Category: Medicine

Presumed Consent and Organ Donation

A New York assemblyman wants NY to adopt a presumed consent law for organ donation. 

The legislation, introduced by Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, a Westchester Democrat, is in two parts: the first step would end the right of the next of kin to challenge the decisions of their dead or dying relatives to donate their organs.

In a second measure, which is far more contentious, people would have to indicate in official documents – their driver’s licenses, most commonly – that they specifically don’t want to donate organs. If the box is not checked, it is presumed the person wants to donate.

The first thing to note about this proposal is that contrary to what Brodsky suggests, the problem isn't families who refuse to follow the wishes of the potential donor–as a rule, families who know, follow.  The problem is that families often don't know what their loves ones would have wanted because many people don't sign their organ donor cards.  

In fact, the way presumed consent actually works is not by overriding the wishes of the family it's by making the wishes of the potential donor more clearly known to her family.  In most presumed consent countries the family still has the ultimate say in practice because what doctor is going to want to go against the wishes of the family in a time of grief?  Instead, presumed consent increases the probability that families say yes by changing their background information from my loved one didn't opt-in to my loved one didn't opt-out. 

So under presumed consent we get more families saying yes–but not all–and there are other constraints such as the number of people who die in a way that makes their organs available for transplant and the availability of transplant surgeons and facilities to do the operation and so forth.

In a roundtable on this issue with Sally Satel, Art Kaplan and others, Kieran Hiely notes:

Spain’s success is due to effective management of the transplant
system, not a simple legal rule. Similarly, Italy’s donation rate grew
rapidly in the 1990s thanks to investment in its system, not because of
its long-standing presumed consent law. Some countries, notably
Austria, do have “true” presumed consent, with no kin veto. But they do
not outperform countries like the U.S. by any great margin.

I'm actually a bit more positive than Kieran, the best evidence is that presumed consent raises donation rates by perhaps 20-30%.  Not bad, but not enough to eliminate the shortage.  To do that, as Satel notes in her contribution to the roundtable it will take live donation.

Kieran also writes:

It’s also worth remembering that, since the 1970s, the U.S.
“transplant community” has worked hard to allay public concerns that
surgeons might be too eager to harvest organs, or that the state might
play too calculating a role in deciding what happens to the bodies of
potential donors.

The latter point is especially important in the United States.  Brazil, for example, switched to presumed consent and then switched back to opt-in when people became fearful and outraged and donation rates fell.  It's not hard to imagine similar blowback in the United States.

It's also worth remembering that considered as a whole the U.S. system is the best in the world.  Spain does have a very high rate of deceased donation, but it does poorly on live donation.  Iran leads the world on live donation because it compensates donors but due to religious feelings about the sacredness of the body Iran, like other Muslim countries, does poorly on deceased donation.  The US does well on both deceased and live donation and in total leads the world.

We can do better but we do need to tread carefully.

OrganDonationRatesWorld

Changing Views on Organ Prohibition

I spoke recently at the Kidney and Urology Foundation of America on using incentives to increase organ donation.  Also speaking was Nancy Scheper-Hughes, the courageous UC Berkeley detective/anthropologist responsible for busting international rings of organ traffickers.

Scheper-Hughes is well known as an opponent of kidney vending, especially because it has often involved the exploitation of poor people in the developing world (fyi, there is no question that exploitation has occurred even if you take the view, as I do, that payment per se is not exploitation.)  In her impassioned talk, Scheper-Hughes presented many pictures of poor people with large scars.  

Thus, I was very surprised that Scheper-Hughes favors a trial of compensation for deceased donation and is even supportive of a trial for compensated live donation saying:

"There are penalties for buying, selling and brokering the sale of organs in this country, but still it goes on, often with an attitude of 'don't ask, don't tell.' I believe that if the laws are not going to be followed, then the laws should change. First, though, a controlled study must take place, in an ethical manner, with a sample of volunteer organ donors being compensated appropriately."

As with alcohol and drug prohibition, many people who do not favor organ sales are coming to recognize that a regulated market or compensation system could be preferable to an illegal market.

Addendum: My powerpoint slides Using Incentives to Increase Organ Donation, cover the problem and some potential solutions which are being adopted around the world.  Also included at the end are some slides especially designed for teaching this material in a principles of economics class.

Tolerating male homosexuals lowers HIV

Andy Francis and Hugo Mialon, both at Emory, report their latest research:

We empirically investigate the effect of tolerance for gays on the spread of HIV in the United States. Using a state-level panel dataset spanning the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, we find that tolerance is negatively associated with the HIV rate. We then investigate the causal mechanisms potentially underlying this relationship. We find evidence consistent with the theory that tolerance for homosexuals causes low-risk men to enter the pool of homosexual partners, as well as causes sexually active men to substitute away from underground, anonymous, and risky behaviors, both of which lower the HIV rate.

That piece has recently come out in the Journal of Health Economics.

Is there a flypaper effect for public health-based foreign aid?

If you give people, or a government, money to do one thing, they might reallocate some of those funds to their preferred marginal expenditures.  A recent study published in Lancet, co-authored by Christopher Murray and Chunling Lu, suggests this is what happens with many instances of foreign aid:

"For every $1 of DAH [development assistance for health] given to government, the ministry of finance reduces the amount of government expenditures allocated to the ministry of health and other government agencies that engage in health spending by about $0.43 to $1.14," they write. "From the global health community's perspective, this means that to increase government health spending by $1, global health funders need to provide at least $1.75 of DAH."

