Insurance
Motorcycle Insurance
Las Vegas Nevada Real Estate
Real Estate In Las Vegas
Las Vegas Real Estate Listings
Real Estate Las Vegas Nevada
Insurance
Recipies Cookbooks Recipes Cookbooks
Malignant Pleural Mesothelioma Treatment
Home Loan
PersonalLoan
Student Loan
Car Insurance
Life Insurance
Dental Insurance
Travel Insurance
Pet Insurance
Medical Insurance
Motorcycle Insurance
Family Health Insurance
Las Vegas Nevada Real Estate
Las Vegas Real Estate Agent
Real Estate In Las Vegas
Henderson Nevada Real Estate
Las Vegas Real Estate Listings
Las Vegas Real Estate Listing
Real Estate Las Vegas Nevada
Loan
Insurance
Real Estate
Issue Tracking Software
Information Technology india
offshore development india
IT Company India
IT Company India
Outsource IT Services
India Based Software Development Company
Offshore software development Company
kama sutra education
Kama Sutra Sex Positions
Sex position photo
Nude Beach Play
Recipies
Recipies
Herbal Penis Enlargement
Drugs Online
Recipies Cookbooks Recipes Cookbooks
Know About Outsourcing Buisiness and market.
Global outsourcing market
Recipies Cookbooks Recipes Cookbooks
Mesothelioma Doctor
cheap travel
cheap hotel online
cheap tour and travel
cheap hotel
cheap hotel
adult sex toys
Car Insurance
Life Insurance
Dental Insurance
Travel Insurance
Pet Insurance
Medical Insurance
Motorcycle Insurance
Family Health Insurance
Las Vegas Nevada Real Estate
Las Vegas Real Estate Agent
Real Estate In Las Vegas
Henderson Nevada Real Estate
Las Vegas Real Estate Listings
Las Vegas Real Estate Listing
Real Estate Las Vegas Nevada
Loan
Insurance
Real Estate
Issue Tracking Software
Information Technology india
offshore development india
IT Company India
IT Company India
Outsource IT Services
India Based Software Development Company
Offshore software development Company
kama sutra education
Kama Sutra Sex Positions
Sex position photo
Nude Beach Play
Recipies
Recipies
Herbal Penis Enlargement
Drugs Online
Recipies Cookbooks Recipes Cookbooks
Know About Outsourcing Business and market.
Global outsourcing market
Recipies Cookbooks Recipes Cookbooks
Mesothelioma Doctor
cheap travel
cheap hotel online
cheap tour and travel
cheap hotel
cheap hotel
adult sex toys
cheap airlines tickets
discount on airline tickets
easy loans
insurance
real estate agent
cheap travel tips
first class cheep flights
savanah vacation
Hoodia Gordonii
cheap flights sydney
cheap flights johannesburg
cheap flights bangkok
cheapflights beijing
cheap flight thailand
cheap last minute flight
cheap international flight ticket
cheap business class flight
cheap flights new zealand
cheap poland flight
cheap flights dubai
cheap flights prague
cheap flights russia
cheap flights japan
cheap flights china
cheap flights thailand
cheap flights riga
cheap flights johannesburg
cheap flights romania
IT offshore outsourcing
link exchange forum and blog
Robots Cheep Flights
Robots Airline Flights
drunkin sailor early in the morning
lovely coloring and artistic design
Next Comments →
Comments on this entry are closed.