Results for “from the comments” 1664 found
From the comments, Scott Sumner
The Danes have an escape hatch that the Swiss did not have, they can join the euro whenever they wish. Thus the Danish central bank can pocket huge profits from European speculators for as long as they wish, and then if their balance sheet gets uncomfortable they can join the euro at the drop of a hat. There are very few countries in such an enviable position. (Even so, I think the peg is a bad idea–they should let their currency float, as the Swedes do).
Oxford, Cambridge, Sweden, Singapore, and Canada (from the comments)
Here’s the data on Swedes at Oxford.
The average acceptance rate for EU applicants was 9.2%. For Swedish applicants it was 3.2%.
For 2013, both Oxford and Cambridge accepted 140 students from Singapore, a country of 3.3 million citizens.
They took 26 from Canada, which has 33 million people.
That is from Chip.
From the comments, on secular stagnation
In “National Income and the Price Level,” Martin Bailey discussed the issues of the liquidity trap and secular stagnation.
He observed that at a zero real interest rate, it would be profitable to level the Rocky Mountains and fill in the Gulf of Mexico. The land created would have a rate of return over zero. Also, replacing all steel with stainless steel would pay off.
The examples get to the problem. If someone wanted to level a mountain and fill in the Gulf, it would take a decade to get EPA approval, if it ever came. At negative real interest rates, there are plenty of profitable investments. Maybe in the medical sector, or energy, or finance, or banking, or education, or transportation….where government approval can block the investment for a decade. Secular stagnation is feasible in a world of heavy regulations and taxes, regardless of technological opportunities or the productivity of capital. Keystone Pipeline, anyone?
In a regulated state, easy Fed policy might boost the stock market and lower bond yields without boosting investment much at all. Sound familiar?
From the comments, on Bob Shiller and CAPE
For context, CAPE is the cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio. On that topic, 3rdMoment writes:
While I have great respect for Shiller, I don’t understand his confidence that the CAPE is likely to return to it’s historical average of around 16. There are several reasons why we might expect the average CAPE going forward to be higher than in the past:
1. The average levels of CAPE in most of the last century appear, with hindsight, to have been puzzlingly low. This is the well-known “equity premium puzzle.”
2. There has been a large shift in corporate payout mix, from virtually all dividends in the past, to a roughly equal mix of dividends and share repurchases today. This by itself will add a couple of points to CAPE even if nothing else changes, (as shown in this post by the anonymous blogger who tweets as “Jesse Livermore”): http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2013/12/Shiller/
3. Some other accounting changes to the definition of profits might raise the CAPE as well, again see the linked blog post above.
4. Lower information and transaction costs and the rise of index investing have dramatically lowered the cost of maintaining a globally diversified portfolio. This decreases the raw rate of return for any given required rate of realized returns. For example if the costs of investing in equities fall by just 50 basis points, this would allow the required raw earnings yield to fall from 5% to 4.5%, corresponding to a rise in CAPE from 20 to 22, without changing realized returns for investors.
5. The real “risk free” return on treasuries seems to be very low by historic standards. Real returns on other forms of debt also appear low. This lowers the return stocks need to be attractive by comparison.
6. Large corporate cash balances, a “global savings glut,” lower rates of real economic growth, possible “secular stagnation,” all seem to point to the idea that real returns are somewhat harder to get than the past.
Some of these reasons are more certain than others, but taken together they seem to show that we have good reason to expect CAPE levels significantly above the historical average going forward.
Are there any countervailing reasons offsetting the list above, factors that would tend to make CAPE lower than in the past? I can’t really think of any. And I haven’t seen anybody else offering any.
From the comments
Mesa wrote:
I would suspect that successful research institutions don’t feel obliged to redistribute their funding to less fortunate institutions. I think the point that is interesting here is that successful academic institutions are probably deemed to have earned their support, while successful business people are not, they having generally thought to have earned their success through luck or inheritance. From the endowment and research funding data it seems universities have both high income inequality and wealth inequality, to use terminology from the current debate.
From the comments
Here is Brett on Piketty:
I’m surprised to see so few critiques of Piketty on the grounds that higher wealth and income inequality won’t necessarily lead to oligarchical politics and the capture of the economy by rentiers. I’m a bit skeptical myself of his interpretation of 19th century politics – at the same time we had the Belle Epoque, there was increasing working class political power in the UK (particularly with reforms in the 1830s and 1860s), the lead-up to the near-complete loss of political power in the House of Lords in 1911, the rise of income taxes in both the UK and France, greater social mobility, broader modernization and consumer culture, and so forth. You see some pushback from Larry Bartels and the like pointing to research showing policymaking following the preferences of the rich and organized, but they don’t provide much information about whether this has changed with increasing income and wealth inequality – the rich and organized interest groups may have just always had a disproportionate interest on policymaking, even during the Postwar Period.
