Results for “fda” 324 found
Friday assorted links
2. Don Boudreaux open letter to me. Here is my original post, and here is AIER being useful. If the GBD had been this second link here, I would be wrong. But it wasn’t.
3. Chinese to vaccinate 50 million for lunar new year.
4. Model and evidence for the IPO market being efficient.
5. Why Iger is a bad pick for ambassador to China.
6. Whether you agree or not, the method and approach of the government/CDC here on vaccine allocation are so low quality as to almost defy belief. Again, whether or not you are convinced by Matt Yglesias, his simple Substack on this same question did a better job (and at a profit, presumably!). A useful reminder for those of you who “blame the CDC problems on Trump.” Here is related NYT coverage. And never forget Glazer. Why do we not prioritize men, who are at higher risk? And from “an expert in ethics.”
8. “Atlantic City has launched an auction in which the winner will get to virtually push the button that starts the long-anticipated implosion of the former Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino building.” Link here.
Can You Hear Me Now? No.
I know, I know, you are tired of me beating on the FDA. Too bad. The beatings will continue until mortality improves.
Today’s beating, however, concerns hearing aids rather than than vaccines. The current system, much like the optometry racket, requires that hearing aids be purchased through an audiologist:
WEBMD: A pair of hearing aids runs $5,600 on average — a cost that health insurance doesn’t typically pick up. In order to get the devices, people with hearing loss must have a medical exam to rule out the slim chance of a serious medical problem that is causing the hearing loss, or they must sign a waiver opting out of the exam. You can only buy hearing aids through an audiologist or a licensed hearing aid dispenser, who is authorized to test hearing and sell hearing aids.
…choosing a hearing professional limits a person’s hearing aid choices, and changing audiologists as a result of location or personal preference could require a person to change hearing aids, too.
Due in part to these hurdles, once a person starts to lose their hearing, they wait an average of 7 years before they seek help.
The NYTimes continues the story:
By now, we were supposed to be swiftly approaching the day when we could walk into a CVS or Walgreens, a Best Buy or Walmart, and walk out with a pair of quality, affordable hearing aids approved by the Food and Drug Administration….in 2017, Congress passed legislation allowing the devices to be sold directly to consumers, without a prescription from an audiologist. The next step was for the F.D.A. to issue draft regulations to establish safety and effectiveness benchmarks for these over-the-counter devices.
Of course, the FDA is likely to miss the deadline. But even I am willing to cut them some slack, given other more pressing concerns. The real issue, however, is one that the NYTimes doesn’t confront and that is why does the FDA regulate hearing aids at all?
Headphones and earbuds are not regulated as medical devices and hearing aid technology is similar to hearings buds with a sophisticated equalizer. Indeed, you can even buy “personal sound amplification products” that are not FDA regulated or approved. It’s only the somewhat arbitrary declaration that these products are “medical devices” that brought them under FDA regulation to the detriment of consumers. The National Academy of Sciences report agrees writing:
FDA has established regulations for hearing aids, including quality system regulation requirements, mandatory labeling, and pre-purchase medical evaluation (or a documented waiver). These regulations, along with a number of state regulations, have largely restricted the availability of hearing aids to being mainly dispensed through medical, audiology, or hearing instrument specialist venues.
…In examining the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) requirements for physician evaluation prior to obtaining hearing aids, the committee finds no evidence that the required medical evaluation or waiver of that evaluation provides any clinically meaningful benefit.
Addendum: In some positive news the FDA lifted its ban on the first non-prescription, at-home SARS-COV test and also on a prescription, paper-strip test. Now all we need is a non-prescription paper-strip test! Come on guys.
From David Splinter, from my email
This is all David:
A related paper by BEA came out today with their updated distributional estimates of personal income. Marina Gindelsky has done a lot of work to produce these estimates.
I have a couple new papers on tax progressivity and redistribution that may be of interest to you. Both used CBO data to avoid the PSZ-AS differences. Abstracts below.
