Matt Yglesias proposes an exchange:
There’s an obvious deal to be cut here — NATO membership for the Baltics is a done deal, but we can return Russia’s "near abroad" to Russia in exchange for Russian cooperation on Iran and North Korea, or else we can have a series of standoffs across a wide Eurasian arc. Some would call this appeasement and, frankly, the shoe fits decently. It strikes me, however, as preferable to either going to war with Iran or to having Iran build a nuclear bomb.
I might add that Natasha still thinks I promised to take out the trash every evening.
Hmm I don’t think this is really the US’s deal to make. The eastern european countries are trying to get into the EU, which almost certainly means movement away from Russia. I don’t see how the US can convince the EU and aspiring countries that a nuclear armed Iran is worse than a Russian dominated eastern europe.
The eastern european countries are trying to get into the EU, which almost certainly means movement away from Russia. I don’t see how the US can convince the EU and aspiring countries that a nuclear armed Iran is worse than a Russian dominated eastern europe.
He is, I believe, referring the former Soviet republics in Asia such as the -stans and Georgia.
If they will aid our efforts against Iran and North Korea, let them keep the Ukraine and Georgia and any of the other Russian federations that they want.
Mighty big “if” there, though, hence the title of the post. (Also from the US perspective.) There’s very little reason to believe that such a deal would be stable from either perspective. Why would the US not be willing to change its mind once Iran and the DPRK were taken of; conversely, what’s to keep Putin from re-establishing control and then failing to really aid efforts on Iran and the DPRK?
I really don’t care, and I have a hard time understanding why anyone would care, what random bloggers are “proposing” that people they don’t know (and who have exceedingly little reason to listen to random bloggers) should do about issues that will only exist in the short run. It’s one thing to blog about what is going on in the world, to observe, analyze, praise, ridicule, and so on. Fine. It’s also one thing to have ideas or theories about fundamental issues that will be around for the long run, and thus one’s ideas might somehow over time filter into society, into education, into the debate, into the democratic process, and make a difference. Great. But to “propose” policies for the U.S. government to implement with regard to concrete matters over the short run seems quite absurd. Even sitting Congressmen have rather little influence on the U.S. government’s foreign policy in the short run, and everyone at the (massive) State Department is chock-full of their own ideas already (hello, that’s why they came to Washington in the first place).
So who exactly is it in government that we think reads young Mr. Yglesias’s blog, drops their glass of port, shouts, “That’s it! That’s how to deal with Putin on today’s issue! My own ideas on the matter were so dumb!” and rushes off to start doing the hard work of changing all the minds and patterns necessary to implement the Yglesias Doctrine before the whole NATO-Iran-Putin issue becomes moot? Who *could* it be? It seems like it must be no one. Please, anyone, correct me if you have evidence to the contrary, but I know of no evidence that any blog-based practical “proposal” has ever substantially shifted or could ever shift enough minds within a six- or twelve-month time span to noticeably alter short-run U.S. foreign policy.
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