Results for “china book”
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What I’ve been reading

1. Kai Bird, The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames.  Kai Bird is very highly rated, but in my view he remains underrated.  I very much like each and every one of his books, and this sympathetic treatment brings to life the Middle East conflicts through the 1980s, and also the life of a CIA officer, as well as a bygone era in U.S. foreign policy.

2. Henry Kissinger, World Order.  I liked parts of his China book, but there’s nothing really to this one.  Leave it alone.

3. Pascal Bonafoux, Rodin & Eros.  Beware of visiting too many Rodin museums, you might end up thinking he just repeated the same themes over and over again.  This book, including the color plates, will jolt you into seeing his work fresh once again.

4. Samuel Fromartz, In Search of the Perfect Loaf: A Home Baker’s Odyssey.  A fun cross-sectional look at the bread universe, combined with some recipes and reminiscences.

5. Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan.  We could use more of this, and I am referring to each of those words “conservative” and “internationalism,” as well as the combination of the two.  This book was published about a year ago, and I don’t think the author could have realized how relevant it was going to become.  An important book for 2014, it sets out a manifesto for a classical liberal but non-isolationist approach to foreign policy.

6. Jeff Riggenbach, Persuaded by Reason: Joan Kennedy Taylor and the Rebirth of American Individualism.  I knew her a bit and was always fond of her.  This book is a good look at 1970s libertarianism, and the rebirth of libertarian feminism in the United States.  Both Alex and I make cameos in the text, he as an editor, gatekeeper, and theorist of self-ownership and abortion, I as a purchaser of the CD collection from the estate of Roy Childs (Joan was executor of the estate and also Roy’s dear friend).

I’ve spent time with both the new Ian McEwan novel and the new David Mitchell.  Both have some virtues but neither appears to be a must-read.

My excellent Conversation with Peter Thiel

Here is the audio, video, and transcript, along with almost thirty minutes of audience questions, filmed in Miami.  Here is the episode summary:

Tyler and Peter Thiel dive deep into the complexities of political theology, including why it’s a concept we still need today, why Peter’s against Calvinism (and rationalism), whether the Old Testament should lead us to be woke, why Carl Schmitt is enjoying a resurgence, whether we’re entering a new age of millenarian thought, the one existential risk Peter thinks we’re overlooking, why everyone just muddling through leads to disaster, the role of the katechon, the political vision in Shakespeare, how AI will affect the influence of wordcels, Straussian messages in the Bible, what worries Peter about Miami, and more.

Here is an excerpt:

COWEN: Let’s say you’re trying to track the probability that the Western world and its allies somehow muddle through, and just keep on muddling through. What variable or variables do you look at to try to track or estimate that? What do you watch?

THIEL: Well, I don’t think it’s a really empirical question. If you could convince me that it was empirical, and you’d say, “These are the variables we should pay attention to” — if I agreed with that frame, you’ve already won half the argument. It’d be like variables . . . Well, the sun has risen and set every day, so it’ll probably keep doing that, so we shouldn’t worry. Or the planet has always muddled through, so Greta’s wrong, and we shouldn’t really pay attention to her. I’m sympathetic to not paying attention to her, but I don’t think this is a great argument.

Of course, if we think about the globalization project of the post–Cold War period where, in some sense, globalization just happens, there’s going to be more movement of goods and people and ideas and money, and we’re going to become this more peaceful, better-integrated world. You don’t need to sweat the details. We’re just going to muddle through.

Then, in my telling, there were a lot of things around that story that went very haywire. One simple version is, the US-China thing hasn’t quite worked the way Fukuyama and all these people envisioned it back in 1989. I think one could have figured this out much earlier if we had not been told, “You’re just going to muddle through.” The alarm bells would’ve gone off much sooner.