The first paper is about the ends of the distribution: tax progressivity has increased significantly since 1979 (and steadily since 1986) due to more generous tax credits for the bottom, while average tax burdens of the top have been relatively unchanged because lower marginal rates were offset by decreased use of tax shelters. The online appendix shows why the CBO estimates differ from those of Saez and Zucman (see Fig. B7 at the end; it’s mostly due to refundable credits at the bottom and imputed income at the top) and the Heathcote et al. paper you blogged about a couple months ago (it’s technical differences and their inclusion of some transfers, but their most similar measure of tax progressivity was not flat—it increased 21 percent since 1979).
The second paper, with Adam Looney and Jeff Larrimore, is about the middle of the distribution. Since 1979, we found that non-elderly middle-class market income increased 39 percent in real per person terms. The increase was 57 percent when accounting for taxes and transfers. This seems to fit with the “updated” view of stagnation—expanding male wages to also look at untaxed compensation and including female compensation and taxes/transfers shows larger median growth. But there was a structural break in 2000. Before then, middle-class incomes grew at the same rate before and after taxes and transfers, and since then income after taxes and transfers grew three times faster (Fig. 6 on page 19). We don’t discuss the recent market income slowdown (maybe related to the debated labor share break around 2000), but we show that the additional fiscal support that filled the gap looks like an unsustainable way to boost middle-class disposable incomes going forward.”
The case for going big is still strong
Since back in April, Michael Kremer, myself, and the AHT team have been advising governments to go big on investing in vaccines. The US, to its credit, made early purchases but they made two mistakes. First, they didn’t buy enough as the Washington Post indicates:
Last summer, Pfizer officials had urged Operation Warp Speed to purchase 200 million doses, or enough of the two-shot regimen for 100 million people, according to people knowledgeable about the issue who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to discuss the situation. But the Warp Speed officials declined, opting instead for 100 million doses, they said.
“Anyone who wanted to sell us … without an [FDA] approval, hundreds of millions of doses back in July and August, was just not going to get the government’s money,” said a senior administration official.
But last weekend, with an FDA clearance expected any day, federal officials reached back out to the company asking to buy another 100 million doses. By then, Pfizer said it had committed the supply elsewhere and suggested elevating the conversation to “a high level discussion,” said a person familiar with the talks who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to share the conversation.
In our discussions, we were talking about at least a $70 billion dollar program and optimally double that and we continually faced the sticker shock problem. Investing in unapproved vaccines seemed risky to many people despite the fact that the government was spending trillions on relief and our model showed that spending on vaccines easily paid for itself (the mother of multipliers!). I argued that this was the world’s easiest cost benefit calculation since Trillions>>Billions. But it was hard to motivate more spending—not just in the United States but anywhere in the world. For reasons I still don’t understand anything out of the ordinary–big spending on at-risk vaccines, spending on testing and tracing, challenge trials–was met with a kind of apathy and defeatism. As I said in July:
Multiple people [in Congress] have told me that things move slowly, no one is stepping up to the plate, leadership is absent. “Who is John Galt?,” they sigh. Ok, they don’t literally say that, but that sigh of resignation is what it feels like in the United States today at the highest levels of government.
OWS was actually the one area where there was some action. But there was a second mistake. We argued that governments shouldn’t buy doses but capacity, i.e. they should cover the cost of building a factory or production line in return for an option on doses from that line. The problem with buying doses is that if you buy without a timeline then the company takes all orders and pushes the low-priced orders to the back of the queue. If you demand a timeline, however, that puts a lot of risk on the firms, since not everything is under their control, and that’s expensive and difficult to contract for and monitor. Thus, we advocated for push funding to de-risk capacity construction for the firms. Capacity construction is well understood–double this line–and thus much easier to contract for and monitor. (Contracting on capacity is also cheaper than a traditional AMC for reasons explained here and also in my discussion with Tyler here.) The nice thing about buying capacity is that it changes the dynamic from one where countries are scrambling to buy before others do to one where early purchases increase capacity that is later available for everyone. OWS, to its credit, did fund capacity construction for Moderna but we wanted more and other governments didn’t step up to the plate.
