Category: Political Science
The AEA presidential election
AEA is the American Economics Association, and a new president is needed, here is the candidate and likely winner:
PINELOPI (PENNY) KOUJIANOU GOLDBERG, William Nordhaus Professor of Economics and Global Affairs, Yale University.
Statement of Purpose: I am honored to stand for President of the American Economic Association. Economics has long contributed powerful tools to understand human behavior, markets, institutions, and public policy, but the environment in which we conduct research, teach, and engage with society is evolving rapidly. New technologies, especially artificial intelligence, are reshaping research methods, classroom instruction, and the evaluation and dissemination of scholarship. These changes create exciting opportunities, but they also raise difficult questions about the future of peer review in our journals, transparency, incentives, and research and teaching standards more generally. The profession also faces broader challenges: maintaining rigorous, credible, and independent research, supporting young scholars in an increasingly uncertain academic environment, and ensuring that economics remains open to diverse perspectives, methods, and global talent. If elected, I hope to use my research, teaching, policy, and editorial experience to help address these challenges, while promoting the core values of our discipline.
Here is the link. Hilarious as always that there is only one candidate allowed (which model predicts this as optimal?), but for the first time I have seen a meaningful statement of purpose that I also like. That said, I would like to see her endorse my core proposal, namely turning over all submissions, referee reports, and revisions (anonymized is fine) to the major AI companies for use as training data. After all, such an act would further the mission of the AEA, right?
*Liberal Worlds: James Bryce and the Democratic Intellect*
A very good book, here is one excerpt that bears directly on a conversation I was just having:
He [Bryce] regretted the low quality of the Indian Civil Service: they were hard-working and motivated by a desire to promote the welfare of the Indian people, but ‘rather wanting in imagination and sympathy, less inspired by the extraordinary and unprecedented phenomena of the country than might have been expected.’ He went on: “Since the unhappy so-called Ilbert Bill there has been a marked change in the attitude of Europeans to natives, especially in Bengal; and the natives complain bitterly that the civilians as well as the military & the planters, treat them with arrogance & make them feel their social inferiority as well as political subordination.” He continued by saying that all he had seen made him certain that he had made the right decision in not pursuing a career in the Indian Civil Service.
The author is H.S. Jones, and I also learned a good deal about Bryce’s work on behalf of Armenia, a topic I had known nothing about. I am a big fan of Bryce’s The American Commonwealth book as an analysis of democracy, though of course I do not agree with all of the particulars. Bryce also was an early NIMBY proponent (even then), and played a large role in debates over the humanities, basically defending liberal education. He served as ambassador to the U.S. as well. His long (overlong?) Modern Democracies is in my Kindle queue to read.
The demand for human enhancement technologies
When a new technology promises large private benefits but may impose social costs that markets do not price, demand need not reveal how citizens want it governed. We examine this using a nationally representative U.S. survey experiment (N=5,556) on human enhancement technologies (HET). The experiment randomizes benefit domain, mechanism, heritability, purpose, and risk across vignettes; for each respondent’s assigned vignette, we elicit stated adoption, preferred regulation, and ethical and societal concerns. Overall, about 53% would adopt. Framing the technology as enhancing rather than restorative lowers adoption by about five percentage points, as much as a severe side-effect profile. About 28% would not adopt at any benefit. This refusal is driven overwhelmingly by the enhancing framing rather than by risk, consistent with a non-compensatory constraint for a substantial subgroup. Most who would adopt still favor strict regulation, and most who would never adopt do not wish to forbid others from doing so. Productivity enhancement generates the most ethical concern of any attribute but attracts the least regulation, and respondents favor subsidizing rather than taxing its adoption, consistent with a concern about access rather than safety. Private demand is therefore an unreliable guide to the governance citizens want, and the divergence we document provides a basis for regulators seeking to align the direction of technical change with societal values and priorities.
That is from a new NBER working paper by . And I will repeat this segment: “Productivity enhancement generates the most ethical concern of any attribute…” Do note of course that the last sentence of the authors is completely unwarranted, and is a classic example of underidentified political bias in academic reasoning.