Morgan Kelly, in his review (via John O’Brien), serves up a related point:
If Piketty’s story about slow growth leading inevitably to rising inequality and the power of the rich is true, then we expect that inequality would have risen sharply during the 19th century when growth in industrialised economies was less than 1 per cent per year. In fact the longstanding research of Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson on English inequality (which Piketty, incredibly, fails to cite) finds inequality was fairly constant, albeit high, until about 1870, and then appears to have fallen somewhat until 1913.
From the comments
Here is BP, on New Zealand:
New Zealand has a chronic shortage of equity capital, exacerbated by a generous pay-as-you-go state pension and a tax system that favours passive landholding as a wealth accumulation vehicle. The country consequently imports a large amount of capital to meet the savings-investment balance and this requires a high equilibrium rate of interest. As a result the exchange rate is chronically high, the returns to exporting are lower than they should be given the country’s bounty, and the hurdle rate of return on investment on new equity investment is high. (Apart from this, the policy mix is pretty good). Many good innovative businesses emerge only to be bought by American corporations or funds before they get to more than say $100m in value, as there is a paucity of domestic investors.
From the comments, Charles Mann on Chinese coal
In any case, according to most analysts — see, e.g., Bloomberg, “The Future of China’s Power Sector”, Aug. 2013 http://about.bnef.com/white-papers/the-future-of-chinas-power-sector/ — China won’t stop putting in coal plants. Indeed. Bloomberg projects that 343-450 gigawatts of new coal generation will be built in China over the next fifteen years, more than the total capacity of the entire US coal base (300 gigawatts). China’s power needs are so big that even if it installs solar and wind facilities faster than any other nation has ever emplaced them, the nation will still bring online 1 large 500 MW coal plant *per week* from now until 2030.
Even if somehow China *could* build enough solar and wind plants in time, it still would be building coal plants, too. The basic reason is that solar panels in China typically produce <20% of their annual peak capacity (China has few sunny regions) and wind 80% of peak capacity and do it all the time, so to get reliable power you have to build vastly more peak capacity from renewables than coal, and China can’t afford that.
There is more, including more from Mann, here.
From the comments
A knocking at the door.
“Who’s there?” I asked. “Amazon drone,” came a polite but firm bass voice.
I opened the door to find box on the step as the hexacopter retracted its delivery arm and spun up its rotors. An invoice icon appeared on my Amazon eyeglasses. What wonders had I been brought today and how much would they cost?
But then, I thought, which of the two of us was truly an Amazon drone?
From the comments, on being a government economist
DC Economist writes:
I am in this cohort of economists (although ashamedly a non-responder to the NSF SED survey – I filled it out but neglected to mail it). And I did chose a government job over an academic offer and I’ve never been sorry that I did.
All my academic offers (2002) were from public institutions, mostly on the west coast and mid-west. For the next five years of my career, almost all of those departments had pay freezes. Meanwhile, I was quickly promoted in my government job. While the cost of living in DC eats a comfortable share of that salary differential, it was decidedly better financial move in retrospect to take the federal job. (I did not know that ex ante; my federal starting salary was actually lower than the starting pay for my best academic offer, and I assumed I was making a financial sacrifice to take a job I genuinely preferred.)
You can make even more money in consulting, but it’s a different world, and I’ve known a fair number of economists who move back and forth between consulting and government, depending on their relative preference for money vs. interesting work. Colleagues that have moved back and forth between academia and government have often voiced to me their extreme surprise how interesting and rewarding the work can be.
I just got back from recruiting at the AEAs and as always, I remain truly surprised how strongly candidates prefer academic jobs to government work. Academic jobs often have serious drawbacks — geography, teaching, collegiality (the incentives are stronger for us to all get along on this side of the market), the gut-wrenching uncertainty of the tenure track. Government jobs often offer better opportunities to do research (especially empirical work) and find similar co-authors. DC is also a great place to be an economist – lots of jobs, lots of interesting work – and the policy work is often more rewarding than teaching can often be. The one serious drawback is a lack of sabbaticals and summer research time. I often groan at the inevitable co-author email flood in May – let’s get back to our paper! – while I’m still working as hard in June as I was in March. But that’s not enough to tempt me back to academia – I’m much, much happier here.
But every year I offer a job to a junior candidate who turns me down for a really marginal academic job. I understand being turned down for a good-to-great academic offer, but turning this job down for a really marginal academic department makes no sense at all to me. And yet so many junior candidates can’t seem to imagine themselves in another line of work that they torpedo their own research opportunities to take a lower-paying, high-teaching load, academic job. Maybe they are just not that into research, and would rather have their summers off than be placed somewhere where they will work harder but have better opportunities for research. Or maybe they worry that all government jobs are being some boring government bureaucrat and they can’t see past that initial bias (those jobs do exist, but those agencies aren’t often looking for Ph.D. economists at AEAs to fill them).