OWS has been a success. In combination with investments from other governments and organizations like CEPI it will save trillions of dollars and many lives. It could have been better but the main takeaway is that the case for going big is still strong. We have solved the scientific problem of making the vaccine but step two is getting billions of doses in arms. If we can increase capacity enough to vaccinate millions more people next year than currently planned that would still pay for itself many times over. Increasing capacity is not impossible. China is increasing capacity for its vaccines. It will be harder to increase capacity for mRNA vaccines since the technology is new and bespoke but it can be done. We need a second Operation Warp Speed, OWS: Delivery and Distribution.
As Tyler said yesterday, Williams wants a cow! We want billions of vaccine doses quickly. It can be done, it should be done.
Fallacies about constraints
I am reading many people claim something like “production and distribution of the vaccine is the constraint, not FDA approval.”
There are multiple mistakes in such a view, and here I wish to focus on the logic of constraints rather than debate the FDA issue.
First, there are vaccines available right now, and it helps some people (and their contacts) to have those distributed sooner rather than later.
Second, easing the FDA constraint encourages the suppliers and distributors to hurry to a greater degree. Just imagine if the FDA were to take a few months longer to approve. The more general point is that citing “x is right now the main constraint right now” does not mean “the elasticity of x is zero.”
“Sure” wrote in the comments:
On the economics side, I am not convinced that production has ramped up as full and as fast as possible. After all there is some risk premium for expanding plants, running constant shifts, etc. and the danger of delayed approval, particularly if you are in some (mostly negligible) way to the other vaccines may not warrant the investment.
After all, approvals appear to move stocks. Do we really think the market is that dumb? If approval has an impact on market value, why exactly would it not also have an impact on the cost of borrowing, expanding, etc.? Surely somebody believes that approval will result in something different will happen than was happening the day before.
Third, “FDA vaccine approval” is a complementary good for the final vaccine service, strongly complementary in fact. If the other complementary infrastructure goods have price/quality combinations that are “too disadvantageous,” the theory of the second best implies that approval processes should be speedier and more lax than you otherwise might have thought. This is just the converse of the classic result that multiple medieval princes imposing multiple tolls on a river create negative externalities for both river users and each other. Lower those tolls wherever you can.
Fourth, let’s say there were three constraints, each absolutely binding at the current margin. Speeding FDA approval, taken alone, would have absolutely no effect. We then ought to be obsessed with identifying and remedying the other two constraints (along with approval)!
But we are not. Instead we keep on citing those (supposed) constraints in defeatist fashion. This absence of obsession with easing constraints is in fact one of the biggest reasons for thinking we can do better. We need to throw more money and talent at these problems, and we are not working hard enough on how to do that. We are just citing the constraints back and forth to each other and pleading helplessness.
As a final note, I recall that my recently deceased colleague Walter E. Williams was especially good on these issues. I recall him once saying he wanted to hire a helicopter to drop a cow into the campus central quad, just to show people that supply has positive elasticity. “I’m going to call them up and say “Williams wants a cow!””
Moo.
Thursday assorted links
1. The immediate immigration policy dilemmas faced by Biden. And humans in Mexico 30,000 years ago?
2. Kerfluffle surrounding Philip Lane, chief ECB economist, about making calls privately to banks.
3. Good Dube thread on new wage stickiness paper.
4. Don Boudreaux on Walter Williams (WSJ). And Jayme Lemke. And David Henderson. And Thomas Sowell.
5. The culture that is San Francisco what is up with you people?
6. US vs. UK vaccine review procedures.
7. Delta: “Our partners at Mayo Clinic
8. Some new corporate and banking stuff (WSJ).
Tuesday assorted links
1. New data on YouTube consumption.
2. New Canadian paper: “…for most parameter values, the optimal policy is to adopt an initial shutdown level which reduces the reproduction number of the epidemic to close to 1. This level is then reduced once a vaccination program is underway.”
3. More on Deep Mind and protein structures. And off-label drug uses, to an extreme.
4. Steve McQueen’s Lovers Rock is one of the very best movies of this year; search Amazon Prime for “Small Axe,” select episode two. Short too.