Maybe globalization is leading towards a neoliberal paradise. Maybe it’s leading to the totalitarian state of the Antichrist. Let’s say it’s not a very empirical argument, but if someone like you didn’t ask questions about muddling through, I’d be so much — like an optimistic boomer libertarian like you stop asking questions about muddling through, I’d be so much more assured, so much more hopeful.

COWEN: Are you saying it’s ultimately a metaphysical question rather than an empirical question?

THIEL: I don’t think it’s metaphysical, but it’s somewhat analytic.

COWEN: And moral, even. You’re laying down some duty by talking about muddling through.

THIEL: Well, it does tie into all these bigger questions. I don’t think that if we had a one-world state, this would automatically be for the best. I’m not sure that if we do a classical liberal or libertarian intuition on this, it would be maybe the absolute power that a one-world state would corrupt absolutely. I don’t think the libertarians were critical enough of it the last 20 or 30 years, so there was some way they didn’t believe their own theories. They didn’t connect things enough. I don’t know if I’d say that’s a moral failure, but there was some failure of the imagination.

COWEN: This multi-pronged skepticism about muddling through — would you say that’s your actual real political theology if we got into the bottom of this now?

THIEL: Whenever people think you can just muddle through, you’re probably set up for some kind of disaster. That’s fair. It’s not as positive as an agenda, but I always think . . .

One of my chapters in the Zero to One book was, “You are not a lottery ticket.” The basic advice is, if you’re an investor and you can just think, “Okay, I’m just muddling through as an investor here. I have no idea what to invest in. There are all these people. I can’t pay attention to any of them. I’m just going to write checks to everyone, make them go away. I’m just going to set up a desk somewhere here on South Beach, and I’m going to give a check to everyone who comes up to the desk, or not everybody. It’s just some writing lottery tickets.”

That’s just a formula for losing all your money. The place where I react so violently to the muddling through — again, we’re just not thinking. It can be Calvinist. It can be rationalist. It’s anti-intellectual. It’s not thinking about things.

Interesting throughout, definitely recommended.  You may recall that the very first CWT episode (2015!) was with Peter, that is here.

*Accelerating India’s Development*

The author is Karthik Muralidharan, and the subtitle is A State-Led Roapmap for Effective Governance.  If you imagine a 600 pp. “state capacity libertarian” take on Indian development this is what you get, admittedly with the libertarian side of the equation downplayed a bit.  Excerpt:

A common misconception is that the inefficiencies of the Indian state stem from its large size — that there are too many workers doing too few things.  In practice, the opposite is true, and the Indian state is highly understaffed.  As Figure 3.1 shows, India has only 16 public employees per 1000 people.  For comparison, China has over three times as many (57) and Norway has nearly ten times as many (159).  Even the US, often viewed as a leading example of a market-driven economy with limited government, has 77 public employees per 1000 people — nearly five times as many as India!

Recommended, here is the link on Amazon India.  An American edition is needed.  Here is a review of the book from The Economist.

My interview with Sam Matey

He is a podcaster who mainly does transcripts.  Our discussion was largely but by no means entirely about climate change, here is one excerpt:

Sam: And India also is building huge amounts of new renewable and other electricity generating capacity. They’re building electric rail networks. They seem to be hitting their stride in a way that China was in about 2000 or 2005. I’m feeling optimistic about the rise of a new broadly-speaking-democratic powerful country in global markets and geopolitics.

Tyler: I would add the cautionary note that hardly anyone in India cares about climate change. Now, you may think they care about correlates to climate change, such as high temperatures in Delhi in the difficult months. But it’s very far from a national priority with any party that I’m aware of or any segment of the electorate. Air pollution is a major issue. But if there’s a way to fix air pollution, say through natural gas, that doesn’t, to a comparable degree, fix climate change, it could prove very popular in India.

So truly green energy has to be very cheap with the intermittency problem truly solved for India to make the transition, because there is not ideological momentum there at all.

And:

Sam: I agree that there’s not going to be a huge ideological drive to solve climate change in China or India, but I suspect that they will be doing a lot of the stuff that would have been considered a really ambitious climate change solving program 10 years ago, nonetheless, just for other reasons. Does that make sense?

