Results for “age of em” 15648 found
The Role of Friends in the Opioid Epidemic
Your friends are not always good for you:
The role of friends in the US opioid epidemic is examined. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health), adults aged 25-34 and their high school best friends are focused on. An instrumental variable technique is employed to estimate peer effects in opioid misuse. Severe injuries in the previous year are used as an instrument for opioid misuse in order to estimate the causal impact of someone misusing opioids on the probability that their best friends also misuse. The estimated peer effects are significant: Having a best friend with a reported serious injury in the previous year increases the probability of own opioid misuse by around 7 percentage points in a population where 17 percent ever misuses opioids. The effect is driven by individuals without a college degree and those who live in the same county as their best friends.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Effrosyni Adamopoulou, Jeremy Greenwood, Nezih Guner, and Karen Kopecky.
Is the mortgage interest deduction a good idea?
I usually don’t like arguments like the one that follows, as purely short-run second best considerations tend to rub me the wrong way. Nonetheless I had never thought of it before, so I am happy to present it for our collective enlightenment:
Mortgage interest deductions and other homeownership subsidies are widely believed to be harmful because they redistribute resources from lower-income renters to higher-income homeowners. We argue that renters actually benefit from these policies in general equilibrium for two reasons. First, the rental supply curve is relatively inelastic, which means that rents fall when these policies reduce rental demand. Second, many renters spend most of their income on housing, and these renters gain substantially from rent decreases. We calibrate a quantitative model to match empirical evidence on these factors and show they are strong enough that subsidizing homeownership actually increases welfare.
That is from a newly published article by Shahar Rotberg and Joseph B. Steinberg. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
The economics of semaglutide
…while one would certainly like to have these drugs available to these patients, if the price of these drugs doesn’t come down, you can make a good argument their cost will literally break Medicare. Why? Well, roughly 35% of Medicare patients are overweight or obese. Roughly 75% of people over 65 have coronary artery disease. (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6616540/#:~:text=The%20American%20Heart%20Association%20(AHA,age%20of%2080%20%5B3%5D.)
Even if you assume these numbers are independent of each other, which is very unlikely, because overweight people are more likely to have cardiovascular disease, this means at least 26% of the roughly 31 million Medicare recipients (and likely more) might benefit from these drugs. We have an eligible population for these drugs therefore of more than 8 million people. At current list prices we would be spending 8mil*1350*12 or about 130 billion dollars a year. Total Medicare spending is about 725 billion a year. So, Medicare spending would go up by more than 17% overnight and stay at that level for a long time to come.
Here is more from Gary Cornell, mostly about the degree of effectiveness.
A Systematic Review and New Analyses of the Gender-Equality Paradox
Contrary to what some naysayers might claim, the paradox is real:
Some studies show that living conditions, such as economy, gender equality, and education, are associated with the magnitude of psychological sex differences. We systematically and quantitatively reviewed 54 articles and conducted new analyses on 27 meta-analyses and large-scale studies to investigate the association between living conditions and psychological sex differences. We found that sex differences in personality, verbal abilities, episodic memory, and negative emotions are more pronounced in countries with higher living conditions. In contrast, sex differences in sexual behavior, partner preferences, and math are smaller in countries with higher living conditions. We also observed that economic indicators of living conditions, such as gross domestic product, are most sensitive in predicting the magnitude of sex differences. Taken together, results indicate that more sex differences are larger, rather than smaller, in countries with higher living conditions. It should therefore be expected that the magnitude of most psychological sex differences will remain unchanged or become more pronounced with improvements in living conditions, such as economy, gender equality, and education.
That is from a new piece by Agneta Herlitz, Ida Hönig, and Martin Asperholm. Via excellence.
Chile’s pension system out of whack
Together, I estimate these policies have effectively pushed returns down by more than 2 percentage points in most cases as suboptimal asset allocation choices with significant practical implications. Note that a mere 1.5 per cent difference in annual returns over a 35-year period can lead to a 30 to 40 per cent reduction in pension payouts. Additionally, there are three more critical issues to consider.
First, the initial design mandated an insufficient 10 per cent contribution from a worker’s salary. Studies suggest that a 15 per cent to 17 per cent contribution is necessary to obtain an acceptable pension. But there has been political reluctance to increase this figure, which would require workers to sacrifice their current take-home pay for future benefits.
Second, about 30 per cent of Chile’s labour market operates informally, and many workers frequently shift between formal and informal employment. Unfortunately, during informal periods, they seldom contribute to their pension accounts.
Here is more from Arturo Cifuentes in the FT.
John Stuart Mill on empirical economics and causal inference
Written by me, here is a passage from GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of All Time, and Why Should We Care?