5. Cecilia Rouse on debt cancellation.
6. Covid-19 in America detected as early as Dec.13-16 2019? See here for good criticisms, still an open question.
7. Update on FDA vaccine review. And new information on the EU review schedule.
The reckless British will be approving the Pfizer vaccine by Dec.7
Likely within a few days, here is the FT story, how about it FDA? What is your reason for waiting?
Can we have an Operation Warp Speed for green energy?
Probably not, as I argue in my Bloomberg column. One problem is that advance market commitments work best when the output is well-defined, more or less homogeneous, and to be distributed according to very clear principles (one shot in the arm for everybody!). You can’t quite hand out green batteries or small nuclear reactors on the same basis. There is a case for subsidizing those, but not necessarily through advance purchase methods. Here is another part of the column:
Operation Warp Speed was also made easier by the internalization of vaccine research within companies or alliances of companies. The pre-purchase agreement limits risk, and within that framework the companies face strong competitive incentives to create a successful product. In the meantime, the work is removed from the public eye and debate, and at the end there is a definitive yes or no decision from the FDA. It is hardly simple, but it could be a lot more complicated.
In contrast, building a new energy infrastructure requires the cooperation of many companies and institutions, including local governments and regulators. One company can’t simply do everything (recall that the attempts of Alphabet to redesign part of Toronto as a new tech-based city met with local resistance and were ultimately put aside). The greater the number of institutions involved, the slower things get. Note that most of those institutions will not be getting pre-purchase funds from the federal government and they will face their usual bureaucratic and obstructionist incentives. When it comes to green energy policy, there are still too many veto points.
A striking feature of vaccine development is just how few social goals are involved. A vaccine should be safe, effective and easy to distribute. In broadly similar fashion, the highly successful Manhattan Project of the 1940s also had a small number of goals, namely a working and deliverable atomic bomb. When it comes to energy, there are already too many goals, and additional ones are often added: job creation, better design and community aesthetics, reductions in secondary pollution, regional economic benefits, and so on.
When I explain Fast Grants to people, and how it worked, it is always striking to me which part of the explanation they understand least. Everybody gets “we had a preexisting team in place, ready to handle accounting, recordkeeping, and payments.” Hardly anyone understands — really understands — “the program has two goals: supporting quality research projects that will feed into stopping Covid, and speed.” On one hand, it sounds self-evident to them, but on the other hand I don’t think they realize how much the intellectual infrastructure of the project really is defined by those goals and no others. Nothing about meeting payroll, or pursuing other meritorious social goals, or getting grant or donor renewal, or raising the stature of the program in the biomedical community, or…? What you choose not to pursue is one of the most radical steps you can take, and often it is so radical that other people don’t even grasp or notice it. They just don’t see you “not doing something.” That can be a good way to innovate!
Wednesday assorted links
2. Nakamura’s life and income.
3. Where are the Covid deaths in Europe? Some people had been wondering. And cross-immunities from Asian history? And using wearables to detect pre-symptomatic Covid? And Dolly Parton Fast Grants. And more on Dolly. And “Hospitalizations are rising faster in Sweden than any other European country…”
4. Why do Chinese liberals support Washington conservatives? (NYT, excellent piece once you inject the Straussian reading; note the fear that liberalism will be redefined in the direction of Hayek).
5. FDA authorizes 30-minute at-home Covid test, supposedly to sell for $50, crazy though to still require a prescription (NYT).
Sunday assorted links
1. They wouldn’t let Barbara Hannigan and Simon Rattle do this in the U.S. today (ten minute music video).
2. What the Chinese say. If you are really for diversity, why don’t we give that writer a NYT column? Why not a CCP columnist for every major outlet? Isn’t that the alternative perspective we should care about the most?
