Category: Economics

MR has had especially good comments lately:

The problem with this thought experiment is that even if every
individual (or all but one) have an upward-sloping individual demand
curve, the market demand curve will still be downward-sloping. The
reason is, when people who seek higher prices will run out of money
faster, thus buying fewer units. So higher prices still lead to fewer
units sold — i.e., a downward-sloping market demand curve.

Or how about this:

Your curve slopes upward until it reaches the point where quantity
times price equals your wealth. From there on, it slopes down (you buy
as much as you can afford, which is less and less at higher prices).

So everyone would quickly spend all their money.

Oddly, some goods might end up with demand curves that slope down in
the relevant price range– in spite of the buyers’ preferences!

Perhaps you’ve already spoken your mind, but comments are open again, in case you would like to take another crack at the problem.  And remember, spent funds are recycled to sellers and do not represent the destruction of real resources.

Tim Harford and I will be on C-Span, also with Sebastian Mallaby and Bob Hahn.  And here is Tim, channeling Thomas Schelling, on why you should burn your Christmas card lists.

One of my main interests is the history of institutions, and in
particular the patterns that recur in successful institutions. These
organizational structures and security mechanisms allow naturally
suspicious strangers to interact with integrity.

These patterns include tamper evidence, shared time, unforgeable costliness, separation of duties, the principle of least authority, risk sharing, and learning from our ancestors,
among many others. These patterns have been useful for centuries, and
(I can report after having spent many years working in the computer
network security field) continue to be useful in the Internet era.

Here is the blog.  Here are Nick’s essays.  The pointer comes from Brad DeLong.  Here is Nick on The Playdough Protocols.

Arnold Kling, teaming up with Robert Fogel, has the answer.

Following my Econoblog debate with Max Sawicky, Kevin Drum writes:

Basically, I’m on Max’s side: I think taxation of capital should be at roughly the same level as taxation of labor income. However, I believe this mostly for reasons of social justice, and it would certainly be handy to have some rigorous economic evidence to back up my noneconomic instincts on this matter. Something juicy and simple for winning lunchtime debates with conservative friends would be best. Unfortunately, Max punts, saying only, "As you know, empirical research seldom settles arguments."

Let me repeat the chosen comparison: capital taxes vs. gasoline taxes and no subsidies for housing.  That is a no-brainer.  But still you might be interested in the question of capital taxes vs. labor taxes.  Here are some points:

1. Supply-siders writing on capital taxation often make exaggerated claims.  Even if you like their conclusions, beware. 

2. Taxing dividends, corporate income, returns to savings, and capital gains all involve separate albeit related issues.  I am willing to consider zero for the lot.  Of that list, the corporate income tax is probably the biggest mess.  The capital gains tax is the least harmful.  The tax on dividends is the least well understood (in perfect markets theory, the level of dividends should not matter at all).  By the way, if you are worried about noise traders, a transactions tax is a better way to address this problem than a capital gains tax.

3. The U.S. currently lacks exorbitantly high levels of capital taxation.  Joel Slemrod estimates a rate of about fourteen percent, albeit with many complications and qualifications.  N.B.: We lower the rate of tax on capital by engaging in crazy-quilt and distortionary adjustments.  Nonetheless it is incorrect to argue "we have high rates of capital taxation and are doing fine, better than Europe."  Do not confuse real and nominal tax rates.

Take the capital gains tax.  Once you consider bequests and options on loss offsets, the effective rate of tax is arguably no more than five percent.  But it is still set up in a screwy way.  Bruce Bartlett points me to this short piece on real tax burdens on capital.

4. Peter Lindert has good arguments that favorable capital taxation has helped European economies finance their welfare states.

5. Larry Summers did the best empirical work on how abolishing capital income taxation would boost living standards. 

6. Encouraging savings will have a big payoff.  If you tax capital at zero, in the long run you will have much more of it.  This holds in most plausible views of the world.  Max’s examples aside, the supply curve for savings does not generally slope downwards; nor need you write me about various strange counterexamples from Ramsey models.  Sooner or later, more capital will kick in to mean a much higher standard of living.

7. Bruce Bartlett points me to this excellent CBO study.  It shows how much capital is taxed unevenly; one virtue of a zero rate is to eliminate many of those distortions in a simple way.

8. Remember those arguments about how more money doesn’t make you happier?  And we are all in a rat race where we work too hard to win a negative-sum relative status game?  I’ve never bought into them, but it’s funny how they suddenly stop coming from the left once the topic is capital vs. labor taxation.

9. The same excellent Slemrod paper (and he is no right-wing supply-side exaggerator) also suggests that the revenue lost from a zero rate on capital would be small.  N.B.: The references to this paper are the place to start your reading on this whole topic.

10. Kevin Drum’s belief in social justice should not necessarily lead him to look for arguments for taxing capital.  Even if we accept his normative views, there is the all-important question of incidence.  Taxing capital can hurt labor.  If you are truly keen to tax capital, this is a sign of a high time preference rate, not concern for the poor.

11. Some forms of human capital also should receive favorable tax treatment.  Vouchers for primary education and state universities are two examples.  I am also happy — in part for equity reasons — to subsidize human capital acquisition through an Earned Income Tax Credit.

12. What is really the difference between capital and labor?  Is it simply measured elasticities?  The size of each potential tax base?  The greater "future orientation" of capital and the possibility for compound returns?  All of the above?  How much does your answer depend on whether you view capital as a "fund" or as a "collection of capital goods"?

