Results for “prediction market”
326 found

Sherlock Holmes on prediction markets

"When you see a man with whiskers of that cut and the ‘Pink ‘un‘ protruding out of his pocket, you can always draw him by a bet," said he.  "I daresay that if I had put £100 down in front of him, that man would not have given me such complete information as was drawn from him by the idea that he was doing me on a wager.

That is from Adventure of the Blue Carbuncle and of course the link is added by yours truly.  The latest news from the prediction markets, by the way, is that the U.S. basketball team is given about a 75 percent chance of taking home the gold medal.

Prediction markets in everything, Brazilian soccer player edition

It could be a fantasy football draft in any office in America –
only these trades are real. This is the office of Traffic, a Brazilian
company leading a new, and controversial, wave of investment in
Brazilian soccer.

Armed with 20 million reals of their own
money (about $12 million) and another 20 million reals they hope to get
from investors, Traffic is buying up contracts of young soccer players
all over Brazil. They then lend the players to teams, who pay the
players a salary and also allow them to showcase their talents. If they
are recruited by a big European team, Traffic and its partners reap the
largest share of the transfer fee. (The player, as usual, gets any
signing bonus, and an often hefty salary.)

“Instead of investing
in the stock market or real estate,” Julio Mariz, Traffic’s president,
said, “these people are investing in buying the economic rights to
football players."

Here is the full story and thanks to Hunter Amor Williams for the pointer; here is Hunter’s beer blog.

Non-profit prediction markets

At Bet2give, an online electronic prediction market, anyone can “bet”
real money on the outcome of these events but with a twist – the
“winnings” go to a charity of the person’s choice.

Here is the full article, and here is Bet2give.com.  One of the "problems" with prediction markets is that they are zero-sum investments and traders cannot on average hope to come out ahead.  So why trade?  If only people really "in the know" trade liquidity will be low.  If too many "betting for fun" fools trade, the prices don’t mean that much.  You might get the right mix of informed and uninformed but who knows?  So the idea of doing these in charitable form might make some sense.

Prediction markets as bribery?

Harald, a loyal MR reader, writes to me:

What would happen if some famous rich person walked into a presidential prediction market and said: "Hello, I’m selling shorts for candidate A, to the value of a hundred million dollars if he should win. I’m not doing this because I don’t believe candidate A will win, indeed, I want her to win. I hope everyone who can help candidate A win, by campaigning, talking to friends, or even just voting, will buy a short from me (I’m practically giving them away!) and go out and do it with a healthy economic self-interest in their hearts!"

Regulators aside, could such a scheme work?  It is best done as a contingent claims market, rather than in the InTrade format.  You buy insurance for a penny, and you get a payout of a thousand dollars if candidate X wins.  Claim holders may then support and talk up candidate X.  Of course people who won’t change their votes for a thousand dollars also will try to buy up the contingent claims.  So the sponsor might restrict purchases to people who live in swing states or who can prove independent voting affiliation or an absence of previous campaign donations [TC: I’ve edited this section a bit for clarity]. 

How about giving away assets that pay off if some important social problem is solved?  How much would it cost to mobilize a strong enough army of voters to oppose farm subsidies?   

Prediction markets at Google

According to the report, “Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence From Google,”
which was presented Friday at the American Economic Association meeting
in New Orleans, the strongest correlation in betting was found among
people who sat very close to one another, trumping even friendship or
other close social ties.

This is tangible evidence, the authors
argue, that information is shared most easily and effectively among
office neighbors, even at an Internet company where instant messaging
and e-mail are generally preferred to face-to-face discussion.

It is an argument, the authors say, for giving greater importance to
“microgeography,” or how people interact in the workplace. The finding
that information moved fastest among people who were the closest
together is also an endorsement of the company’s “third rule for
managing knowledge workers: Pack Them In,” the authors say.

And Adam Smith is validated once again:

The other crucial finding of the report was that there was a
detectible “optimism bias” among Google employees. That is, results
that were good for the company tended to be overpriced, particularly
for “subjects under the control of Google employees, such as, would a
project be completed on time or would a particular office be opened.”

This
optimism was most evident among new employees, the report found, and it
was bound to show up on days when Google stock had climbed.