Tyler: It makes sense, but keep in mind there’s also going to be technological progress for fossil fuels. And there has been; fracking was a big, big increase in productivity. It could spread to more parts of the world quite easily. The energy demands of the world, over some period of time, they could go up by 3x or 4x. And to think green energy will absorb all of that and cut into the current flows, I think it’s a bigger requirement than is often imagined.

Again, I wouldn’t say I’m pessimistic, but I’m not optimistic either. I’m genuinely uncertain.

And this:

Tyler: Maybe, but there’s two sources of quite green energy that have been declining. Nuclear we’ve already mentioned, but also hydroelectric. So some things are leaving the scene. And I would just say in general, looking at history, I’m very cautious about extrapolating either positive or negative trends. There’s so many efforts to do so. So in the 70s, there’s this great fear of overpopulation. Right now, there’s this great fear of a fertility crisis and underpopulation.

I’m not saying we shouldn’t think about either one of those, but it could well be neither comes to pass. Extrapolating current trends can rather rapidly lead us astray because of the power of the exponent. But maybe the world is just messy and not all that exponential.

In the latter part of the dialogue we talk about Morocco, Kenya, Mexico, Ethiopia, and the productivity crisis in Canada, among other issues.  Will Buddhism rise or fall in influence?  And what does it mean to suggest that books are overrated?

Trump’s threat to let Putin invade NATO countries

I don’t usually blog on “candidate topics,”or “Trump topics,” but a friend of mine asked me to cover this.  As you probably know, Trump threatened to let NATO countries that failed to meet the two percent of gdp defense budget obligation fend for themselves against Putin (video here, with Canadian commentary).  Trump even said he would encourage the attacker.

Long-time MR readers will know I am not fond of Trump, either as a president or otherwise.  (And I am very fond of NATO.)  But on this issue I think he is basically correct.  Yes, I know all about backlash effects.  But so many NATO members do not keep up serious defense capabilities.  And for decades none of our jawboning has worked.

Personally, I would not have proceeded or spoken as Trump did, and I do not address the collective action problems in my own sphere of work and life in a comparable manner (“if you’re not ready with enough publications for tenure, we’ll let Bukele take you!” or “Spinoza, if you don’t stop scratching the couch, I won’t protect you against the coyotes!”).  So if you wish to take that as a condemnation of Trump, so be it.  Nonetheless, I cannot help but feel there is some room for an “unreasonable” approach on this issue, whether or not I am the one to carry that ball.

Even spending two percent of gdp would not get many NATO allies close to what they need to do (and yes I do understand the difference between defense spending and payments to NATO, in any case many other countries are falling down on the job).  I strongly suspect that many of those nations just don’t have effective fighting forces at all, and in essence they are standing at zero percent of gdp, even if their nominal expenditures say hit 1.7 percent.  Remember the report that the German Army trained with broomsticks because they didn’t have enough machine guns?  How many of those forces are actually ready to fire and fight in a combat situation?  It is far from obvious that the Ukraine war — a remarkably grave and destructive event — has fixed that situation.

The nations that see no need to have workable martial capabilities at all are a real threat to NATO, and yes this includes Canada, which shares a very large de facto Arctic border with Putin, full of valuable natural resources.  Even a United States led by Nikki Haley cannot do all the heavy lifting here.  What if the U.S. is tied down in Asia and/or the Middle East when further trouble strikes?  That no longer seems like such a distant possibility.  And should Western Europe, over time, really become “foreign policy irrelevant,” relative to the more easternmost parts of NATO?  That too is not good for anybody.

With or without Trump’s remarks, we are likely on a path of nuclear proliferation, starting in Poland.

