Results for “culture that is germany”
105 found

Germany fact of the day

Germany’s real effective devaluation in terms of relative unit labour costs compared with the EU27 during 1994-2009 is about 20%.

The post, which focuses on German outsourcing to Eastern Europe (an effect not included in the above estimate), is interesting throughout.  Germany is sometimes called an "inflexible" country or an "inflexible" culture.  But if you look at the longer sweep of history, you can make an equally good or better case that the Germans have a remarkably flexible culture, sometimes too flexible.  In this particular case it seems to be just flexible enough.

This account can help us understand why Germany is not so keen on higher inflation and a weaker euro.  Think of depreciation as a substitute for wage flexibility.  If you've managed a good deal of wage flexibility — in part in advance — policymakers probably don't need or want the depreciation.  It bears also on why the Germans don't so much see Keynesian economics as applying to their country.

Addendum: I very much enjoyed this Paul Krugman post.

The culture that is German, a continuing series

Economic protectionism, linguistic protectionism, status protectionism, or all three?:

Americans with PhDs beware: Telling people in Germany that you’re a doctor could land you in jail.  At least seven U.S. citizens working as researchers in Germany have faced criminal probes in recent months for using the title "Dr." on their business cards, Web sites and resumes. They all hold doctoral degrees from elite universities back home…Violators can face a year behind bars.

Here is the full story.  And get this: "A male faculty member with two PhDs can fully expect to be called "Herr Professor Dr. Dr. Schmidt," for example."

Update: They just changed the law.  I guess I should have titled this post "The earthquake that is Germany," etc.  Sadly there is no medium for telling The Washington Post that their front page story this morning is wrong but of course we have a very keen reader willing to leave comments.

A “Grand Coalition” in Germany?

The electoral deadlock in Germany may mean a "Grand Coalition" with its two major parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats.  This is the likely outcome if neither of the major parties can assemble a coalition with the minor parties; some minor/major alliances simply are not possible, for either political or ideological reasons.

Looking to public choice theory, how will a Grand Coalition operate?

Models of proportional representation typically allow for multiple equilibria, but a plausible outcome involves a trade between a major party and an allied minor party.  The minor party will promise to support the major party in forming a coalition, if the major party makes one or two key policy concessions.  The distribution of gains will depend on bargaining power.  Will the major party have other possible coalition allies?  Does the minor party crave power, or would it rather stake out a purist stance on policy, and risk being left outside the coalition?  Note that once the coalition is in place the minor party often has a difficult time defecting.  Minor party officials come to enjoy the perks of power.  Their threats to bring down the coalition often are not credible.  So the resulting government often holds power snugly and governs sluggishly.

When no minor party is available for the coalition, the terms of the bargain shift.

First, a Grand Coalition usually means that the two major parties have roughly equal electoral strength.  If the coalition collapses, and a government must re-form, and either party could come out on top in the new bargain.  Therefore the (slightly) weaker coalition member does not have a very strong incentive to hold the coalition together.

Second, the two major parties often have opposing platforms.  So the initial policy compromise might stop either party from doing much of anything.  That is one reason to expect stalemate.  It also means that the (slightly) stronger party doesn’t gain much from the coalition; it cannot promote its agenda.  There is also the danger of many minor parties proliferating at the fringes, given the centrism of the joint coalition.  This lowers the returns to holding power at the center, as these minor parties will cut into your future electoral support.

The bottom line: Two parties in a Grand Coalition will reap low gains from trade.  Neither party will much mind if the Grand Coalition collapses.  Stability is "knife-edge."  But the parties therefore might be willing to take more chances.  What do they have to lose?  A Grand Coalition does not mean certain policy gridlock (in contrast to this pessimistic view). 

And let us say that both parties recognize the need for reforms, but are held back by voters.  An arrangement where accountability is low and "each party can blame the other" might be exactly what is needed.

