A new BPEA paper by Eric Chaney (pdf) suggests maybe not:
Will the Arab Spring lead to long-lasting democratic change? To explore this question I examine the determinants of the Arab world’s democratic defi cit in 2010. I find that the percent of a country’s landmass that was conquered by Arab armies following the death of the prophet Muhammad statistically accounts for this defi cit. Using history as a guide, I hypothesize that this pattern reflects the long-run influence of control structures developed under Islamic empires in the pre-modern era and and that the available evidence is consistent with this interpretation. I also investigate the determinants of the recent uprisings. When taken in unison, the results cast doubt on claims that the Arab-Israeli conflict or Arab/Muslim culture are systematic obstacles to democratic change in the region and point instead to the legacy of the region’s historical institutional framework.
Here is a good sentence:
…the fact that the Arab world’s democratic defi cit is shared by 10 non-Arab countries that were conquered by Arab armies casts doubt on the importance of the role of Arab culture in perpetuating the democratic defi cit.
And this:
Once one accounts for the 28 countries conquered by Arab armies, the evolution of democracy in the remaining 15
Muslim-majority countries since 1960 largely mirrors that of the rest of the developing world.
Is conquest the only way to cause change in ‘control structures’?
Replace Islamic with non-Western European and put the cutoff date to 1989 and boom, works for 90% of the world. Replace 1989 to 1944 and works even better. But yes, Islam is the reason for a democratic deficit.
1989 would already have difficulty accounting for democratization in Korea and Taiwan. 1944 would have trouble explaining fascist Spain and Portugal. But true, the cutoff date matters.
Eric Chaney does not blame Islam, as a note, but Arab caliphates. There are majority-Muslim states that were never conquered – Indonesia and Malaysia were never Arab. I am not sure how much better Chaney’s hypothesis does than blaming the (non-Arab, Turkish) Ottoman Empire, which later conquered much of the same Mediterranean territory but did not extend to Iberia (or is Spain considered to have a democratic deficit?) or past modern Iran (which isn’t democratic today, conversely). On the other hand the Caliphates never did reach through Southeastern Europe. Chaney may be identifying an interaction between geography-induced ease of conquest and some historical coincidence (Ottoman less Soviet influence approximates Caliphate less Spanish influence…?).
I’m not sure that ease of geographic conquest relates to democracy. Historical conquest might though…
I don’t agree with this thesis, but southern Spain had a LOT of population replacement after the Arabs/Muslims were driven out during the reconquest, Morocco was never conquered by the Ottomans, but Hungary was, and what is now Romania was under Ottoman rule for centuries. I bet Oil would be a far better explainer of the Democracy deficit, as would a lack of direct rule by European states in first half of the 20th century.
Arab is not the same as Islam, and replacing Arab with Islam would produce enough examples to invalidate the argument.
You know in the late 1980s it was argued that East Asians had never had a strong democracy, one party LDP rule in Japan was declared not a real democracy, and this was proof East Asians had a cultural disinterest in Democracy. I remember this argument being made as late as 1992.
I don’t hear this much anymore.
I hear it quite often, from the apologists of the Chinese regime.
I’m sorry, why precisely does this cast doubt? Is he supposing that a conquering and ruling army does not impose its own culture, or at least influence the culture of the conquered country? And that one can really distinguish between “Arab/Muslim culture” and the historic legacy of the caliphate, when surely the two influenced each other?
Exactly. I took this as evidence of the opposite of what he claims.
ditto.
The deficits of the Arab world, democratic, economic or otherwise, should never be used to justify one or the other side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The latter should be taken on it’s own terms. How the rest of the region interprets it is significant, but not decisive.
Why not?
I don’t always choose my allies, but when I do, I don’t choose people who blow themselves up and teach their children how to murder people.
People in democratic societies don’t, in general, raise those types of people. If they do, those people are a slim minority. Democracy deficits are almost synonymous with civility deficits.
I don’t see how/why he measures Arab control from c 1100 but not British colonial control c 1800-1920? Strikes me that we might want to look at those institutional changes – esp indirect rule and use of local notables.