People talk about threats to democracy in Poland, and I am not happy they have restricted the power of their judiciary.  But consider Germany.  The country has given up its energy independence, it may lose a significant portion of its manufacturing base, its earlier economic strategy was to cast its lot with Russia and China, AfD is the #2 party there and growing, and the former east is politically polarized and illiberal, among other problems.  Most of all, the country has lost its will to defend itself.  That is in spite of a well-educated population and a deliberative political systems that in the more distant past worked well.  You can criticize Trump’s stupid provocations all you want, but unless you have a better idea for waking Germany (and other countries) up, you are probably just engaging in your own mood affiliation.  On this issue, “argument by adjective” ain’t gonna’ cut it.

The best scenario is that Trump raises these issues, everyone in Canada and Western Europe screams, they clutch their pearls and are horrified for months, but over time the topic becomes more focal and more ensconced in their consciousness.  Eventually more Democrats may pick up the Trump talking points, as they have done with China.  Perhaps three to five years from now that can lead to some positive action.  And if they are calling his words “appalling and unhinged,” as indeed they are, well that is going to drive more page views.

The odds may be against policy improvement in any case, but by this point it seems pretty clear standard diplomacy isn’t going to work.  I am just not that opposed to a “Hail Mary, why not speak some truth here?” approach to the problem.  Again, I wouldn’t do it, but at the margin it deserves more support than it is getting.  Of course it is hard for the MSM American intelligentsia to show any sympathy for Trump’s remarks, because his words carry the implication that spending more on social welfare has an unacceptably high opportunity cost.  So you just won’t find much objective debate of the issues at stake.

If you’re worried about Trump encouraging Putin, that is a real concern but the nations on the eastern flank of NATO are all above two percent, Bulgaria excepted.  Maybe this raises the chance that Putin is emboldened to blow up some Western European infrastructure?  Make a move against Canada in the Arctic?  I still could see that risk as panning out into greater preparedness, greater deterrence, and a better outcome overall.  Western Europe of course has a gdp far greater than that of Putin’s Russia. they just don’t have the right values, in addition to not spending enough on defense.

So on this one Trump is indeed the Shakespearean truth-teller, and (I hope) for the better.

Saturday assorted links

1. Hans Niemann okie-dokie.  And a response.

2. Should more British homes be built using straw?

3. Base models of LLMs do not seem to skew so much politically.  Substack version here.

4. Cameroon starts first malaria vaccine rollout.

5. What economists thought in the 1980s.

6. Does the solar shield idea have potential? (NYT)

7. NYT profile of Coleman Hughes, a highly intelligent and reasonable man.  Again, here is Coleman’s new book The End of Race Politics.  I will be doing a CWT with him.

8. “Richest five families in Florence 🇮🇹 from 1427 are still the richest today (archival data). Not only the top shows persistence. Any family who was in the (1427) top third is almost certain to still be there today.”  Link here.

9. Ross Douthat on Dan Wang on where the future dynamism lies (NYT).

My Conversation with Rebecca F. Kuang

Here is the audio, video, and transcript, here is the episode summary:

Rebecca F. Kuang just might change the way you think about fantasy and science fiction. Known for her best-selling books Babel and The Poppy War trilogy, Kuang combines a unique blend of historical richness and imaginative storytelling. At just 27, she’s already published five novels, and her compulsion to write has not abated even as she’s pursued advanced degrees at Oxford, Cambridge, and now Yale. Her latest book, Yellowface, was one of Tyler’s favorites in 2023.

She sat down with Tyler to discuss Chinese science-fiction, which work of fantasy she hopes will still be read in fifty years, which novels use footnotes well, how she’d change book publishing, what she enjoys about book tours, what to make of which Chinese fiction is read in the West, the differences between the three volumes of The Three Body Problem, what surprised her on her recent Taiwan trip, why novels are rarely co-authored, how debate influences her writing, how she’ll balance writing fiction with her academic pursuits, where she’ll travel next, and more.

Here is one excerpt:

COWEN: Why do you think that British imperialism worked so much better in Singapore and Hong Kong than most of the rest of the world?