A System of Logic covers many different topics, but for our purposes the most important discussion is Mill’s treatment “Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry,” sometimes called “Mill’s Methods” and indeed receiving their own Wikipedia page. Mill outlines different manners in which causes and effects might be correlated, or not, and what we can infer from such patterns, and how difficult it can be to sort out actual cause and effect from the data. He refers to the “direct method of agreement,” the “method of difference,” “joint method of agreement difference,” the “method of residue,” and the “method of concomitant variations,” all as ways of trying to make correct or at least better inferences from the data.
I’ll spare you the details on the full argument, but in essence Mill was trying to figure out how to do causal inference econometrics, but with words only. That enterprise was doomed to fail, but it gives us insight into what Mill thought was by far the most important question in social science, namely causal inference when faced with complex underlying chains of cause and effect. For Mill, everything is what we would now call “an identification problem,” and this understanding is clearest in Mill’s chapters “Fallacies of Generalization” and “Fallacies of Ratiocination.” Mill also serves up a remarkably on-target discussion of how the different nature of social science problems, and their possibly greater complexity, can lead to identification problems that are not necessarily present in the natural sciences – see his chapter “Of the Chemical, or Experimental, Method in the Social Science.” That entire approach is remarkably 2020s in orientation, and you won’t find earlier history of thought books giving Mill much if any credit for this.
In a funny way, Mill was ahead of Milton Friedman in his understanding here. Friedman knew much more statistics, but in his economics he often presented causal inference as fairly straightforward. In his Monetary History of the United States, co-authored with Anna Schwartz, the reader does get the impression that the historical correlations, and ordinary least squares techniques, do in fact show that the money supply is a central driver of nominal income, given the relative stability of money demand. Later, the real business cycle theorists were to challenge that inference, and suggest that often it was income that was causing the money supply. That is a kind of complex challenge Mill seemed quite comfortable with in A System of Logic, whereas Friedman and Schwartz assigned higher power to common sense approaches to cause and effect.
Mill remains in my eyes one of the most underrated thinkers.
Robert Sams on the future of crypto (from my email)
In response to this last crypto post of mine:
I’m glad you’ve put this one out there, as it’s a thesis i’ve been thinking about for many years and do not think it’s exotic at all.For all the hand-wavy hypothesising about the future of AI autonomous agents, precious little attention is given to the role of legal personhood in the discussion. The very concept of “autonomous agent” is ambiguous in this regard. In one sense, it means some autonomously operated system that is acting _on behalf_ of someone|something else; in another sense, it means something that acts on its own behalf, it “has agency”. The distinction is critical, because it’s hard to see how an AI system can have agency if it cannot, on its own, own property, enter into contracts, sue and be sued. Having agency is more than being intelligent.It’s pretty hard to imagine a scenario where jurisdictions start granting legal personhood to AI systems. There may be legal entities where human directors delegate corporate decision making to an AI, but there’s always an essential human-fiduciary-in-the-loop with legal personhood and is the nexus of AI regulation. But blockchains upend this framework, offering an alternative infrastructure where a different model of ownership, contract and dispute resolution where a human fiduciary role is not an essential requirement. AI’s can be first-class citizens in the crypto economy.So having agency is more than being intelligent, you need “economic personhood” to autonomously interact in the real world, and blockchains provide the infrastructure for non-human, economic persons. If an AI can buy its own GPU compute and other resources, and fund its opex by selling services people (or other AIs) value, the AI has economic personhood.Crucially, these non-human economic persons do not need _general_ intelligence, they just need domain-specific capabilities that enable it to produce valuable output and continuously adapt to a competitive marketplace. That is why the idea is not very exotic at all, as the current capabilities of LLMs and blockchains are arguably sufficient for this scenario to materialise in the near term.The obstacles seem to be more tractable problems, like: “how can the AI agent learn to trust the veracity of data it solicits and quality of services (esp GPU compute) it buys?”. Whilst it sounds kind of funny, there’s an opportunity for human operated service providers to build brands of trustworthiness with AI agents by doing things that are easy for context-aware humans but hard for AIs, like attesting to the veracity of a data feed (“is it really 41c in lower Manhattan today?”, “did USDJPY really rally 10% on the day?”).—AI-Human trust games may turn out to be more effective than centralised human feedback loops operated by big AI tech, esp if the AI’s are domain-specific and must strive for product-market fit to survive. And whilst AGI doomers will be predictability horrified by the prospect of AI’s with economic personhood, my own contrary view is that our entire orientation to the subject will change if we see just how vulnerable to attack these AI’s are once you cut the umbilical chord they currently have by being ensconced inside the trusted environments funded by big tech’s enormous balance sheets.Finally, I suspect that an economic personhood orientation to the AI x-risk debate will improve the research and dialogue significantly. My own speculation is that we’ll eventually come to the conclusion that the telos of AGI is not a singularity but a plurality of competing A[G]Is. It seems more fruitful to ponder the respective comparative advantages of AIs vs humans in the domains of computational power and context awareness and explore the codependencies when these two classes of intelligent economic agent must compete and cooperate in a decentralised market.
