From Emma Jacobs at The FT:
That women earn less money than men is well known. But research has revealed that even when women start their own not-for-profit “social enterprises” they pay themselves less than their male peers.
The study, comprising 159 social entrepreneurs in the UK, showed an adjusted pay gap between the sexes of about 23 per cent. That is similar to the global difference in earnings between men and women. The International Labour Organisation estimates that to be about 23 per cent – meaning that, for every £1 men earn, women earn 77p.
…The new research, by academics at London Business School, Aston University and the University of Antwerp, mirrors previous findings on the salaries earned by male and female founders of for-profit companies. A report on Goldman Sachs’ 10,000 Small Businesses programme, noted that female participants, on average, paid themselves 80 per cent of the salary of male participants.
Saul Estrin, visiting professor of strategy and entrepreneurship, London Business School, and co-author of the latest report, points out that the differences cannot be explained by discrimination since these chief executives set their own pay.
He looked at the entrepreneurs’ job satisfaction and found female social entrepreneurs to be more satisfied with their role than their male counterparts.
One hypothesis suggested in the article is that the female entrepreneurs prioritize autonomy over higher pay and end up happier in these jobs, relative to their alternatives, than do the male entrepreneurs.
According to David Schneider and Adam Reich it does, their paper is called Marrying Ain’t Hard When You Got A Union Card? Labor Union Membership and First Marriage. The abstract is this:
Over the past five decades, marriage has changed dramatically, as young people began marrying later or never getting married at all. Scholars have shown how this decline is less a result of changing cultural definitions of marriage, and more a result of men’s changing access to social and economic prerequisites for marriage. Specifically, men’s current economic standing and men’s future economic security have been shown to affect their marriageability. Traditionally, labor unions provided economic standing and security to male workers. Yet during the same period that marriage has declined among young people, membership in labor unions has declined precipitously, particularly for men. In this article, we examine the relationship between union membership and first marriage and discuss the possible mechanisms by which union membership might lead to first marriage. We draw on longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-79 to estimate discrete time event-history models of first marriage entry and find that, controlling for many factors, union membership is positively and significantly associated with marriage. We show then that this relationship is largely explained by the increased income, regularity and stability of employment, and fringe benefits that come with union membership.
That is via the excellent Kevin Lewis, who cites some other interesting papers at the link.
Philip Bump reports:
Note the big swing in the Asian voting bloc, too. In 2012, strong support for the president among Asian-American voters was a surprise. Asian voters preferred the president by 47 points. In 2014, the (low turnout) group split about evenly. It was a 46-point swing.
The full account is here, via Megan McArdle.
That is the conclusion from Alex Verstak et.al., here are some sentences to ponder:
…the impact of older articles has grown substantially over 1990-2013. In 2013, 36% of citations were to articles that are at least 10 years old; this fraction has grown 28% since 1990. The fraction of older citations increased over 1990-2013 for 7 out of 9 broad areas and 231 out of 261 subject categories. Second, the increase over the second half (2002-2013) was double the increase in the first half (1990-2001).
The full abstract and article is here. For the pointer I thank Dan Getz.
Daniel Schneider, Kristen Harknett, and Sara McLanahan have been working on this topic. The result is not surprising, but nonetheless worthy of note:
In the United States, the Great Recession has been marked by severe negative shocks to market conditions. In this study, we combine longitudinal data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study with Bureau of Labor Statistics data on local area unemployment rates to examine the relationship between adverse labor market conditions and intimate partner violence between 1999 and 2010. We find that rapidly worsening labor market conditions are associated with the prevalence of violent controlling behavior in marriage. These effects are most pronounced among whites and those with at least some secondary education. [emphasis added] Worsening economic conditions significantly increase the risk that white mothers and more educated mothers will be in violent/controlling marriages rather than high quality marital unions.
The working paper is here (pdf).
There is a new NBER paper by Patrick L. Baude, Marcus Casey, Eric A. Hanushek, and Steven G. Rivkin, the abstract is no surprise but it is nice to see common sense intuition confirmed:
Studies of the charter school sector typically focus on head-to-head comparisons of charter and traditional schools at a point in time, but the expansion of parental choice and relaxation of constraints on school operations is unlikely to raise school quality overnight. Rather, the success of the reform depends in large part on whether parental choices induce improvements in the charter sector. We study quality changes among Texas charter schools between 2001 and 2011. Our results suggest that the charter sector was initially characterized by schools whose quality was highly variable and, on average, less effective than traditional public schools. However, exits from the sector, improvement of existing charter schools, and positive selection of charter management organizations that open additional schools raised average charter school effectiveness over time relative to traditional public schools. Moreover, the evidence is consistent with the belief that a reduction in student turnover as the sector matures, expansion of the share of charters that adhere to a No Excuses philosophy, and increasingly positive student selection at the times of both entry and reenrollment all contribute to the improvement of the charter sector.
