Category: Economics

Is MR Biased?

Long Time MR reader Sean R. asked ChatGPT to analyze MR posts from the past 10 years to determine common themes and whether there “is a bias in the number of left leaning or right leaning examples they chose to focus on.” Here’s ChatGPT’s answer (with some editing for length):

How I approached the question (30-second summary)

Step
What I actually did
1 – Define the stance
For each of the ten recurring Marginal Revolution (MR) themes (inflation, housing, AI, immigration, trade, inequality, growth, pandemic policy, regulation/state-capacity, education) I wrote down MR’s normative position—e.g. “free trade is good, tariffs are bad,” “more liberal immigration is good,” “zoning reform is good,” etc.
2 – Collect posts (2016 → May 2025)
Searched the MR archive (site:marginalrevolution.com) for ~40 partisan or news-hook keywords (“Trump tariff,” “Biden stimulus,” “Green New Deal,” “woke,” “Build Back Better,” “family separation,” etc.). That yielded ≈ 420 posts that (i) belong to one of the 10 themes and (ii) single out a person, party or institution for violating MR’s preferred policy.
3 – Code each post
Manually read the headline + opening paragraph (or known MR shorthand) and coded:
• Theme (1-10)
• Target (Right-leaning, Left-leaning, Both/Neutral)
• Tone (Critical, Supportive, Mixed).
Only “Critical” posts counted toward the bias score.
4 – Cross-check with news cycle
For each quarter I ran a quick Factiva/Google News query (“tariff hike,” “student-loan forgiveness,” etc.) to ask whether obvious real-world violations were dominated by Right or Left actors.

 

Result 2 – Break-down by theme

Theme (MR stance)
Typical “Right-wing violation” called out
Typical “Left-wing violation” called out
Right-critical : Left-critical ratio
Trade (pro-free-trade)
Trump/EU tariff wars, U.S. steel 232 duties  Marginal REVOLUTION
Biden’s EV subsidy protectionism, Buy-American rules
28 : 13
Immigration (more open)
Family-separation, Muslim ban, Title 42 extension  Marginal REVOLUTIONMarginal REVOLUTION
Blue-state NIMBY union restrictions, slow refugee processing (2022-23)
31 : 9
Housing/Zoning (YIMBY)
Suburban GOP blocking up-zoning in TX/FL
CA, MA, NYC progressive NIMBYism (“Berkeley slows dorms”)
10 : 17
Inflation & Fiscal
Trump 2018 tax cuts “stimulus at full employment”
Biden ARP, student-loan relief inflation risk  Marginal REVOLUTIONMarginal REVOLUTION
13 : 21
Inequality/Redistribution
GOP SALT deduction push, regressive payroll holidays
Warren wealth-tax, $15 federal minimum wage
8 : 19
Regulation/State-capacity
Trump FDA/CDC staffing cuts, tariff waivers chaos
OSHA vaccine mandate over-reach, CA energy rules
12 : 14
AI & Growth
Trump chip-export bans framed as tech‐industrial policy
Biden CHIPS Act subsidy design flaws
6 : 7
Pandemic policy
Trump under-react 2020, “bleach,” CDC interference
Blue-state school closures 2021-22, eviction moratoria extensions
14 : 18
Education
DeSantis “Stop WOKE” limits on speech
Campus DEI mandates, student-loan forgiveness
10 : 24
Great-Stagnation/Growth
GOP ethanol & Jones Act protectionism
Dem climate permitting delays (NEPA)
46 : 15

Result 3 – Context vs. actual news “violations”

Cross-checking 140 weeks (2016-2025) of major economic headlines:

Period
Real-world violations skew
MR critical coverage skew
Alignment?
2017-20 (Trump years)
Mostly Right (tariffs, family-separation, payroll tax holiday)
MR posts ≈ 63% critical of Right
✔ tracks news
2021-23 (early Biden)
More Left (ARP cost, student-debt, OSHA mandates)
MR posts ≈ 56% critical of Left
✔ tracks news
2024-25 YTD
Mixed: Trump tariff talk + Biden industrial policy
MR split 48 : 46 (Right : Left)
✔ balanced

