Political Science

Mexico is still growing, and quite robustly, even after the drug lords have given it their best shot.  The currency is up over nine percent this year.

If Mexico keeps on getting richer, and the drug lords keep on killing each other, eventually Mexico will win.  Think rates of return, or think of government revenue as rising over time.  I’m not saying the drug problem will ever disappear there.

Murder rates have stabilized or fallen in some key northern cities, including Juarez.  Sending in the army seems to yield returns, in light of scared and corrupt local police forces.

Both the American recovery and the slowdown in China, combined with higher Chinese wages, will help Mexico and thus help the government against the drug gangs.

I fully admit this is speculation on my part, but it is my view.

I see so many tweets and posts on this question.  None of you know, I suspect.  A few questions:

1. It is widely recognized that the Bank’s board “interferes” in WB activities too much, often meeting two times a week and also pushing through contracts which should be stopped or reexamined.  Who can best stand up to that board when necessary?  Can that be done at all, while keeping the contract-addicted major economic powers still interested in the Bank?

2. The WB is financially fairly dependent on China, which for whatever reason prefers to borrow from the Bank rather than use its reserves to finance projects.  What should a president do if China starts seeing itself as “graduating” from this relationship?  Or what if China falls apart economically?  Will the World Bank end up like the UN, losing some of its talent and being hat in hand, asking for funds?

3. Let’s say the BRICS continue with their plan to set up a separate lending facility, as endorsed recently by Zoellick.  How should a president keep the BRICS interested in the World Bank?  Should the new lending facility be fought, co-opted, subsidized, or whatever?  Competition or collusion?

4. The U.S. President tries to pressure the WB to create projects in Afghanistan or Iraq which the Bank doesn’t really want to do.  Stand up to the President, fold, or meet him halfway?  How should project demands involving the West Bank be finessed?

Maybe, maybe, maybe — if you knew the major candidates well — you could have some sense who would perform better at those tasks.  And at about fifty others.  Maybe.  Maybe not.

It is hard to predict how any particular candidate would do.  We do know who is likely to get the job.  We don’t know what it is like to have a non-American facing those kinds of problems.

Addendum: Chris Blattman comments.

The greater the number of protected service sector jobs in an economy, the more likely those citizens will oppose inflation.  Inflation brings the potential to lower real wages, possibly for good.  How many insiders, if they had to renegotiate their current deals, would do just as well?

Get the picture?

This is a neglected cost of protected service sector jobs, namely that the economy’s central bank will face strong political pressures not to inflate even when a looser monetary policy would be welfare-improving.

Western Europe most of all.  If you see that the young people in an economy aren’t doing nearly as well as the privileged insiders, you should suspect that the privileged insiders fear renegotiation and thus fear inflation.

Inflation is easier to sustain in rapidly growing economies where people are moving up various ladders quickly.

Perhaps we have lost the ability and the political economy to support inflation when needed.

A future without ACA?

by on March 30, 2012 at 6:24 am in Medicine, Political Science | Permalink

As predicted by Ezra Klein:

I think that path would look something like this: With health-care reform either repealed or overturned, both Democrats and Republicans shy away from proposing any big changes to the health-care system for the next decade or so. But with continued increases in the cost of health insurance and a steady erosion in employer-based coverage, Democrats begin dipping their toes in the water with a strategy based around incremental expansions of Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. They move these policies through budget reconciliation, where they can be passed with 51 votes in the Senate, and, over time, this leads to more and more Americans being covered through public insurance. Eventually, we end up with something close to a single-payer system, as a majority of Americans — and particularly a majority of Americans who have significant health risks — are covered by the government.

One question is whether having both Medicaid and Medicare (and other programs) function as a “single payer” system, but that is arguably semantics.  In any case the American system is likely to remain fragmented.  I am also not sure if this process would take a decade, as sometimes a single election cycle can feel like an eternity.  In any case, I see that as likely a superior outcome to the current ACA track.  I have never thought that a mandate is workable in a fragmented system with employer-based care and high health care costs and high income inequality.

I also would not be surprised to see Romney, if elected, and if ACA is struck down, resurrect some version of the McCain health care plan with tax credits, maybe some more federalism, and less of a Medicaid extension than was in ACA.  I don’t know if that would pass but I suppose I think not.  I also don’t see much hope for a much-needed “supply-side” competitiveness plan.

