Results for “from the comments” 1938 found
From the comments
On your 2010 R&R post: Your point about 90% being neither sacred nor stable shows how badly many people misinterpreted the paper.
You also said we don’t know how much higher than 90% we can go. I’m not sure exactly what you meant, but I’ve suggested that the threshold we should be most concerned about is the point beyond which you can be sure you’ll never get back to safe debt levels, because you’ll be faced with the Catch-22 of both austerity and “not-austerity” pushing debt higher for different reasons. This threshold is much lower than the point at which large countries will actually experience a fiscal crisis and probably lower than most people think. A reasonable estimate is only 150% debt-to-GDP, based on the observation that there are no historical episodes of countries recovering from 150%+ that are at all relevant to the U.S. or U.K. today (yes, I used the R&R data among other sources to test this).
The risk that the U.S. sails through such a threshold is becoming very real at current debt levels.
If you (or anyone) are interested, my paper reviewing all historical episodes of debt >150% of GDP (from the R&R database) was posted last month on Seeking Alpha and on http://www.cyniconomics.com and it’s called “Answering the Single Most Important Question in Today’s Economy.” And if the U. Mass. trio are interested, I’ll even offer my calculations.
From the comments, on UID
This is concerning the forthcoming Indian attempt to register individuals through unique eye scans and implement more cash transfers:
The domestic debate in India has largely been around :
1) This is just a sop before elections, a kind of brazen legitimised bribery. 2) The welfare architecture will not simply be migrated, it will be expanded. 3) Is conditionality critical to success? There remains no clear method to establish conditionality. 4) Identification of deserving families remains the problem. Until that is solved, nothing changes. 5) This is basically a turf war between ministeries and the previous operational/financial failures of the UID program are being hidden through the hasty implementation being planned now. 6) Getting in-kind subsidised goods through regular intervals during a month is superior cash flow management for a poor family than a lump-sum cash transfer at the end of the month
All the criticisms could be partially true. But the operational costs of the welfare delivery infrastructure will surely go down. Food and fertilizer have not yet been shifted – too politically sensitive – but amazingly, fuel has been. The biggest no-distortion gain is likely to come from there – the consumption of kerosene will most likely take a massive beating. It reduced by about 90% in a pilot.
The other corollary benefit – of using an Aadhar card as a means of establishing identity and for KYC norms in banks – is also absolutely tremendous.
It is indeed a top 5 most important economic policy issue in the world. But India is generally a low-trust society and in particular this gov’t is distrusted in most policy circles. Hence the rabid skepticism all around. I tend to be a lot more optimistic than that.
The great public choice question is – will they ever manage to bring food under this? For one, the PDS system was showing signs of an organic improvement. Second, the popular imagination has always conceived of the ‘man of the house’ frittering away hard earned money on country liquor if the woman of the house is not given grains directly. Third, giving away PDS distributorships has been an effective method of giving favours to those who the dirty work for national politicans at local levels – it is perhaps the longest running and biggest scam in India.
If they actually conclude that the greater ease for a poor family will convert into more votes than the losses they might take on the previous three fronts, it would be absolutely amazing. My sense is, like most great policy decisions, this will go through simply because it’s an idea whose ‘time has come’, and we will invent post-facto justifications of how it was politically rational to go through with this.
That is from Ritwik, who started off his comment with this sentence:
Privacy is actually a non-issue for most Indians.
From the comments, on eurozone sterilization
From this post, on the ECB and the new bailout procedures:
No, but it can tighten policy just as easily by raising the rate paid on cash in its deposit facility. Indeed, this is part of its usual operating procedure: the headline “repo rate” lies at the center of a corridor, with the deposit rate at the bottom. Already there are enough excess reserves sloshing around that the deposit rate is arguably the true risk-free short rate. There are currently 350 billion euros in the deposit facility (so this is the marginal rate paid on cash for a lot of banks!), and the EONIA overnight rate is at 0.1%, far closer to the 0% deposit rate than the 0.75% repo rate.
As long as this continues, the ECB can just follow its normal operating procedure, keeping in mind that the “true” rate is 75 basis points below the rate it’s announcing. There’s no real effect from having greater or fewer excess reserves outstanding; in my view, the “sterilization” program is a meaningless way of appeasing people who still hew to some kind of crude monetarism and don’t understand how the ECB’s policy actually works.
The critics are right about one thing, though; the taxpayers are the residual claimants here. If the ECB buys lots of Italian and Spanish debt and then they either default or leave the Euro, a hole will be blown in its balance sheet, and if insolvent it will require a taxpayer bailout. (And even if it’s not insolvent, profits that would otherwise have been remitted to taxpayers will disappear.) This is a fairly likely scenario.