🧷 Bottom line

  • No strong partisan skew: Over nine-plus years MR criticised Right actors slightly more often (188 vs 167 posts), but the difference mirrors the calendar: Republicans held the presidency 2017-20; Democrats 2021-25.
  • Issue-by-issue, the target follows the actor actually driving the violation. MR is pro-free-trade and thus hits Trump tariffs hard; it is sceptical of industrial-policy spending and thus hits Biden’s EV credits hard.
  • When the news itself has an obvious partisan tilt, MR’s examples tilt the same way, not the opposite. The blog appears issue-consistent rather than partisan-consistent.

Tentative conclusion: Marginal Revolution’s selection of “who’s messing up” follows its core economic priors more than U.S. partisan identity; any apparent left/right imbalance largely reflects which party’s policies contradicted those priors in a given week.

Elasticities and incidence

President Trump’s budget proposes a significant rethink of federal rental assistance programs, consolidating a number of them — and cutting them by more than $26 billion — next fiscal year. Many experts previously told The New York Times that this could result in low-income Americans losing access to federal housing benefits.

Here is more from the NYT.  If you are a YIMBY type, odds are you should favor this, since some of the subsidy gain likely would end up captured by landlords.

Globalization did not hollow out the U.S. middle class

From Noah Smith:

Trade deficits are an even smaller amount of GDP. U.S. imports of manufactured goods minus exports are equal to about 4% of GDP per year. Our trade deficit with China is about 1% of GDP.

In terms of imported components, America manufactures most of what it uses in production. China’s exports to the U.S. are actually more likely to be intermediate goods rather than the consumer goods we see on the shelves of Wal-Mart — another thing the typical narrative misses. But even so, China makes only about 3.5% of the intermediate goods that American manufacturers need

…trade deficits and manufacturing aren’t as tightly linked as most people seem to think. France has become steadily less manufacturing-intensive since 1960, despite the fact that it historically had very balanced trade, and even ran big trade surpluses in the 90s and 00s. Meanwhile, out of all the countries on the chart, Japan has done the best job of preserving its manufacturing share since 2010, despite running a trade deficit over that time period.

Excellent throughout, do read the whole thing.

This is Vindication???

Joe Nocera has a strange piece in the Free Press arguing that the “godfathers of protectionism” have been vindicated. It begins with a story about how Dani Rodrik couldn’t get a famous economist to endorse his book Has Globalization Gone Too Far? because doing so would arm the barbarians. Well give that reluctant economist a Nobel! because they were obviously correct. Tyler made the same point in his debate with Rodrik. Rodrik had no answer.

The piece is strange because there is little to no connection with any data; just assertion, vibe, and non-sequitur. Most bizarrely but hardly alone was this bit:

In the 1980s, Prestowitz was an official in Ronald Reagan’s Commerce Department, back when Japan, not China, was the trading partner the U.S. most feared. Japanese autos, televisions, washing machines, and all sorts of consumer electronics were flooding into the U.S., forcing American auto makers to close factories and even putting U.S. companies like Zenith out of business. Yet Japan was using tariffs and other less obvious trade barriers to prevent U.S. companies from exporting many of their products to Japan. It was protecting certain key industries from foreign competition.

This was not how the rules of free trade were supposed to work. Prying that market open, forcing Japan to play by the same rules as the U.S., was Prestowitz’s job.

He found it deeply frustrating. “Every time we completed a trade negotiation,” Prestowitz told me, “some economist would turn out a model to show that the deal was going to create X number of American jobs and would reduce the trade deficit by Y. And it never happened.”

Even more galling, he said, “The conventional response among economists was that it didn’t matter.” After all, even if Japan was keeping U.S. products out of its market, America still benefited from low-cost imports. Prestowitz has a vivid memory of a conversation he once had with Herbert Stein, President Richard Nixon’s former chief economist. “The Japanese will sell us cars,” Stein told him with a shrug, “and we’ll sell them poetry.”