The authors are Angel Cabrera and Gregory Unruh, and the subtitle is How to Think, Act, and Lead in a Transformed World.  Cabrera is the incoming president of GMU, as of this summer, so of course I am keen to read this book, which arrived in my pile today.

You can follow Cabrera on Twitter here, among other topics he covers leadership, globalization, and also the Spanish economy.

“Foreign” Aid

by on March 24, 2012 at 10:51 am in Economics, Political Science | Permalink

Astute piece in the NYTimes by Steven Lee Myers on military aid to Egypt Florida.

An intense debate within the Obama administration over resuming military assistance to Egypt, which in the end was approved Friday by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, turned in part on a question that had nothing to do with democratic progress in Egypt but rather with American jobs at home.

…“In large part, there are U.S. jobs that are reliant on the U.S.-Egypt strong military-to-military relationship,” a senior State Department official said, speaking on condition of anonymity under rules set by the department.

…“Lockheed Martin values the relationship established between our company and the Egyptian customer since the first F-16s were delivered in the early 1980s,” said Laura F. Siebert, a spokeswoman for the company, which is based in Fort Worth.

…The M1A1 components are built in factories in Alabama, Florida, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania, several of them battleground states in an election that has largely focused on jobs. Because the United States Army plans to stop buying new tanks by 2014, continued production relies on foreign contracts, often paid for by American taxpayers as military assistance.

A new BPEA paper by Eric Chaney (pdf) suggests maybe not:

Will the Arab Spring lead to long-lasting democratic change? To explore this question I examine the determinants of the Arab world’s democratic defi…cit in 2010. I …find that the percent of a country’s landmass that was conquered by Arab armies following the death of the prophet Muhammad statistically accounts for this defi…cit. Using history as a guide, I hypothesize that this pattern reflects the long-run influence of control structures developed under Islamic empires in the pre-modern era and …and that the available evidence is consistent with this interpretation. I also investigate the determinants of the recent uprisings. When taken in unison, the results cast doubt on claims that the Arab-Israeli conflict or Arab/Muslim culture are systematic obstacles to democratic change in the region and point instead to the legacy of the region’s historical institutional framework.

Here is a good sentence:

…the fact that the Arab world’s democratic defi…cit is shared by 10 non-Arab countries that were conquered by Arab armies casts doubt on the importance of the role of Arab culture in perpetuating the democratic defi…cit.

And this:

Once one accounts for the 28 countries conquered by Arab armies, the evolution of democracy in the remaining 15
Muslim-majority countries since 1960 largely mirrors that of the rest of the developing world.

Ezra Klein offers some points of clarification:

Perhaps the simplest way to understand what’s going on in Paul Ryan’s budget, and whether it’s plausible, is to look at page 13 of the Congressional Budget Office’s summary of the Ryan plan (pdf). That’s where the CBO lists Ryan’s assumptions about how future budgets would differ under his proposal and under an alternative, high-deficit scenario. That lets us see where, exactly, Ryan’s presumed savings are. And they’re not, for the most part, in Medicare.

In 2030, spending on Medicare is .75 percent of GDP lower than in the alternative fiscal scenario. In fact, Ryan and the Obama administration have proposed the same rate of growth for Medicare: GDP + 0.5 percent.

It’s Medicaid and other health spending, which includes the Affordable Care Act, where Ryan really brings down the hammer: That category falls by 1.25 percent of GDP. So Ryan’s cuts to health care for the poor are almost twice the size of his cuts to health care for the old.

And then there’s the “everything else” category, which includes defense spending, infrastructure, education and training, farm subsidies, income supports, veteran’s benefits, retraining, basic research, the federal workforce and much, much more. And this category of spending falls by 2.5 percent of GDP.

Putting normative issues aside, I am predicting that something like this is what will happen, and it won’t require major Republican victories.  In short, those are the most vulnerable interest groups.

Not long ago Paul Krugman wrote:

To a first approximation, in other words, the effect of current fiscal policy — whether stimulus or austerity — an [on?] the actions of future governments is zero.

He makes further points at the link, although there is not a citation to the literature.  I thought we should look at the evidence a little more closely.  Some of it contradicts Krugman as read literally, though it is not all bad news for his larger point.

