Results for “"no give, no take"” 5 found
In January, Israel will become the first country in the world to give people who sign their organ donor cards points pushing them up the transplant list should they one day need a transplant. Points will also be given to transplant candidates whose first-degree relatives have signed their organ donor cars or whose first-degree relatives were organ donors.
In the case of kidneys, for example, two points (on a 0-18 point scale) will be given if the candidate had three or more years previous to being listed signed their organ card. One point will be given if a first-degree relative had signed and 3.5 points if a first-degree relative had previously donated.
In Entrepreneurial Economics I argued for a point allocation system like this–which I called a "no give, no take" system–as a way to increase the incentive to sign one's organ donor card. One advantage of a no-give, no take system over paying for organs is that most people find this type of system to be fair and just–those who are willing to give are the first to receive should they one day be in in need.
The new policy will be widely advertised in Israel and will be transitioned into place beginning in January. I think this new policy is very important. If organ donation rates increase in Israel, I expect that other countries will quickly follow suit.
By the way, is it peculiar that the two countries in the world with the best organ donor systems are now Israel and Iran?
Hat tip to Dave Undis whose Lifesharers group (I am an advisor) is working on implementing a similar system in the United States.
Kominers, Pathak, Sonmez, and Unver apply market design tools to incentivize convalescent therapy:
COVID-19 convalescent plasma (CCP) therapy is currently a leading treatment for COVID-19. At present, there is a shortage of CCP relative to demand. We develop and analyze a model of centralized CCP allocation that incorporates both donation and distribution. In order to increase CCP supply, we introduce a mechanism that utilizes two incentive schemes, respectively based on principles of “paying it backward” and “paying it forward.” Under the first scheme, CCP donors obtain treatment vouchers that can be transferred to patients of their choosing. Under the latter scheme, patients obtain priority for CCP therapy in exchange for a future pledge to donate CCP if possible. We show that in steady-state, both principles generally increase overall treatment rates for all patients|not just those who are voucher-prioritized or pledged to donate. Our results also hold under certain conditions if a fraction of CCP is reserved for patients who participate in clinical trials. Finally, we examine the implications of pooling blood types on the efficiency and equity of CCP distribution.
The idea is quite similar to the “no give, no take” rule for organ donation that I have promoted for many years. Namely, if you don’t sign your organ donor card you go to the back of the queue should you ever need an organ donation. Israel adopted the idea some years ago by giving points to people who signed their organ donor card. As with no-give, no-take, the point of the rules that Kominers et al. promote isn’t fairness per se but rather as an incentive to increase donations and thus increase the supply of plasma.
Two policies would address the shortfall of kidneys in the U.S.: instituting a priority-scoring system for donors and their kin and paying donors.
Israel pioneered the former in 2012. Prioritizing organ allocation by donor status—a system that economist Alex Tabarrok termed “no give, no take”—incentivized people to register as organ donors. It also removed a hurdle to living donation: The incentive to abstain because of a hypothetical (What if my son needs a kidney?) went away since the policy guarantees that a donor’s kin will be prioritized in the event that they need a transplant. The results? Both living and deceased donations have gone up, and the number of people who have died on the waitlist fell by 30% between 2010 and 2013.
To obviate the kidney shortage, we should heed the recommendation of Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker and others by making it legal to compensate donors.
Linde donated a kidney with the aid of the excellent National Kidney Registry. The registry matched him to a recipient whose own willing but incompatible donor donated to another patient in need. Bravo Dmitri.
Here are previous MR posts on organ donation.
In Entrepreneurial Economics I argued for a “no give, no take” system for organ donation–people who signed their organ donor cards would be given priority over non-signers should they one day need an organ. The idea has an element of justice to it but the primary goal is to increase the incentive to sign one’s organ donor card.
Israel recently adopted this policy by giving extra points on the allocation system to people who previously signed the organ donor card. In the case of kidneys, for example, two points (on a 0-18 point scale) are given if the candidate had three or more years previous to being listed signed their organ card. One point is given if a first-degree relative had signed and 3.5 points if a first-degree relative had previously donated.
It’s early but so far the policy appears to be very successful:
Due to the population’s surge of interest in obtaining an organ donor card, the Adi-National Israel Transplant Center has extended through March 31 the deadline to register as a donor and receive special benefits.
…During the past few weeks, Adi’s phone system has collapsed several times due to the high demand.
Since Adi decided to give preferential treatment to those registering as a potential organ donor, tens of thousands of people have registered, raising the number of potential donors to over 600,000. Until last year, the rate of registration was among the lowest in the Western world.
Hat tip to David Undis whose excellent group Lifesharers (I am an adviser) is implementing a private version of no-give, no take in the United States.