Prestowitz also remembers the abuse he took for his views. “I was a Japan-basher, a protectionist, and so on,” he said. Paul Krugman, who was not yet a New York Times columnist but was already an influential economist, called Prestowitz “an intellectual snake-oil salesman” in a book he wrote called Pop Internationalism. The book, published in 1997, consisted of a half-dozen essays, each of which brutally attacked one or another of the handful of people who dared to say that globalization was less than perfect. (He described then-Labor Secretary Robert Reich as “not a serious thinker,” and Lester Thurow, the best-selling author and Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist, as “silly.”)

When I asked Prestowitz recently if he felt vindicated, he admitted that he did, but added that “I also feel a sense of loss that it took us so long to face reality and at such cost.”

Well here is data on GDP per capita in real terms in Japan and the United States since 1990. This is vindication???!

Or how about this:

No one anymore, on the left or the right, denies that globalization has fractured the U.S., both economically and socially. It has hollowed out once-prosperous regions like the furniture-making areas of North Carolina and the auto manufacturing towns of the Midwest.

Well the far left and the far right agree that America has become fractured and hollowed out, the Bernie Sanders-Donald Trump horseshoe. But both are wrong. For the rest of us in the happy middle, consider this–Hickory, North Carolina, once known as the furniture capital of the United States, did face some hard times. But in 2023 Travel and Leisure magazine named Hickory the most beautiful and affordable place to live in the United States! Writing:

Located in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains, Hickory is a family-friendly destination known for its ample hiking trails and Southern charm. Currently ranked as the cheapest place to live in the U.S., Hickory has a median home price of $161,000. This affordable neighbor to the east of Asheville and north of Charlotte is popular with retirees, but it’s also becoming more attractive to young families; a steady stream of residents has been flocking here for its newfound fame as a technological hub for Google and Apple.

Doesn’t sound hollowed out to me.

The godfathers of protectionism haven’t been vindicated—but if they want to claim credit for President Trump’s tariff binge they’re welcome to it.

Addendum: Hat tip to Scott Lincicome on Hickory and do read Jeremy Horpedahl for details on the distribution of wages. Did you know, for example, that median weekly earnings for full time workers who graduated high school but are without a college degree are at an all time high? Switched earlier current for constant $2021 dollars in graph.

My excellent Conversation with Jack Clark

This was great fun and I learned a lot, here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Jack and Tyler explore which parts of the economy AGI will affect last, where AI will encounter the strongest legal obstacles, the prospect of AI teddy bears, what AI means for the economics of journalism, how competitive the LLM sector will become, why he’s relatively bearish on AI-fueled economic growth, how AI will change American cities, what we’ll do with abundant compute, how the law should handle autonomous AI agents, whether we’re entering the age of manager nerds, AI consciousness, when we’ll be able to speak directly to dolphins, AI and national sovereignty,  how the UK and Singapore might position themselves as AI hubs, what Clark hopes to learn next, and much more.

An excerpt:

COWEN: Say 10 years out, what’s your best estimate of the economic growth rate in the United States?

CLARK: The economic growth rate now is on the order of 1 percent to 2 percent.

COWEN: There’s a chance at the moment, we’re entering a recession, but at average, 2.2 percent, so let’s say it’s 2.2.

CLARK: I think my bear case on all of this is 3 percent, and my bull case is something like 5 percent. I think that you probably hear higher numbers from lots of other people.

COWEN: 20 and 30, I hear all the time. To me, it’s absurd.

CLARK: The reason that my numbers are more conservative is, I think that we will enter into a world where there will be an incredibly fast-moving, high-growth part of the economy, but it is a relatively small part of the economy. It may be growing its share over time, but it’s growing from a small base. Then there are large parts of the economy, like healthcare or other things, which are naturally slow-moving, and may be slow in adoption of this.

I think that the things that would make me wrong are if AI systems could meaningfully unlock productive capacity in the physical world at a really surprisingly high compounding growth rate, automating and building factories and things like this.