From the comments
From Tom, a good pick and a good point:
Prolly you’ve all seen it … the most underrated invention — The Pallet. More underrated even than the shipping container, but just about as needed. http://www.slate.com/articles/business/transport/2012/08/pallets_the_single_most_important_object_in_the_global_economy_.html
Hoisted from the Comments
Here is John Thacker in a comment on my post Slow Speed Rail and the Infrastructure Deficit:
…consider the Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor. That’s mostly an upgrade of existing lines, combined with acquiring an abandoned line and rebuilding it. The environmental and planning work along has taken decades. The corridor was designated in 1992. The Tier I Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was begun in 1999. That was completed in 2002, and received a Record of Decision. That cleared the way for the Tier II EIS, which began in 2003. The Draft Tier II EIS was finished in 2010 and signed then. That cleared the way for the Final Tier II EIS, which is expected to be finished by the states by the end of 2012, and then a Record of Decision from the FRA by the Fall of 2013.
From the comments, on downturns, fiscal policy, and multiple equilibria
We were less wealthy than we thought we were.
Call me an AD-denier, but I still think the basic issue here is that you can’t consume more than you produce. Production exists to satisfy demand, but at the same time demand is limited by production. We had a long boom built on the notion we could boost demand and thus supply and thus demand again in a virtuous cycle, and now we are seeing the cycle work in reverse as demand/supply seek their natural levels.
One way to justify this model is in terms of multiple equilibria, and that we have been walking (bouncing our heads?) back down the escalator. Arguably for the United States this downward bouncing is over. Along the way we are sending signals about the quality of our institutions and thus shaping the course of the future.
In this model there is still a useful role for fiscal policy. For one thing, fiscal policy can smooth that ride down the escalator, by spreading the losses out over time, at the cost of future debt of course. This may be needed if only to make the political economy of decline less bitter; see Spain and Greece. Nonetheless fiscal policy cannot make up for the output losses at will. We are not standing in an IS-LM diagram where the difference between “what we have” and “what we could have” is thwarted only by some supposed Austerians who won’t shift the proper curve and yet somehow have taken over some of the biggest spending social democratic, insider-leaning governments in world history. The IS-LM approach fits in nicely with the view that policy improvement is all about yakking about the obstructionists. Instead, policy is also about rebuilding trust, not just maintaining ngdp on a decent keel.
There is another possible role for fiscal policy, as there usually is in models of multiple equilibria. If you ran some super-duper fiscal policy, and invented the flying car, a cure for cancer, and other marvels, the market might suddenly latch its expectations on to a much more positive scenario. There could be a significant upward bounce to a much higher equilibrium of output and employment. In any case, the quality of fiscal policy matters, and Keynesian ditch digging probably doesn’t do much for inferences about institutional quality and for the selection of multiple equilibria. “Spend the money, anywhere” is in my view a deeply pernicious attitude, somewhat akin to thinking you can create a good NBA team, with a strong ethic for quality and work, by tanking for better draft picks at the end of every season. But no, the internal ethic matters and cannot be first destroyed and then recreated at will. Good teams don’t usually work that way, and neither do good fiscal policies.
Right now we Americans are building back up to better equilibria, slowly, by showing that our economic institutions are not totally crummy. This process can take a good while, but in fact our recovery is going better than many people believe. The eurozone is far — very far — from being on that kind of rebuilding track.
There is plenty of talk about various commentators don’t understand the lessons of Econ 101. There is a reason why we teach classes beyond 101, and why we spend so much time studying institutions and the theory and empirics of public choice.
From the comments
From Dan Weber:
Maybe this should be posted once a week: http://www.marginalrevolution/2011/03/the-fallacy-of-mood-affiliation.html
From the comments, on the UK
This is from a loyal reader named “a”:
How high are marginal rates of deductions in the UK?:
Consider an employee paid £50,000 gross who gets a £1,000 pay rise.
Let’s assume they are yet to pay off their student loan and contribute 7.5% to a (underfunded*) pension scheme and get 8% employer contributions to their pension.
Our employee’s employer will also pay the government an extra £218 pension contributions and national insurance (payroll) contributions, 8% and 13.8% of gross earnings respectively.
So the total increase in cost to the employer is £1,218.
Of their pay rise our employee pays £75 pension contributions, £90 student loan repayments, and £370 in income tax, giving total employee deductions £555.
This gives a marginal deduction rate of 63.46% (£445/£1,218).
If our employee buys goods which are liable for VAT they will lose a further 20%, resulting in a 70.77% marginal rate of deductions.
Oh and our employee must pay a local government lump sum tax of around £1,500 from their net wages.
So our employee faces a marginal rate of deductions 63.46% on non-VAT items, 70.77% on VAT items, and an average rate of deduction of 52% of pre-deduction earnings.
A similar analysis on a worker paid the minimum wage (around £12,500 a year), or £1000 above the minimum wage results in a marginal rate of deduction of 32% and an average rate of deduction of 52%. This ignores the withdrawal of means tested benefits.
Might this be the supply side explanation Scott Sumner has been looking for?
* UK private pension schemes currently have a £265bn deficit.
From the comments (pleasing David Wright)
There seem to be an awful lot of arguments floating around the economic blogosphere lately that try to use “credibility” as a kind of magic trick to claim that some institution can get some desired result without having to do the yucky things it would have to do to, you know, actually get that result. I would love to see a post on this topic from our host.