Eck? Are you saying that British colonial control in that period would predict and increased chance of autocracy now? India, Sri Lanka, South Africa and others are all democracies (all though some are very shaky). I suspect any correlation between autocracy and British colonialism is weak, and slightly negative.
“I don’t see how/why he measures Arab control from c 1100 but not British colonial control c 1800-1920? Strikes me that we might want to look at those institutional changes – esp indirect rule and use of local notables.”
Well, compare the countries subject to British colonial control, with those that never were (e.g. Jordan vs Syria, Israel/Palestine vs Lebanon). Compare the countries that were under British colonial control for a long time (e.g. Egypt) with those under British control for a short time (e.g. Iraq). It doesn’t seem that British control has anything to do with the democratic deficit in the Arab world.
Besides, the classic case of indirect British colonial rule through the use of local notables isn’t the Arab world, but India. And that has had easily the most stable democracy in the Third World. I see no explanatory factor here, and if anything I’d say it is a counteracting trend. Non-European countries formerly subject to British colonial control seem to have less of a democratic deficit than average, and that seems equally true in the Arab world.
The question is to what degree the former colony threw off the British mantle.
The US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bermuda, et al turned out well because they kept most about Britain that was good, the notable exception being slavery. British common law, religion, work ethic, civil service
I think he is confusing a very distant historic event with very recent historic events.
It is very hard, if not impossible, to build a democratic order in a country which has strong and active totalitarian movement. The successes are few (both Italy and France managed to rein in their communists during the Cold War), the failures are numerous (from Weimar Germany and interwar Japan to Czechoslovakia in 1948, Iran in 1979 etc.)
Nowadays, salafism and qutbism are very active and present in the Arab society, and they have genuine support of significant portions of the population. Even in Tunisia, the most secular of the current Arab countries, there is huge support for Ennahda outside the major urban centers (but not in the capital itself).
So, why should one wonder?
I note that three or your four failures are democracies today.
Yes, but they underwent long totalitarian era, and paid very dearly during that time.
I was not commenting the long-term lookouts (say, 100 years), but the lookout for the closest generation – which is what most people are interested in.
I just can’t see that Arab spring would lead into democracy. It will take a whole lot more to make those countries democratic.
Yeah, I’m sure cultures that forbid women to drive cars and leave home without a male relative, and also force them on threat of death to marry their rapist, have absolutely no inherent impediment to democracy.
What we we need are more western academics writing papers defending these people.
Phony elections with ignorant voters legitimizing tyrants and oligarchs that are actually tribal charades to satisfy the liberal international community are what we’re talking about here. Stipulating that democracy is the summit of political development is presumptuous.
Democracy in Western countries been a process of liberalization. Democracy in the Mideast has generally been a process of radicalization, at least in the short run.
But it’s important to remember democracy is a process, not an event. The election of radicals has consequences that the voting public tend to appreciate much more after the first few elections. The most salient question seems to be whether the commitment to rule of law and democracy is strong enough that failed governing paradigms can be replaced democratically.
Damn I wish this blog had a “like” button sometimes.
Couldn’t have said it better myself.
I think in the US we have an ideological obsession with “democracy”, rather than governance. This is one of the thing that makes us so incapable of dealing with different political systems–because democracy is supposed to be a light switch which you turn on and then…well, you’re supposed to have the steady, brilliant light of Democracy. And you’re done and its obvious that democracy solves all problems.
Economists would do far better to think more about governance, and less about democracy.
It all depends on whether you value democracy as a means towards an end, or an ideal in itself.
I always thought it was both. We desire democracy for its virtues but take the bitter with the sweet. We believe that, in the long run, the democratic process approximates an intelligent information system, just like free markets. Democracies evolve.
took an academic paper to say what blogs were saying from the jump.
If we accept that “democracy” is a process rather than a condition, it should be obvious that the degree to which the process can function in any social order is dependent on the constraints extent within the various social organizations (which comprise the over-all order) and further those constraints from within the social groupings from which the organizations are formed and continuously morph.
