The always-keen John de Palma sent me this:
(…)policy multipliers
are likely to be disappointingly small compared with historical
estimates of their importance. Many of you will remember from Econ 101
the idea of the Keynesian multiplier, which is that the impact of
traditional macro policies is "multiplied" by boosting private
consumption by households and capital investment by firms as they
receive income from the initial round of stimulus(…) Policy
multipliers are greater than 1 to the extent the direct impact of a
policy on GDP is multiplied as households and companies increase their
spending due to the increased income flow they earn from the
debt-financed purchase of goods and services sold to meet the demand
generated by the initial round of stimulus. Historically, multipliers
on government spending are estimated to be in the range of 1.5 to 2,
while multipliers for tax cuts can be much smaller, say 0.5 to 1. But
these estimates are from periods when households could – and did – use
tax cuts as a down payment on a car or to cover the closing costs on a
mortgage refinance(…)With the credit markets impaired, tax cuts, as
well as income earned from government spending on goods and services,
will not be leveraged by the financial system to nearly the same
extent, resulting in (much) smaller multipliers(…)
It’s still not clear to me how we can differentiate the effects of tight credit and poor economic outlook. How many households and businesses would be willing to take loans in this environment even if they were available on good terms? It seems like if consumers aren’t willing to spend tax cuts on goods, they’re highly unlikely to borrow and pay interest for those same goods. Are banks hoarding these excess reserves because they won’t lend, or because nobody wants it? OK, maybe not nobody, but if someone is sensible enough to be a good credit risk, they might also be sensible enough not to take on credit in an uncertain economic environment. Even with good banks, would we still have the contraction problems?
Not to mention the crowding out of investment which makes the 1.5-2.0 pretty suspect to begin with.
It is less that credit markets are impaired than the economy is overleveraged. Crowding out? In some alternate universe. Utterly preposterous in this one.
I would probably look at Japan during the lost decade-fiscal stimulus and zombie banks/firms to get credit constrained multipliers. What were the fiscal multipliers then?
You might also look at fiscal multipliers during the 91 recession–another time I recall hearing ‘credit crunch.’ Perhaps you want to estimate them using regional data, since different regions had different credit crunches, I think.
I don’t know the facts–what are they?
我們éžå¸¸æ“…長於花蓮的層次串è¯èˆ‡å±‹ä¸»å€‹äººç¨ç‰¹çš„人文氣質
ï¼Œç‚ºæ‚¨å‰µé€ èˆ’é©ã€å“味ã€è³ªæ„Ÿçš„新生活空間。 在室內è¨è¨ˆæ¥ç•Œï¼ŒèŠ±è“®æ°‘宿我們優質的å£ç¢‘來自於一æµçš„è¨è¨ˆã€æ–½å·¥åœ˜éšŠï¼Œé‚„有å多年來兢兢æ¥æ¥ç´¯ç©å‡ºä¾†çš„ä¿¡è½åŠæœå‹™å“質花蓮，我們的è¨è¨ˆã€æ–½å·¥åœ˜éšŠèŠ±è“®æ°‘宿ä¸è«–在ä½å®…室內è¨è¨ˆåŠå•†æ¥ç©ºé–“è¨è¨ˆï¼Œçš†æ“有多年è±å¯Œçš„經驗åŠè¦–野。 充滿高度創æ„çš„è¨è¨ˆï¼ŒåŠé«˜è³ªæ„Ÿçš„施工å“è³ªï¼Œæ˜¯æˆ‘å€‘ä¸€è²«çš„å …æŒã€‚
æˆ‘å€‘å …ä¿¡è¨è¨ˆå§‹çµ‚來自於人性，唯有將è¨è¨ˆèˆ‡ç”Ÿæ´»å®Œç¾ŽçµåˆèŠ±è“®æ°‘宿，æ‰èƒ½å‰µé€ 出兼具美å¸ã€ç©ºé–“ã€è³ªæ„Ÿã€å¯¦ç”¨ã€å¿ƒéˆã€äº«å—的新生活價值。
您的託付，是我們責任的開始花蓮旅éŠï¼Œæ‚¨çš„肯定是我們ä¸æ–·å‰é€²çš„動力花蓮民宿。
Comments on this entry are closed.