Category: Economics

The benefits of international trade are usually greater than you think, belated St. Patrick’s Day post

The shamrock (three-leaf clover) is one of Ireland's most recognizable symbols. But demand for "Irish" shamrocks is now so great that the small island nation must import clover seeds from countries like New Zealand, India, and Germany. In 2007, Ireland imported nearly 200 metric tonnes of clover seeds worth $677,864.

I thank The Browser for the pointer.

Someone has to be wrong

Paul Krugman thinks Brad DeLong is wrong.  Brad DeLong thinks that Paul Krugman is wrong.  Robert Waldmann thinks that Brad DeLong is wrong.  The topic of course is the Geithner plan.

I'm not so far from Kevin Drum's view, as stated here and here.  It has some chance of succeeding and the relevant alternatives are also bad for the taxpayer.

But can the government itself be trusted?  Here is some of the recent fallout:

…some executives at private equity firms and hedge funds, who
were briefed on the plan Sunday afternoon, are anxious about the recent
uproar over millions of dollars in bonus payments made to executives of
the American International Group.

Some
of these executives have told administration officials that they would
participate only if the government guaranteed that it would not set
compensation limits on the firms, according to people briefed on the
conversations.

The executives also expressed worries about
whether disclosure and governance rules could be added retroactively to
the program by Congress, these people said.

The bottom line?: Here are what Thugz say about the various bailouts.  Excerpt:

…they laughed when I said the government should prioritize the punishment of senior management. In the words of Shine,
the elder statesman of the group, “You have to be real careful when you
mess with folks at the top, because when the war is over, you’ll need
these guys real quick. Ninety-nine percent of people just doing what
they’re told – you couldn’t find half a brain among all of them. But the ones with the brains – don’t let them go.”

In fact you would expect a successful businessman to understand that.

Insurance markets in everything

Jared Sylvester writes me:

Earlier this month you
made one of your "Markets in Everything" posts on Marginal Revolution
about Hyunadi's program to buy back cars from people who lose their
jobs.  I thought you might be interested to know that Jos A Bank is now
offering to refund the price of a new suit in the same circumstances,
or in the case of the self-employed, in the case of a bankruptcy
filing.  You can find the details here:
http://www.josbank.com/Templates/riskfreesuit.tem

Buy a House, Get a Visa (2)

The buy a house, get a visa program which I have been pushing for some time is getting some serious play.  Writing in the WSJ, Richard Lefrak and Gary Shilling note:

The blueprint for a program to sell surplus housing to immigrants is already in place with the EB-5 visa program. Each year, 10,000 EB-5 visas for this country are available for foreigners who each invest $1 million in a new enterprise ($500,000 in economically depressed areas) that creates at least 10 full-time jobs. After two years, the entrepreneur and his family can become permanent residents.

Why not reduce the investment required and expand the program to 100,000?  

Barry Ritholz John Mauldin has further thoughts and links.  Thanks to Jim Ward for the pointer.

Our House of Representatives

Henry Blodgett writes:

If the "TARP bonus" bill the House passed today becomes law, any of
the hundreds of thousands of people who work for Citigroup, Bank of
America, AIG, and nine other major US corporations will have to fork
over 90 cents of every dollar they make that puts their household
income over $250,000.

That's household income, not individual income.*  If you're
married and filing singly, you'll have to surrender anything over
$125,000.  Indefinitely.

Read the whole thing.  There is this too:

The really distressing part is what this tax will do to the corporations that we now own and are supposedly trying to save.

(Remember?  That's the reason we bailed Citigroup, AIG, GM, and the
rest of them out–to save them.  Because we convinced ourselves that
civilization would end if we didn't.)

Thanks to our stupidity
bailouts, we now own major stakes in these firms (at mind-boggling
expense). So it's not clear why we want to destroy them.  But that's
what we seem determined to do.

Addendum: Here is one of many stories about death threats against A.I.G. employees.

Quantitative easing

Bernanke will do it.  I'm sitting in an airport, so here is a very quick take.  It is cheaper and quicker than fiscal stimulus; this should have been our first move.  It is more likely to work.  There are two effects: lowering long-term interest rates and the helicopter drop of the cash.  It belies previous talk of a liquidity trap.  It does not address most of the underlying problems in the real economy and as you know I see the "sectoral shift" element of this downturn as very much underrated.  In that sense don't expect too much.  It shows that at the limit fiscal and monetary policy blur together.  The more the Fed takes on its balance sheet, the more the long-run independence of the central bank is damaged.  Monetizing so much government debt is what Third World nations do.  Draining the new money from the system will someday be a problem.  It may introduce a round of "beggar-thy-neighbor," central bank-engineered currency depreciations.  "Operation Twist," from the 1960s swapped short- for long-term assets but did not seem incredibly effective, although it was done under very different circumstances.  Trillion is the new billion.  If this fails the U.S. economy, and the stock market, will test new bottoms.  The most articulate advocate of quantitative easing is Scott Sumner.

Irving Fisher on the liquidity trap

The very healthy influence of Scott Sumner has induced me to read the Irving Fisher works I had never looked at before.  Wow.  It’s Fisher, not Keynes, who is the prophet of our times and the superior analyst of the Great Depression.  Circa 1932, Fisher wrote:

…in the depression of 1929-32, while the volume of deposit currency in member banks was falling 21 per cent, the velocity of it was being reduced by 61 percent….a mere new supply of money, to replace what has been liquidated or hoarded, might fail to raise the price level by failing to get into circulation…a mere increase in M might prove insufficient, unless supplemented by some influence exercised directly on the moods of people to accelerate V — that is, to convert the public from hoarding.