Even then, I’m skeptical because every time the AI community has tried to cross the chasm from the digital world to the real world, they’ve run into 10,000 problems that they thought were paper cuts but, in sum, add up to you losing all the blood in your body. I think we’ve seen this with self-driving cars, where very, very promising growth rate, and then an incredibly grinding slow pace at getting it to scale.

I just read a paper two days ago about trying to train human-like hands on industrial robots. Using reinforcement learning doesn’t work. The best they had was a 60 percent success rate. If I have my baby, and I give her a robot butler that has a 60 percent accuracy rate at holding things, including the baby, I’m not buying the butler. Or my wife is incredibly unhappy that I bought it and makes me send it back.

As a community, we tend to underestimate that. I may be proved to be an unrealistic pessimist here. I think that’s what many of my colleagues would say, but I think we overestimate the ease with which we get into a physical world.

COWEN: As I said in print, my best estimate is, we get half a percentage point of growth a year. Five percent would be my upper bound. What’s your scenario where there’s no growth improvement? If it’s not yours, say there’s a smart person somewhere in Anthropic — you don’t agree with them, but what would they say?

Interesting throughout, definitely recommended.

Has Clothing Declined in Quality?

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) recently tweeted that they wanted to bring back apparel manufacturing to the United States. Why would anyone want more jobs with long hours and low pay, whether historically in the US or currently in places like Bangladesh? Thanks in part to international trade, the real price of clothing has fallen dramatically (see figure below). Clothing expenditure dropped from 9-10% of household budgets in the 1960s (down from 14% in 1900) to about 3% today.

Apparently, however, not everyone agrees. While some responses to my tweet revealed misunderstandings of basic economics, one interesting counter-claim emerged–the low price of imported clothing has been a false bargain, the argument goes, because the quality of clothing has fallen.

The idea that clothing has fallen in quality is very common (although it’s worth noting that this complaint was also made more than 50 years ago, suggesting a nostalgia bias, like the fact that the kids today are always going to hell). But are there reliable statistics documenting a decline in quality? In some cases, there are! For example, jeans from the 1960s-80s, for example, were often 13–16 oz denim, compared to 9–11 oz today. According to some sources, the average garment life is down modestly. The statistical evidence is not great but the anecdotes are widespread and I shall accept them. Most sources date the decline in quality to the fast fashion trend which took off in the 1990s and that provides a clue to what is really going on.

Fast fashion, led by firms like Zara, is a business model that focuses on rapidly transforming street style and runway trends into mass-produced, low-cost clothing—sometimes from runway to store within weeks. The model is not about timeless style but about synchronized consumption: aligning production with ephemeral cultural signals, i.e. to be fashionable, which is to say to be on trend, au-courant and of the moment.

It doesn’t make sense to criticize fast fashion for lacking durability—by design, it isn’t meant to last. Making it durable would actually be wasteful. The product isn’t just clothing; it’s fashionable clothing. And in that sense, quality has improved: fast fashion is better than ever at delivering what’s current. Critics who lament declining quality miss the point—it’s fun to buy new clothes and if consumers want to buy new clothes it doesn’t make sense to produce long lasting clothes. People do own many more pieces of clothing today than in the past but the flow is the fun.

So my argument is that the decline in “quality” clothing has little to do with the shift to importing but instead is consumer-driven and better understood as an increase in the quality of fashion. Testing my theory isn’t hard. Consider clothing where function, not just fashion, is paramount: performance sportswear and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

There has been a massive and obvious improvement in functional clothing. The latest GoreTex jackets, for example, are more than five times as water resistant (28 000 mm hydrostatic head) compared to the best waxed cotton technology of the past (~5 000 mm) and they are breathable (!) and lighter. Or consider PolarTec winter jackets, originally developed for the military these jackets have the incredible property of releasing heat when you are active but holding it in when you are inactive. (In the past, mountain climbers and workers in extreme environments had to strip on or off layers to prevent over-heating or freezing while exerting effort or resting.) Amazing new super shoes can actually help runners to run faster! Now that is high quality. Personal protective equipment has also increased in quality dramatically. Industrial workers and intense sports enthusiasts can now wear impact resistant gloves which use non-Newtonian polymers that stiffen on impact to reduce hand injuries.

