Here is from MIT Technology Review, surveying research on chess blunders and cognition by Ashton Anderson at Microsoft Research in New York City, Jon Kleinberg of Cornell, and Sendhil Mullainathan:
…Anderson and co have found evidence of an entirely counterintuitive phenomenon in which skill levels play the opposite role, so that skillful players are more likely to make an error than their lower-ranked counterparts. The team call these “skill anomalous positions.”
That’s an extraordinary discovery which will need some teasing apart in future work. “The existence of skill-anomalous positions is surprising, since there is a no a priori reason to believe that chess as a domain should contain common situations in which stronger players make more errors than weaker players,” say Anderson and co. Just why this happens isn’t clear.
I don’t, by the way, find the concept of skill anomalous positions to be so surprising. Better chess players have more “chunking” and more intuitions. Usually that knowledge adds value, but in a variety of counterintuitive positions it can lead players down the wrong paths. For instance a beginner probably does not know that on average a Queen and Knight working together are more effective than a Queen and Bishop, yet this is not always true and the less tutored intuition will sometimes prove correct. Similarly, the better player may think that an endgame of Bishops of opposite color is more likely to be drawn, and often that is true. Yet in other situations those ill-matched Bishops can yield an attacking advantage to the player with the better command of space, and so on.
I believe there are analogous concepts for economics and also philosophy, probably for other disciplines too. For instance in economics I wonder if a person with less knowledge of open economy macroeconomics might sometimes end up making better forecasts. Many anti-elitist theories of politics imply these phenomena can be true in a broad range of situations, Brexit for instance according to some.