Results for “department why not” 147 found
The University presidents
Here is three and a half minutes of their testimony before Congress. Worth a watch, if you haven’t already. I have viewed some other segments as well, none of them impressive. I can’t bring myself to sit through the whole thing.
I don’t doubt that I would find their actual views on world affairs highly objectionable, but that is not why I am here today. Here are a few other points:
1. Their entire testimony is ruled by their lawyers, by their fear that their universities might be sued, and their need to placate internal interest groups. That is a major problem, in addition to their unwillingness to condemn various forms of rhetoric for violating their codes of conduct. As Katherine Boyle stated: “This is Rule by HR Department and it gets dark very fast.”
How do you think that affects the quality of their other decisions? The perceptions and incentives of their subordinates?
2. They are all in a defensive crouch. None of them are good on TV. None of them are good in front of Congress. They have ended up disgracing their universities, in front of massive audiences (the largest they ever will have?), simply for the end goal of maintaining a kind of (illusory?) maximum defensibility for their positions within their universities. At that they are too skilled.
How do you think that affects the quality of their other decisions? The perceptions and incentives of their subordinates?
What do you think about the mechanisms that led these particular individuals to be selected for top leadership positions?
3. Not one came close to admitting how hypocritical private university policies are on free speech. You can call for Intifada but cannot express say various opinions about trans individuals. Not de facto. Whether you think they should or not, none of these universities comes close to enforcing “First Amendment standards” for speech, even off-campus speech for their faculty, students, and affiliates.
What do you think that says about the quality and forthrightness of their other decisions? Of the subsequent perceptions and incentives of their subordinates?
What do you think about the mechanisms that led this particular equilibrium to evolve?
Overall this was a dark day for American higher education. I want you to keep in mind that the incentives you saw on display rule so many other parts of the system, albeit usually invisibly. Don’t forget that. These university presidents have solved for what they think is the equilibrium, and it ain’t pretty.
Malthus was smarter than you think, vice and prostitution edition
That is a passage from my new book GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time and Why Does it Matter?
So one way to read Malthus is this: if a society is going to have any prosperity at all, the people in that society either will be morally quite bad, or they have to be morally very, very good, good enough to exercise that moral restraint. Alternatively, you can read Malthus as seeing two primary goals for people: food and sex. His accomplishment was to show that, taken collectively, those two goals could not easily be obtainable simultaneously in a satisfactory fashion. In late Freudian terms, you could say that eros/sex amounts to the death drive, but again painted on a collective canvas and driven by economic mechanisms.
Malthus also hinted at birth control as an important social and economic force, especially later in 1817, putting him ahead of many other thinkers of his time. Birth control was widely practiced for centuries through a variety of means, and Malthus unfortunately was not very specific. He did call it “unnatural,” and the mainstream theology of his Anglican church condemned it, as did many other churches. But what did he really think? Was this unnatural practice so much worse than the other alternatives of misery and vice that his model was putting forward? Or did Malthus simply fail to see that birth control could be so effective and widespread as it is today? It doesn’t seem we are ever going to know.
From Malthus’s tripartite grouping of vice, moral restraint, and misery, two things should be clear immediately. The first is why Keynes found Malthus so interesting, namely that homosexual passions are one (partial) way out of the Malthusian trap. The second is that there is a Straussian reading of Malthus, namely that he thought moral restraint, while wonderful, was limited in its applicability. So maybe then vice wasn’t so bad after all? Is it not better than war and starvation?
I don’t buy the Straussian reading as a description of what Malthus really meant. But he knew it was there, and he knew he was forcing you to think about just how bad you thought vice really was. Malthus for instance is quite willing to reference prostitution as one possible means to keep down population. He talks about “men,” and “a numerous class of females,” but he worries that those practices “lower in the most marked manner the dignity of human nature.” It degrades the female character and amongst “those unfortunate females with which all great towns abound, more real distress and aggravated misery are perhaps to be found, than in any other department of human life.”