Here is the story.  Of course this is very important work.  Thanks to Chris Masse for the pointer.  Elsewhere in prediction markets land, InTrade has now started conditional prediction markets, which consider oil prices, interest rates, and U.S. troops in Iraq, conditional on who becomes President.

Prediction Markets: Some assorted news

  1. Wrap-up of an interesting conference run by Consensus Point (HT: Midas Oracle;  Disclosure: I’m an occasional advisor to Consensus Point).  Robin Hanson tells me that he is now (back to) bullish on prediction markets – he saw real evidence of real firms implementing prediction markets and taking them seriously.
    UPDATE: Another nice summary available here.
  2. How to bet real money, in a country in which real money markets are illegal? www.bet2give.com allows you to bet your charitable donations against mine.  You win the bet?  My donations go to your charity.  I win the bet?  Your donations go to my preferred charity.  Brilliant.  Incentives, charitable donations, and legal protection – all good things.  A longer description here.  (HT: Emile Servan-Schreiber of NewsFutures)
  3. The ’08 race at InTrade: Latest trading suggest Hillary is a strong favorite to win the Democratic nomination (66% chance).   The Republican primary is a true three horse race.  Most puzzling (to me): How is Obama only a 16% chance?  Some say he is really running for VP, but the markets suggest he is only a 27% chance to win the second spot on the ticket.  My tip: Buy Obama for Prez at 8%.

    [Full disclosure: I’m an occasional advisor to both Consensus Point and NewsFutures]

Prediction Markets on the Surge

Mark Thoma points us to a new paper by Michael Greenstone that tries to evaluate the effect of the surge.  The news is not good.

This paper shows how data
from world financial markets can be used to shed light on the central question
of whether the Surge has increased or diminished the prospect of today’s Iraq
surviving into the future. In particular, I examine the price of Iraqi state
bonds, which the Iraqi government is currently servicing, on world financial
markets. After the Surge, there is a sharp decline in the price of those bonds,
relative to alternative bonds. The decline signaled a 40% increase in the
market’s expectation that Iraq will default. This finding suggests that to date
the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be
undermining it.

It’s amazing how far we have come since 2003 when Robin Hanson’s DARPA-funded Policy Analysis Market was ridiculed and canceled.

Why don’t more businesses use prediction markets?

Last week in The New York Times (TimesSelect), Joseph Nocera quoted Robin Hanson as saying private businesses had not made a breakthrough with the use of idea futures.  It seems natural to let your employees bet on future business conditions, the success of product lines, or broader questions of corporate strategy.  Microsoft and Google and a few other companies have played with the idea, but it does not (yet?) seem to be taking off.  Why not?

1. Prediction markets threaten the hierarchical control of top managers.  It would become too obvious that most managers are idiots, unable to predict the future.

2. Prediction markets make a big chunk of the bettors into "losers."  Yet within a company morale is all-important.  Businesses proceed by soliciting feedback, and by reshaping their plans to pretend that everyone is on board and has an ego stake in the final outcome.  Prediction markets make this coordination more difficult.  Once people make bets, they start rooting for their bet to win and for the other bet to lose.  They move away from maximizing the value of the firm and develop an oppositional mentality vis-a-vis other employees.  Furthermore it is disruptive to have a running tally on who are the winners and losers each day.

3. No matter what they pretend, businesses are not much interested in forecasting many future variables.  Successful businesses find product markets they can control for long periods of time.  They do a few things really well, and let a surprisingly large number of tasks slide.

4. We already have implicit betting markets in the form of resource prices.  When the information contained in those prices is sufficiently important, institutions will be organized in terms of "markets," rather than "firms."  Or firms can look at resource prices in outside markets for the information they need.

5. Most employees have no rational basis on which to bet.  If someone knows the truth, but is otherwise locked out from credibly signaling that knowledge to management, something is wrong with the organization of the company.  The small prizes from corporate prediction markets won’t be enough to elicit that knowledge from him in any case.

6. The corporate beast is far more constrained than most outsiders imagine.  Interest groups must be courted, coordinated, and sometimes fought every step of the way.  When it comes to choice, there are fewer degrees of freedom than one might think.  The real question is not what to do, but rather having the will and effectiveness to do it.  A bit like international free trade, no?  Prediction markets don’t help much in this regard.