Graduate students really should be more strongly considering some of the great government jobs in the DC area. You really can have a great, rewarding career here.
From the comments, on seasonal business cycles
ohwilleke reports:
While “Christmas” is new, the notion of a consumption splurge after the fall harvest, followed by a lean late winter-early spring season (Lent/Ramadan) before the spring harvest is deeply rooted in pre-modern agricultural reality. When you have an abundance of perishable goods it makes sense to consume them before they go bad, and then to string out the more limited supply of durable foodstuffs when fresh foodstuffs are scarce. In the same way, summer vacation is rooted in the need to free up children for agricultural labor at times of peak demand. As noted above, spring weddings supply a consumption boost after the Spring Harvest and also are timed to minimize the likelihood of critical parts of a first pregnancy taking place during the lean late winter-early spring (although these days it has more to do with the end of the school year).
Only with cheap and fast trans-hemispheric shipping (together with a lack of significant piracy for most of that trade), and advances in food preservation and refrigeration in the last half century or so, have those agricultural considerations become irrelevant (although, of course, excess and lean times should fall at different parts of the year in the Southern hemisphere and in places like Southern India, the Sahel, and the tropics of Asia, African and South America that have different seasons).
Japan and China use end of year bonuses (often as 6-12% of annual compensation) as a significant part of annual compensation as a way to share rather than leveraging macroeconomic risk for firms and the economy as a whole. In good years, when there is more supply, lots of people get big bonuses; in bad years, scarcity is widespread. The main virtue of this approach is that it makes firms more robust and puts them under less pressure to engage in cyclic layoffs but making labor costs look more like equity and less like debt. This too was well suited to an agricultural tradition rooted in sharecropping or the equivalent that was once widespread in all feudal economies as well as in neo-feudal economies in places like the American South. This isn’t a strategy limited to the orient. It is also the quintessential Wall Street economy model utilized by major financial firms like investment banks and the large law firms that serve them.
The pressure from the “real economy” – both the goods and services supply side and the labor demand side – to have punctuated consumption is much weaker now than it once was, particularly in economies or sectors of economies without the strong annual bonus tradition. The largest sectors of the modern economy that are both strongly cyclic in terms of business cycles and very seasonal within each year, are construction and real estate – and these cycles also drive a fair amount of durable goods consumption. Both construction and real estate are weakest in the winter. Agriculture’s share of the economy is now much more stable from a consumer’s perspective and much smaller as a percentage of the total economy. Real estate handles cyclic shifts by being largely commission based. Construction relies on highly fragmented project specific team building through networks of general contractors and subcontractors rather than integrated firms (a pattern also common in the film industry and theater industry).
Bottom line: The finance oriented macroeconomic models obsessed with interest rates, inflation, GDP growth rates, unemployment rates and size of the public finance sector are ill suited to analyzing optimal seasonal business cycle patterns. A more fruitful analysis looks at the roots of current seasonal patterns in economic history and at the way that the “real economy” has changed with technology to see if those patterns still make sense, perhaps for new reasons.
You will find ohwilleke’s blog here.
From the comments, on lotteries and education
John S. wrote:
States don’t use lottery proceeds to *increase* funding to schools. They tie the lottery to education as a marketing gimmick, both to sell it to the voters initially, and then to deflect criticism (what do you mean you don’t like the lottery — are you anti-education?) See http://goo.gl/f5b55R
We’re told we need lotteries because people would gamble anyway, and yet a large fraction of lottery revenues go toward advertising, presumably so that people don’t lose interest in it.
I also liked the remarks from ant1900:
This (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racino) suggests that the appeal of racinos is being able to bring in slot machines to an existing race track. After reading only a few pages of ‘Addiction by Design’ I can see why. The smart machines are now subsidizing the humans and the horses. The horses are probably the hook that convinces voters to allow horse tracks to expand into slot machines (‘we have had the hose track for many years and that has worked out ok, and they are already regulated and already in the gambling business, so let’s let them expand into slot machines, which is not a huge leap from betting on horses’).
From the comments, negative T-bill rates of return
On my somewhat complicated post on negative rates of return from last week, Robert Sams writes:
Very interesting post and #5 is crucial (it’s a geometric process). Two points.
1. I think that we can substitute “ability to leverage at near-treasury rates” for “special trading technologies” and get the same implied predictions yet put the relevant institutional factors into relief.