How bad are those vices relative to starvation and population triage? Well, the modern world has debated that question and mostly we have opted for vice. You thus can see that the prosperity of the modern world does not refute Malthus. We faced the Malthusian dilemma and opted for one of his options, namely vice. It’s just that a lot of us don’t find those vices as morally abhorrent as Malthus did. You could say we invented another technology that (maybe) does not suffer from diminishing returns, namely improving the dignity and the living conditions those who practice vice. Contemporary college dorms seem pretty comfortable, and they have plenty of birth control, and of course lots of vice in the Malthusian sense. While those undergraduates might experience high rates of depression and also sexual violation, that life of vice still seems far better than life near the subsistence point. I am not sure what Malthus would think of college dorm sexual norms (and living standards!), but his broader failing was that he did not foresee the sanitization and partial moral neutering of what he considered to be vice.
Written by me, recommended, and open source at the above link.
A Genius Award for Airborne Transmission
One of the strangest aspects of the pandemic was the early insistence by the WHO and the CDC that COVID was not airborne. “FACT: #COVID19 is NOT airborne.” the WHO tweeted on March 28, 2020, accompanied by a large graphic (at right). Even at that time, there was plenty of evidence that COVID was airborne. So why was the WHO so insistent that it wasn’t?
Ironically, some of the resistance to airborne transmission can be traced back to a significant achievement in epidemiology. Namely, John Snow’s groundbreaking arguments that cholera was spread through water and food, not bad air (miasma). Snow’s theory took time to be accepted but when the story of germ theory’s eventual triumph came to be told, the bad air proponents were painted as outdated and ignorant. This sentiment was so pervasive among physicians and health officials that anyone suggesting airborne transmission of disease was vaguely suspect and tainted. Hence, the WHOs and CDCs readiness to label airborne transmission as dangerous, unscientific “misinformation” promulgated on social media (see the graphic). In reality, of course, the two theories were not at odds as one could easily accept that some germs were airborne. Indeed, there were experts in the physics of aerosols who said just that but these experts were siloed in departments of physics and engineering and not in medicine, epidemiology and public health.
As a result of this siloing, we lost time and lives by telling people that they were fine if they kept to the 6ft “rule” and washed their hands, when what we should have been telling them was open the windows, clean the air with UVC, and get outside. Windows not windex.
Linsey Marr at Virginia Tech was one of the aerosol experts who took a prominent role in publicly opposing the WHO guidance and making the case for aerosol transmission (Jose-Luis Jimenez was another important example). Thus, it’s nice to see that Marr is among this year’s MacArthur “genius” award winners. A good interview with Marr is here.
It didn’t take a genius to understand airborne transmission but it took courage to put one’s reputation on the line and go against what seemed like the scientific consensus. Marr’s award is thus an award to a scientist for speaking publicly in a time of crisis. I hope it encourages others, both to speak up when necessary but also to listen.
Addendum: I didn’t take part in the aerosol debates but my wife, who has done research in aerosols and germs, told me early on that “of course COVID is airborne!” Wisely, I chose to take the word of my wife over that of the WHO and CDC.
Disputes over China and structural imbalances
There has been some pushback on my recent China consumption post, so let me review my initial points:
There exists a view, found most commonly in Michael Pettit (and also Matthew Klein), that suggests economies can have structural shortfalls of consumption in the long run and outside of liquidity traps.
My argument was that this view makes no sense, it is some mix of wrong and “not even wrong,” and it is not supported by a coherent model. If need be, relative prices will adjust to restore an equilibrium. If relative prices are prevented from adjusting, the actual problem is not best understood as a shortfall of consumption, and will not be fixed by a mere expansion of consumption.
Note that people who promote this view love the word “absorb,” and generally they are reluctant to talk much about relative price adjustments, or even why those price adjustments might not take place.
You will note Pettis claims Germany suffers from a similar problem, America too though of course the inverse version of it. So whatever observations you might make about China, the question remains whether this model makes sense more generally. (And Australia, which ran durable trade deficits from the 1970s to 2017, while putting in a strong performance, is a less popular topic.)
