Immigration enforcement ideas

by on June 25, 2007 at 11:51 am in Law | Permalink

My preferred immigration plan would be to massively increase the number of visas, set a very minimal bar to meet–not a terrorist, not a criminal, not carrying a hideous contagious disease–and then auction off various tranches of visas, classed not by type but by length of stay.  Let the visas be transferrable.  Then let immigrant communities do enforcement for you, as illegal immigrants suddenly threaten to erode the price of their valuable asset: the right to stay in-country.

That is from Jane Galt

The implicit model is that once people have spent money for an asset they value that asset more than they would value their prospective income stream from living in the United States.  Jane postulates a kind of endowment effect for immigrants.  Moving away from family-based immigration also limits potential trustable allies for law-breaking. 

I suspect that auction-based proposals will result in too few legal unskilled immigrants, and also more illegal immigration of the unskilled, but I would not rule out this idea just yet.  I’m still waiting for someone to write down an impossibility theorem for a good immigration policy, noting that much of the domestic demand is for immigrant traits (e.g., cheapness and immediate readiness to work) which are strongly correlated with illegality.  That is some employers want (explicitly or implicitly) to deny some of their workers the benefits of integrating with the U.S. capital stock.  Has anyone analyzed immigration policy in terms of finding optimal price discrimination on the side of a country-sized monopsonistic buyer…?

Mark June 25, 2007 at 12:43 pm

Sounds a lot like indentured labour as per the British empire post slavery.

Dave June 25, 2007 at 2:26 pm

My mental variation of this was to allow legal immigrant waiting in line to be eligible to hire a bounty hunter to remove an illegal immigrant, and open up a “fast-track” slot for them (like FDA testing) if they paid for it. I would phase the implimentation of this, and allow existing illegals to sell their slots before the bounty hunters are allowed to market their services. Penalties for repeat illegal immegration might need to be adjusted, and I’d take fingerprints/DNA with the deportations to enforce it.

Of course such a thing would never happen.

ryan June 25, 2007 at 4:38 pm

Maybe I misunderstood, but I don’t see why her model depends on the endowment effect. If visas are transferable, then a rational agent with a visa possesses an asset that can be sold and the value of which will decrease with illegal immigration (illegal immigration being a substitute for the asset the visa-holder possesses).

As to the impossibility theorem for good immigration policy, what’s the problem with the status quo? You want high immigration, but you also want the immigrants to be cheap (which sometimes means the minimum wage can’t hold) and ready to work (correlated with illegality) and then there’s the reasonable argument against immigration which points out that access to the social welfare system means new immigrants impose costs on everyone already here. Okay, why aren’t all these problems solved by making immigration illegal and never enforcing said laws? You get lots of immigrants who are cheap and don’t touch the social welfare system, right?

Steve Sailer June 25, 2007 at 6:59 pm

Tyler notes: “that much of the domestic demand is for immigrant traits (e.g., cheapness and immediate readiness to work) which are strongly correlated with illegality.”

Cheapness is also strongly correlated with low human capital, and low human capital is strongly correlated with a lot of traits we don’t want in fellow citizens, neighbors, coworkers, and the eventual co-ancestors of our posterity. Further, American culture is such that in the bottom third or so of our society, many human capital facets, such as work ethic and honesty, tends to decline over the generations and other human capital facets, such as education, tend to plateau quickly. So we need to start with as high human capital immigrants as possible.

tommy June 25, 2007 at 11:03 pm

There is evidence that, at least in schooling levels (Smith, AER v93, no2), Latinos make important progress across generations. This is a fact often overlooked because comparisons are usually made between, say, CURRENT 2nd generation and CURRENT 1st generation, while the relevant comparison is CURRENT 2nd generation and its predecessor: 1st generation 25 YEARS AGO. Once this adjustment is made, it’s clear that pretty significant progress takes place in schooling levels across subsequent Latino generations… that is, no “plateau”

Simply not correct. There appears to be a significant plateau if fourth generation Mexican-American performance is any indication.

If there were significant progress, we would expect states with longstanding Hispanic populations, like California, to have large numbers of Hispanic contributors in more intellectual demanding fields like high tech. Instead, we find Mexicans are a non-factor in such areas.

If you want to see where decades of Hispanic integration lead, you can check out the stats for New Mexico.

aizhengw June 27, 2007 at 2:20 am
James June 27, 2007 at 7:07 am

Whatever your plan, how about we only implement it with countries that allow the same? I.e. If China has a very restrictive immigration policy, then we too shall have a restrictive one in regards to Chinese citizens. Because it’s easy to see a world in which the groups who enforce their borders permeate and inhabit the nations of those who don’t. It would be in the interest of countries with small economies and large birthrates to do this to rich open-borders democracies emphasis on democracies.

鑽石 April 2, 2008 at 8:40 pm

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