While it is slowly becoming less universal, the basic social groupings of the Arab-dominated Near and Middle East are the nulclear and extended families. By traditions and belief systems the constraints in those groupings are hiearchical, non-concensual, and given to individual subordination and “devaluation;” relying on highly centralized authority for “certainty”
of actions or deferments. All relationships are personal. The successive social organizations of Clans and Tribes, comprised of those social groupings, while often developing as much degree of consensus necessary to reduce conflicts (but not tensions), retain the basic constraints arising from the shared value systems of their components. Exchanges and relationships are intra-personal, much in the nature of the “extended family concept,” which, of course, is the historic root of Clan and Tribe. The individual remains subordinate and “devalued,” except as may be determined by relationships through Tribe and Clan. While impersonal transactions are beginning to grow, they are still limited and reliance on non-personal representations (those other than the traditional within the social organization) is very limited. Reduction of that constraint would be essential to establishing some degree of a Democratic process. Moving on to the Social Orders of Kingdoms, Nations, Theocracies, and economic unions, etc., that comprise the area, we observe the feed-through of the under-lying consraints in the larger populations that might otherwise form an electorate. As Western Civilization intrudes, and its contacts bring about exchanges, including communications and infiormation, as well as the more normal goods and services, on the impersonal formats in common use, the effects of some of the constraints lessen, but not without trepidations.
We are thus some time out from Democratic processes being able to function in those Social Orders, absent further, more dramatic and accelerated Western intrusions such as occurred in Iraq, but have receded in Turkey.
We are thus some time out from Democratic processes being able to function in those Social Orders, absent further, more dramatic and accelerated Western intrusions such as occurred in Iraq, but have receded in Turkey.
Nice.
1) Democracy can be imported to the Middle East via “dramatic and accelerated Western intrusions” a/k/a, bombing the shit out of them; 2) democracy works, once the organic institutions have been destroyed by the State.
Obviously, they hate us for our freedom.
So it’s not their culture, it’s just their whole history?
“I find that the percent of a country’s landmass that was conquered by Arab armies following the death of the prophet Muhammad statistically accounts for this defi cit.”
Not only this, but these same countries are also finding it difficult to get enough water for their populations. It also gets very hot in these same countries in the summer!
This sounds like a deeply stupid paper. However, it may be an overacademic attempt to explain two things, one that is common sense and one that is not as but still pretty obvious. Those are that societies without historical experience in representative institutions will struggle with instituting representative democracies, and that the way Islam developed makes separation of “church” and state really difficult.
Here in London, all the help seems to be Polish. They fulfill the role that Mexican labor has in the US in the service economy. I have to admit, this disappoints me a bit. When I moved to Hungary in 1990, I assumed that such large differences would largely disappear in twenty years. True, the Poles tend to be young–college age. They won’t necessarily be in this position as their careers progress. But still, I had hoped Eastern Europe would have closed up more in the intervening years.
I had lunch with Chris Skrebowski here in London on Monday. Chris started his career as analyst for BP and was editor of Petroleum Review, a respected industry publication.
Chris is like Scott Sumner or Bryan Caplan–I may not always agree with him, but I always want to hear what he has to say. (To be fair, I mostly agree with him. He’s an excellent analyst.)
On Monday, the topic at lunch turned to the question of Middle East uncertainties, and one of these was Saudi Arabia. The Saudis face a complex calculus. Should Iran get the Bomb, then the Kingdom’s will be politically weaker. And the US is withdrawing from Iraq and allowing a more decisive ascendance of Shiites there. Thus, a Sunni dominated Saudi Arabia would face a Shiite arc from Iran to Syria.
And then there’s Mubarak. Mubarak was a US ally for a long time. And the US just cut him lose. If Saudi Arabia becomes unstable, then what will become of the ruling family? Will they be exiled to Englewood, New Jersey (where Gaddafi had a house) with a few billion in tow? Or will they face the fate of Mubarak, or worse, Qaddafi? The Saudis have to think beyond a US-protected future.
