Kominers, Pathak, Sonmez, and Unver apply market design tools to incentivize convalescent therapy:
COVID-19 convalescent plasma (CCP) therapy is currently a leading treatment for COVID-19. At present, there is a shortage of CCP relative to demand. We develop and analyze a model of centralized CCP allocation that incorporates both donation and distribution. In order to increase CCP supply, we introduce a mechanism that utilizes two incentive schemes, respectively based on principles of “paying it backward” and “paying it forward.” Under the first scheme, CCP donors obtain treatment vouchers that can be transferred to patients of their choosing. Under the latter scheme, patients obtain priority for CCP therapy in exchange for a future pledge to donate CCP if possible. We show that in steady-state, both principles generally increase overall treatment rates for all patients|not just those who are voucher-prioritized or pledged to donate. Our results also hold under certain conditions if a fraction of CCP is reserved for patients who participate in clinical trials. Finally, we examine the implications of pooling blood types on the efficiency and equity of CCP distribution.
The idea is quite similar to the “no give, no take” rule for organ donation that I have promoted for many years. Namely, if you don’t sign your organ donor card you go to the back of the queue should you ever need an organ donation. Israel adopted the idea some years ago by giving points to people who signed their organ donor card. As with no-give, no-take, the point of the rules that Kominers et al. promote isn’t fairness per se but rather as an incentive to increase donations and thus increase the supply of plasma.