To cite reality for just a moment, Germany had a "Grand Coalition" from 1966 to 1969, and this was no obvious disaster.  Student revolts aside, many Germans consider these years a golden age. The earlier Grand Coalition passed important economic legislation in 1967 and restricted civil liberties in a controversial manner.  Modern German politics is often slow, but in relative terms this period was not a time of gridlock.

Addendum: Here is a longish piece I once wrote on proportional representation; note Alex’s contribution on referenda as well.

Wednesday assorted links

1. When were the great philosophers?

2. When it comes to the great stagnation, don’t blame the engineers.  A very good post with lots of detail; I say fear the services!

3. Are ravens as clever as chimps?  Paper here.

4. Traffic lights embedded in pavements, in case you cross the street while viewing your smartphone the culture that is Germany.

5. Frequency of Sex Shapes Automatic, but Not Explicit, Partner Evaluations.

6. Noah Smith is leaving academia for full-time at Bloomberg.

7. Why are reactionaries especially unpopular in the United States?

“…increased travelling does not make elites more cosmopolitan.”

File under The Culture that is Germany.  Here is the rest of the abstract:

In this article, we investigate cosmopolitan attitudes among the people often considered the most cosmopolitan – the elite. Studying the typical class of frequent travellers provides a particularly good opportunity to study the relationship between transnational activities and cosmopolitanism. We also comprehensively investigate the link between postmaterialist values and cosmopolitan attitudes. We test our arguments using an original dataset that includes a relatively large sample of the German positional top elite in the years 2011 and 2012. A comparison between these data and data from a general population survey shows that while transnational activities affect the attitudes of ordinary citizens, increased travelling does not make elites more cosmopolitan. We discuss several reasons why this might be the case. We also observe that postmaterialist values and the ideological environment of the elite play a key role. Finally, we tentatively suggest that cosmopolitan elites do not endanger national social cohesion, as some fear they might. We show that cosmopolitanism and localism are not mutually exclusive and that members of the German elite feel even more attached to their nation than ordinary Germans.

Like my source the excellent Kevin Lewis, I wonder how much this applies to other nations as well.

Assorted links

1. There is no great stagnation.

2. 88 percent of Bavarian doctors have prescribed placebos.  The study (in German) is here.

3. The culture that is Japan language of decay.

4. "The search for mud is simple."

5. "The Ashtray Argument."

6. Why Mexican shark reunions are so amazing.

7. The culture that is Germany.

8. Will eBooks first take over in New Zealand?

9. Benjamin Barber on Libya and Qaddafi, his defense.

10. Who is slamming rural America?

Assorted links

1. Me on Reason.TV.

2. Nicholson Baker whinges about Kindle.

3. North Korean beer commercial.

4. An intellectual journey with many stops (one of Brad DeLong's best posts).

5. Extending the "all you can eat" concept, and yet the law intervenes.  Or, "the culture that is Germany."

6. The Women's Leadership Fund, a new investment strategy.

7. More patently false claims about China.

8. Via Kottke, cats play Arnold Schoenberg's Op.11; I loved this one.

The polity that is German

None dare call it eugenics:

Dachshunds, the German dog breed known for their distinctive long bodies and short legs, face an uncertain future if proposed changes to an animal protection law are approved, Germany’s kennel club said.

A draft of the bill, from the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture, was published in February and aims to combat “torture breeding,” or breeding to produce animals with characteristics that will cause them to suffer, and to regulate the online trade of animals.

However, the draft contains requirements that could end the breeding of certain dogs, such as the dachshund, according to a statement from the V.D.H., Germany’s kennel club.

The bill lists various disease characteristics, like anomalies of the skeletal system, that would be outlawed. That could be interpreted as a ban on breeding animals with any significant size deviation from the “original wolf type,” the V.D.H. said…

The restrictions could be applied to the leg length of dachshunds. The breeding of beagles, Jack Russell terriers and miniature schnauzers could also be affected, as well as of dogs with short noses, like the English bulldog, French bulldog and pug.

Here is the full NYT article.