The Italian Bishops Conference has recently agonised about how to address the devil during exorcisms following a Vatican decision to translate into Italian the venerable Latin formula, Vade retro Satanas.
Bishops were unsure which form of “you” to use – the familiar “tu” or formal “lei”.
The full story is about Cardinal Dionigi Tettamanzi, 66, the archbishop of Genoa, and a leading candidate to be the next Pope. Here are his controversial Ten Rules on Resisting Satan.
The betting market has Tettamanzi as a 5 to 4 favorite to win the Papal election.
Addendum: One reader wrote and asked why I found the rules for resisting the devil so controversial. As I understand the controversy, it has provoked controversy among Catholics, many of whom feel that the devil should not be so prominent in theology.
From 1450 to 1500, between 10,00 to 15,000 titles were published, with an average print run of 500 copies.
By 1962, 250,000 titles were being published each year; this implies a growth rate five times more rapid than that of population.
Since the development of television (defined as 1950), world population has grown 1.6 percent a year. The number of book titles has grown by an average of 2.8 percent a year.
The human race publishes a book every thirty seconds.
From Gabriel Zaid’s fun, new So Many Books: Reading and Publishing in an Age of Abundance.
By the way, the first book to sell a million copies was Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind.
I vote for the gorilla, which in fact took first prize.
I sell bonsai by the roadside. The best sign I have discovered so far is “One day only”
Some good signs I display before the motorist gets to my truck include:”50% off”, “$15-500”, “bonsai for Mom”, “bonsai” (written in chinese). “See the 300 year old bonsai”
What other signs would your [Industrial Organizaton] class suggest?
How quickly can IO students come up with the three main reasons why “for Mom” works better than “for Dad”, even though any bonsai club is predominantly male?
From BonsaiDave, an avid reader, responding to my earlier post on Persian carpet sales.
Yes, the beautiful do get better student evaluations, the research of Daniel Hamermesh confirms this, the link is through Instapundit.
And get this bit, taken from the link within the link:
According to their data, the effect of beauty (or lack thereof) on teaching evaluations for men was three times as great as it was for women.
How about this?:
A glance at Web sites such as ProfessorPerformance.com and RateMyProfessors.com — where students rate their instructors on criteria such as coolness, clarity, easiness, helpfulness, and hotness (on RateMyProfessors.com, hot professors get chili peppers beside their names) — leaves little doubt about the viciousness of some students. Petty comments abound: “Someone fire this fat bastard” and “Looks like a hobbit, is not a nice person!”
Harold Glasser has been a victim of such comments. One of his students posted the following remarks on ProfessorPerformance.com: “Glasser where’s (sic) the same blue fleece sweatercoat thing, and this awful matching blue fleece hat that looks like the one Elmer Fudd wore. If this wasn’t enough, he has some of the same mannerisms as Dr. Evil,” from the Austin Powers movies.
There is no chili pepper next to my name, but given all this, my opinion of my looks has gone up.
Addendum: Here is link to the paper, thanks to John Charles for the pointer.
1. We envy those close to us, who get paid just a bit more, not Bill Gates.
2. Men find it hardest to forgive other men for their success with women.
3. Men do not much envy women because they view women as “one of life’s prizes”.
4. The philosophers who wrote most insightfully about envy were all bachelors (Kant, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche).
My take: I envy how well he writes, but was comforted to read that tenured academics typically earn more than he does.
Here is Steve Landsburg’s follow-up column, from Slate.com, it includes an excellent summary of the original debate as to whether daughters cause divorces.
The bottom line: Landsburg argues convincingly that divorce really is more common when parents have a daughter, rather than a son. Now here is Steve’s new explanation for this fact:
Suppose parents believe that inherited wealth is more important to a boy than to a girl–either because wealth gives boys a bigger advantage in the mating competition or because boys are more likely to do something entrepreneurial. Then parents of boys will try harder than parents of girls to preserve their wealth. In particular: 1) Parents of boys will avoid divorce, because divorce is costly; and 2) parents of boys will have fewer children, because extra children dilute the inheritance.
My take: I still think that most parents, especially fathers, simply prefer boys, whether they admit it or not. But like Steve, I consider myself an exception to this principle!
It costs up to $3 per name to get a list of the nation’s top executives, including title and address.
On average, for every $1000 you make, your name is sold once a year.
The number of junk phone calls surpassed 87 billion last year. At least 2 billion junk faxes were spit out last year. And the average consumer will get 572 pieces of junk mail this year.