There are ungated copies here.
A new paper (pdf) by Benjamin A. Brooks, Karla Hoff, Priyanka Pandey runs at least one set of tests suggesting the answer is yes:
In an experiment in India, high-caste and low-caste men repeatedly played the Stag Hunt coordination game. This game has two equilibria, only one of which is efficient. Compared to low-caste men, high-caste men were significantly less likely to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, and they were also 29 percentage points less likely to keep trying for efficient coordination after getting the “loser’s payoff”—the payoff to a player who attempts efficient coordination when his partner does not. We explain both findings in a model of learning where high-caste, but not low-caste men, see the loser’s payoff as an insult rather than an accident. These findings provide evidence that cultural construals can impede efficient coordination, which is a key component of economic development.
I find the distinction here between “low payoffs as insult” and “low payoffs as accident” to be especially interesting and in the broader literature underexplored.
For all the chatter about that recent video where the woman walks through New York City and is repeatedly harassed, I thought it worth mentioning there is a systematic study of this question going on at MIT economics (and elsewhere), conducted in part by job market candidate Sara Hernández, with numerous co-authors. The paper isn’t ready yet, but here is the abstract:
This study seeks to document the frequency of street harassment and preventive measures women take to avoid it. It explores the association between experiences of street harassment and perceptions of social cohesion among women currently presenting for health care at public health clinics. The study was conducted in Mexico City, the most populous city in North America, which has a high documented prevalence of gender-based violence against women, ranging from 20-30% in a woman’s lifetime. Despite the pervasiveness of gender-based violence in the city, little is known about experiences related to street harassment. Data were drawn from a baseline survey among women currently participating in a randomized controlled trial in Mexico City (N=952). Current findings underscore the needs for programs and policies to promote the safety and well being of women and addressing community and structural-level forms of gender discrimination and violence.
I believe this issue will continue to receive more attention in the future. The “flexibility” of the behavior of men — depending on social expectations for one thing — remains an underexplored topic in economics.
That has been the received wisdom, but it is now challenged by a new paper (pdf) by Christina and David Romer:
This paper revisits the aftermath of financial crises in advanced countries in the decades before the Great Recession. We construct a new series on financial distress in 24 OECD countries for the period 1967-2007. The series is based on narrative assessments of the health of countries’ financial systems that were made in real time; and it classifies financial distress on a relatively fine scale, rather than treating it as a 0-1 variable. We find little support for the conventional wisdom that the output declines following financial crises are uniformly large and long-lasting. Rather, the declines are highly variable, on average only moderate, and often temporary. One important driver of the variation in outcomes across crises appears to be the severity and persistence of the financial distress itself when distress is particularly extreme or continues for an extended period, the aftermath of a crisis is worse.
There is Justin Lahart coverage here, including a contrast with Reinhart and Rogoff.
I remember this question being debated extensively circa 2009-2011, and those who said there was a (limited) role for mismatch unemployment were mocked pretty mercilessly. Well, Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante have a piece in the new American Economic Review entitled “Mismatch Unemployment.” (You can find various versions here.) It’s pretty thorough and state of the art. Their conclusion:? “…mismatch, across industries and three-digit occupations, explains at most one-third of the total observed increase in the unemployment rate.” The people thrown out of work could not be matched as well as the unemployed workers of the past.
Much of the matching problem was for skilled workers, college graduates, and in the Western part of the country. Geographical mismatch unemployment did not appear to be significant. Now, “at most one-third” is not the main problem, but it is not small beans either. That’s a lot of people out of work because of matching problems.
Again, the Great Recession arose from a confluence of supply and demand problems.