Will Rinehart on YIMBY and Sure (from my email)
I won’t double indent, everything that follows is from Will and not from me:
“…you put up the post “MR commentator ‘Sure’ on YIMBY” and I wanted to send an email because I’m not sure I agree with the comment, given Rosen-Roback and some recent research in urban economics.
Sure writes that “what people want from their housing is overwhelmingly a short commute and low density,” which is only half right. People want amenities, including a short commute and space, but more importantly, they want good schools and a mix of local consumption goods.
One of the most important amenities for a school is its school district. Basically, any survey of home buyers ranks school districts at the very top of demands, and they show a willingness to give up space in order to be in better schools.
Then, there’s the broad notion of local consumption. Sparked by Miyauchi, Nakajima, and Redding (2021), urban economics is shifting to include smartphone data in order to understand the consumption side of agglomeration better. It is an area we know little about because data was so hard to collect.
Combining smartphone data with economic census data, the authors show that non-commuting trips are frequent, more localized than commuting trips, and are strongly related to the availability of nontraded services. From here, the authors augmented a standard model to incorporate travel to work and this hyper local travel. Their findings are powerful. Consumption access makes a sizable contribution relative to workplace access in explaining the observed variation in residents and land prices across locations.
So when Sure asks,
Suppose they do [liberalize housing], who is going to move in [to Arlington and Alexandria]? The guys who are buying in Chantilly because they want space? Or the guys crowded into a apartment building in NE DC who work in Foggy Bottom?I submit it will be the latter.
I think that’s probably wrong. The people moving into those homes in the suburbs will not want space but good schools first and foremost. So it very well could be people from Chantilly move to Arlington, but I would suspect that Arlington will get more people because they generally have better schools than Alexandria and others. Thus, the amenity of interest would be education not space.
Sure is right that “If we liberalize zoning everywhere (i.e. the YIMBY dream) then we should expect a net movement from the areas where people say they don’t want to live to the areas where they say they want to live.” But they misstep in thinking that “on net that means out of the urban core and into something less dense.” In the open-city Rosen-Roback model, generally speaking, liberalization of housing would mean people head into the urban core and into the suburbs.
In total, Sure seriously overweights commuting time and housing space, and underweights education as an amenity and local consumption.”
Vegemite ain’t enough
This survey of 3,000 Australians aged 15 to 24 found that the career most were interested in pursuing was ‘mental health therapist’ at 17% of respondents. ‘Tradie’ – which includes plumbers, electricians, and carpenters etc – was 6%.
Here is the article, with a link to the underlying report. Via Chris Wokker.
Which are the most underperforming parts of the world? (from my email)
You’ve written about undervalued economies in the past, but after visiting the Bay Area, I wonder what you think are the most underperforming places in the world? Define “place” as you wish, but I mean underperforming relative to easily achievable/median policy mixes. So less “what if Albanians acted like Singaporeans” and more “what if LA improved land use.”
I ask because the Bay Area, despite its achievements, seems like a candidate (Paul Graham seems to think so), as does Southern California which cedes the world’s most livable climate to cars. Various parts of Mexico come to mind. Eritrea sits on a key trade route with little to show for it. My Bosnia is a disappointment relative to neighbors. West Virginia?
Always eager to hear your thoughts.
That is from Haris Hadzimuratovic. I have a few nominations:
1. Albania I think will end up much richer, more or less on a par with parts of the former Yugoslavia. The country has enjoyed a growth spurt lately. So Albania is a good pick, but it is converging and soon won’t be a pick anymore.
2. Egypt and Lebanon should be much richer. You cannot cite their neighbors in support of that claim, but they are both extremely cultured places. Lebanese migrants in particular have done very well elsewhere.
3. Armenia should be much richer. Armen Alchian would agree.
4. Belarus should be richer than Russia, not poorer than Russia.
5. Nicaragua should be modestly richer than it is.
6. Venezuela was once the richest country in Latin America, now it is among the poorest. Cuba too.
(You will notice that communism is implicated in 3-6, and arguably #1 too.
7. Yemen should be richer, though I would not expect it to be rich.
What else?