For the full story, read here.
Scary, yes, but to me this suggests possible technological solutions to the problems (email spam is harder to solve, since it costs less to send). This year marketers will spend $193 billion on soliciting you, ideally this is money they would like to save.
I doubt if legislation is the sole or main answer. Since 2002, 1500 privacy bills in fifteen states have been introduced. A California consumer group filed $2.2 trillion of class action suits against a single junk faxer. When you see signs of the problem abating, send me a junk fax and let me know.
Tyler mentioned, following a depressed Brad DeLong, a new paper on education vouchers in Chile that does not find large achievement gains. I have some criticisms of the paper (see below) but I was surprised that neither mentioned the most important recent paper on vouchers, Vouchers for Private Schooling in Colombia by Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King and Kremer in the Dec. 2002 AER.
Using data from a randomized experiment, Angrist et al. estimate that attending private school increased the probability of finishing eighth grade by 13-15 percentage points or 25 percent. Test scores increased by .29 standard deviations which is equivalent to about an extra year’s worth of schooling which has been estimated to increase yearly wages by 10 percent. Other markers such as teen cohabitation also improved.
Is this just a case of dueling papers? No, first, unlike Hsieh and Urquiola (HU), the Angrist et al. results are consistent with results found elsewhere. See in particular those found for Catholic schooling in the United States . Second, Hsieh and Urquiola (HU) are good researchers, judging by their paper, but Angrist et al. have a much more convincing research design – results from a randomized trial beat econometric identification any day. Cheer up Brad!
I shouldn’t give the impression that the results are directly comparable, however, as HU are trying to get at the general equilibrium effect of a voucher experiment and Angrist et al. are after the partial equilibrium effect of private schooling. Given the large gains found in the partial equilibrium literature, however, the GE results from HU are not plausible in my view.
Now regarding the HU paper some information is in order. First, there were no vouchers in Chile. Instead, there was public funding of some private schools on a per-student basis. Parents could not apply their voucher to the tuition at a private school of their choice.
Second, HU do not test whether students who transferred to private schools did better than other students – they tested whether aggregate scores (public and private) increased over time as more students attended private schools. Their evidence seems consistent with a nationwide decline in public school quality over time. More generally, I would have liked to have seen some information in their paper on the power of their tests. Given the size of the private sector what sort of gains could would we have expected to see in the aggregate scores and is their technique powerful enough to pick up such gains?
Third, HU claim that “cream skimming” was extensive but I find this difficult to believe because there is no price difference between public and private (voucher-accepting) schools since each was paid the same per-student amount. There are some non-pecuniary barriers but no limits on entry that HU mention.
Fourth, why did private enrollment increase if parents did not perceive a quality improvement? HU mention “freshly painted walls” which I thought was a bit flip – we ought to take revealed preference more seriously.
I do think that the HU study of Chile provides useful information about designing a good voucher program and my priors would have been that the program instituted in Chile, even though not a true voucher program, would have produced a larger effect – thus I learned something from the paper.
Some people find this objectionable but I am in favor of experimentation.
Have you ever wondered why Persian carpets always seem to be for sale? Why the stores are always having “liquidations”? Why the stores are always “going out of business”?
I presented this conundrum to my Industrial Organization class, they came up with two possible explanations.
First, most consumers have little or no idea what the pieces are worth. So you can tell them you are having a sale when you really are not. A few people might be fooled, and you don’t lose anything with the more knowledgeable customers, or with the more skeptical customers. One student called a relative who was a carpet dealer, he appeared to confirm this hypothesis. Note, by the way, that some localities limit how often stores can claim to have sales.
Second, most customers demand only a small number of such carpets. Repeat business may not be so common. Plus the stores buy large quantities of carpets at a time, receiving discounts in the process. The stores end up holding almost all of their capital in the form of inventory, and very little in the form of reputation. The stores then seek to play the Ronald Coase “durable goods monopoly” game, whereby you start with high prices, hope to sell some, and then keep lowering the price repeatedly, until the stock is gone (then you can buy more and start the process over again). Almost all of the time prices will be falling, which is precisely what we observe.
The highest quality textile dealers, as you might find on Madison Avenue, do not pursue this strategy, and they do not have perpetual sales. They sell to better informed buyers, and they have a greater need to maintain their reputational capital. They are certifying higher valued pieces, and pieces which are bought as investments, not just mere decorations. They will keep price steadier, and build a reputation for reliability, rather than always preparing for the next liquidation.
As always, your thoughts on this matter are welcome.