KUANG: What do you mean by work so much better?

COWEN: Singapore today, per capita — it’s a richer nation than the United States. It’s hard to think, “I’d rather go back and redo that whole history.” If you’re a Singaporean today, I think most of them would say, “We’ll take what we got. It was far from perfect along the way, but it worked out very well for us.” People in Sierra Leone would not say the same thing, right?

Hong Kong did much better under Britain than it had done under China. Now that it’s back in the hands of China, it seems to be doing worse again, so it seems Hong Kong was better off under imperialism.

KUANG: It’s true that there is a lot of contemporary nostalgia for the colonial era, and that would take hours and hours to unpack. I guess I would say two things. The first is that I am very hesitant to make arguments about a historical counterfactual such as, “Oh, if it were not for the British Empire, would Singapore have the economy it does today?” Or “would Hong Kong have the culture it does today?” Because we don’t really know.

Also, I think these broad comparisons of colonial history are very hard to do, as well, because the methods of extraction and the pervasiveness and techniques of colonial rule were also different from place to place. It feels like a useless comparison to say, “Oh, why has Hong Kong prospered under British rule while India hasn’t?” Et cetera.

COWEN: It seems, if anywhere we know, it’s Hong Kong. You can look at Guangzhou — it’s a fairly close comparator. Until very recently, Hong Kong was much, much richer than Guangzhou. Without the British, it would be reasonable to assume living standards in Hong Kong would’ve been about those of the rest of Southern China, right? It would be weird to think it would be some extreme outlier. None others of those happened in the rest of China. Isn’t that close to a natural experiment? Not a controlled experiment, but a pretty clear comparison?

KUANG: Maybe. Again, I’m not a historian, so I don’t have a lot to say about this. I just think it’s pretty tricky to argue that places prospered solely due to British presence when, without the British, there are lots of alternate ways things could have gone, and we just don’t know.

Interesting throughout.

Boosting fertility by subsidizing child-bearing for *young* women

From Vidya Mahambare:

Several countries have grappled with a longstanding dilemma – how to reverse the trend of falling fertility rates. In 2019, eighty-one countries had fertility rates below the population replacement threshold. The replacement fertility rate, estimated at 2.1 births per woman, represents the level required to sustain a stable population over the long run, assuming mortality and migration remain constant.

Is it now time, at least in some countries, to implement policies targeted at lowering the age at which women have their first child?

Perhaps, yes. Here is why.

While most countries in Europe, Northern America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and China have had low fertility rate for years, India, the most populous country, joined them in 2021. Countries such as Greece, Italy, Japan, and Spain have had very low fertility levels below 1.5 births per woman for decades. South Korea has the lowest fertility rate, with 0.8 births per woman.

Countries have tried several policies to raise the fertility rates, with only sporadic and local success. A commonly adopted measure is maternity leave, paid or unpaid, with job security. Other policies include subsidised childcare, child or family allowances, paid or unpaid paternity leave, flexible or part-time work hours for parents, and tax credits for dependent children.

These measures are appropriate, but miss one point.

The age at which a mother gives birth to her first child can impact her likelihood of having a second child. In several developed countries, the mean age of mothers at the birth of their first child has surpassed or is close to 30 years. Since 2000, many countries have seen the mean age at first birth increase by at least two years. Even in China, reports indicate that the age at which new mothers give birth to their first child now exceeds 30 years in Shanghai.

Until 2010, the largest number of new births in developed countries occurred among mothers aged 25 to 29. Presently, the highest number of first-time mothers falls within the 30-34 age group. Women can and do have successful deliveries in their late thirties and early forties. For many, it is a deliberate decision to start a family late.

The point however, is this – even if a woman desires to reconsider her choice of having a single child, there is less time and inclination to reverse the course if the first childbirth occurs after the mother reaches the age of 30.

