Results for “licensing”
122 found

Facts about occupational licensing

We find that in 2006, 29 percent of the workforce was required to hold
an occupational license from a government agency, which is a higher
percentage than that found in studies that rely on state-level
occupational licensing data.

That is from a new paper by Morris Kleiner and Alan Krueger.  I am happy to see such respected economists turning their attention to a neglected issue.  Here is a non-gated version of the paper.

There is, by the way, an interesting sentence buried near the end of the paper:

In contrast, union members perceive themselves as less competent than other workers.

Do we need occupational licensing?

Alan Krueger writes:

In a new book, "Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting
Competition?" (Upjohn Institute, 2006), Morris M. Kleiner, an economist
at the University of Minnesota, questions whether occupational
licensing has gone too far. He provides much evidence that the balance
of occupational licensing has shifted away from protecting consumers
and toward limiting the supply of workers in various professions. A
result is that services provided by licensed workers are more expensive
than necessary and that quality is not noticeably affected.

Read more here.  I can’t yet find this listed on Amazon.com, any pointers?  Here is a pdf of part of the book.  Here is a home page for the book.

Carmel stops licensing new art galleries

Art is dead in Carmel — or at the very least, its growth is stunted.

With a glut of art in the idyllic seaside village — about four out of 10 businesses [out of a total of about 300] are art galleries — the Carmel City Council is taking action to prevent new galleries from springing up.

As expected, the council unanimously agreed last week to impose a moratorium on licensing art galleries in the city.

Here is the full story. Is this a public choice story of old galleries keeping out upstarts? A slow growth movement? A rebellion against the horrible aesthetic quality of so many contemporary Western landscapes? All of the above?

Claude 3 Opus and AGI

As many MR readers will know, I don’t think the concept of AGI is especially well-defined.  Can the thing dribble a basketball “with smarts”?  Probably not.  Then its intelligence isn’t general.  You might think that kind of intelligence “doesn’t matter,” and maybe I agree, but that is begging the question.  It is easier and cleaner to just push the notion of “general” out of the center of the argument.  God aside, if such a being exists, intelligence never is general.

In the structure of current debates, the concept of “AGI” plays a counterproductive role.  You might think the world truly changes once we reach such a thing.  That means the doomsters will be reluctant to admit AGI has arrived, because imminent doom is not evident.  The Gary Marcus-like skeptics also will be reluctant to admit AGI has arrived, because they have been crapping on the capabilities for years.  In both cases, the stances on AGI tell you more about the temperaments of the commentators than about any capabilities of the beast itself.

I would say this: there is yet another definition of AGI, a historical one.  Five years ago, if people had seen Claude 3 Opus, would they have thought we had AGI?  Just as a descriptive matter, I think the answer to that question is yes, and better yet someone on Twitter suggested more or less the same.  In that sense we have AGI right now.

Carry on, people!  Enjoy your 2019-dated AGI.  Canada has to wait.

Concluding remarks: Forget that historical relativism!  True AGI never will be built, and that holds for OpenAI as well.  Humans in 2019 were unimaginative, super-non-critical morons, impressed by any piddling AI that can explain a joke or understand a non-literal sentence.  Licensing can continue and Elon is wrong.

Sunday assorted links

1. The pessimistic view on Ethiopia.

2. Inside the NBA’s chess club.

3. Brian Goff on education and the cost disease.

4. Genes and depression and bad luck is endogenous.

5. TC on internet writing.  And TC on Bill Laimbeer on passive-aggressive economists.

6. How should state and local governments respond to illegal retail cannabis?

7. Diaper spa for adults, and a licensing issue too.

8. The Karpathy review of Apple Vision Pro.  I likely will try it once there is a small army of people who have figured out the ins and outs and who can serve as tutors, including for setting the thing up.  One reason I am not “first in line” with this device is that it strikes me as a “technology of greater vividness” (a bit like some drugs? or downhill skiing?), and not so much a “technology to understand people and cultures more deeply.”  I think the latter interests me more, and I also do better with the latter.  But perhaps I am wrong!  To be clear, I am not arguing that “technologies of greater vividness” are objectively or intrinsically worse, if anything more people seem to prefer them.