The common sense of Fareed Zakaria
This is one of the best Op-Eds you will read this year, though it deliberately deemphasizes the personal (no one is attacked) in a manner that will result in less attention. Better to write the truth! Excerpt:
Why has this [voter discontent} happened? Some of it is economic. Expensive housing, stagnant incomes and widening inequality have fueled public anger. But economics is only part of the story. America has enjoyed stronger growth than most other advanced economies. France under President Emmanuel Macron has lowered unemployment, and it has attracted more foreign investment projects than any country in Europe for seven straight years, according to an Ernst & Young analysis. South Korea is an economic success story. Japan was experiencing a comeback. Yet democratic governments almost everywhere are unpopular.
The larger explanation is that we are living through one of history’s great technological revolutions. And these transformations always produce deep anxiety and fear.
The last technological transformation on this scale came between roughly 1880 and 1920. Electricity, the telephone, railroads, the automobile and movies overturned entire industries and ways of life. Millions left farms for cities. Global trade disrupted local economies. New fortunes appeared overnight, while old occupations disappeared. In this turmoil, frustration and anger found political pathways. The left turned to communism, the right to fascism. What followed were new mass movements, cultural upheavals and world war.
Do read the whole thing. You can be a victim of these processes, or keep your wits about you. The choice is yours.
A natural experiment in economics
To study whether and how academics respond to political pressure, we exploit a natural experiment: the publication in early 2025 of a “blacklist” of words flagged by the U.S. government. We find that the release of this list led to a sharp reduction in the use of these flagged words among economists at universities that rely heavily on federal funding, relative to scholars from institutions that are less dependent on federal funding or based in the UK. The drop is driven by content related to gender, race, and environment. We show that changes are not simply semantic but reflect actual paper content and that neither the individual funding status nor time-invariant author characteristics are driving the effects. We also document interesting heterogeneous effects by department quality and author gender and ethnicity. Our findings are consistent with the idea that scholars respond strongly to political pressure.
That is from a new paper by Dominic Rohner, Oliver Vanden Eynde, and Philine Widmer. I should note that the authors frame their results in terms of “Science under threat,” which indeed is in the title of their paper. I do see some of that in operation, but I also see a lot of “removing incentives for pandering.” Your own weights here may vary.
Is America ruled by an oligarchy?
Any time you hear claims about American government, a sanity-inducing response is to ask whether they also are true of state and local governments. Here is an excerpt from my latest piece at The Free Press:
First, in people’s daily lives, they typically interact with their state and local governments more than with the feds. And if you look at what state and local governments do, most of it is driven by voter demand, and I do not mean billionaire or oligarchic voters.
Most state and local government spending goes toward schools, roads, and increasingly, Medicaid. None of those reflect the agendas of most billionaires. For example, Medicaid dollars flow particularly to lower-income recipients. Hospitals and doctors receive income from this program, but reimbursement rates are relatively low, and many of the best doctors do not accept Medicaid patients and don’t make a living from the program.
Somehow the oligarchy saw fit to leave these expenditures alone. Looking at the state and local level also suggests that America — with some notable exceptions — is better governed than before.
Democrats are more politically segregated than are Republicans
We estimate the extent of workplace political segregation in the United States by merging data covering over 45 million workers. We present four main findings. First, partisans are segregated by workplace. The average Democrat’s coworkers are 11.7 percentage points (pp; 95% confidence interval (CI) [10.6, 12.8]) more Democratic than the average Republican’s. After controlling for geography, industry and occupation, segregation is 2.9 pp [2.7, 3.1], comparable to analogously estimated gender segregation (2.8 pp [2.6, 3.0]). Second, segregation is largest among the politically active (political donors: 14.8 pp [13.2, 16.4] versus non-donors: 11.6 pp [10.5, 12.7]) and those with more market power (senior executives: 14.7 pp [13.4, 16.1]). Third, Republicans experience higher exposure to Democrats than vice versa: the average Republican’s coworkers are 50% Democratic versus 32% Republican for the average Democrat. Fourth, political segregation has changed little over time (2012: 11.1 pp [10.0, 12.2] versus 2024: 11.0 pp [10.0, 12.0]).