Pettis even has claimed that “US business investment is constrained by weak demand rather than costly capital”, and that is from April 4, 2023 (!).
It would take me a different blog post to explain how someone might arrive at such a point, with historic stops at Hobson, Foster, and Catchings along the way, but for now just realize we’re dealing with a very weird (and incorrect) theory here. I will note in passing that the afore-cited Pettis thread has other major problems, not to mention a vagueness about monetary policy responses, and that rather simply the main argument for current industrial policy is straightforward externalities, not convoluted claims about how foreign and domestic investment interact.
Pettis also implicates labor exploitation as a (the?) major factor behind trade surpluses, and furthermore he considers this to be a form of “protectionism.” Now you can play around with scholar.google.com, or ChatGPT, all you want, and you just won’t find this to be the dominant theory of trade surpluses or even close to that. As a claim, it is far stronger than what a complex literature will support, noting there is a general agreement that lower real wages (ceteris paribus) are one factor — among many — that can help exports. This point isn’t wrong as a matter of theory, it is simply a considerable overreach on empirical grounds. Of course, if Pettis has a piece showing statistically that a) there is a meaningful definition of labor exploitation here, and b) it is a much larger determinant of trade surpluses than the rest of the profession seems to think…I would gladly read and review it. Be very suspicious if you do not see such a link appear!
Another claim from Pettis that would not generate widespread agreement is: “…in an efficient, well-managed, and open trading system, large, persistent trade imbalances are rare and occur in only a very limited number of circumstances.” (see the above link) That is harder to test because arguably the initial conditions never are satisfied, but it does not represent the general point of view, which among other things, considers persistent differences in time preferences and productivities across nations.
Now, it does not save all of this mess to make a series of good, commonsense observations about China, as Patrick Chovanec has done (Say’s Law does hold in the medium-term, however). And as Brad Setser has done.
In fact, those threads (and their citation) make me all the more worried. There is not a general realization that the underlying theory does not make sense, and that the main claim about the determinants of trade surpluses is wrong, and that it requires a funny and under-argued tracing of virtually all trade imbalances to pathology. And to be clear, this is a theory that only a small minority of economists is putting forward. I am not the dissident here, rather I am the one delivering the bad news.
So the theory is wrong, and don’t let commonsense, correct observations about China throw you off the scent here.
Great News for Female Academics!
For decades female academics have been told that the deck is stacked against them by discrimination in hiring, funding, journal acceptances, recommendation letters and more. It’s dispiriting to be told that your career is not under your control and that, no matter what you do, you face an unfair, uphill battle. Why would any woman want to be a scientist when they are told things like this:
A vast literature….shows time after time, women in science are deemed to be inferior to men and are evaluated as less capable when performing similar or even identical work. This systemic devaluation of women women results in an array of real consequences: shorter, less praise-worth letters of recommendation, fewer research grants, awards and invitations to speak at conferences; and lower citation rates for their research…
The good news is that this depressing and dispiriting story isn’t true! In an extensive survey, meta-analysis, and new research, Ceci, Kahn and Williams show that the situation for women in academia is in many domains good to great. For example, in hiring for tenure the evidence is strong that women are advantaged. Moreover, women are advantaged especially in fields where they have relatively low representation (GEMP: geosciences, engineering, economics, mathematics/computer science, and physical science).
Among political scientists, Schröder et al. (2021) found that female political scientists had a 20% greater likelihood of obtaining a tenured position than comparably accomplished males in the same cohort after controlling for personal characteristics and accomplishments (publications, grants, children, etc.). Lutter and Schröder (2016) found that women needed 23% to 44% fewer publications than men to obtain a tenured job in German sociology departments.
…In summary, all of the seven administrative reports reveal substantial evidence that women applicants were at least as successful as and usually more successful than male applicants were—particularly in GEMP fields.