What did the different great economists think about India?

One feature of my new generative book GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of All Time and Why Does It Matter? is that almost all of the major contenders (save Hayek) considered India and wrote about India.  I compare and contrast the different treatments, as this is one test of how good an economist you are: can you make sense of a very new and different environment?

From the text, written by me, here is Milton Friedman on India:

Let’s consider Milton Friedman’s 1955 memo written to the government of India, based upon his first trip there. No one ever has suggested that Friedman was an expert on India, or even an expert on developing nations, a topic that barely came up in his published research (he does discuss Hong Kong and the other Asian tigers in some of his more popular writings).

Friedman starts the memo by noting that a five percent rate of economic growth should be possible for India, reflecting of course his interest in economic progress. That was during a time when Indian growth rates were more in the range of two percent, and the prevailing approach was to refer to “the Hindu rate of growth” in a pessimistic manner. Friedman also suggests that Indian growth will be “catch-up growth,” drawing upon the “technical and scientific knowledge” of the world. Early on in the memo, Friedman also argues for a moderately expansionary monetary policy, much better education and training, and better infrastructure.

So far Friedman is on track.

He presents further specifics when confronting other views. For instance, he argued that the prevailing development literature put too much emphasis on aggregate investment and the capital to output ratio. Friedman worried about the possibility of malinvestment, and that the Indian government would favor “heavy industry…and handicrafts” too much, at the expense of small and medium-size enterprises.  Furthermore, he saw that India should focus more on human capital.

Friedman also insists that the Indian government should not excessively expand the public sector. He criticized “nationalization and detailed state control over economic activity,” hardly a surprising view from Milton Friedman. You might see this point as overlooking the possibility of East Asian-style industrial policy, but Indian government interventions, during this period and afterwards, did turn out relatively badly, and furthermore the East Asian successes were hardly apparent or even existing at the time. So Friedman’s analysis may be imperfect in hindsight, but overall it was defensible. Nonetheless Friedman could have raised the importance of an economy having sectors with increasing returns, learning effects, and higher growth potential, but he did not. Most of all, he was appropriately critical of the efforts of the Indian government to protect inefficient industries, and he attacked licensing requirements and the general stifling of progress through excess regulation and favoritism.

Friedman also called for India to have money supply growth of 4 to 6 percent a year, and he placed special stress on this recommendation. My view is a little different, having observed that South Korea often had high double-digit inflation during its economic miracle, but still this was sound enough advice, even if he overly prioritized the point.

On the tax side, Friedman called for a broader tax base for India with a greater scope for direct income taxation. Excise taxes, in turn, should be cut back. These recommendations also have held up well, and furthermore they belie the view of Friedman as a mindless tax cutter.

In his notes on Indian economic planning, Friedman expressed concern that the distribution of income in India was widening rather than narrowing. He also takes pains to rebut the view that India is culturally or religiously unsuited for economic growth, and he blames poor Indian economic policy for India’s poverty, not the Indian people. To the current reader, this sharp distinction between culture and ideas about policy may sound naïve, especially since Friedman complains about both corruption and the fondness of Indian intellectuals for socialist ideology. Do those two factors truly have nothing to do with the culture of a country or region? In any case Friedman saw the very great potential in India.

He also criticized India’s system of foreign exchange allocation and called for a freeing up of capital markets and exchange rates. Arguably the verdict on this recommendation is still out, as India still controls capital flows and thus its exchange rate to some extent. Some defenders of this policy will argue it is why India has avoided a major financial crisis, namely that international capital flows in and out of the country never have been so volatile. Again, while I tend to agree with Friedman here (there is evidence that foreign capital significantly boosts Indian productivity), I would acknowledge this as a possible point of criticism. At the very least it is not obvious that Friedman was correct in this segment of his recommendations.