And there’s another thing. It looks like the opportunity to rapidly increase oil prices may be waning. Read this article by Chris (http://www.odac-info.org/newsletter/2011/09/16), and scroll down to Graph 1 (my contribution). It will give you an idea why I think oil prices rises are increasingly likely be limited to only global GDP growth, oil efficiency improvements, and dollar inflation. Saudi Arabia is not producing much more oil than it has in recent years. All the upside has been in the oil price. But if price gains are going to be smaller in the future, the ability of the Saudis to buy off their opposition may not be in 2013 what it was in 2011.
So if you’re Saudi Arabia-or more precisely the Saudi ruling family–is time on your side? And if not, how and when might you like to see the whole Iranian situation resolved? Now combine that with news reports of Saudis arming the Syrian opposition, and it’s not hard to be worried. Since when does the Saudi royal family support revolution and democracy? Yes, there’s a family connection to Syria, but if the reports are true, it suggests a Saudi Arabia which may feel it can’t live with the emerging status quo of encirclement by nuclear-armed Shiites and abandonment by waivering Americans.
Yes, it was nice to see Chris. But I have to admit, lunch left me unsettled.
Jeez Louise, it’s just like yesterday. The Arab Spring will not and cannot lead to democracy in the Arab Spring countries, because their average IQ remains about 83-85, and democracy doesn’t work in countries that have an average IQ of less than 90. Mind you, those 80-something IQs could be increased, maybe, by this or that intervention, but barring that, there will be no democracy there. And again, just like yesterday, all the rest is blah blah blah. Why don’t people get that?
It’s not their IQ. It is their whole culture. But he’s also asking the wrong question to begin with.
The author appears to make the same basic mistake as do other advocates of exporting democracy to places like the Middle East, which is to assume that it will produce a tolerant, liberal society like those in the EU and US.
In reality, most people in those places simply don’t WANT a tolerant society. Most of them see life as a battle between their own set of customs (including religion) and everyone else’s. And if you give them the vote, they’ll use it to oppress their neighbors before their neighbors do the same unto them.
The plain fact is that the only possible way to create a stable, liberal society in a place like Iraq or Iran is to impose the rule of a colonial empire on them and keep it in place for several generations, and have it actively prevent that nation’s children from being taught the intolerant ways of their fathers. Yes, I’m talking cultural genocide.
Politically incorrect as it is to say this even in the US these days, some cultures simply demand that their followers be intolerant, now and always. And if you make the mistake of giving those cultures the benefit of Western ideas of tolerance, you simply guarantee that those cultures will replace your own, ending all tolerance.
It’s high time that France’s and Germany’s laws against Nazi-like parties be expanded to exclude all intolerant teachings from the protection of the freedoms they seek to destroy. And it’s time that the rest of the West adopt similar laws.
And as long as the West maintains its present unwillingness to engage in colonialism, we may as well pull completely out of the Middle East, because nothing else we can possibly do will change the barbarity of most of its population.
Tell me Tyler, is it mood affiliation that makes you come down on the pessimistic side of this argument? You’ve used that line of argument quite a bit in the past few weeks about those who think differently from you in the econsphere. Maybe time for a look in the mirror.
The less said about Tabarrok’s Fox News-like sense of victimisation from the PC-police, the better. The reason why “culture/inherent values” argument makes for poor academia isn’t PC culture. It’s that it becomes non-falsifiable pretty quickly, whether for women or Arabs or whatever other non-white-male subgroup you have in mind.
Oh and btw, in the literature on South America and much of Europe in the 70s, everyone blamed Catholicism – very few people making that argument today. *shakes head, moves on*
@John David Galt
> It’s not their IQ.
Oh, but it is. Not 100%, of course, but certainly more than any other factor. I understand why you might not understand that, but reading your and all the other explanations above is like listening to geocentrists’ convoluted explanations about how the solar system works. If you take a step back and just try to imagine, if only for the sake of imagining, that all the problems you mention above flow from having a national average IQ of about 83, then it all makes sense: intolerance of otherness? Low IQ. High religiosity? Low IQ. Seeing women as farm animals? Low IQ. Short fuse? Low IQ. Once you allow yourself to take that intellectual leap, then it all makes sense. Until the low-IQ countries become average-IQ countries (by hook or by crook), they will remain mired in misery and violence. Anyway, slowly people are cottoning on. Too slowly for my liking, but still…
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