Since the 1990s the policies of the three major players (Taiwan, China, and the United States) have become unstable in many ways. The possibility of a miscalculation by any participant with respect to the two others is quite high. China thinks that Washington will not sacrifice Los Angeles for Taiwan, the United States that Beijing will not sacrifice twenty or thirty years of development for Taipei, and Taiwan that it can confront Beijing with a fait accompli and not suffer the consequences. Those are three dangerous mistakes.
That is from Therese Delpech’s fascinating Savage Century: Back to Barbarism. This book made a splash in France but has been virtually ignored in the U.S. There haven’t been many reviews but here are some endorsements.
Two of the book’s major themes are a) don’t be fooled, the barbarisms of World War II and 20th century totalitarianism are not really behind us, and b) don’t expect Asia to be stable in the 21st century. Highly recommended and yes it did remind me of John Nye.
Speaking of John, here is a Reason dialogue with John, covering his new book and also his description of GMU lunches.
The potential for a conflict between the US and China over Taiwan is very real. However, Los Angeles is in no danger in any case. China will not launch a nuclear strike against LA because of the thousands of warheads that would fall on China in retaliation. Conversely, the US will never launch a first strike against China for fear of losing LA. Mutual Assured Destruction remains alive and well in the 21st century.
Any war over China will be fought with conventional weapons. At the ragged edge of plausibility, the Chinese might launch a nuclear first strike against the American fleet. However, that isn’t likely and would result in a massive counterstrike against the Chinese armed forces massing (presumably) for an invasion of Taiwan. A very unlikely scenario at best.
As Napoleon and Hitler learned, islands are very hard to invade. Not only do troops need to get across the water, they need to be supplied. The chances of an actual conquest of Taiwan is low. Beijing’s more likely to succeed if it can starve Taiwan through submarine warfare, but that carries its own risks. Even if the US Navy doesn’t stop an invasion fleet, it is likely to escort merchant vessels. The US has fought several wars involving issues of freedom of the seas and not recognizing submarine warfare as a legitimate blockade. Would China risk a naval war that appeals to the strengths of the US and the weaknesses of China?
The more important question is whether China will risk war when the certainty of success is so low. There is a small chance of success of a quick victory, a slightly larger chance of a pyrrhic victory, and a large chance of failure. Could Beijing keep the Mandate of Heaven after a defeat in war?
But the point of the book is well taken.
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Strange that I was looking up John Nye of GMU and this post was in the top 5. Not really what I was looking for.
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