Unraveling the female thinness premium
That is a paper by Shasha Wang, who is on the job market from the University of Pennsylvania. Here is the abstract:
This paper studies two mechanisms that jointly contribute to thinness premium in the marriage market: the economic mechanism and the non-economic mechanism. My empirical findings from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) reveal that all else being equal, thinner females are more likely to marry richer males. A one-unit increase in BMI (Body Mass Index), roughly equivalent to a six-pound increase for a 5’6″ figure, is associated with a 3.9% decrease in the husband’s annual labor income for noncollege wives and a 4.3% decrease for college-educated wives. Using the Simulated Method of Moments to estimate a two-stage static matching equilibrium model, this paper determines whether the observed preference for thinner female partners in the marriage market is a result of assortative mating due to the thinness premium in the labor market or is driven by non-economic factors such as a preference for smaller body sizes or other traits associated with smaller body sizes, such as self-discipline, active social interactions, and positive social image. The estimation results indicate that the positive correlation between a husband’s income and his wife’s thinness is primarily attributed to a male preference for thinner spouses. Women with a BMI below 25 only earn 4% more income than those with a BMI above 25 (assuming all other factors are equal), but having a wife with a BMI below 25 significantly enhances a husband’s utility, akin to a 1.15 times increase in his consumption.
Please note that is not her job market paper. Her main paper is a very interesting piece on when/where STEM gaps arise across men and women.
Is fear a bigger problem than hate?
I deploy this protocol as a lab-in-the-field experiment in Jos, Nigeria, to study the region’s ongoing conflict between Christians and Muslims. I find that fear explains 76% (and hate 24%) of the non-cooperative behavior I observe in a coordination game played between Christians and Muslims. Moreover, this fear is mostly unwarranted, as non-cooperators grossly exaggerate the percentage of hateful people in the outgroup. I then estimate a structural model to determine what type of policy intervention would most effectively increase cooperation. My counterfactual analysis suggests that interventions that correct unwarranted fears would be highly effective. In contrast, interventions that reduce hate would not because hateful people also have high levels of fear. Finally, I study an actual policy intervention with an RCT in which I provide participants access to a radio drama that promotes intergroup cooperation. Using my experimental protocol, I find that the radio drama decreases hate but not fear and thus does not translate into increased cooperation, as my model predicts.
That is from Migual Ortiz, an economics job market candidate from UC Berkeley.
Das Adam Smith Problem
The second set of advocates for the book [Theory of Moral Sentiments] I usually find in media outlets, sophisticated media outlets at that, or I hear it over lunch table conversation. These claims suggest that Wealth of Nations covers the commercial, selfish side of human behavior, while Theory of Moral Sentiments is an account of the caring, empathetic side, or something like that. I wish I had a nickel for every time I read or heard that contrast. Maybe it is harmless enough, but – and I don’t completely understand why — it kind of makes me sick. It is simultaneously an attempt to claim a bland centrist middle ground, to snidely distance oneself from capitalism and selfishness, and reduce Smith to a series of empty clichés. It is trying to be pat rather than insightful. It is trying to give everything its place in a manner that we can then safely ignore.
Just for a start, I view Smith’s portrait of human nature in Wealth of Nations as rich and multi-faceted, a piece of behavioral economics, in modern terminology, rather than narrow, commercial, and purely selfish. And in Theory of Moral Sentiments yes people are empathetic, and show sympathy for others, but they are often caring in…pretty narrow and selfish ways. I just don’t think the “each book carves out its own sphere” understanding of the pair works very well.
My biggest takeaway from TMS is that humans beings make evaluations, including sympathetic evaluations but not only, based on local rather than global information. They put a lot of weight on what is right before their eyes and neglect the bigger picture. The very opening passage of TMS expresses how we can understand the emotions of others only through our own. We cannot look around corners to understand other minds directly, so we make inferences from our own experience. Smith demonstrates and then demonstrates that point again throughout the book.
That is a passage from my generative book, written by me, GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time, and Why Does It Matter?
Minimum wages and rents
This topic remains underdiscussed in the minimum wage debates, here are some recent results from Atsushi Yamagishi:
I analyze the effect of minimum wage hikes on housing rents using exogenous variation in minimum wages across local labor markets in Japan. I estimate that in low-quality rental housing market, a 10% minimum wage increase induces a 2.5%–4.5% increase in rents. Minimum wage hikes benefit workers in light of a spatial equilibrium model showing that changes in housing market rents work as a sufficient statistic for measuring utility changes arising from changes in minimum wages. The increase in housing rents also implies an unintended benefit for homeowners.
Atsushi Yamagishi is from Princeton economics, but that is not his job market paper, here is the whole portfolio, which looks quite interesting.
Marriage sentences to ponder
Increased exposure to opposite-sex members of other class groups generates a substantial increase in interclass marriage, but increased exposure to other race groups has no detectable effect on interracial marriage.
That is from the job market paper of Benjamin Goldman, a job market candidate from Harvard University.