Studies often report decreased happiness and life satisfaction during the early stages of parenthood, and younger parents may be unhappier. This is not the same as saying children don’t make parents happy. Parenthood by itself can have a substantial positive effect on life satisfaction but time and monetary cost offsets it. That is why the negative association between fertility and happiness is weaker in countries with higher public support for families.

As parents gain experience and adjust to the demands of parenthood, they may become more adept at managing stress and finding joy in parenthood. They may begin to recognise that loosening the intensive parenting norm relieves stress and raises happiness. Also, recently a study shows that the reported results about the trade-off between happiness and children require strong assumptions about how individuals report happiness and their beliefs about its distribution in society.

Rising female education and employment, women’s delayed entry into the labour market, high monetary and time cost of raising kids, and rising real estate prices have all played a role in declining fertility. In societies where marriage is culturally deemed essential for starting a family, the rising age at marriage and a declining marriage rate also contribute to a postponement in having the first child. For example, In South Korea, a country where only 2% of childbirth is outside marriage, the marriage rate has slid to a record low.

Countries need to contemplate whether they should promote more women having their first child in their twenties. Historically, several countries have had official policies to raise women’s age at marriage and the age at their first child. Is it time to shift gears?

Should countries that aim to boost fertility consider offering increased financial incentives or tax concessions for specific age brackets? Is it time for countries, including Canada and the United States of America, which currently have below-replacement level fertility and lack official policies to influence fertility levels, to initiate strategies aimed at reducing the average age of women with their first child?

Further, several countries facing fertility crises continue to subsidise family planning services directly through public programs or indirectly through non-governmental organisations. Indeed, the option for family planning should be accessible to all adults, but is there a necessity to offer public support for it in countries facing below-replacement-level fertility rates?

A word of caution. The above suggestions do not apply to all countries with fertility rates below the replacement level. An example is India, where the mother’s mean age at first birth is still less than 22 years, with the median age at first marriage less than 20 years in 2019-21 for women in 25-29 age cohort.

What may go wrong with a policy that aims to lower women’s age at first child? Could it be that women would still prefer to have only one child but at a younger age? Yes, that is possible, but that’s no different from today and, hence, not a worse outcome. Would women end up compromising their education and employment? Not really, if we are targeting the whole age group of twenties. Can couples afford to have children 2-3 years earlier than now? That’s tough to answer, but it may be feasible with childcare subsidies and workplace support.

To be clear, child support should be available for women of all ages. Exploring increased incremental support tailored to specific age groups might be worthwhile in a race to raise fertility rates.

My Conversation with Fuchsia Dunlop

Here is the audio, video, and transcript, conducted over a long meal at Mama Chang restaurant in Fairfax.  Here is the episode summary:

As they dined, the group discussed why the diversity in Chinese cuisine is still only just being appreciated in the West, how far back our understanding of it goes, how it’s represented in the Caribbean and Ireland, whether technique trumps quality of ingredients, why certain cuisines can spread internationally with higher fidelity, what we can learn from the different styles in Indian and Chinese cooking, why several dishes on the table featured Amish ingredients, the most likely mistake people will make when making a stir fry, what Lydia has learned managing an empire of Chinese restaurants, Fuchsia’s trick for getting unstuck while writing, and more.

Joining Tyler, Fuchsia, and Lydia around the table were Dan WangRasheed GriffithFergus McCullough, and Sam Enright.

Here is one excerpt:

WANG: Yes, that’s right. If I can ask a follow-up question on this comparison between India and China. Maybe this is half a question also for Tyler. Why do we associate Indian cuisine so much more with long simmers, whereas Chinese cuisine — of course, it is a little bit of everything, as Fuchsia knows so well, but it is often a little bit more associated with quick fries. What is the factor endowment here of these two very big countries, very big civilizations having somewhat divergent paths, as we imagine, with culinary traditions?