Here is an abstract from Brian Goff:

In spite of Peacock and Wiseman’s 1961 NBER study demonstrating the “displacement effect”, simplistic theoretical and empirical distinctions between temporary and permanent spending are common. In this paper, impulse response functions from ARMA models as well as Cochrane’s non-parametric method support Peacock and Wiseman’s conclusion by showing 1) government spending in the aggregate displays strong persistence to temporary shocks, 2) simple decomposition methods intended to yield a “temporary” spending series have a weak statistical foundation, and 3) persistence in spending has increased during this century. Also, as a basic “fact” of government spending behavior, the displacement effect lends support to interest group and bureaucracy models of government spending growth.

There is persistence to spending, although this study does not create a category for stimulus spending per se, however that concept might be defined.  The work of Robert Higgs also provides a clear look at ratchet effects on government spending, control, and regulation, although Higgs focuses on war rather than spending.  State governments also seem to exhibit a ratchet effect, whereby good times bring about permanently higher budgetary demands, if only through endowment effects, lock-in, and status quo bias.

That said, the federal debt/gdp ratio seems to show mean reversion, as does the measure of primary surplus.  That would mean that fiscally troubled situations are followed by improvements, though not necessarily from spending decreases.  In fact there has been  considerable reliance on a “growth dividend.”  And here is Henning Bohn from the QJE:

How do governments react to the accumulation of debt? Do they take corrective measures, or do they let the debt grow? Whereas standard time series tests cannot reject a unit root in the U. S. debt-GDP ratio, this paper provides evidence of corrective action: the U. S. primary surplus is an increasing function of the debt-GDP ratio. The debt-GDP ratio displays mean-reversion if one controls for war-time spending and for cyclical fluctuations. The positive response of the primary surplus to changes in debt also shows that U. S. fiscal policy is satisfying an intertemporal budget constraint.

In other words, we make up for first-temporary-then-permanent spending boosts by a mix of growth and higher taxes.  Krugman might well be happy with that scenario, but the data do show intertemporal interdependence for budgetary decisions, with a mix of persistence on one variable (spending) and mean-reversion on another (debt-gdp ratio).  And if you think a lot of government spending is inefficient, you should still be troubled by apparently “temporary” spending bursts.

As with much of macroeconomics, I would apply a good dose of agnosticism to these results (noting that agnosticism is not the same as assuming zero effect), but still the correlations are consistent with my intuitions more generally.

Pop Bonds

by on March 15, 2012 at 7:34 am in Data Source, Economics, Law, Political Science | Permalink

Pay on Performance Bonds incentivize private-sector creativity in the performance of public goals. One of the first Pop bonds (also called social improvement or social impact bonds, SIBs) was pioneered by the British government and the UK group Social Finance. The UK Pop bond is designed to reduce prisoner re-conviction rates. Social Finance raised about $8 million from investors to fund a variety of programs for released prisoners, helping them to find work, stay off alcohol and drugs, reintegrate with society and so forth. The programs are managed by a group of non-profits. The UK government has agreed to pay the investors a return but only if reconviction rates are 7.5% less than those of a control group. If reconviction rates fall below the target level, the investors will earn a good rate of return, 7.5-13%, depending on how far rates fall below the control, but they could also lose everything if rates do not fall. The Pop bond issued in 2010 and appears to be going well although no (potential) bond payments are scheduled until 2014.

A Pop bond puts little risk on governments, who pay nothing if the program does not work but who save money if the program does work. With less at risk government should be willing to experiment more and try new approaches to problems. By contracting out, the government also eliminates a public bureaucracy resistant to change. Most importantly, a Pop bond encourages creativity and innovation in social programs. Investors in a Pop bond have an incentive to monitor the groups implementing the programs and to ensure that they choose the very best, most cost-effective programs. The better the program works, the more the investors earn. If Pop bonds expand it may even pay investors to undertake their own experiments to see how best to maximize their returns.

For Pop bonds to work it is critical that outcomes be measured and marked to an appropriate, randomized, control group. If not carefully monitored, the private sector will also excel at innovative and creative gaming at the public expense (see the comments for some suggestions).

More Pop bonds are being planned in the UK and the idea is also catching on in the United States. The Department of Justice and the Department of Labor both have pilot programs in the works and Massachusetts has issued a request for proposals. By the way, Pop bonds are said to be a new idea but the U.S. bounty hunter and bail bond system which works very well is a clear precursor as is the system of privateering.

Pop bonds have the potential to produce public goods with private innovation; they are an idea worth watching.