…In a natural experiment, French economists used national exam data for 11 fields, focusing on PhD holders who form the core of French academic hiring (Breda & Hillion, 2016). They compared blinded and nonblinded exam scores for the same men and women and discovered that women received higher scores when their gender was known than when it was not when a field was male dominant (math, physics, philosophy), indicating a positive bias, and that this difference strongly increased with a field’s male dominance. Specifically, women’s rank in male-dominated fields increased by up to 40% of a standard deviation. In contrast, male candidates in fields dominated by women (literature, foreign languages) were given a small boost over expectations based on blind ratings, but this difference was small and rarely significant.6
The situation is also very good in grant funding and journal acceptance rates which are either not biased or biased towards women. Similarly, “no persuasive evidence exists for the claim of antifemale bias in academic letters of recommendation.”
There is evidence of bias in student evaluations. Both female and male students rate male professors higher, even in situations where names are known but actual gender is blinded. Male students are more likely to write nasty comments. Most research universities, in my experience, don’t put much weight on student teaching evaluations, beyond do you pass a fairly low bar, but it can be disconcerting to get nasty comments.
There is also mild evidence of differences in salary, although less so when productivity is taken into account.
Some critics will say, but the real discrimination happens before a women applies for a tenure track job! Maybe so but that is a shifting of goal posts and we should take pride in the fact that in the United States today (and most developed countries) there is very little bias against women in high stakes, important decisions in tenure track hiring, journal acceptances, grant funding and so forth. This is a major accomplishment.
It should be noted that the Ceci, Kahn and Williams paper is an adversarial collaboration; Ceci and Williams have published previous work showing that women are, generally speaking, not discriminated against in academia while:
Kahn has a long history of revealing gender inequities in her field of economics, and her work runs counter to Ceci and Williams’s claims of gender fairness. Kahn was an early member of the American Economics Association’s Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP). Articles of hers in the American Economics Review (Kahn, 1993) and in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Kahn, 1995) were the first publications on the status of women in the economics profession. She was the first to identify gender inequities as a concern in economics, something she has revisited every decade since then in her publications. In 2019, she co-organized a conference on women in economics, and her most recent analysis in 2021 found gender inequities persisting in tenure and promotion in economics (Ginther & Kahn, 2021). In short, gender bias in academia has been a long-standing passion of Kahn’s. Her findings diverge from Ceci and Williams’s, who have published a number of studies that have not found gender bias in the academy, such as their analyses of grants and tenure-track hiring in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS; Ceci & Williams, 2011; Williams & Ceci, 2015).
The Ceci, Kahn, and Williams paper covers much more material than I can cover here and is nuanced so read the whole thing but do also shout the good news from the rooftops!
Are macroeconomic models true only “locally”?
That is the theme of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:
It is possible, contrary to the predictions of most economists, that the US will get through this disinflationary period and make the proverbial “soft landing.” This should prompt a more general reconsideration of macroeconomic forecasts.
The lesson is that they have a disturbing tendency to go wrong. It is striking that Larry Summers was right two years ago to warn about pending inflationary pressures in the US economy, when most of his colleagues were wrong. Yet Summers may yet prove to be wrong about his current warning about the looming threat of a recession. The point is that both his inflation and recession predictions stem from the same underlying aggregate demand model.
You will note that yesterday’s gdp report came in at 2.9%, hardly a poor performance. And more:
It is understandable when a model is wrong because of some big and unexpected shock, such as the war in Ukraine. But that is not the case here. The US might sidestep a recession for mysterious reasons specific to the aggregate demand model. The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy has indeed been tighter, and disinflations usually bring high economic costs.
It gets more curious yet. Maybe Summers will turn out to be right about a recession. When recessions arrive, it is often quite suddenly. Consulting every possible macroeconomic theory may be of no help.
Or consider the 1990s. President Bill Clinton believed that federal deficits were too high and were crowding out private investment. The Treasury Department worked with a Republican Congress on a package of fiscal consolidation. Real interest rates fell, and the economy boomed — but that is only the observed correlation. The true causal story remains murky.