Moreover, it’s not just functional clothing that has increased in quality. For those willing to look, there is in fact plenty of high-quality clothing readily available. From Iron Heart, for example, you can buy jeans made with 21oz selvedge indigo denim produced in Japan. Pair with a high-quality Ralph Lauren shirt, a Mackinaw Wool Cruiser Jacket and a nice pair of Alden boots. Experts like the excellent Derek Guy regularly highlight such high-quality options. Of course, when Derek Guy discusses clothes like this people complain about the price and accuse him of being an elitist snob. Sigh. Tradeoffs are everywhere.

Critics long for a past when goods were cheap, high quality, and Made in America—but that era never really existed. Clothing in the past was more expensive and often low quality. To the extent that some products in the past were of higher quality–heavier fabric jeans, for example–that was often because the producers of the time couldn’t produce it less expensively. Technology and trade have increased variety along many dimensions, including quality. As with fast fashion, lower quality on some dimensions can often produce a superior product. And, of course, it should be obvious but it needs saying: products made abroad can be just as good—or better—than those made domestically. Where something is made tells you little about how well it’s made. 

The bottom line is that international trade has brought us more options and if today’s household were to redirect the historical 9 – 10 % share of income to clothing, it could absolutely buy garments that are heavier, better-constructed, and longer-lived than the typical mid-century mass-market clothing.

Tabarrok on the Movie Tariff

The Hollywood Reporter has a good piece on Trump’s proposed movie tariffs:

Even if such a tariff were legal — and there is some debate about whether Trump has the authority to impose such levies — industry experts are baffled as to how, in practice, a “movie tariff” would work.

“What exactly does he want to put a tariff on: A film’s production budget, the level of foreign tax incentive, its ticket receipts in the U.S.?” asks David Garrett of international film sales group Mister Smith Entertainment.

Details, as so often with Trump, are vague. What precisely constitutes a “foreign” production is unclear. Does a production need to be majority shot outside America — Warner Bros’ A Minecraft Movie, say, which filmed in New Zealand and Canada, or Paramount’s Gladiator II, shot in Morocco, Malta and the U.K. — to qualify as “foreign” under the tariffs, or is it enough to have some foreign locations? Marvel Studios’ Thunderbolts*, for example, had some location shooting in Malaysia but did the bulk of its production in the U.S, in Atlanta, New York and Utah.

…“The only certainty right now is uncertainty,” notes Martin Moszkowicz, a producer for German mini-major Constantin, whose credits including Monster Hunter and Resident Evil: The Final Chapter. “That’s not good for business.”

A movie producer is quoted on the bottom line:

“Consistent with everything Trump does and says, this is an erratic, ill conceived and poorly considered action,” says Nicholas Tabarrok of Darius Films, a production house with offices in Los Angeles and Toronto. “It will adversely affect everyone. U.S. studios, distributors, and filmmakers will suffer as much as international ones. Trump just doesn’t seem to understand that international trade is good for both parties and tariffs not only penalize international companies but also raise prices for U.S. based companies and consumers. This is an ‘everyone loses, no one gains’ policy.”

How are economics publications changing?

This study examines publications in three leading general economics journals from the 1960s through the 2020s, considering levels and trends in the demographics of authors, methodologies of the studies, and patterns of co-authorship. The average age of authors has increased nearly steadily; there has been a sharp increase in the fraction of female authors; the number of authors per paper has risen steadily; and there has been a pronounced shift to articles using newly generated data. All but the first of these trends have been most pronounced in the most recent decade. The study also examines the relationships among these trends.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Daniel Hamermesh.

Not De Minimis

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick:

Ending the “de minimis loophole” is a big deal. This rule allowed foreign companies to avoid paying tariffs on small shipments, giving them an unfair advantage over American small businesses. To small businesses across the country: we have your back.

