Assorted links

by on June 25, 2012 at 7:03 am in Uncategorized | Permalink

1 Ted Craig June 25, 2012 at 8:44 am

2. I believe the measure of a bear’s intelligence is if he wears a hat and a tie.

2 Dan June 25, 2012 at 9:24 am

Interesting. Why lump the rant in defense of political science and the cities selling naming rights together?

Perhaps if I can no longer get NSF funding I’ll start selling naming rights for my papers/

3 Nick June 25, 2012 at 10:31 am

An anonymous Yosemite ranger, quoted on the problem of designing bear-proof trash containers: “There is considerable overlap between the intelligence of the smartest bears and the dumbest tourists.”

4 Turing Test June 25, 2012 at 10:47 am

Quantitative political science, like “macro-economics”, is a big joke — careerism over true knowledge or insight

5 Becky Hargrove June 25, 2012 at 11:23 am

Even a black bear has no qualms about letting itself into a house and helping itself to the contents of a kitchen, especially if there is only one person living on a rural property.

6 Adrian Ratnapala June 25, 2012 at 1:31 pm

Why do the Swedish measure their strawberries in litres?

7 bnoogiepop June 25, 2012 at 3:26 pm

Why has nobody commented that it’s Freeman Dyson (of “Dyson Sphere” fame) that’s a coauthor on the prisoner’s dilemma paper?

8 Roy June 25, 2012 at 3:27 pm

When I was a kid in Minnesota, strawberries were sold by the quart. Volume measures such as the bushel are pretty common in agriculture. How are strawberries sold where you are?

9 dearieme June 25, 2012 at 5:15 pm

By the punnet.

10 Daniel Thune June 25, 2012 at 4:37 pm

Every few years someone makes the claim, using some narrow measure of intelligence such as “numerosity” or “GPSA”, that bears may be smarter than we think, yet these researchers seem to ignore the larger spectrum of bear behavior which has been addressed over and over elsewhere, namely that bears rarely, if ever, apply any of these so-called “abilities” in a natural setting. Bears, of course, are not stupid, but they are about as dumb as you think.

11 Jonas June 25, 2012 at 4:50 pm

I think #4 is extremely interesting, and want to hear Tyler’s thoughts on it.

12 Andy June 26, 2012 at 12:10 am

Anywhere I can get an ungated copy of #4?

13 Benjamin Byron June 26, 2012 at 4:31 am

It appears Jacqueline Stevens has made the very important discovery that political science–indeed any science concentration–is a probabilistic endeavor, often initiated for less than ideal reasons (that’s where the funding is, &etc), whose value is based more on its deliberative qualities within the particular area of study rather than the accuracy of its (tacit) predictions or descriptions of reality. I believe Jim Manzi’s treats with this topic in a much more constructive way in his excellent book “Uncontrolled.” It would be one thing if Ms. Stevens was articulating an argument concerning the lack of epistemic modesty in political science, particularly in the quantitative analyses. However, this is not the source of her discomfort. Further, Saideman notes that there are very few political scientists that are in the prediction business.

14 Tracy W June 26, 2012 at 5:26 am

Can anyone figure out from the article what the winning prisoner’s dilemma strategy actually is?

15 TallDave June 26, 2012 at 11:37 am

2. Well, they have devised some very clever means of obtaining YouTube hits.

16 Right Wing-nut June 26, 2012 at 2:51 pm

I’ve not seen the paper, but the description seems clear enough: Let A and B be players, with a for defect & A for cooperate & etc. Then there are four possible outcomes, ab, aB, Ab, and AB. The payout is symmetric, and the payout for A in AB is less than the payout for aB, with the payout for ab usually the worst of all. If we normalize the payouts from 0-1, as B, we can constrain A’s payout from ab to Ab if we wish to punish, and from aB to AB if we wish to reward. If we want to force the average payout to some range, we simply defect if A has accumulated “to much” and cooperate if too little. It is in this sense that B determines A’s payout.

This methodology works so long as the cost of implementing any given strategy is fixed. If more complicated strategies are more expensive, then there is no stable strategy. (Tit-for-tat costs more to implement than always cooperate. Always cooperate loses to random defectors. Random defectors lose to Tit-for-tat.)

It seems to me that the indirect game, where there is some probability (say 10%) that the player’s play is NOT what they intend, would promote a sophisticated player. It seems to me that the sophisticated player goes in expecting to be cheated, and is pre-prepared to handle that case.

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