Why they might drum me out of the Economists’ Corp

by on January 13, 2006 at 6:10 am in Economics | Permalink

Some of you are still asking me what I think of Steve Landsburg’s argument that we should pull the plug on people who did not buy (would not have bought?) fairly priced ventilator insurance. 

If you like invective, here is what Kevin Drum thinksDaniel Davies distinguishes between willingness to pay and willingness to be paid; fair enough.  You might also wonder how much long-term insurance is available in the first place.

But my objection is more fundamental.  I do not accept that ex ante choices provide definitive information about ex post values.   Taking another context, assume you think the chance of cancer is only five percent when in fact for you it is (for genetic reasons) fifty percent.  You fail to buy insurance, but does that mean you don’t value your life much?  In this case I am willing to downgrade the economic values we might infer from market behavior; it was based on faulty information.

Now take the underinsured, now-dead woman (Tirhas Habtegiris).  She thought, either implicitly or explicitly, that her chance of needing "plug-pulling insurance" was small.  Maybe this seemed reasonable at the time.  But in reality she needed that insurance with p = 1.  She was wrong.

Does the cancer case differ from the ventilator case?  Perhaps they are not identical in their moral implications (the probability mistakes may differ in their ex ante reasonableness), but in both cases, if we are going to use economic methods, I prefer to use the valuations based on better rather than worse information.  And based on correct information, the now-dead woman had a high value for that plug not being pulled.  Look at the ex post valuation, not the ex ante valuation.  After all, we know she is (was) on the ventilator, why go back to an imaginary state of affairs where this information is missing?

For selfish people, the value of life will be, in terms of willingness to pay, their entire wealth.  In terms of willingness to be paid, the value of life will be infinite or undefined.  When the "perfect information market valuations" turn out so screwy and disparate, that is a sign the whole method has broken down.  Note also the neat trick that altruistic people, who care about bequests, will appear to have lower values of life; that is fishy too.

Mark Kleiman makes some related (but non-identical) points, and here are his lecture notes on the topic.

I don’t buy Rawls or Harsanyi, both of whom begged the question on the moral force of ex ante agreement.  I also don’t think we should value human lives by looking at the value of risk reduction, although this may provide broadly relevant information.  You’ve just got to decide how much a particular life is worth.  If you are thinking "yikes," you are right, but, forgive the pun, that is life.

Are we spending too much money keeping people alive in their final throes?  From a rules perspective, yes.  On a case-by-case basis, maybe not.  I don’t know how to reconcile "rules" and "act" perspectives, even in simpler contexts. 

In any case our decision comes down to an ethical judgment, where the money and the life meet each other, mano a mano, on an open plain.  When it comes to this lady, a terminal cancer patient who was alert at the time, the marginal costs of keeping her going just didn’t seem that high.

Addendum: If you are interested in pursuing these issues, try John Broome’s "Trying to Value a Life," Journal of Public Economics 1978, and the discussion in the 1982 M. Jones-Lee book, The Value of Life and Safety.  Or read the comments below.

EclectEcon January 13, 2006 at 7:37 am

If you don’t hold people responsible the decisions they make using poor information, that will seriously reduce the incentive to acquire better information for ex ante decisions.

Slocum January 13, 2006 at 8:25 am

What I find ironic about this case is that it is an exception to the general rule in the U.S. which is that even those terminally ill and near death are not denied expensive end-of-life care for funding reasons. And this case is going to make exceptions that much less likely in the future because the publicity for Baylor medical center has been terrible.

On the other hand, my understanding is that government-run systems are more likely to fail to provide care for reasons of cost. For example, I believe that it’s still the case (or was until recently) that many in the UK have very poor access kidney dialysis treatments under the NHS.

This ventilator case is being interpreted as evidence of the harshness of the U.S. system and yet there are good reasons to believe that a government run system would unappolgetically “just decide how much a particular life is worth” and establish rules where denial of expensive, end-of-life care to late-stage terminal patients would be routinely denied. Or, as with the NHS, the treatment might not be forbidden but unavailable to many due to lack of resources, so late-stage terminal patients might be denied access to ventilators because there weren’t enough to go around and their condition made them last in line.

There is a broad consensus that the U.S. ‘wastes’ too much money on expensive end of life care, but ending that ‘waste’ means things like not just stopping ventilator treatment for terminal patients after a month but not providing a ventilator *at all* in such cases.

