Category: Economics
Argentina dollar facts of the day
From greenbacks stuffed into children’s teddy bears to fortunes tucked away in the ceiling, Argentines have more than $250 billion in dollars stashed at home, along with offshore accounts and safe-deposit boxes—some six times the reserves of the central bank.
But two years into Milei’s government, Argentines are easing their grip on their precious dollars.
Dollars held in the country’s banks by private-sector investors hit a record at the end of last year of nearly $37 billion, up 160% since Milei took office in December 2023, according to central-bank data.
Here is more from the WSJ.
Hanno Lustig and Romain Wacziarg now have a Substack
Self-recommending, here goes.
Trump’s Pharmaceutical Plan
Pharmaceuticals have high fixed costs of R&D and low marginal costs. The first pill costs a billion dollars; the second costs 50 cents. That cost structure makes price discrimination—charging different customers different prices based on willingness to pay—common.
Price discrimination is why poorer countries get lower prices. Not because firms are charitable, but because a high price means poorer countries buy nothing, while any price above marginal cost is still profit. This type of price discrimination is good for poorer countries, good for pharma, and (indirectly) good for the United States: more profits mean more R&D and, over time, more drugs.
The political problem, however, is that Americans look abroad, see lower prices for branded drugs, and conclude that they’re being ripped off. Riding that grievance, Trump has demanded that U.S. prices be no higher than the lowest level paid in other developed countries.
One immediate effect is to help pharma in negotiations abroad: they can now credibly say, “We can’t sell to you at that discount, because you’ll export your price back into the U.S.” But two big issues follow.
First, this won’t lower U.S. prices on current drugs. Firms are already profit-maximizing in the U.S. If they manage to raise prices in France, they don’t then announce, “Great news—now we’ll charge less in America.” The potential upside of the Trump plan isn’t lower prices but higher pharma profits, which strengthens incentives to invest in R&D. If profits rise, we may get more drugs in the long run. But try telling the American voter that higher pharma profits are good.
The second issue is that the plan can backfire.
In our textbook, Modern Principles, Tyler and I discuss almost exactly this scenario: suppose policy effectively forces a single price across countries. Which price do firms choose—the low one abroad or the high one in the U.S.? Since a large share of profits comes from the U.S., they’re likely to choose the high price:
Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla was even more direct, saying it is time for countries such as France to pay more or go without new drugs. If forced to choose between reducing U.S. prices to France’s level or stopping supply to France, Pfizer would choose the latter, Bourla told reporters at a pharma-industry conference.
So the real question is: will other countries pay?
If France tried to force Americans to pay more to subsidize French price controls, U.S. voters would explode. Yet that’s essentially what other countries are being told but in reverse: “You must pay more so Americans can pay less.” Other countries are already stingier than the U.S., and they already bear costs for it—new drugs arrive more slowly abroad than here. Some governments may decide—foolishly, but understandably—that paying U.S.-level prices is politically impossible. If so, they won’t “harmonize upward.” They’ll follow the European way: ration, delay and go without.
In that case, nobody wins. Pharma profits fall, R&D declines, U.S. prices don’t magically drop, and patients abroad get fewer new drugs and worse care. Lose-lose-lose.
We don’t know the equilibrium, but lose-lose-lose is entirely plausible. Switzerland, for example, does not seem willing to pay more:
Yet Switzerland has shown little political willingness to pay more—threatening both the availability of medications in the country and its role as a global leader in developing therapies. Drug prices are the primary driver of the increasing cost of mandatory health coverage, and the topic generates heated debate during the annual reappraisal of insurance rates. “The Swiss cannot and must not pay for price reductions in the USA with their health insurance premiums,” says Elisabeth Baume-Schneider, Switzerland’s home affairs minister.
If many countries respond like Switzerland—and Trump’s unpopularity abroad doesn’t help—the sector ends up less profitable and innovation slows. Voters may feel less “ripped off,” but they’ll be buying that feeling with fewer drugs and sicker bodies.
Plug me back in!
AIs can now rent human labor.