The nocebo effect arises when you expect a poor health outcome, and then get one. For obvious reasons, nocebo effects are harder to test scientifically, because researchers do not wish to create them on purpose.
Robert Ehrlich, in his Eight Preposterous Propositions, reports a few experiments. A group of hospital patients were given sugar water, and were told it would induce vomiting. Eighty percent of the patients vomited as a result.
Many Chinese and Japanese people believe that the number four is unlucky. Scientists studied a sample of 200,000 such people, living in America. On the fourth day of the month, the death rate from heart attacks was thirteen percent higher.. In California, where Asian population concentrations might reinforce superstitious beliefs, the death rate on the fourth was twenty-seven percent higher. I wonder how many of the “heat deaths” in Europe were accelerated, simply because some people thought they were supposed to be dying.
Additional notation: The machine I am working on won’t do “Cut and paste” for links, among other things, nor will it do boldface. You can track down the Ehrlich book through Amazon.com or my previous posts on placebos.
The U.S.-born children of immigrants are replacing their parents as the fastest-growing generation in the Latino population, and the shift will have profound effects on the country’s largest minority group.
The children of immigrants are likely to move closer to the mainstream than their parents — marrying people from other backgrounds, for example. Their political views are likely to change as well, becoming more liberal on abortion, experts say, but less supportive of affirmative action. Their earnings and education will surpass those of their parents, experts predict, but will not close the gap with the Anglo majority.
“The biggest difference is that we’re shifting from a process where the largest component is Spanish-speaking immigrants — where language and immigration status were two enormous questions — to growth of a population that is English-speaking and native-born,” said Roberto Suro, the Pew center’s director. “You totally move away from the issues that have been dominant. They have a totally different set of issues than their parents do.”
My take: Good news all around. I don’t believe common cries that America is collapsing under the weight of Latino immigration, for one statement of this view, see Mexifornia, by Victor Davis Hanson. No, market prices are not always right, but until real estate prices collapse in California and Texas, it is hard to be so worried about the problem. The Great American Experiment continues to work.
Here is the Washington Post article. Here is the home page of the Pew Hispanic Center, I don’t yet see the study on-line. Here is a relevant interview, with Jeffrey Passel and Rebecca Blank, two researchers in the area.
The “bounty hunter” conference was fascinating. To be precise, I was invited to speak before the California Bail Agents Association which includes bail bond agents who write the bonds, surety/insurance companies who back the bonds as well as bail enforcement agents (aka bounty hunters) who recapture fugitives.
The bounty hunters were generally big guys but not so that you would notice on the street – these were not your Gold’s Gym type. A bounty hunter can always buy muscle but what they really need is smarts. A successful bounty hunter avoids excessive confrontation because every pickup is a lawsuit waiting to happen. One bounty hunter told me a big part of his success has been unfailing politeness.
Another key element is getting family members to cosign the bond – even hardened criminals don’t want to see Momma’s house taken should they fail to appear at trial.
It’s no coincidence that bail agents typically have their annual convention in Reno or Las Vegas but these are poker players not mindless feeders of the slot machine. (The distinction between these forms of gambling strikes me as important but to my knowledge has not been taken up by economists.)
Many of the “bondsmen”, perhaps even a majority, are women. Bondsmen must develop intuition and judgment about who is a flight risk and women may be particularly good at this. Also, although the defendant’s are usually men, its often their wives, girlfriends and mothers who bail them out and dealing empathetically with these women is a big part of the art – alas, repeat business is not uncommon.
As with other insurance industries, you can make a lot of money quickly by writing bail but trouble comes when your charges skip and their bail becomes forfeit. At least that is what is supposed to happen but – and I am surprised to be saying this – lax regulators and high-price lawyers can open a window of opportunity that makes bad bail writing potentially profitable. The problems this creates for the honest players in the industry was a big topic at the conference. I was impressed, however, that there was also a frank discussion about how to distinguish rules meant to weed out the fraudulent from anti-competitive rules. This is a topic I need to think more about.
A whopping one-quarter of all felony defendants fail to appear at trial. Of these some thirty percent can’t be found after a year.
The police are overrun with unserved arrest warrants for failure to appear and typically devote little time to the task.
As a result, FTA appear rates are some 28% lower for those released on commercial bail compared to those released on their own recognizance.
When a defendant does FTA he is about 50% more likely to be caught and is caught much sooner if a bounty hunter is on his trail compared to if only the police are involved. (Both of these effects are after controlling for other relevant factors, of course).