2. Your #1-3 still works with the wrong model of Treasury returns, as it implicitly models demand as if it’s coming from a “real money” portfolio sort of buyer. Those guys exist of course, and they’re basically buyers at any price (central banks, regulatory demand, etc.). But if we ignore CB policy expectations, the valuation is set in the leveraged market, which is much larger, and treasuries trade rich /not/ so much b/c people want safety and therefore want to buy them, but rather they trade rich because people want to /short/ them for hedging purposes (e.g., investor wants corporate credit w/o the interest rate risk.)
Sounds paradoxical, I know, but failure to appreciate this fact is the basic misconception of the entire “risk premia” way of modelling this stuff.
For any given treasury issue, X billion were sold by Treasury, but the outstanding amount of people long the issue will be many times X because of all those repo leveraged buyers of UST’s, and for every one of those repoed longs, there is a short on the other side doing reverse repo. The market clears with the repo rate, which can often be much lower than fed funds and indeed can go up to -300bps at times if the (primarily hedging) demand from shorts is extreme. (The effective repo rate in this market is rather different from the general collateral series you can pull from public sources.. it’s hard to get good data as it’s proprietary to the big IDB’s… why the Fed tolerates this degree of opacity, I’ve never understood.)
Treasuries can therefore be seen as a special financial “currency”, and the treasury market can be modeled as type of free banking regime, where the public debt is base money, the much larger qty of leveraged UST positions is broad money, and the repo market is an interbank lending market where USD cash is collateral instead of money.
Looked at this way, the phrase “shadow banking system” is a quite literal description. Turn a market monetarist lose in this parallel universe, and the low rate conundrum is due to UST “base money” not keeping up with demand and the Treasury is a tight fisted CB.
In this universe, the real return of treasuries isn’t the relevant variable, it’s the spread between the repo rate and the treasury yield, which acts as a sort of “fee” for the guy who wants a hedged Investment in a riskier asset and pari passu a benefit to the party who wants a leveraged bet that the Fed means what it says about ZIRP. In finance-land with its UST currency, that spread /is/ the ST interest rate, which is volatile and well-above zero.
Now we can define quite precisely your “entry fee” thesis: the entry fee is the relative credit terms (haircut’s, etc) you’ll get in this repo market. In a world of only non-bank dealers and traders, those terms are symmetrical b/c counter-party risk is broadly symmetrical. In the world of TBTF, naturally only the bank holdco’s get the best terms. So, to win the wealth-accumulation game in this world, be a bank or be a very good client of a bank.
Ponder at your leisure!
From the comments, on Dodd-Frank
This is on the Volcker Rule:
My own view (and I’m a banking lawyer) is that the ban on proprietary trading will have an immaterial effect on the asset size of banking organizations. It might reduce their complexity.
An overlooked issue is that Volcker applies throughout the banking organization. That is, the ban on proprietary trading is not limited to the federally insured depository institution and restricts the activities of all of the affiliates of the depository institution. That’s a dramatic expansion in scope, with questionable policy justifications.
Another overlooked issue is that Volcker also bans investments in certain types of investment funds. Some think this is simply a ban on investments in private equity and hedge funds that is intended to avoid regulatory arbitrage around the proprietary trading restrictions. The statutory definition of covered funds was sloppy, and so the covered fund restrictions are actually much broader – and without any apparent policy purpose. This is particularly a problem for foreign banking organizations, as it looks that Volcker will have a broad extraterritorial scope.
To me, one of the more interesting aspects of Volcker is its implications for administrative law. There are many who would prefer that Congress delegate less to the administrative agencies and instead legislate with particularity. The Volcker experience suggests that might not always work well. The statute defines “private equity and hedge fund,” “proprietary trading,” “solely outside the United States,” etc. with particularity, but those definitions are generally not well-connected to the underlying policy concerns. The statutory language really left the regulators with few options to salvage a good and sensible rule. We probably would have been better off had Congress deferred more to the agencies here.
Finally, as a general matter, the difference between “security” (subject to the proprietary trading ban) and “loan” (not subject) probably isn’t a distinction that matters when it comes to the safety and soundness of banking organizations. Stepping back a bit, it’s hard to imagine what, why and how Volcker is up to.
From the comments, John Goodman on health insurance subsidies
Commenting on yesterday’s post, John Goodman writes:
Two points:
1. The premium the individual pays is not fixed as a percent of income. The subsidy is fixed, based on the second lowest silver plan premium and that amount is based on income. But the consumer is free to buy any plan. Remember, the second lowest priced silver plan may be a really lousy plan. It might have a very narrow network, for example. So, all the plans are competing against each other, with one fixed subsidy and an array of premiums. The premium an insurer charges will matter very much. 2. After 2018, the out-of-pocket premium for the second lowest priced silver plan will no longer be fixed as a percent of income. Premium subsidies as a whole will grow no faster than GDP + 0.5%, the same rate of growth that is in the Obama budget for Medicare.
The thread has some other good comments as well.