Just as the Review and the political science profession in general failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the Review before
1914 conveyed little sense that a cataclysmic world war was imminent. The
journal did publish an article on the Balkans (Harris 1913), but it did
not focus on the larger power transitions taking place in Europe until
publication of a rather realist analysis of “The Causes of the Great
War” after World War I had begun (Turner 1915). In this same time
period, the Review was filled with articles putting a favorable
emphasis on international law as a means toward peace.
So what are we economists missing now? Hat tip to Dan Drezner.
How did the leading econ journals do in predicting the fall of communism?
The common lore is that “everyone” anticipated WWII (well except Chamberlain). And, after it started, it was anticipated that the US would enter and enter on the side of the Allies. How much of this was ex post rationalization or were period intellectuals also saying so (proxied by articles in APSR)?
According to Richard Pipes, the main reason for the lack of accurate analysis of [the fall of] the Soviet Union was that there was premature consensus among Sovietologists, and hence stagnation in the field. Part of this was due to early Cold War funding of the field. Ironic that the influx of capital into the field by policy-makers would make the field useless for policy.
I went to school with a guy who did his PhD in Soviet studies in the late 80′s and literally hit the job
market as the Soviet Union collapsed. He had 5 years of study and expertise that went by-bye.
Economists miss:
(1) How ordinary people translate / misunderstand / misapply economics insights and the (disastorous) effects such misunderstandings have. That is — economists sell a sharp product and expect expret users — some (most?) people apply efficiency arguments incorrectly. Its not that people can’t use the tools, its just that: (a) people stop their analysis too soon (b) are overly certain about their result.
(2) Insufficient regard for common-sense and field observation. Suburbs leave people feeling alienated, akrasia leads people to frequently make very bad choices.
(3) Efficiency and redundancy almost always cut in opposite directions — economists systematically undervalue redndancy that builds robustness.
(4) The argument that historicly we have innovated before problems (scarcity, toxicity) arise is more of a gamble than most economists admit.
The possibility of a technological singularity.
Economists also neglect what would happen if the earth is struck by a marshmellow the size of the state of Texas.
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