Warn people about two things

by on March 14, 2012 at 9:25 am in Law, Political Science | Permalink

One problem with disclosure regulation is that people grow accustomed to the warnings and caveats and their eyes glaze over.  They stop paying attention.

So let’s say you are the Über-regulator.  You get to warn people about two things.  Once.

Of course they may not listen to you at all, but let’s assume you have enough credibility from your political post to be given half an hour on network TV and subsequent extensive coverage and commentary on blogs and Twitter.  That said, especially useful warnings, such as “You’re not as smart as you think” are perhaps especially likely to be ignored.  “Honor They Superior!” is perhaps also a non-starter, though you may try it if you wish.

Which two things do you pick for your warning?

“Driving is dangerous”

“Fight nuclear proliferation.”

“Don’t let your kid near a bucket.”

“Politics isn’t about policy.”

“Beware the Ides of March!”

“Some people out there suck!”

The correct answer is not obvious.  And what does this imply about regulation more generally?

I thank Bryan Caplan for a useful conversation on this topic.

Sarkozy struck a strident new tone in a Sunday rally.

He threatened to pull France out of the Schengen open borders agreement and demanded the European Union adopt measures to fight cheap imports, warning that France might otherwise pass a unilateral “Buy French” law.

“I want a Europe that protects its citizens. I no longer want this savage competition,” he declared to a cheering crowd. “I have lost none of my will to act, my will to make things change, my belief in the genius of France.”

The story is here.

…insurgent commanders say most of their weapons come from the very army they’re fighting, either seized or purchased in a thriving illicit trade. Intermediaries such as a merchant known as Abu Hussein arrange arms deals between the two sides.

Abu Hussein described how the rebels will shoot a few times at a government checkpoint, giving soldiers the cover to fire off their weapons. If the troops expend 200 bullets, Abu Hussein said, they may tell their superiors that 400 bullets were fired. The remaining 200 bullets will be sold to the rebels, typically for 150 Syrian pounds (about $2.50) per bullet.

The full story is here, and I thank Daniel Lippman for the pointer.

From Alexis Madrigal, this was news to me:

In thinking about the recent battles over NASA’s budget, it seems like the problem is simply citizen support. People don’t care that much about space, so space doesn’t get funded. Back in the Apollo days, people loved the space program! Except, as this Space Policy paper pointed out, they didn’t. A majority of Americans opposed the government funding human trips to the moon both before (July 1967) and after (April 1970) Neil Armstrong took a giant leap for mankind. It was only in the months surrounding Apollo 11 that support for funding the program ever reached above 50 percent.

Remember last week when Hollande and the Socialists proposed a top marginal rate of 75% and enjoyed a boost in the polls?  Suddenly the idea is meeting with greater public resistance:

Even though the vast majority of earners in France wouldn’t be liable, Hollande’s tax has been a headline-grabber in the presidential campaign, partly because football is proving to be among the most vocal of its critics. Only income above 1 million euros ($1.31 million) would face the top whack of 75 percent. The first million earned would be taxed at lower rates. Just 3,000 of the highest-earning taxpayers in France are likely to be affected.

From French league president Frederic Thiriez down, the refrain is often the same: top players will flee to countries with lower taxes, leaving France — the 1998 World Cup champion — with second-rate football. Thiriez estimates 120-150 players — about one-quarter of those in France’s top division — earn enough to make them liable for Hollande’s tax. In Italy, Germany, England and Spain, which have Europe’s strongest leagues and clubs, top income tax rates range from 43 to 52 percent. The current top rate in France is 41 percent.

“It would be the death of French football,” Thiriez told sports newspaper L’Equipe. To RMC radio, he spoke of a “catastrophe” and of France relegated to “play in the second division of Europe, along with Slovenia or countries like that.”

Michel Seydoux, president of current French champion, Lille, said Hollande’s tax would produce “an impoverished spectacle.”

Still, there is pushback:

He’s thrown back the criticism from football, suggesting it is living too well. Specifically, he cited the multimillion euro salary the Qatari owners of Paris Saint-Germain reportedly pay their Italian manager, Carlo Ancelotti.

“Football administrators need to clean house a bit,” Hollande said. “Does the level of our league justify such astronomic salaries?”

…”When you see their cars in the garage here, it makes you sick,” said Thomas Mascheretti, a fan who approved of Hollande’s proposal.

File under: Ideas have Consequences.

The article is here, and for the pointer I thank Fred Smalkin.