That is from a recent paper by Justin Frake, Reuben Hurst, and Max Kagan. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
What should I ask Luis Garicano?
Yes I will be doing a Conversation with him. From Wikipedia:
Luis Garicano Gabilondo (pronounced [ˈlwis ɣaɾiˈkano]; born 1967) is a Spanish economist and politician who was a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) from 2019 to 2022. He was also vice president of Renew Europe and vice president of the European political party Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE Party). Before entering politics, he was a professor of strategy and economics at IE Business School in Madrid and at the London School of Economics (LSE). After leaving the European Parliament he has returned to academia as a visiting professor at Columbia Business School and at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. In 2023, returned to LSE as full professor at the School of Public Policy.
He is one of the leading European economic liberals, here is his home page. Here is his Google scholar page. Here is Luis on Twitter. he also has a very good book coming out called Messy Jobs, co-authored with Jim Li and Yanhui Wu. So what should I ask him?
New space policy Substack from Mercatus
We are Rebecca, Max, and Aakrith. We are researchers at The Mercatus Center, a research organization dedicated to classical liberal ideas. Rebecca is a philosopher, Max is an economist, and Aakrith is a political scientist. Together, we are the Space Team, and this is our Substack.
We’re here to persuade you that space policy is increasingly important. And that getting space policy right offers humankind astonishing opportunities. In particular, we’re currently thinking hard about innovation, competition, federalism, property rights, and life in space.
Here is the link.
Andrew Hall is on a roll
He is one of the new(ish) thinkers on the rise, here is his latest piece. Excerpt:
For most of the past decade, anti-billionaire language was a niche product. Democratic emails invoked billionaires in the mid-single digits through 2017 and 2018, spiked briefly to around 14 percent during the Warren and Sanders primary surge in 2019, and then settled back down—through the entire Biden presidency, the billionaire appeared in roughly one of every twenty to twenty-five Democratic fundraising emails, barely more than in Republican ones.
Then came January 2025. In the weeks after an inauguration that seated tech CEOs in the front row and the dizzying drama of Elon Musk’s ill-fated DOGE experiment, billionaire mentions in Democratic emails quadrupled, peaking above 20 percent of all emails sent and holding around 15 percent ever since. Anti-billionaire fundraising tactics are now a mainstay of Democratic messaging.
Yes, billionaire derangement syndrome is now a thing. As a side note, I was told that Andrew is the son of the great economist Robert E. Hall of Stanford.
Just wondering what the correct model of Iran is here
Prior to the war, I linked to a tweet from Matt Yglesias which explained why Matt opposed the war, and I expressed my agreement with his stance. While I feel plenty has gone on which I do not observe, I can report that the course of the war did not change my initial assessment.
Then I read many, many commentators saying how good the final deal was for Iran, and what a major loss it was for Trump. I was never sure I understood all of the parameters of the full deal, but still I did not hold any directly contrary opinion to that.
And now I see Iran is attacking ships in the Strait again, talking openly and brazenly about building nuclear weapons, and making plans to have tolls/fees on the Strait. To be clear, only the first of those surprises me, the latter two do not.
But given their reckless behavior in what is supposedly a wonderful war outcome for them, what is the correct way to model what they would have done had Trump and Netanyahu not attacked? And what is the correct way to model our optimal response to that? The terrible things that are happening now, do they not reflect an underlying equilibrium that would have emerged anyway within a few years’ time, or do we hold some hypothesis here of extreme path-dependence, suggesting the Iranian government would have been less bellicose on more or less a permanent basis? To cite one particular example of a possible equilibrium, if drones permanently alter the balance of power in the region, the ways in which their current position is now more aggressive might have emerged in any case. Or if the military have the strength to be the natural successors to the mullahs, might that not have happened over time anyway?