3. The public sector wrestling culture that is Uzbekistan.
How to conduct clinical trials while releasing a vaccine
There are many ways to conduct clinical trials while releasing a vaccine—indeed, we can make the clinical trials better by randomizing a phased release. Suppose we decide health care and transit workers should be vaccinated first. No problem–offer the workers the vaccine, put the SSNs of those who wants the vaccine into a hat like draft numbers, vaccine a randomly chosen sub-sample, monitor everyone.This is the well known lottery technique for measuring causal effects often used in the school choice literature. If we use this technique we can greatly increase sample sizes and as we study each wave we will gather more confidence in the data. We won’t have enough vaccine in November to vaccinate everyone or probably even all health care and transit workers so a lottery is an ethically fair as well as statistically useful way to distributed the vaccine. We can also randomize across cities and regions.
That is from a recent post by Alex Tabarrok, on the blog Marginal Revolution, and there is more at the link. Of course I don’t have to tell you what Alex’s brother thinks of all this.
Addendum: Anup Malani notes:
BTW, those worried about ethics here should note that most product markets, even many dangerous ones (including non-FDA regulated medical care) use the population testing approach. Drugs are the exception. Elsewhere handle risk via exclusively via ex post tort liability.
So please don’t offer some kind of passive, under-argued Twitter comment on how unacceptably unethical it is — do some analysis and empirics on the trade-offs! And read up on surgical procedures while you are at it.
Saturday assorted links
1. More on the multiple vaccines problem. And sitting in on the FDA vaccine panel meeting. And Arthur W. Baker, EV winner for his work on vaccines, now has a home page.
2. Escaped cloned female mutant crayfish take over Belgian cemetery.
4. The German tilt-and-turn window. And Germany moves to improve ventilation.
5. Krugman short paper on the Trump trade war (analytical, not polemic).
How to Vaccinate and Continue Clinical Trials
According to Helen Branswell writing at STAT:
There are serious signs the Food and Drug Administration is getting cold feet over the notion of issuing emergency use authorizations to allow for the widespread early deployment of Covid-19 vaccines.
…“We are concerned about the risk that use of a vaccine under an EUA would interfere with long-term assessment of safety and efficacy in ongoing trials and potentially even jeopardize product approval,” Gruber said. “And not only the first vaccine, but maybe even follow-on vaccines.”
This is nonsense. There are many ways to conduct clinical trials while releasing a vaccine—indeed, we can make the clinical trials better by randomizing a phased release. Suppose we decide health care and transit workers should be vaccinated first. No problem–offer the workers the vaccine, put the SSNs of those who wants the vaccine into a hat like draft numbers, vaccine a randomly chosen sub-sample, monitor everyone.This is the well known lottery technique for measuring causal effects often used in the school choice literature. If we use this technique we can greatly increase sample sizes and as we study each wave we will gather more confidence in the data. We won’t have enough vaccine in November to vaccinate everyone or probably even all health care and transit workers so a lottery is an ethically fair as well as statistically useful way to distributed the vaccine. We can also randomize across cities and regions.
Tyrone, never one to mince words, also has good suggestions:
First, they could simply pay people to partake in those trials. Isn’t that in essence what the NBA did with its Covid testing in the bubble? If the value of those clinical trials truly is so high, it should be possible to internalize enough of those benefits to encourage participation. If institutional barriers stand in the way there, let’s obsess over fixing those.
Why should we force so many Americans to be sacrificial lambs, just to subsidize the trial costs? Let those costs be taken out of grant overhead! (And admin. salaries, if need be.)
…Second, there is another way to keep the trial up and running. Approve use of the treatment, but allow the suppliers to charge very high prices! Better yet, use the law to make them charge high prices and if need be forbid insurance coverage.
Or we could use human challenge trials. The ethical objections to such are now looking more and more like nonsense as thousands of people die weekly.
In short, the idea that releasing a vaccine in phases is a threat to clinical trials is a dangerous and false dichotomy and another example of how our leaders lack vision, imagination, and courage.
The AstraZeneca trial is allowed to resume
Federal health regulators have decided to allow the resumption of U.S. studies of a leading Covid-19 vaccine candidate from AstraZeneca PLC and the University of Oxford, according to a person familiar with the matter and materials reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.
Here is the WSJ article, no real explanation given by either the company or the FDA.