My Conversation with Andrew Ross Sorkin
This was great fun for me, here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Andrew debate whether those 1929 stock prices were justified, what Fed and policy choices might have prevented the Depression, whether Glass-Steagall was built on a flawed premises, what surprised Andrew most about the 1920s beyond the crash itself, how business leaders then would compare to today’s CEOs, whether US banks should consolidate, how Andrew would reform US banking regulation, what to make of narrow banking proposals and stablecoins, whether retail investors should get access to private equity and venture capital, why sports gambling and new financial regulations won’t make us much safer, how Andrew broke into the New York Times at age 18, how he manages his information diet, what he learned co-creating Billions, what he plans on learning about next, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: I have a few general questions about the 1920s. Obviously, you did an enormous amount of work for this book. Putting aside the great crash and the focus of your book, what is it you learned about the 1920s more generally that most surprised you? Because you learn all this collateral information when you write a book like this, right?
SORKIN: So many things. The book turned into a bit of a love letter to New York in terms of the architecture of New York. I don’t think I appreciated just how many buildings went up in New York and how they were constructed and what happened. That fascinated me. I think the story of John Raskob, actually, who was, to me, the Elon Musk of his time, somebody who ran General Motors, became a super influential investor. He was a philosopher king that everybody listened to at every given moment.
He ultimately constructs the Empire State Building, which was probably the equivalent of SpaceX at that time. He had written a paper about creating a five-day workweek back in 1929, November, as all of this is happening. Not because he wanted people to work less and be nice to them, but because he thought there was an economic argument that if people didn’t have to work on Saturdays, more people would buy cars and gardening equipment, and do all sorts of things on the weekends, and buy different outfits and clothing. There were so many little things.
Then, I would argue, actually, his role in taking his fortune — he got involved in politics. He was a Republican turned Democrat. He spent an extraordinary amount of money to secretly try to undermine the reputation of Hoover. I would say to you, today, I actually think that part of the reason that Hoover’s reputation is so dim, even today, is a result of this very influential, wealthy individual in America who spent two years paying off journalists and running this secret campaign to do such a thing. You go back and really read the press and try to understand why some of these views were espoused.
By the way, this was before the crash. He started this campaign effectively in May of 1929, just three months after Hoover took office.
COWEN: It’s striking to me how forgotten Raskob is today. There’s a lesson in there about people who think they’re doing something today that will be remembered in a hundred years’ time. It probably won’t be, even if you’re a big, big deal.
SORKIN: It’s remarkable. He was a very big deal. He famously used to tell everybody, “Everybody ought to be rich.” He was trying to develop, back then, what would have been something akin to one of the first mutual funds, levered mutual funds, in fact, because he also wanted to democratize finance.
COWEN: Let’s say you’re back in New York. It’s the 1920s; you’re you. Other than walking around and looking at buildings, what else would you do back then? I would go to jazz concerts. What would you do?
SORKIN: Oh my goodness. You know what I would do? But I’m a journalista, so you’ll appreciate this.
COWEN: Yes.
SORKIN: I would have been obsessed with magazines. This was really the first real era of magazines and newspapers and the transmission of media, the sort of mass media in this way. I would have been fascinated by radio. I think those things, for me, would have been super exciting.
The truth is, I imagine I would have gotten caught up in the pastime of stock trading. It is true that all these brokerage houses are just emerging everywhere, and people are going to play them as if it’s a pastime. I always wonder whether prohibition played a role in why so many people were speculating because instead of drinking, what did they do? They traded.
Some of the time he spent interviewing me…
Regulating a Monopolist without Subsidy
We study monopoly regulation under asymmetric information about costs when subsidies are infeasible. A monopolist with privately known marginal cost serves a single product market and sets a price. The regulator maximizes a weighted welfare function using unit taxes as sole policy instrument. We identify a sufficient and necessary condition for when laissez-faire is optimal. When intervention is desired, we provide simple sufficient conditions under which the optimal policy is a progressive price cap: prices below a benchmark face no tax, while higher prices are taxed at increasing and potentially prohibitive rates. This policy combines delegation at low prices with taxation at high prices, balancing access, affordability, and profitability. Our results clarify when taxes act as complements to subsidies and when they serve only as imperfect substitutes, illuminating how feasible policy instruments shape optimal regulatory design.
That is from a new paper by Jiaming Wei and Dihan Zou. Via the excellent Samir Varma.
Effective tax rates for billionaires
Here is the tweet, here is the source data.
Does Peer-Reviewed Research Help Predict Stock Returns?
