We introduce history-bound reelections. In their simple form, they consist in a “score-replication rule.” Under such a rule, an incumbent has to match the highest vote share he or she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine score-replication rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare, as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences, and they ensure that able officeholders are reelected. Candidates might offer their own score-replication rule in campaigns. We outline how political competition may be affected by such new forms of elections.
That is from a new paper by Hans Gersbach, in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. At some margins, we might use this procedure for scientific refereeing as well. You would have to receive superior referee reports, relative to the weighted average of your last set of publications, for instance. What about people who continually raise the bar on what they expect from their friends? Petulant, immature demanders, or do you bring out the best in people, otherwise serving as an optimal recycler/changer of the human experience?