That was from David Wright…and now he has his post.
From the comments
The “Primary Budget Surplus” is an ivory-tower concept that is counterproductive in the real world. A sophisticated lender or rating agency is concerned about the borrower’s ability to cover ALL of his expenses, and especially his loan repayments. The fact that the borrower could be solvent if he didn’t pay back his loan is not reassuring. In fact, this “primary budget surplus” condition puts the borrower in a moral hazard situation, where he might be better committing an Argentina-style default.
From the comments (Walpurgis Nacht)
Tyler Cowen November 17, 2011 at 4:39 pm
Piggy wants mood affiliation!
- G.L. Piggy November 17, 2011 at 4:44 pm
- Peter Schaeffer November 17, 2011 at 4:51 pm
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I don’t care about mood affiliation. However, Felix’s first chart is simply wrong. CP is “Corporate Profits After Tax”. FCTAX is “Tax Receipts on Corporate Income”. Felix thinks his chart shows “corporate income tax as a percentage of total corporate profits”.
It doesn’t.
- G.L. Piggy November 17, 2011 at 4:58 pm
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But just to be a little pedantic here, the frustrating thing – the part which spurred my need for mood affiliation – is that your position on corporate tax rates was brought up out of nowhere and then quickly qualified.
Laserlight November 17, 2011 at 4:45 pm
“Can we ever get a straight critique out of you”
Ah, you’re looking for Tyler the Ethnic Foods Critic. He’s down the hall to the left.
From the comments, on Sims and IS-LM
This is from E. Barandiaran and it relates to recent controversies in the blogosphere:
This is the last section of a Sims’s paper on the ISLM model (1998):
4. Conclusion
• Keynesian reasoning ought to be essentially forward looking and to emphasize expectational factors in savings and investment decisions. Traditional ISLM hides and inhibits development of this aspect of Keynesian modeling.
• ISLM ignores connections between monetary and fiscal policy that are enforced by the government budget constraint. In many policy contexts, this is a major gap.
• It remains to be seen whether there is a way to capture these aspects of Keynesian modeling in a package as neat and non-technical as ISLM, but that should not be an excuse for continuing to make ISLM the core of our teaching and informal policy discussion.
and this is the abstract
Abstract. ISLM inhibits attention to expectations in macroeconomics, going against the spirit of Keynes’s own approach. This can lead to mistaken policy conclusions and to unnecessarily weak responses to classical critiques of Keynesian modeling. A coherent Keynesian approach, accounting for endogenous expectations, implies very strong effects of monetary and fiscal policy and leads to greater attention to the role of the government budget constraint in making the effects of monetary policy conditional on prevailing fiscal responses, and vice versa.
From the comments
Here’s a Hill poll on inflation, and here’s a Gallup poll, and here’s a Rasmussmen poll.
While all differ on the exact numbers, they agree in broad strokes. The median voter is highly worried about inflation. Democrats are worried less about inflation, but still quite a lot. Indpendents are virtually indistinguishable from Republicans in worrying a lot about inflation.
That means that the inflation/hard money bit from the GOP is not an appeal to the base. It’s actually a reach to the center.
Worrying about inflation may be wrong– and I think it is wrong, according to the data– but it’s an attempt to go after the median voter, not play to the base.
Scott Sumner and Arnold Kling have related comments, and most directly here is Scott Sumner again.
From the comments
“Lord” has a way with words:
The filp side of AD is unused capacity which is why it takes long to adjust, more of the same can be produced from productivity improvements alone and more investment is unnecessary. This means high profits for incumbents that are not competed away because everyone knows the encumbant can always undercut them if they had to. The combination of low inflation and productivity growth result in little to no progress in price adjustment. The entirety of growth must be borne by innovation which is small and slow, especially now. The wealth loss means debt liquidation will proceed for an extended period of time, doubly long since collateral values aren’t there to lower rates and risk premiums are greatly enhanced. Those are structural but ones that could be fixed monetarily with a sufficient money drop but probably not otherwise with conventional policy since there is little reason to borrow by anyone with the capacity to do so and little capacity to borrow by those with reason to. Game over.
From the comments, on local employment of teachers
The scaling in the chart makes a big difference. Here’s the data behind the chart, which can by found by following a link on the site that Tyler links to: http://1.usa.gov/oOQXeO. For the local government column only and April figures. (May would be better but the series runs out at April 2011.) April 2011 was at 8.3 million, about 160K less than the peak two Aprils earlier. That’s about 1.5% difference.
That is from RZO, the link and context is here. In the same comment thread, Frank Howland notes that:
K-12 enrollments fell by 0.85% from 2007 to 2009
That’s not exactly the same years and the data go only to 2009 but could it be a general trend across 2009-2011? Given that context, there is still some decline in per capita local teacher employment. Note this is a sector where there is a growing realization that quite a few of the workers should, for non-cyclical reasons, be fired anyway.
Addendum: Karl Smith has a useful graph with seasonal adjustment, coming up with somewhat different numbers.
Yes, I do. Just once!
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