Two of the economists behind the Clinton package, Summers and Bradford DeLong, later argued against fiscal consolidation, even during the years of full employment under President Donald Trump [and much higher national debt]. The new worry instead was secular stagnation based on insufficient demand, even though the latter years of the Trump presidency saw debt and deficits well beyond Clinton-era levels.
The point here is not to criticize Summers and DeLong as inconsistent. Rather, it is to note they might have been right both times.
And what about that idea of secular stagnation — the notion that the world is headed for a period of little to no economic growth? The theory was based in part on the premise that global savings were high relative to investment opportunities. Have all those savings gone away? In most places, measured savings rose during the pandemic. Yet the problem of insufficient demand has vanished, and so secular stagnation theories no longer seem to apply.
To be clear, the theory of secular stagnation might have been true pre-pandemic. And it may yet return as a valid concern if inflation and interest rates return to pre-pandemic levels. The simple answer is that no one knows.
Note that Olivier Blanchard just wrote a piece “Secular Stagnation is Not Over,” well-argued as usual. Summers, however, has opined: “we’ll not return to the era of secular stagnation.” I was not present, but I can assume this too was well-argued as usual!
The culture that is New Jersey
The digital alerts that debuted on Garden State highway signs last month may have displayed a bit too much Jersey attitude.
As of Wednesday afternoon, messages such as “Get your head out of your apps” and “mash potatoes — not your head” are no longer visible on the New Jersey Department of Transportation’s network of 215 permanent digital alert signs throughout the state. Similar messages have been used in other states, including Utah, Pennsylvania, Delaware, California, and Tennessee.
“The FHWA [Federal Highway Administration] has instructed us to cease posting these creative safety messages,” Stephen Schapiro, NJDOT’s press manager, said in an email Wednesday afternoon.
In a statement, the FHWA said that it “is aware of the changeable message signs and has reached out to NJDOT.” Representatives from FHWA did not comment on why New Jersey was told to stop using the messages.
Here is the full story, via Mike Doherty.
Friday assorted links
1. Various predictors and their methods and records.
2. Why aren’t obesity breakthroughs receiving more attention?
4. What music will they play at the Queen’s funeral? (NYT)
5. Private insurers are forcing changes on police departments.
6. What you can buy in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for half a million dollars. Or can you?
7. Excellent Dwarkesh Patel podcast with Charles Mann. Both highly rated but still underrated!
Tuesday assorted links
The Myth of Primitive Communism
AEON: Today, many writers and academics still treat primitive communism as a historical fact. To take an influential example, the economists Samuel Bowles and Jung-Kyoo Choi have argued for 20 years that property rights coevolved with farming. For them, the question is less whether private property predated farming, but rather why it appeared at that time. In 2017, an article in The Atlantic covering their work asserted plainly: ‘For most of human history, there was no such thing as private property.’ A leading anthropology textbook captures the supposed consensus when it states: ‘The concept of private property is far from universal and tends to occur only in complex societies with social inequality.’
In fact, although some tribes had communal sharing of (some) food, most did not. Private property, far from being unknown, was normal among all hunter-gatherers that have been studied. Manvir Singh writing in Aeon continues:
Agta hunters in the Philippines set aside meat to trade with farmers. Meat brought in by a solitary Efe hunter in Central Africa was ‘entirely his to allocate’. And among the Sirionó, an Amazonian people who speak a language closely related to the Aché, people could do little about food-hoarding ‘except to go out and look for their own’. Aché sharing might embody primitive communism. Yet, Hill admits, ‘the Aché are probably the extreme case.’
…More damning, however, is a starker, simpler fact. All hunter-gatherers had private property, even the Aché….Individual Aché owned bows, arrows, axes and cooking implements. Women owned the fruit they collected. Even meat became private property as it was handed out. Hill explained: ‘If I set my armadillo leg on [a fern leaf] and went out for a minute to take a pee in the forest and came back and somebody took it? Yeah, that was stealing.’