Finally, Friedman closes the memo by noting he has focused so much on monetary and financial affairs because that is his area of expertise. He also notes a few times that he is no expert on the economic affairs of India.

In sum, this memo is not perfect…but it basically hits the mark, has held up well, and Milton Friedman passes the test of giving good policy advice into a broadly unfamiliar situation.

You will find the endnotes in the core text.  Of course Smith, Malthus, Mill, and Keynes also dealt with India, with varying degrees of success.  The import of India for the history of political economy remains a wee bit underrated.

Jeremy Howard on AI Safety and the Age of Disenlightenment

Proposals for stringent AI model licensing and surveillance will likely be ineffective or counterproductive, concentrating power in unsustainable ways, and potentially rolling back the societal gains of the Enlightenment. The balance between defending society and empowering society to defend itself is delicate. We should advocate for openness, humility and broad consultation to develop better responses aligned with our principles and values — responses that can evolve as we learn more about this technology with the potential to transform society for good or ill.

Here is the full paper, let us not forget these basic truths.  Should be put into the new Acemoglu and Lensman model!  (They do political economy, right?)

Web 3.0 has a future after all

That is the theme of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:

I fully expect the ideas behind Web 3.0 to make a major comeback — as the legal and institutional framework for AI bots. It’s worth thinking through how this might work.

Say you run a charity and want to create and distribute an AI bot that will teach mathematics to underprivileged schoolchildren. That’s great, but the bot will encounter some obstacles. In some jurisdictions, it may need to pay licensing and registration fees. It may need to purchase add-ons for recent innovations in teaching. If it operates abroad, it may wish to upgrade its ability to translate. For a variety of reasons, it might need money.

All those transactions would be easy enough if AIs were allowed to have bank accounts. But that’s unlikely anytime soon. How many banks are ready to handle this? And imagine the public outcry if there were a bank failure and the government had to bail out some bot accounts. So bots are likely to remain “unbanked” — which will push them to use crypto as their core medium of exchange.

Critics often point out that dollars are more efficient than crypto as a form of exchange. But if AI bots can’t use dollars, then they will have to use crypto. Yes, some owners might give bots access to their checking accounts, while others might want to OK every bot expenditure through the dollar-based banking system. But most people, I suspect, would rather let the bots operate on their own, without all those risks and hassles — and again, that brings us back to crypto.

There are well-known arguments for why “agentic” bots are often more efficient than “tool” bots, and they are going to need money that is consistent with a reasonable degree of bot autonomy. Furthermore, possibly for liability reasons (do you want to be indicted in some foreign country because of something your bot said or did?), many of these bots won’t be owned at all. That will be another force pushing the bots to operate in the crypto nexus.

There is much more at the link, including a discussion of NFTs as property rights in this regime.  You can expect law, adjudication services, and smart contracts as well, all as substitutes for a “proper” legal system.

Wednesday assorted links

1. Toronto anti-capitalist cafe is closing.  I guess capitalism was worse than they thought (better than I thought?).

2. Brazilian Portuguese edition of Talent is out, Talento, with Daniel Gross.

3. New George Tavlas book on the history of monetarism.

4. Gorton and Zhang on bank runs and crypto.

5. Can data keep people out of prison?  Steve Levitt podcast with Clementine Jacoby of Recidivez.

6. Are more Americans donning fake British accents?

7. The hackers, on LLM licensing.

*The AI Revolution in Medicine: GPT-4 and Beyond*

A new, forthcoming book by Peter Lee, Carey Goldberg, and Isaac Kohane, with Sebastian Bubeck.  The researchers were given advance access to GPT-4 (with no editorial controls), and this book documents the power of the results, for instance:

In our testing, when given a full battery of USMLE [medical licensing exam] problems, GPT-4 answers them correctly more than 90 percent of the time.