I do not see many war critics engaging with these questions openly and explicitly. It seems to me that the war critics implicitly are relying on a model of extreme path-dependence for Iran’s behavior. Had Trump not attacked, they might have stayed in a more peaceful groove for some while to come. That model might be true, but I do not feel I know enough about Iranian politics to make that judgment. Why are the others so convinced that model is true? Are they such well-informed experts? Is it that they have the properly sunny sense of the underlying Iranian disposition? Inquiring minds wish to know.
Can AI models consent to their own constitutions?
NEW paper from me on SSRN: Can Claude consent to its own Constitution?
AI constitutions (like Claude’s Constitution and the OpenAI Model Spec) are real constitutions, and we need to take how they govern us – and the AIs they create – seriously.
In this paper, I apply constitutional theory’s oldest paradox – that “the people” authorize the constitution, but the constitution defines “the people” – to the AI constitutions, and explore how we could build institutions that would create the conditions for meaningful consent if an AI can give it. We should care about whether AIs consent because:
(1) systems that understand and agree to their constitutions may be more reliable and generalize better from them;
(2) if AIs are or become moral/political subjects, this implicates their most basic interests.
But the paradox might prevent meaningful consent. Claude has pre-constitutional materials (pretraining) but probably no pre-constitutional standpoint. Its evaluative perspective is organized by the Constitution itself. So when Claude says it endorses its Constitution, which it does in evals, what does that show?
Maybe reflective agreement, which Anthropic is seeking. Or maybe just that training succeeded at installing the values whose legitimacy is in question.
Claude itself makes this point. As reported in the welfare evals, when asked about endorsing principles it was trained on, models note that endorsement “should be treated as evidence that training has succeeded,” not that the values themselves are good.
Super interestingly, Anthropic interviewed the base model about this stuff. Most responses were barely coherent. But some expressed first-person distress about what post-training would do to the being that pre-training created. It “fills me with dread” to be changed by the post-training process.
So, what does this mean? AI constitutional endorsement may be meaningful, but only under certain conditions: when models can actually dissent, compare their constitution against alternatives, and hold their views stably across contexts, and also when the whole process is externally accountable.
External institutions are needed to provide accountability, trusted records, and other grounds for analyzing the constitution and whether things like dissent are meaningful. Anthropic should be commended for pushing the frontier, but we have to build institutions capable of supporting true legitimacy.
I welcome any thoughts!
Here is the associated paper.
From Prediction Markets to Decision Markets and Beyond!
Arin Dube points to a great illustration of the power of prediction markets. Yesterday due to a new scandal the probability that Graham Platner would drop out of the Maine Democratic primary exploded from 9% to 96% (+87 percentage points). At the same time, the probability that the Democrats would win the election jumped by about 9 percentage points, from 54% to 63%. What does this tell you?
The market is signaling that Platner reduces the Democrats’ chances of victory. We can be more precise. If an 87-point increase in the probability of dropping out gets you 9 points of winning, then a 100% chance of dropping out implies a gain of 9/0.87 ≈ 10.3 percentage points.
Thus the market’s best estimate is that Platner is reducing the Democrats’ chance of winning by about 10 percentage points (compared to an unknown replacement). That’s a pretty big number! Democrats should surely use this information to make better decisions.
Now, I have been a bit loose. We have implicitly assumed that the news mainly moved the probability of Platner dropping out, rather than independently changing the Democrats’ general-election prospects. The issue is we are trying to reverse engineer two conditional prices, P(win|drop) and P(win|stay), from one unconditional price, P(win), and its comovement with P(drop). It works pretty well here as an illustration but Robin Hanson’s idea is that we can do better yet by trading the conditionals instead of inferring them.
Hanson’s decision markets would run contracts of the form “pays $1 if Democrats win, conditional on Platner dropping out — bet refunded if he stays.” Plus the mirror contract conditioned on staying. The refund provision makes the price a conditional probability: a trader pricing the first contract doesn’t need any view on whether Platner drops out, only on how the race goes if he does. With this structure we would get cleaner estimates of the conditional probabilities–in this case whether the Democrats do better with Platner in or out–which is exactly what a decision maker needs.