Furthermore debt relief does not increase domestic government health care spending but grants to NGOs, unlike direct foreign aid to governments, do increase such spending.  A summary of the study is here.  Here is an abstract and a gated link.

Why the Massachusetts mandate is stronger than the federal mandate

Reihan Salam pursues the issue:

Reader Jim Fair kindly pointed me to an important provision in the Massachusetts law that is not present in ACA, as I understand it. The following is from a summary provided by Healthinsuranceinfo.net:

  • If you buy individual health insurance through Commonwealth Choice you may face a pre-existing exclusion period. No pre-existing condition exclusion period can be applied unless you have a break of 63 or more days of continuous coveragePre-existing condition exclusion periods can last up to 6 months. Commonwealth Choice plans can look back 6 months to see if you actually received care or treatment for a condition. In addition, pregnancy can be considered a pre-existing condition in individual health insurance. Genetic information cannot be considered a pre-existing condition.
  • No preexisting condition exclusion period can be imposed if you are HIPAA eligible.

This strikes me as a powerful disincentive to going without coverage that effectively strengthens the mandate. 

Attracted to Evil?

In transcranial magnetic stimulation (“TMS”), a coil of wire is placed near the head. Alternating current flowing through the coil induces a magnetic field with a strength of up to 2.5 teslas (one tesla is 20,000 times the strength of the earth’s magnetic field). The field passes harmlessly through the skull and influences the electrical Brain_magnetsignals passing among neurons in the brain.

(Image and quote from Progress Daily.)

TMS has been used to stimulate or suppress different centers of the brain including those involved with attention, language and memory.   A new paper in PNAS used TMS to disrupt part of the brain involved in judging intention and morality.  Here is a summary:

Magnets can alter a person's sense of morality, according to a new report in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 

Using a powerful magnetic field, scientists from MIT, Harvard University and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center are able to scramble the moral center of the brain, making it more difficult for people to separate innocent intentions from harmful outcomes….

Magnetic fields made people judge outcomes more than intentions.

The effect was small and temporary but no less disturbing especially if the effect could be made to operate at a distance.  Perhaps the tin-foil-hat-people have had it right all along.

Sometimes third-party payment *lowers* cost

Really. There is a new paper by Mark Duggan and Fiona Scott Morton — "The Effect of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical Prices and Utilization." — in the just-arrived issue of the American Economic Review.  

The point is that large buyer groups, structured incentives for patients to consume certain products, and formularies ("a mechanism that allows a buyer to identify a therapeutically similar treatment as a viable substitute for a patented treatment") all can help lower cost.  These institutions are cited as reasons why Medicare D has cost about twenty percent less than expected; the third party can institute these procedures more effectively than can individuals paying out of pocket, or so the data in this paper indicates.

Ideally much more of the health care sector should work this way, although usually it doesn't.

You'll find earlier versions of the paper here.  The references are also a good place to start for catching up on some of the major papers in health care economics over the last ten years.

China diabetes fact of the day

It's not surprising to see China as "number one" in so many things, but I was surprised by the magnitude of this development:

According to the report, more than 92 million adults in China have diabetes, and nearly 150 million more are well on their way to developing it. The disease is more common in people with large waistlines and in those who live in cities, the report indicates.

"For every person in the world with HIV there are three people in China with diabetes," said David Whiting, an epidemiologist with the International Diabetes Federation, who was not involved in the research.

The Federation projected last year that some 435 million people would have diabetes by 2030. "With this new study, we're going to have to rerun our estimate," Whiting told Reuters Health.

The full story is here.

The extreme tension in Caplanian thought

Bryan writes:

Fortunately, the government can handle this problem without spending trillions or heavily regulating the insurance or medical industries.   All it needs to do is provide a means-tested subsidy to make private health insurance more affordable for those who need it most.  The subsidy should be based on income, wealth, chronic health status – and, given Balan's focus on the deserving poor – on past and current behavior.  People who engage in voluntary risky behaviors – smoking, drinking, over-eating, mountain-climbing, violence, etc. – should receive a smaller subsidy, or no subsidy at all.  The same goes for people who failed to buy long-term insurance when they were healthy and employed, then ran into health or financial troubles. 

First, I am worried about a governmental process which first judges the "deservingness" of each poor person before setting the proper subsidy.  Do they videotape your life as you go along, or do they convene a Job-like trial when you submit receipts for reimbursement?

Second, causality is so often difficult to determine in medicine.  Say a poor guy had a heart attack but he ate grilled meats for thirty years.  Was that irresponsible behavior or not?

Third, and most of all, Bryan loves to stress the heritability of intelligence, income, and even life expectancy, among other variables.  But how can your parents be your fault? 

This is a fundamental tension in Caplanian thought, namely the desire to promote intuitions of both meritocracy/desert and facts about heritability.  Bryan can't have it both ways.

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How mandate penalties will be enforced

From the Joint Committee on Taxation:

The penalty is assessed through the Code and accounted for as an additional amount of Federal tax owed. However, it is not subject to the enforcement provisions of subtitle F of the Code. The use of liens and seizures otherwise authorized for collection of taxes does not apply to the collection of this penalty. Non-compliance with the personal responsibility requirement to have health coverage is not subject to criminal or civil penalties under the Code and interest does not accrue for failure to pay such assessments in a timely manner.

There is much more discussion here and I thank Joe Kristan for the pointer.  Megan McArdle adds comment.  Maybe the legal issues here are not yet clear, but so far it is not looking good.

Ahem!

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