And it can give very good explanations.

Due out May 13, this book is the documentation, definitely recommended, especially for the skeptics.

Capabilities of GPT-4 on Medical Challenge Problems

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in natural language understanding and generation across various domains, including medicine. We present a comprehensive evaluation of GPT-4, a state-of-the-art LLM, on medical competency examinations and benchmark datasets. GPT-4 is a general-purpose model that is not specialized for medical problems through training or engineered to solve clinical tasks. Our analysis covers two sets of official practice materials for the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE), a three-step examination program used to assess clinical competency and grant licensure in the United States. We also evaluate performance on the MultiMedQA suite of benchmark datasets. Beyond measuring model performance, experiments were conducted to investigate the influence of test questions containing both text and images on model performance, probe for memorization of content during training, and study calibration of the probabilities, which is of critical importance in high-stakes applications like medicine. Our results show that GPT-4, without any specialized prompt crafting, exceeds the passing score on USMLE by over 20 points and outperforms earlier general-purpose models (GPT-3.5) as well as models specifically fine-tuned on medical knowledge (Med-PaLM, a prompt-tuned version of Flan-PaLM 540B). In addition, GPT-4 is significantly better calibrated than GPT-3.5, demonstrating a much-improved ability to predict the likelihood that its answers are correct. We also explore the behavior of the model qualitatively by presenting a case study that shows the ability of GPT-4 to explain medical reasoning, personalize explanations to students, and interactively craft new counterfactual scenarios around a medical case. Implications of the findings are discussed for potential uses of GPT-4 in medical education, assessment, and clinical practice, with appropriate attention to challenges of accuracy and safety.

Here is the full paper by Harsha Nori, Nicholas King, Scott Mayer McKinney, Dean Carignan, and Eric Horvita.  Ho hum, people, ho hum!

Via Ethan Mollick.

Saturday assorted links

1. How to date recordings, using background electrical noise.

2. Visiting Kabul under Taliban rule.

3. “We ask why green bond promises are so weak, while the same investors demand strong promises from the same issuers in other settings.

4. Permission-slip culture is hurting America.

5. Old Corpse Road.

6. Amit Varma podcast with Rohini Nilekani.

7. Plastic roads?  From the new edition of Works in Progress.

8. Garett Jones on the private return to AGI.

9. John Cochrane on the minimum wage and monopsony.

Thursday assorted links

1. Could we trade with ants?

2. Five trends that will shape urban Africa.

3. Is the Fed losing money on QE?

4. Do Asian-Americans have the world’s highest life expectancy?

5. On immigration (and authority) Daniel Klein is correct.

6. Can ChatGPT pass medical licensing examsSpeculative GPT thoughts.  And “I taught ChatGPT a language.” And “The return of the Socratic method, at scale and on demand.”  Get ready people!  “Rewrite this article so it sounds like a human.”  And Chat GPT recommends the best books on AI.  Get with the program!  Yes, I mean you.  Only yesterday I found the beast very helpful in prepping questions for Glenn Loury (thanks Glenn, that was a great episode!).

7. Roman vs. modern concrete, updated and revised.

The Truss economic plan

On Friday [as indeed it happened], Ms. Truss’ government is expected to announce a series of tax cuts, including cutting taxes for new home purchases as well as reversing planned hikes in the corporate tax and cutting a recent increase in payroll taxes. It will also abolish limits on bonuses for bankers and allow fracking for shale gas across the U.K.

The measures come in addition to a big government spending plan to cap household and corporate energy bills this winter that could cost the U.K. government roughly £100 billion, equivalent to about $113 billion, over the next two years.