DUNLOP: That’s a really interesting question. It’s hard to answer because I don’t really know anything about Indian food. I did have a really interesting conversation with an Indian who came on my tour to Yunnan earlier this year because I was speculating that one of the reasons that Chinese food is so diverse is that the Chinese are really open-minded, with very few taboos. Apart from Muslims eating halal food and some Buddhists not eating meat, there’s a great adventurous open-mindedness to eating.

Whereas in India, you have lots of taboos and religious and ritual restrictions. That’s one reason that you would think it would be a constraint on the creativity of Indian food. But this Indian I was talking to, who’s a food specialist — he reckoned that the restrictions actually forced people to be more creative. He was arguing that Indian food had all the conditions for diversity that Chinese does.

In terms of cooking methods, it’s hard to say. Again, I don’t know about Indian food, but the thing about China is that there’s been this intense thoughtfulness about food, really, for a very long time. You see it in descriptions of food from 2,000 years ago and more.

In the Song Dynasty, this incredible restaurant industry in places like Hangzhou, and innovation and creativity. I suppose that when you are thoroughly interested in food like the Chinese and thinking about it creatively all the time, you end up having a whole plethora of different cooking methods. That’s one of the striking things about Chinese cuisine, that you have slow-cooked stews and simmered things and steamed things and also stir-frying. That might explain why several different methods have achieved prominence.

COWEN: Before I comment on that, Lydia, on the new dish, please tell us.

The dishes are explained as they were consumed, the meal was excellent, of course the company too.  A very good episode, highly rated for all lovers of Chinese food.  And here is Fuchsia’s new book, Invitation to a Banquet: The Story of Chinese Food, self-recommending.  And here are previous MR mentions of Fuchsia, including links to my two earlier CWTs with her.

Emergent Ventures, 30th cohort

Mike Ferguson and Natasha Asmi, Bay Area and University of Michigan, growing blood vessels in the lab.

Klara Feenstra, London, to write a novel about the tensions between Catholicism and modern life.

Snigdha Roy, UCLA, for a conference trip and trip to India, math and computation and biology.

Nikol Savova, Oxford, and Sofia, Bulgaria, podcast on Continental philosophy, mathematics.

Seán O’Neill McPartlin, Dublin, policy studies and YIMBY interests.

Olivia Li, NYC, geo-engineering, undergraduate dropout.

Suraj M. Reddy, High school, Newark, Delaware, 3-D printing and earthquakes.

Zhengdong Wang, USA and London, DeepMind, to advance his skills in thinking and writing.

Andrés Acevedo, Medellin, podcast about Colombia.

Luke Farritor, University of Nebraska, deciphering ancient scrolls, travel grant.

Hudhayfa Nazoordeen, Sri Lanka and Waterloo, hydroponics for affordable food. 

Thomas Des Garets Geddes, London, Sinification, China newsletter.

Chang Che, book project on the return of state socialism in China, USA/Shanghai.

Alexander Yevchenko, Toronto, ag tech for farmers.

There are more winners to be listed, please do not worry if you didn’t fit into this cohort.  And here is a list of previous winners.

Income security for American workers has been rising

American workers are doing relatively well, but there is still a lot of anxiety about their plight. To many commentators, the US worker is suffering: Whether the culprit is outsourcing, trade with China, or the sheer daily turbulence of capitalism, that worker faces increasingly volatile income prospects. One political scientist even wrote a whole book about this worry.

Fortunately, the reality is much brighter. One study of this question, performed by a group of economists from Wharton, Stanford, the University of Minnesota and Brookings, suggests that income volatility has mostly been declining for the last seven decades — and especially for the last four. Whatever volatility risks remain, they used to be much worse.

One striking feature of these results, posted last week and based on data from the US Census Bureau and the Social Security Administration, is how widespread are the gains in job security. They are not going to just a scant few workers. They are long-running for both women (dating to the 1950s) and men (dating to the 1980s). They hold across most demographic groups and by gender, age, earnings level and cohort.