Finance theory is in even more trouble than we had thought:
Mining 29,000 accounting ratios for t-statistics > 2.0 leads to cross-sectional return predictability similar to the peer review process. For both, ≈ 50% of predictability remains after the original sample periods. This finding holds for many categories of research, including research with risk or equilibrium foundations. Only research agnostic about the theoretical explanation for predictability shows signs of outperformance. Our results imply that inferences about post-sample performance depend little on whether the predictor is peer-reviewed or data mined. They also have implications for the importance of empirical vs theoretical evidence, investors’ learning from academic research, and the effectiveness of data mining.
That is from a new paper by Andrew Y. Chen, Alejandro Lopez-Lira, and Tom Zimmermann. Via KingoftheCoast.
Bill Dudley on scarce reserves
In addition to the transitional issues, a regime of scarce reserves has disadvantages. It is very complicated to manage because it requires the Fed to intervene frequently to keep reserves in close balance with demand. For example, in the past, the Treasury had to keep its cash balance at the Fed low and stable so that fluctuations did not make it difficult for the central bank to maintain control of short-term interest rates. Banks satisfied reserve requirements over a two-week reserve maintenance period to make it easier for the Fed to match demand and supply.
Also, scarce reserves are incompatible with open-ended backstop facilities that can support confidence during times of stress. In an open-ended backstop, there is no risk that the central bank will exhaust its lending capacity. In contrast, when the amount of funds on offer is limited, there is an incentive to access the facility quickly before the funds run out. An open-ended facility is superior in maintaining and restoring confidence in the system. In contrast, a scarce reserves regime undermines the ability of the central bank to fulfil its lender of last resort function — the reason why the Fed was established in the first place.
Part of the subtext here is a desire to continue paying interest on reserves. Here is more from Bloomberg. Here is some analysis from 5.2 Pro, including a look at what Scott Sumner would say.
What should I ask Joel Mokyr?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him. He is of course one of this last year’s Nobel Laureates in economics, here is previous MR coverage of him. Here is Wikipedia.
He has a recent book Two Paths to Prosperity: Culture and Institutions in Europe and China, 1000-2000, co-authored with Avner Greif and Guido Tabellini.
So what should I ask him?
David Hume update — “model this”
The tomb of the philosopher David Hume and two other memorials at a historic cemetery in Edinburgh have been vandalised with “disturbing occult-style paraphernalia”.
A tour guide made the discovery at the Old Calton burial ground. It included a drawing of a naked woman pointing a bloodied knife at a baby with a noose around its neck, and coded writing on red electrical tape attached to the David Hume mausoleum and two nearby memorial stones.
The guide emailed photographs of the vandalism to Edinburgh council and described the symbols as “satanic”.
A group on Telegram purporting to be responsible for the vandalism of graves at unnamed cemeteries posted photographs of the same damage in a now-deleted channel. They shared examples of other disturbing drawings, including a naked woman grabbing the bloodied head of a baby, to which one member responded: “For EH1?” EH1 is the postcode in Edinburgh covering the historic Old Town.
The group also posted photographs of strange paraphernalia found at the Old Calton burial ground, including nails hammered through red candles, chalked symbols and red tape in which the words “anti meta physical front” were printed.
Here is the story, via Hollis Robbins.
Supply is elastic, installment #6437
In Italy’s storied gold‑making hubs, jewellers are reworking their designs to trim gold content as they race to blunt the impact of record prices and appeal to shoppers watching their budgets.
The rally is putting undue pressure on small artisans as they face mounting demands from clients including international brands to produce cheaper items, from signature pieces to wedding rings…
“The main question that I’ve heard in the last months is if I can produce something lighter while having the same appearance,” said Massimo Lucchetta, owner of Lucchetta 1953, an independent jeweller which makes items for department stores in Bassano del Grappa, near Italy’s premier gold-crafting hub of Vicenza in the country’s northeast.
Here is the full story, via John De Palma.
The Effects of Ransomware Attacks on Hospitals and Patients
As cybercriminals increasingly target health care, hospitals face the growing threat of ransomware attacks. Ransomware is a type of malicious software that prevents users from accessing electronic systems and demands a ransom to restore access. We create and link a database of hospital ransomware attacks to Medicare claims data. We quantify the effects of ransomware attacks on hospital operations and patient outcomes. Ransomware attacks decrease hospital volume by 17–24 percent during the initial attack week, with recovery occurring within 3 weeks. Among patients already admitted to the hospital when a ransomware attack begins, in-hospital mortality increases by 34–38 percent.