Some proponents of primitive communism concede that foragers owned small trinkets but insist they didn’t own wild resources. But this too is mistaken. Shoshone families owned eagle nests. Bearlake Athabaskans owned beaver dens and fishing sites. Especially common is the ownership of trees. When an Andaman Islander man stumbled upon a tree suitable for making canoes, he told his group mates about it. From then, it was his and his alone. Similar rules existed among the Deg Hit’an of Alaska, the Northern Paiute of the Great Basin, and the Enlhet of the arid Paraguayan plains. In fact, by one economist ’s estimate, more than 70 per cent of hunter-gatherer societies recognised private ownership over land or trees.
Moreover, the sharing that some hunter-gatherers practiced was functional rather than ethical.
Whatever we call it, the sharing economy that Hill observed with the Aché does not reflect some lost Edenic goodness. Rather, it sprang from a simpler source: interdependence. Aché families relied on each other for survival. We share with you today so that you can share with us next week, or when we get sick, or when we are pregnant.
take away the function and the sharing disappeared, often brutally:
In their book Aché Life History (1996), Hill and the anthropologist Ana Magdalena Hurtado listed many Aché people who were killed, abandoned or buried alive: widows, sick people, a blind woman, an infant born too soon, a boy with a paralysed hand, a child who was ‘funny looking’, a girl with bad haemorrhoids. Such opportunism suffuses all social interactions. But it is acute for foragers living at the edge of subsistence, for whom cooperation is essential and wasted efforts can be fatal.
None of this should be surprising to anyone familiar with the property-rights tradition of Demsetz and Barzel. The primitive communism of hunter-gatherers is no different in principle from the primitive communism of the wifi service at Starbucks, the modern day police and fire departments, or the use of Shakespeare’s works. As Barzel put it, “New rights are created in response to new economic forces that increase the value of the rights.” Thus, in this respect, there are no major differences among peoples, only differences in transaction costs, externalities, and technologies of inclusion and exclusion.
Friday assorted links
1. Charo revisionism (NYT), Department of Why Not?
2. Interview with Dubov (chess, Russia, Karjakin, etc.).
3. Scott Sumner on #TheGreatForgetting.
4. Should you send a Scot to prison for a rude tweet?
5. Giorgio Agemben thread from Zohar Atkins.
Monday assorted links
1. Summers on the Fed and whether we can expect inflation to diminish much. Some points I have not seen him make in earlier presentations.
2. A hypothesis as to why Russia is focusing on Mariupol.
3. Can you beat the football bookmakers?
5. New results on whether NBA referees are racially biased.
6. UCLA zero wage job listing update. I blame the whole fracas on HR departments, not that UCLA as a school did anything wrong.
How the job market works at top schools
At least pre-Covid, most of the faculty would get together and rate the graduate students (I am not sure how it has operated for the last two years, though I suspect the same, only over Zoom). Some but not all of the students would be designated as “should work at a top school.” If you were not so rated, your chance of being hired at a top school was slim. Other schools, of course, would know not to pursue the top candidates, and would shoot lower, though some foolhardy places might try to lure them anyway. But basically if you were hiring at a high level, you would call the placement officer at a top school, and they would tier the candidates, based on where you were calling from, and recommend accordingly.
Of course this process has very little transparency and not much in the way of appeal, or even competition, or for that matter accountability to outside parties. Might it also be a factor behind a lot of the academic conformism we witness? You go through the early part of your career knowing that you are auditioning for a committee. Can any voice wreck you? Or is it majority rule? You will never know!
Unlike a lot of the whiners, I am not saying this system is necessarily bad — I am genuinely unsure, in part because of the lack of transparency, not to mention that the relevant alternative is possibly something worse yet. In any case, I find it striking how little discussion this method has received. It allocates most of the best jobs in the economics profession, and it does not obviously satisfy many of the ideals that at least some of us pay lip service to. John List, now tenured at the University of Chicago, received his initial Ph.D from University of Wyoming, not a top school, but that kind of climb up the academic ladder is extremely rare in economics.