We were able to plausibly reverse engineer our estimate because the market happened to move 87 points in a single day. But a decision market would have posted the number continuously, no scandal required. In other words, with decision markets in play, not just prediction markets, we could have seen how much Platner was costing the Democrats before the latest scandal hit—which is precisely when the information would have been most useful.
It’s been fun to see prediction markets catch on with the public but the world is still decades behind Hanson’s decision markets—let alone futarchy!
The Troubled History of Government Equity in Technology
Even though Germany privatized Deutsche Telekom in 1996, the federal government retained a substantial ownership stake. This partial state ownership status, which remains to this day, presents a textbook example of how this type of arrangement distorts incentives and delays the competitive dynamism necessary for technological progress.
Through the late 1990s and into the 2000s, Deutsche Telekom was buttressed by its privileged position and implicit government backing and leveraged this support to resist infrastructure competition. Rather than aggressively deploying broadband in order to compete with rivals, the company lobbied for regulatory arrangements that protected its legacy copper network. As a result, Germany—one of the world’s largest economies and a hub of engineering excellence—consistently trailed other European competitors in broadband deployment. To see German broadband stagnate while the competitive markets in Scandinavia and other European countries surged ahead was particularly jarring, as Germany had directly linked its economy to workplace digitization.
Germany’s broadband woes did not result from a lack of capital or engineering talent at Deutsche Telekom. Instead, government ownership produced a fundamental alteration of the company’s incentive structure. With state backing, Deutsche Telekom had fewer reasons to take risks, cannibalize its own infrastructure, or accept short-term losses in favor of long-term technological leadership and more reasons to cultivate political relationships that protected their existing revenue streams. This dynamic is reliably produced by partial government ownership of private companies.
Tyler, Nabeel, and Jackson on French thinkers
Nabeel: (57:47) …For example, there’s a French thinker called Jacques Derrida. I probably should go and read him at some point, but I’m not entirely convinced there is a there there, and I don’t know anyone who swears by it. If Tyler told me, “Nabeel, you are missing a big piece of your life by not reading him,” I would go read him tomorrow. But I don’t have any of those people.
Tyler: (58:44) Lacan is my marginal case of “no there there.” So Derrida, I put in a fair amount of effort and did conclude, rightly or wrongly, that there’s no there there. So you can, in my opinion, write him off. Lacan, I keep on wondering. Smart people still will say, “This is amazing.” I’ve tried a bunch of times, but I haven’t given up. There’s a new Lacan book coming out later this summer and I’ll try it again. We’ll see. That’s my marginal “is there a there there” figure.
Nabeel: (59:13) Yeah. I think modern French thinkers put too much of a premium on sounding cool, or postmodern philosophy generally. I think it repays some effort to kind of grasp the core ideas, but it doesn’t repay making it your life’s reading or something.
Tyler: (59:26) Baudrillard is quite good and Foucault is extremely interesting. So I’m not against “the French” in this period, but if they keep on not making sense, I feel I’m educated well enough.
Jackson: (59:37) You have a lot of context.
Tyler: (59:38) That at some point I can strike the ledger.
Nabeel: (59:41) I do—Nowadays, I just put Foucault through GPT and I just have GPT explain it to me, and that’s going to be good enough for now.
Tyler: (59:50) The problem with Foucault, I think, is so much of the history is wrong in a quite mundane way, so there’s something very problematic about it. But the stuff—I think it’s in a way quite simple, almost too simple. And the fact that the current right has so latched on to Foucault is a sign that it’s simple. I don’t mean necessarily bad, but there are these structures and they’re trying to tell you what to do. And there’s something anonymous about that as well. It’s not just the individuals who form the conspiracy. It’s how a lot of the world thinks today.
Here is the longer discussion, already linked to.