That is by Hannah Neprash, Claire McGlave, and Sayeh Nikpay, recently published in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
Are the French lazy?
Olivier Blanchard writes:
The French are not lazy. They just enjoy leisure more than most (no irony here)
And this is perfectly fine: As productivity increases, it is perfectly reasonable to take it partly as more leisure (fewer hours per week, earlier retirement age), and only partly in income.
He has follow-up points and clarifications in later posts. For instance:
If somebody, in France, wants to work hard, retire late or not all, and work 50-60 hours a week, it is perfectly possible. (this conclusion is based on introspection). Some of us are blessed with exciting jobs. Most of us unfortunately are not.
Here is JFV on that question. And a response from Olivier. Here is John Cochrane.
Perhaps “lazy” is not the right word for this discussion. I view West Europeans in general as providing good quality work per hour, but wanting to work fewer hours, compared to Americans and also compared to many East Asians. Much of that is due to taxes, noting that tax regimes are endogenous to the mores of a population. (Before the 1970s, West Europeans often worked longer hours, by the way.) So it is not only taxes by any means. Furthermore, many (not all) parts of Europe have superior leisure opportunities, compared to what is available in many (not all) parts of the United States. That seems to me the correct description of the reality, not “lazy,” or “not lazy.”
I would add some additional points. First, the world is sometimes in a (short?) period of local increasing returns. I believe we are in such a period now, as evidenced by China and the United States outperforming much of the rest of the world. Maybe the French cannot do anything to leap to such “large economy margins,” but I am not opposed to saying “there is something wrong” with not much trying. Perhaps lack of ambition at the social level is the concept, rather than laziness. I see only some French people, not too many to be clear, throwing themselves onto the bonfire trying to nudge their societal norms toward more ambition.
Second, although the world is not usually in an increasing returns regime, over the long long run it probably is. We humans can stack General Purpose Technologies, over the centuries and millennia, and get somewhere really splendid in a (long-run) explosive fashion. That is another form of increasing returns, even if you do not see it in the data in most individual decades in most countries.
That also makes me think “there is something wrong” with not much trying. And on that score, France can clearly contribute and to some extent already is contributing through its presence in science, math, bio, etc. The French even came up with an early version of the internet. Nonetheless France could contribute more, and I think it would be preferable if social norms could nudge them more in that direction. I do not see comparable potent externalities from French leisure consumption. Maybe the French could teach America how wonderful trips to France are, and thus induce Americans to work more to afford them, and if that is the dominant effect I am happy once again.
So on the proactive side, it still seems to be France could do better than it does, and social welfare likely would rise as a result. That said, they hardly seem like the worst offender in this regard, though you still might egg them on because they have so much additional high-powered potential.
The United States as an Active Industrial Policy Nation
We document and characterize a new history of U.S. federal-level industrial policies by scanning all 12,167 Congressional Acts and 6,030 Presidential Orders from 1973 through 2022. We find several interesting patterns. First, contrary to a common perception, the United States has always been an active industrial policy nation throughout the period, regardless of which party is in power, with 5.4 laws and 3.4 Presidential Orders per year on average containing new industrial policies. Second, we identify roughly 300% more instances of industrial policies than those in the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database during 2008-2022, despite using essentially the same definition. Third, industrial policies in practice are as likely to be justified by national security as by economic competitiveness. Fourth, many U.S. industrial policies incorporate design features that help mitigate potential drawbacks, such as explicit expiration dates and pilot programs for emerging technologies. Finally, based on stock market reactions and firm performance, the identified policies are recognized as economically significant in shifting resource allocations.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
So if I were designing an “industrial policy” for America, my first priority would be to improve and “unstick” its procurement cycles. There may well be bureaucratic reasons that this is difficult to do. But if it can’t be done, then perhaps the U.S. shouldn’t be setting its sights on a more ambitious industrial policy.
A second form of American industrial policy is the biomedical grants and subsidies associated with the National Institutes of Health.
Published in 2019, but still relevant today.