Most lesser ranked schools, including GMU, do not rank their candidates collectively in the same manner. There is no collective ranking, rather individual faculty, or perhaps small working groups, recommend their favored candidates. In part they are competing against the other recommending faculty in their own department. There is no “secret, collusive meeting,” and so you might think there is an incentive to over-recommend and to deplete the collective credibility of the department. The market, however, understands that and takes it into account, and in that sense the credibility of the department “starts off depleted” to begin with. The recommendations then have to be somewhat exaggerated simply to “break even” in the resulting signal-jamming equilibrium.
Lower-ranked schools don’t have the option of sending most of their Ph.D. students to Tier 1 research universities, so the notion of a uniform ranking probably doesn’t make sense there. And if you have only three graduating Ph.D. students in a year, and two of them are returning home to Asia, as is the case in many of the lower-ranked programs, does it really make sense to rank them? Furthermore, the lower-ranked schools may have a higher variance of faculty quality, which would render a consensus ranking of the graduates more difficult to achieve. In contrast, almost all of the faculty at Harvard have a pretty good sense of “what it takes” to succeed at MIT or Princeton as a junior faculty member.
Which method is better? Is the current state of affairs, with a split system, optimal? Is the current system due to break down in some way? Why don’t the economists at top schools talk about this much? Is the whole thing just a plain, flat outrage? Here is one of the few discussions I can find, and yes it does affirm that the practice occurs, though it overstates its universality.
What do you all think?
The economics of exploding job market offers
I am hearing various Twitter reports that in the absence of AEA scheduling coordination, the junior economics job market is involving a lot of departments jumping the gun, interviewing early, and then making “exploding offers” with a short fuse, hoping to snap up desperate candidates. I am not personally involved in that market this year, but my sources seem credible. In any case, this is a problem worth thinking through.
As an economist, how should we think about exploding job market offers?
1. If you are a decently strong candidate who is highly risk-averse, you will end up with too low quality a job. That said, the market is satisfying your risk-averse preference just as it does when you buy insurance. And if you are so risk-averse, maybe your research record won’t be so important anyway, even if you manage to publish well. I guess I am not that worried about these people. I am happy enough to tax their risk-aversion, and in fact I suspect we should tax their risk-aversion all the more.
2. You might argue there are “thick market externalities,” and so it is efficient if most of the offers/trading occur closely bunched in time (see Niederle and Roth). After all, many asset price markets have designated trading hours, rather than full blast trading 24/7. While I find that analogy plausible, keep in mind what the efficiency here consists of, namely placing the more highly rated candidates in the more highly rated schools. Is it so terrible if a “market inefficiency” shakes up that system a bit? I thought the system was too elitist anyway. Some would say “too white male patriarchical, etc.” anyway. That is not exactly my view, but I agree that status quo ex ante methods were hardly sacrosanct.
2b. I am not one to trust a “managed intervention” into the previous job market methods more than a general disruption of trading. Of course if you are an AEA elite leader, you might differ on this.
3. Private sector offers for economists are “always there,” as for instance Amazon and Uber are not locked into the same hiring schedule as academic departments are. So at the margin these exploding offers will push more economists into the private sector. I am fine with that, as arguably economists are currently excessively subsidized into academic institutions by government support.
4. Possibly the longer-term equilibrium is that everyone is pushed into acting in November, and perhaps with fewer flyouts. I am not sure that is a bad option. Is much extra, true information revealed between November and January? If you are a good department and afraid of losing good candidates to exploding offers, can’t you just hurry up yourself? That speed-up of the entire process also gives the secondary market, for those who did not get offers on the first round, more time to operate. Surely there is room for the entire process to hurry up, yes?
4b. The more quickly the first tier of offers is cleared up, the more efficiently the queued candidates (say second or third in line for an offer) will be allocated. Isn’t that important too? For an egalitarian maybe more important? And rapid, exploding offers may take some top candidates off the market more quickly, in a good way, and stop the places that have no chance at them from chasing after them and wasting time?
5. A speedier overall job market presumably would help the job candidates who are anti-procrastinators and hurt the candidates who are procrastinators. I am fine with that! On the offering side, maybe it would help private universities, which tend to be speedier, and hurt public universities? YMMV.