Here is the rest of my latest Bloomberg column.

What I’ve been reading

Naomi Klein, Doppelganger: A Trip into the Mirror World.  Have you ever been confused by Naomi Klein vs. Naomi Wolf?  Intellectually they are both pretty crazy.  And they are both named Naomi.  Some might think they bear some resemblance to each other.  Well, here is a whole book on that confusion!  And it is written by Naomi Klein.  How much insight and self-awareness can one intellectually crazy person have about being confused for another intellectually crazy person?  Quite a bit, it turns out.  Recommended, though with the provision that I understand you never felt you needed to read a whole book about such a topic.

Benjamin Labutut, The Maniac.  Chilean author, he has penned the story of von Neumann but in the latter part of the book switches to contemporary AI and AlphaGO, semi-fictionalized.  Feels vital and not tired, mostly pretty good, thoiiugh for some MR readers the material may be excessively familiar.

J.M. Coetzee, The Pole.  Short, compelling, self-contained, again deals with older men who have not resolved their issues concerning sex.   Good but not great Coetzee.

Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach: Unpublished Writings of Gary S. Becker.  I am honored to have blurbed this book.

Richard Campanella, Bienville’s Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans is one mighty fine book.

Shuchen Xiang, Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The History and Philosophy of an Idea.  Chinese cosmopolitanism, there was more of it than you might have thought.  Should we be asking “Where did it go?”  Or is it there more than ever?

Monday assorted links

1. What happens to your returns? (New Yorker)

2. “The hobby of “collecting” had the highest average IQ.”

3. Is there a new accent developing in Antarctica?

4. How one man created a multimillion-dollar resale market for Buc-ee’s snacks (Texan throughout).

5. More Heidi Williams (and others) on speeding scientific progress, and the co-authored (various luminaries) Nature article is here.

6. One take on the roots of China’s current problems.  And “Also a widely published poet, his [Gewirtz’s] achievements echo the polymath scholar-officials in the Chinese tradition, including major historian poets from Ban Gu (32–92 CE) through Ouyang Xiu (1007–72 CE) and beyond.”  Link here.

Emergent Ventures winners, 27th cohort

Tanner Greer and The Center for Strategic Translation, to fund translation into English of important Chinese works, so that Westerners may understand China better.

Nabeel Qureshi, New York City, to support his next project.

Matthew Adelstein, Ann Arbor, for the study of utilitarianism and to become a public intellectual.

Kris Gulati, UC Merced, CA and Cambridge, Mass., to support his work in the economics of science.

Amos Wollen, Oxford Freshman, philosophy. General career development, podcasting, and travel.

Max Thilo, London, to travel to Singapore and study their health care system.

Juliette Sellgren, University of Virginia and Arlington, to attend a Civic Future conference in Cambridge, general career development.

Olutoba Ojo, Nigeria/Newark, Delaware, 17, computational biology, general career development.

Maggie Li, University of Toronto, physiological changes in brain vasculature with aging, and conference attendance.  Personal website here.

Jordan Dworkin, Federation of American Scientists, NYC, a pledge toward a metascience experimentation prize.

Anna Claire Flowers, George Mason University, travel grant to Civic Future conference in Cambridge, UK, general career development.

Julia Pamilih, starting at Harvard Kennedy School, formerly Westminster, to become a leading expert on Indonesia.

Lada Nuzhna, San Francisco (originally Ukraine), for patent-related efforts, related to her work on gene expression.

Adithya Chakravarthy, Toronto,  for his YouTube channel for advanced math videos.

Rebecca Lowe, Oxford, political philosopher, to support her writing of a book on the philosophy of freedom, Twitter here.

Ukraine tranche

Viktoriia Schcherba, Kyiv, now Harris School, Chicago, to study economic and political reconstruction.

Dmytro Semykras, Ukraine and Graz, Austria, to develop his career as a pianist.

Congratulations to all!  Here are previous cohorts of EV winners.