One wishes that Keynes were so clear. And what is the best way to restore confidence and break the liquidity trap?  Restoring confidence in banks, so that a multiplier, working through credit, may be effective again.  Fisher also suggests negative interest on reserves and he outlines in detail how this might be done.

That is all from his Booms and Depressions, First Principles, a very sophisticated work.  Pigou, Hawtrey, and Viner are also all worth reading; they are more advanced in their thinking than Keynes was willing to admit.

Hail Irving Fisher, still one of the most underrated economists of the 20th century.  By the way, 1936 – 1932 equals 4.

Reforms for money market funds

»» Impose for the first time daily and weekly minimum liquidity requirements and require regular stress testing of a money market fund’s portfolio.
»» Tighten the portfolio maturity limit currently applicable to money market funds and add a new
portfolio maturity limit.
»» Raise the credit quality standards under which money market funds operate. This would be
accomplished by requiring a “new products” or similar committee; encouraging advisers to follow best practices for determining minimal credit risks; requiring advisers to designate the credit rating agencies their funds will follow to encourage competition among the rating agencies to achieve this designation; and prohibiting investments in “Second Tier Securities.”
»» Address “client risk” by requiring money market fund advisers to adopt “know your client” procedures and requiring them for the first time to disclose client concentrations by type of client and the potential risks, if any, posed by a fund with a client base that is strongly concentrated.
»» Enhance risk disclosure for investors and the market and require monthly website disclosure of a money market fund’s portfolio holdings.
»» Assure that when a money market fund proves unable to maintain a stable $1.00 NAV, all of its
shareholders are treated fairly…
»» Enhance government oversight of the money market by developing a nonpublic reporting regime for all institutional investors in the money market, including money market funds, and encouraging the SEC staff to monitor higher-than-peer performance of money market funds.
»» Address market confusion about money market institutional investors that appear to be—but are not—money market funds.

pp.7-8 tell you what they don't want to do, take a look.  Maybe that above list sounds reasonable, but it also sounds designed to prevent money market-like institutions from…guess what…competing with money market funds.  It also sounds designed to preserve the good name of money market funds next time something goes screwy.  It is designed to preserve p (share) =1 without requiring a legal commitment to that effect and without instituting overly burdensome regulation.  Pretty neat, huh?  It's a circle the wagons approach, combined with a reluctance to ante up any cash on the table.  You don't suppose they are still planning to depend on the Fed as a lender of last resort, do you?

You'll see a lot more proposals like this from industry participants.  "Help me look good again," but with little recognition of the toothpaste tube metaphor and with few remedies for wherever the next bout of systemic risk gets squeezed to.  I don't blame the money market sector for not solving this problem (economists can't solve it either), but at the same time it's important to recognize such proposals for what they are: the new financial services sector equivalent of NIMBY.  Put your systemic risk junk somewhere else.  But where?

Only in England

This paragraph, from this story, caught my eye:

With no heir, the late Herbert Blagrave, a philanthropic racing figure, left his family fortune to a trust, along with orders that the money should be spent on sick children, the elderly and injured jockeys.

The link is via Rachel Davison, and it concerns the sale of an entire English village.  How is this for a sales pitch?

Tim Sherston of Jackson-Stops called the village a "safe and sound investment" despite the economic slowdown.

"You've got an entire village — 22 houses, a cricket pitch, a village shop, a forge and 1,500 acres of farmland, 450 acres of woodland …We think actually there will be a lot of potential buyers for this."

How much will it go for?  Here is the website for the Injured Jockeys Fund, note the photo on the top.

Betting your views, follow-up

My claims that you are not required to publicly bet your views have received enough denunciations (mostly commentators on other blogs) that I feel it is time to rub some salt into the open wounds. 

First, I have nothing against betting one's views and indeed I've done it with Bryan Caplan, though mostly for fun.  No one bets his or her views consistently, or that frequently relative to the number of views, so I am simply pointing out that a default of "no betting at all" is an OK point along that spectrum.  In fact it is a homage to the idea of division of labor.  Nor have I seen the critics publicly revealing their equity and other asset portfolios, the real bets which matter in financial terms.

More generally, we may wish that researchers express "real commitment" to their views.  I don't see betting as an essential part of such a commitment portfolio.  "Simply being a certain way" when it comes to inquiry is #1 on my list.  Having a good and deserved personal reputation for truth-seeking is another.  An emphasis on betting, in my view, represents an odd economistic view that commitments should be viewed essentially or primarily in monetary terms.  From a variety of other settings (try giving your wife "cash" for Valentine's Day) we know that signaling commitments through money can backfire.  Might that be the case here as well?

Doesn't the very offer to bet signal that your view is possibly based on private, not easily verified-in-public information?  Doesn't it signal a lack of confidence in the publicly available information itself?

If I think of the scientists who have influenced me most, or done the world the most good, very few of them were practitioners of public betting.  Furthermore that correlation is no accident (I would bet that most of them regarded, or would have regarded, the idea skeptically, or as a kind of public relations stunt).  You might think that is a market failure of some kind and maybe it is.  But in the meantime, if you do have a truly good idea, maybe the best course of action is to mimic the other holders of truly good ideas and that means not betting publicly on your idea.

I'm not suggesting that such a mimicry strategy is best with p = 1.0, only that it gives you one of a number of rationales for not betting at all.