6. Through the use of letters and phone calls and exclusivity norms, there has been a de facto preemptive market for the top schools for a long time. And now others are jumping in early!? Just exactly who is supposed to be fooled here?
7. What is the actual initial job market distortion we might want any change to address or improve? Might it be that job market candidates are too “Top Five” oriented and too risk-averse? I am genuinely unsure here. But if that is the problem, I don’t see why having more exploding offers should be so terrible.
8. Aren’t a lot of the most important opportunities in your life to come similar to “exploding offers”? Is it so terrible if you have to get used to this method early on?
9. If you really hate exploding offers, work on weakening the supposition that a candidate is not allowed to take one and then a month later “quit” and take another, better job. Discussed here.
10. The best argument for a coordinated market is simply that it serves the interests of the top schools, and makes sure they get the best candidates, even the risk-averse ones. Yet everyone is afraid to come out and make this explicitly elitist, anti-egalitarian, and so they resort to a lot of loose moralizing rhetoric (“ooh, it stresses people!” or “ooh, it’s unfair!”) that does not really befit how economists ought to be thinking about the problem.
Here are my earlier remarks on related issues.
How do geologists think?
From Dinwar, in the comments:
As for what it means to think like a geologist….it’s complicated. There definitely is a particular way of thinking unique to geologists. I’m convinced that it’s something you’re either born with or not; training just finishes what you started. Engineers and geologists think VERY differently, in nearly incompatible ways, which is fun because we work together all the time.
The main thing is, geologists think in terms of the context of deep time. We view everything from the perspective of millions of years, minimum. When a geologist looks at a stream they see the depositional zones, the erosional zones, the flood plane–and they are thinking both how the local geology affected it and how the stream will look in five million years. (As an aside, you get really strange looks when you discuss this with your eight-year-old son at a park.) And I do mean EVERYTHING. I remember drinking some loose-leaf tea once, adding the tea to the cup then the water, and realizing as the leaves settled that the high surface-area-to-volume ratio combined with cell damage from desiccation made them get water-logged very quickly, allowing for certain flood deposits to form. I’d always been curious about that.
Another thing to remember is that geologists by definition are polymaths. You can’t be a third-rate geologist unless you have a deep understanding of physics, chemistry, biology, anatomy, fluid dynamics, engineering, astronomy, and a host of other fields. Geology is what you get when those fields overlap. I learned as much about brachiopod anatomy from a structural geologist as I did from any paleontologist, and my minerology class started with “Here’s the nuclear physics of stellar evolution.” We’re expected to know drilling and surveying and cartography and…well, pretty much anything that could possibly affect dirt.
Ultimately, since we are dealing with historical sciences, we are detectives. We examine clues, make hypotheses, and look for evidence to support or refute them (for a fantastic discussion of this find the paper “Strong Inference”–that’s held as an ideal for geologic thinking). Like any scientist we look for subtle things, things that have a bearing on our particular field of study. I’m convinced, for example, that the soil in one area I work in has two distinct layers: a loose, fluffy depositional layer of clay, and a more firm layer of clay derived from the limestone bedrock dissolving. This is due to subtle variations in firmness, moisture content, color, whether or not limestone pieces are in the material, etc.–stuff that most people don’t notice. It’s no special ability on my part–my mother notices things about the weave of cloth that are invisible to me, because she makes the stuff. It’s all training. But the desire to look for it? That’s personality.
Field geologists are even worse–we do all that, only in conditions that would make any sane person run screaming. We’re expected to be athletes, MacGyver, scientists, managers, and Les Stroud all rolled into one. On bad days we add combat medic to the list. Hiking on a broken leg isn’t considered an unreasonable expectation (bear in mind I’m talking about the geologists–my safety manager would be VERY cranky to hear about someone doing that!). People who do this sort of thing routinely view the world in slightly different ways from most ordinary people. Most geologists go through a course called Field Camp, which is an introduction to field work. Walk into any geology department that has this and you can tell who’s gone through the class and who hasn’t.