7. When reward systems are created, employees view them as a means to distribute further privileges to insiders and favorites.  Prediction markets would be viewed the same way and in fact this might be true.  Who else is going to win all those bets?  Do corporations really need more insider favoritism?

Your thoughts?  Here are five open questions about prediction markets.

Five open questions about prediction markets

Here is the new version of the paper, for $5.  Here are older versions of the paper.  Here is a summary of the five questions.  Of these five, I worry most about getting uninformed traders to participate in a game with zero-sum (at best, assuming no trading costs) pecuniary returns.  I doubt if idea futures will be the sexiest form of gambling for most people.  Insofar as traders look for fun, only the celebrity-obsessed and current events-obsessed will find idea futures more attractive than Las Vegas or Baden-Baden.  (That is why contracts on politicians and Michael Jackson have been so popular.)  If you are simply looking to earn money for the longer run, Wall Street, with its positive expected rates of return, offers better odds.  That being said, as the fixed costs of market creation fall, a relatively small number of traders may suffice to keep most of the important idea futures going.

Prediction markets for the flu

In many asset markets the very phenomenon of market trading appears to increase volatility. Richard Roll did some empirical studies of exogenously determined market closings (occasionally various exchanges have closed for brief periods for purely technical reasons, such as catching up on paperwork or upgrading systems). Price volatility was higher across periods when markets where open than when markets where shut. In essence you draw inferences from watching other people trade, other people draw inferences from your inferences, and so on. The “dialogue” embedded in the market makes the price bounce around, even when it hones in on a better mean forecast.

Note further that most meta-rational people should not trade (economists refer to no-trade theorems). When you trade, you should always ask why you think you know more than the person you are trading with. Not every trader in the market as a whole can meta-rationally conclude that she knows more than the other traders. Yes you might trade for liquidity to put your kids through college, but I suspect that most trading in prediction markets is or would be opinion-based. It is especially prone to hubris and irrationality, which again contributes to volatility.

Here is the paradox. We need volume for the price to tell of much about market conditions. But volume is based on irrationality to large extent. Most people — the uninformed — should simply park their money about forget about active trading. And the remaining informed cannot so easily trade against each other.

Prediction markets may be least well-suited for predicting terrorist attacks. Tracking an excessively volatile price could create worry and perhaps sometimes panic. What will happen each time the market price spikes for a nuclear bomb going off in a major American city?

The very virtue of prediction markets now becomes their cost. If you hear rumors, in the absence of prediction markets, you can ignore them and pretend they are not true. With asset markets, however, your forecast moves into equality with that of the market, otherwise you would trade. It is precisely this “forcing quality” that makes prediction markets so useful, but also so potent. Price movements are materially and psychologically harder to ignore. The very feature of prediction markets that mobilizes information also mobilizes coordinated social reactions to the embodied information, and not always for the better.

So the prediction market skeptics have a valid point in some contexts, but this does not detract from the benefits of prediction markets more generally.

Google is using prediction markets within the firm

The markets were designed to forecast product launch dates, new office openings, and many other things of strategic importance to Google. So far, more than a thousand Googlers have bid on 146 events in 43 different subject areas (no payment is required to play).

We designed the market so that the price of an event should, in theory, reflect a consensus probability that the event will occur. To determine accuracy of the market, we looked at the connection between prices of events and the frequency with which they actually occurred. If prices are correct, events priced at 10 cents should occur about 10 percent of the time.

In the graph below, the X-axis indicates the price ranges for the
group. The orange line represents the average price, which is how often
outcomes in that group should actually happen according to market
prices. The purple line is how often they did happen. Ideally these
would be equal, and as you can see they’re pretty close. So our prices
really do represent probabilities – very exciting!

The image

Here is the story, and thanks to several of you who sent in the link.

Annual awards for prediction markets

Which prediction markets ("information futures") had the best year last year?  Worst?  Which contract performed the best or was the most interesting?  What was the best academic paper in the area?

Find the answers to these questions, and many others here.

Thanks to Robin Hanson for the pointer, I will note that Robin was named (deservingly) as person of the year in this area, even though he bet Saddam would not be captured.