There is a new paper (pdf) by Nicola Gennaioli and Hans-Joachim Voth, forthcoming in The Review of Economic Studies:
Powerful, centralized states controlling a large share of national income only begin to appear in Europe after 1500. We build a model that explains their emergence in response to the increasing importance of money for military success. When fiscal resources are not crucial for winning wars, the threat of external conflict stifles state building. As finance becomes critical, internally cohesive states invest in state capacity while divided states rationally drop out of the competition, causing divergence. We emphasize the role of the “Military Revolution”, a sequence of technological innovations that transformed armed conflict. Using data from 374 battles, we investigate empirically both the importance of money for military success and patterns of state building in early modern Europe. The evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model.
The pointer is from Mark Koyama.
It is by Eva Vivalt and is called “How Much Can We Generalize from Impact Evaluations?” (pdf). The abstract is here:
Impact evaluations aim to predict the future, but they are rooted in particular contexts and results may not generalize across settings. I founded an organization to systematically collect and synthesize impact evaluations results on a wide variety of interventions in development. These data allow me to answer this and other questions across a wide variety of interventions. I examine whether results predict each other and whether variance in results can be explained by program characteristics, such as who is implementing them, where they are being implemented, the scale of the program, and what methods are used. I find that when regressing an estimate on the hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis result formed from all other studies on the same intervention-outcome combination, the result is significant with a coefficient of 0.6-0.7, though the R-squared is very low. The program implementer is the main source of heterogeneity in results, with government-implemented programs faring worse than and being poorly predicted by the smaller studies typically implemented by academic/NGO research teams, even controlling for sample size. I then turn to examine specification searching and publication bias, issues which could affect generalizability and are also important for research credibility. I demonstrate that these biases are quite small; nevertheless, to address them, I discuss a mathematical correction that could be applied before showing that randomized control trials (RCTs) are less prone to this type of bias and exploiting them as a robustness check.
Eva is on the job market from Berkeley this year, her home page is here. Here is her paper “Peacekeepers Help, Governments Hinder” (pdf). Here is her extended bio.
Here is a new paper by Aaron A. Duke and Laurent Bègue:
The hypothetical moral dilemma known as the trolley problem has become a methodological cornerstone in the psychological study of moral reasoning and yet, there remains considerable debate as to the meaning of utilitarian responding in these scenarios. It is unclear whether utilitarian responding results primarily from increased deliberative reasoning capacity or from decreased aversion to harming others. In order to clarify this question, we conducted two field studies to examine the effects of alcohol intoxication on utilitarian responding. Alcohol holds promise in clarifying the above debate because it impairs both social cognition (i.e., empathy) and higher-order executive functioning. Hence, the direction of the association between alcohol and utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian responding should inform the relative importance of both deliberative and social processing systems in influencing utilitarian preference. In two field studies with a combined sample of 103 men and women recruited at two bars in Grenoble, France, participants were presented with a moral dilemma assessing their willingness to sacrifice one life to save five others. Participants’ blood alcohol concentrations were found to positively correlate with utilitarian preferences [emphasis added] (r = .31, p < .001) suggesting a stronger role for impaired social cognition than intact deliberative reasoning in predicting utilitarian responses in the trolley dilemma. Implications for Greene’s dual-process model of moral reasoning are discussed.
The gated version is here. The original pointer is from SteveStuartWilliams.
I’ve long wanted to read a paper on this topic and I just ran across a 2011 essay in the American Sociological Review, by Delhey, Newton, and Welzel. Most papers on trust work with general questionnaire responses, but those queries often conflate whether you trust the people you know, or the people who surround you, with whether you trust your government and other larger social institutions. You can imagine for instance that a country could have strong interpersonal trust at the micro level but also lots of cynicism about its establishment power structures.
The innovation of this paper is to compare micro trust measures with macro trust measures and see where there are big differences. Not surprisingly, the most trusting coutries, such as Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland, score high on both the micro and macro measures of trust.
The countries where asking the macro question makes the biggest difference in overall trust rank are South Korea (falls 18 places when macro considerations are considered explicitly), Thailand (falls 17 places), and China and Romania. Argentina, Poland, and Slovenia gain the most in their relative trust rankings when the radius of trust is brought into play. In general, when we account explicitly for the macro governance dimension, Asian countries decline in the trust rankings and Latin countries go up in the trust rankings by some modest amount.
In “A More Perfect Union,” Mr. DuBois downloaded 19 million profiles from 21 online dating sites. He then wrote software to sort them by ZIP code, and determine the words most frequently used in each location. In the resulting maps, the top-ranked words replace city names. New York is “Now.” Atlanta is “God.”
That is from Steve Lohr at The New York Times.