The goal is to spur growth in an economy facing weak growth and high inflation, partly brought on by an energy price shock from higher natural-gas prices from the war in Ukraine, as well as a U.S.-style labor shortage. Absent the government bailouts, economists warned that many Britons would be unable to pay their energy bills this coming winter and thousands of companies would go broke…

The government is also planning a deregulation drive, in particular in the finance sector, to try to bolster London’s role as a business hub.

Taken together, the Truss plan is a bold but risky gamble that the payoff from higher growth will more than offset the risks from a big expansion in the government’s deficit and debt at a time of high inflation and rising interest rates, which will increase the cost of servicing the debt and could shake investors’ confidence in the U.K. economy and its currency.

Here is more from the WSJElsewhere Ryan Bourne covers the tax changes in more detail:

    • the recent 1.25 percent employer and employee national insurance tax rises have been reversed;
    • the basic rate of income tax would be cut from 20 percent to 19 percent;
    • the highest 45 percent marginal income tax rate would be abolished entirely, making 40 percent the top official marginal rate band;
    • stamp duty (the property transactions tax) on all transactions up to home values of £250,000 and £425,000 for first-time buyers has been scrapped;
    • the planned increase in the corporate profits tax has been abandoned (so maintaining it at 19 percent);
    • full and immediate expensing in the corporate tax code for the first £1 million invested in plant and machinery would be made permanent;
    • new investment zones would be introduced, in which there would be a 100 percent first year enhanced capital allowance relief for plant and machinery and building and structures relief of 20 percent per year.

And on regulation:

  • new investment zones would encompass streamlining existing planning applications (and these are potentially big zones, if the councils and authorities in discussions are any guide – the Greater London Authority, for example);
  • environmental reviews would be shortened and reformed;
  • childcare deregulation proposals (probably on staffing and occupational licensing) are forthcoming;
  • new planning reforms for housing are forthcoming;
  • the onshore wind generator ban will be lifted;
  • the fracking moratorium has been lifted;
  • the cap on bankers’ bonuses will be abandoned;
  • agricultural regulation will be reformed;
  • the sugar tax and lots of other anti-obesity regulations will be abandoned;
  • the arduous tax rules on contractors known as IR35 will be scrapped;
  • all future tax policy will be reviewed through this prism of simplification;
  • there will be an expansion of the number of welfare claimants who must submit to more intensive work coaching with the aim of increasing their hours

The FT details the negative reaction from UK bond, equity, and currency markets.  Furman and Buiter are very negative, Summers too.  In my view, these are mostly good policies, but how will all that borrowing go over?  And is the Bank of England up to doing the appropriate offsets?  I will cover these policies as they unfold…

The Return of Privateering?

TexasSignal: Rep. Lance Gooden, a Republican who represents Texas’ 5th District, has introduced legislation that would allow U.S. citizens to seize the yachts, jets, and other property belonging to Russian oligarchs who have been sanctioned in response to the invasion of Ukraine. In other words, privateering.

…In the age of sail, it was common for nations to issue letters of marque licensing private citizens to raid the shipping of enemy nations. The practice died down in the 19th Century with the Paris Declaration of 1856 outlawing privateers. However, the United States never signed the Paris Declaration, and Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to issue letters of marque.

Gooden’s bill would require President Biden to issue letters of marque to seize yachts and other assets belonging to sanctioned Russian citizens. Gooden’s office even says that letters of marque could be issued to hackers to go after Russia in cyberspace.

There are three questions. First, should some Russian citizens be sanctioned? Second, should assets belonging to sanctioned Russian citizens be seized? Third, should privateers be able to do the seizing under a legal regime? There is a lot of room for debate on the first two questions but oddly these questions aren’t debated. Sanctions of this kind are common and broadly regarded as legitimate although likely overused in my view. The latter question arouses the most debate but is to me the easiest to answer. Sure, why not? Privateering worked well in the wars of the 19th century and we could likely have saved trillions by using bounties in the war in Afghanistan.

Here’s my paper on privateering and my story about the time I went bounty hunting in Baltimore.