Tom January 13, 2006 at 9:45 am

If the woman’s family was unwilling to pay to keep her alive, why
should complete strangers be forced to pay to keep her alive. Obviously,
there are numerous people who believed this decision was wrong and the
woman should have been kept alive on a ventilator. But of these people,
how many put their money where there mouth is and actually sent in money
to keep her on a ventilator? How many have ever sent money to keep someone on
a ventilator? People are very ethical as long as it comes at someone
elses expense or out of someone elses wallet!

DK January 13, 2006 at 11:13 am

Qudryggia, if there is perfect information, then expected value equals value, there are neither wages nor insurance, and you know both the existence of God and whether or not Alex has any pull with God.

I never liked Alex’s reply anyway, since Christianity has an explicit prohibition in the Bible on buying or selling salvation, and I presume other religions with a notion of heaven would have something similar. Of course, one could interpret that to ban Pascal’s Wager, too.

Timothy January 13, 2006 at 11:51 am

There’s a away around the St. Petersburg Paradox by imposing a diminishing marginal utility of wealth and looking at the expected utility rather than the expected value. I don’t remember the specifics, as it was an example in microecon a few years ago and my memory for such things is hazy.

Alex’s reply to Pascal’s Wager is much more difficult, but DK is right that with perfect information you know whether God exists or not and, if God exits, whether Alex actually has any pull, as well as how much Alex’s pull will influence the decision regarding damnation, and whether or not that will be enough to achieve the result you want.

I never liked Alex’s reply anyway, since Christianity has an explicit prohibition in the Bible on buying or selling salvation.

That didn’t stop the Church from doing it, but I would like to know where I can buy an indulgence these days, might come in handy.

Barkley Rosser January 13, 2006 at 12:19 pm

Tyler,

Ex ante, you were clearly going to be drummed out of the Economist’s Corps.
However, ex post, I think you will be kept in…

spencer January 13, 2006 at 12:50 pm

None of the comments seem to want to bring her age into this discussion.
She was 27 and this has two major implications that I can think of off the top of my head.
Because she was young she is quite likely to underestimate the risk of needing
the venilator. Because the risks of needing health care are age dependent — the old are more likely to need it while the young are most likely to not have insurance. But doesn’t this get to the heart of the issue of how to “pool” the risk? But the core of the health insurance issue is how to pool risk and the existing system has some major problems dealing with this.

On the other hand, because she was young the benefit from providing her the care would be much greater then if she were 87. Yet this example shows that our existing system also does a poor job of dealing with this issue — not that I am taking the position that other countries system of denying some care to the elderly is the best solution.

But don’t these complications make the issues very different then what most of the discussion focused on?

DK January 13, 2006 at 2:18 pm

Re: Tyler’s point that altruistic people value life less, I think that altruistic people value other people’s lives more, not that they value their own lives less.

Qundryggia, I like your point about S&P puts a lot. But, if I care about the “million tiny risks”, I don’t want to assume the exchange guaranteeing the puts will survive a 1929-style crash.

Timothy, technically indulgences didn’t buy salvation, only a decrease of your time in purgatory, which we can think of as a period of finite but negative utility preceding the infinite utility of heaven. I wonder if the idea of purgatory itself came about as a medieval Catholic solution to the difficulty of analyzing infinite utilities — you can’t credibly threaten infinite punishment for minor infractions.

Which brings us back to the point — death is a pretty harsh punishment for not insuring yourself against such a small risk, which may not be insurable anyway.

Tyrone Slothrop January 13, 2006 at 4:09 pm

I liked Daniel Davies’ response to Landsburg at Crooked Timber:

http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/11/a-simple-coasian-test-for-some-kinds-of-economic-bollocks/

radek January 13, 2006 at 11:58 pm

Re: “There’s a away around the St. Petersburg Paradox by imposing a diminishing marginal utility of wealth and looking at the expected utility rather than the expected value.”

To really get around it you need a bounded utility function. Log (an unbounded function that goes to infnity the most “slowly”) can’t do it for reason qundryggia mentions.

pk January 14, 2006 at 2:26 pm

Fundamental to the liberal (in the true sense) economist’s viewpoint is that the individual is best informed to make decisions regarding themselves.

Patrick January 19, 2006 at 11:29 pm

Would anyone be able to give me some background or point me in the direction to find backcround information on the Dec. 2005 China export quota bidding process? I believe the situation is that 70% of the quotas are held by existing exporters. The remaing 30% go to a bid process.

bbn November 14, 2006 at 7:16 am

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