The bottom line: It all depends on the margin.  If your levels of government spending allow you to keep labor rates of taxation below 40 percent, I don’t see comparable gains from lowering tax rates on labor.  If you have equity concerns, express them through other policy instruments.  But if your marginal tax on labor is 65 percent and your tax rate on capital is 15 percent, cut the tax on labor first.

I know it hurts, but all of you non-right-wingers out there should consider a zero rate of taxation on capital.  Comments are open.

You will find the essay here, with comments, and yes it includes Smith and Mandeville up through the moderns.

Max, are you willing to raise your hand and say: "I want to in essence
double the real rate of taxation on capital income. I don’t think the
growth rate will fall"?

That is from my debate with Max Sawicky, here is the link.  Go see if Max raises his hand.

Addendum: I’ve opened up comments, since Max seems to be requesting that.

$430 a square foot, to buy the air rights for an unfettered view of Central Park.

Our new hire at GMU, Ilia Rainer, posed this question over lunch yesterday.  Why don’t rental car companies use the superior Japanese product?  Our group came up with a few hypotheses:

1. Rental car drivers consume patriotism by using the American product.  Often a third party, such as a corporation, is picking up the bill.  Rental car companies don’t want a "foreign" image.

2. Rental cars are (and must be) well taken care of by Hertz and others.  Japanese cars perform better when maintenance is low, but with plenty of care American cars do just fine.

3. Here is a variant on #2: Rental cars have higher value on the resale market than regular used cars, given that they are well taken care of.  This boosts the value of U.S. cars relative to Japanese cars, since Japanese cars will hold up anyway.

4. The fraud problem in the auto repair market is severe.  If you can fix your cars yourself, at marginal cost, U.S. autos are a fine buy.

5. U.S. cars are more comfortable for long drives, which makes them better suited for the rental market.  They are also better for "nature driving" out west.  Japanese cars are better for daily commutes, urban driving, and stop-and-go driving, which are more likely found in your daily life and less likely relevant for the rental market.

But surely you can do better.  Your thoughts?  Comments are open.

Here it is, courtesy of http://catallarchy.net.  They also point our attention to some data on Ireland vs. the Scandinavian countries.

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Happy Holidays!

Let us say, just for fun, that you woke up one morning to a world where everyone else’s demand curve — except yours — slopes upward.  But it is not common knowledge that  this is the case.  What is the first oddity you would notice? 

1. The most expensive radio stations would be filled with the most ads.  The music would never come.

2. Your house would have no electricity, due to grid overload.  (Is this true?  An upward-sloping curve does not mean you will demand more at the current price.  Think of twisting the demand curve around the current point of intersection.)

3. The most transparent agents would be found wandering the streets, bereft of all wealth, the victims of corporate price hikes.

4. You would wonder why so few people were reading your blog.

5. You would check ebay and find very high prices for items with active bidding.  (Hmm…what kind of auction markets are behind the scenes for our power supply?)  (Addendum: What is the Nash equilibrium here?  Will people hold off bidding, hoping that tomorrow’s price will be higher?)

6. You would be puzzled why the Nordstrom’s sale was so empty.

7. It would take you days to notice any significant difference at all.  After a few weeks, they would call in the econometricians to solve the identification problem in the data.

How long would it take you to figure out that other peoples’ demand curves were sloping upwards?  How long would it take for society to fall apart?

Comments are open.

Ed Glaeser writes in his new abstract:

Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors will be larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when consumers have weaker incentives to learn the truth. These comparative statics suggest that bounded rationality will often increase the costs of government decisionmaking relative to private decisionmaking, because consumers have better incentives to overcome errors than government decisionmakers, consumers have stronger incentives to choose well when they are purchasing than when they are voting and it is more costly to change the beliefs of millions of consumers than a handful of bureaucrats. As such, recognizing the limits of human cognition may strengthen the case for limited government.

Yes, some NBER Working Paper Abstracts should be screamed from the rooftops.  Here is the paper itself.  Glaeser also offers some arguments against "soft paternalism":

1. Soft paternalism is an emotional tax on behavior which yields no government revenues.

2. Soft paternalism can cause bad decisions just as easily as hard paternalism.

3. Public monitoring of soft paternalism is much more difficult than public monitoring of hard paternalism.

4. While hard paternalism will be limited by public opposition, soft paternalism is particularly attractive because it builds public support.

5. Soft paternalism can build dislike or even hatred of subgroups of the population.

6. Soft paternalism leads to hard paternalism.

7. Soft paternalism complements other government persuasion. 

Get this:

Soft paternalism requires a government bureaucracy that is skilled in manipulating beliefs.  A persuasive government bureaucracy is inherently dangerous because that apparatus can be used in contexts far away from the initial paternalistic domain.  Political leaders have a number of goals, only some of which relate to improving individual well-being.  Investing in the tools of persuasion enables the government to change perceptions of many things, not only the behavior in question.  There is great potential for abuse.

Thanks to Daniel Klein for the pointer.

I went to Wegman’s less than 24 hours before Thanksgiving and purchased a turkey, yams, cranberries, a pumpkin pie, wine, cranberry cheese, fresh bread, peanut butter and some more wine.  Not a single item was in short supply let alone in shortage.  I give thanks for capitalism.