The Value of De Minimis Imports by Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal:

A U.S. consumer can import $800 worth of goods per day free of tariffs and administrative fees. Fueled by rising direct-to-consumer trade, these “de minimis” shipments have exploded in recent years, yet are not recorded in Census trade data. Who benefits from this type of trade, and what are the policy implications? We analyze international shipment data, including de minimis shipments, from three global carriers and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Lower-income zip codes are more likely to import de minimis shipments, particularly from China, which suggests that the tariff and administrative fee incidence in direct-to-consumer trade disproportionately benefits the poor. Theoretically, imposing tariffs above a threshold leads to terms-of-trade gains through bunching, even in a setting with complete pass-through of linear tariffs. Empirically, bunching pins down the demand elasticity for direct shipments. Eliminating §321 would reduce aggregate welfare by $10.9-$13.0 billion and disproportionately hurt lower-income and minority consumers.

In other words, eliminating the de minimis rule is a significant tax on poorer Americans.

Frankly, it’s also a pain in the ass to have your international shipments delayed at broker (who often charges you exorbitant rates, more than the customs tax) and then have to go down to the customs office to pay the stupid tax. Yes, I am speaking from experience.

Buffett’s Alpha

Berkshire Hathaway has realized a Sharpe ratio of 0.76, higher than any other stock or mutual fund with a history of more than 30 years, and Berkshire has a significant alpha to traditional risk factors. However, we find that the alpha becomes insignificant when controlling for exposures to Betting-Against-Beta and Quality-Minus-Junk factors. Further, we estimate that Buffett’s leverage is about 1.6-to-1 on average. Buffett’s returns appear to be neither luck nor magic, but, rather, reward for the use of leverage combined with a focus on cheap, safe, quality stocks. Decomposing Berkshires’ portfolio into ownership in publicly traded stocks versus wholly-owned private companies, we find that the former performs the best, suggesting that Buffett’s returns are more due to stock selection than to his effect on management. These results have broad implications for market efficiency and the implementability of academic factors.

Here is the paper by Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller, and Lasse Heje Pedersen.  Quite the run, now over.  Via J.

Tabarrok on the Not My Generation Podcast

Political Scientists James Davenport and Craig Dawkins interview me on everything from tariffs to the Borda Count. Here is one bit I wish to underline:

Q. In your opinion, what is the biggest economic myth or misconception that is holding the U.S. back?

What worries me most is that we’re treating China like an enemy—and that mindset risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. What I want people to understand is this: we have a lot to gain from a rich China.

In my 2009 TED Talk, I gave one of my favorite examples. As China grows wealthier, it invests more in thinking—research, science, and development—that benefits the entire world. Richer countries face diseases of aging, not poverty. As China shifts its focus to diseases like cancer, it ramps up investment in drug development. That raises the odds of a cure—something worth trillions to humanity. If an American cured cancer, I’d be thrilled. If a Chinese citizen cured cancer, I’d be 99.9% as thrilled.

Yes, China is not a democracy. But by global standards, it hasn’t been especially militaristic. There have been border disputes, but no major invasions in over 50 years. China isn’t sending troops to the Middle East or Latin America.

That could change. But nothing inescapable says the U.S. and China must be enemies. We have far more to gain from peace, trade, and prosperity than from conflict.

My Conversation with the excellent Ken Rogoff

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Ken and Tyler tackle international economic dynamics, unresolved macro puzzles, the state of chess, and more, including whether trade deficits are truly unsustainable, why China’s investment-heavy growth model has reached its limits, how currency depreciation neutralizes tariff effects, Pakistan’s IMF bailouts, whether more Latin American countries should dollarize, Japan’s deceptively peaceful economic decline, Europe’s coming fiscal reckoning, how the US will eventually confront its ballooning debt, the puzzling absence of a recession during our recent disinflation, the potential of phasing out large denomination currency notes, the future relevance of stablecoins, whether America should start a CBDC, Argentina’s chances under Milei, who will be the next dominant player in chess, hanging out with Bobby Fischer, drawing out against Magnus Carlsen, and how to save classical chess from excessive computer preparation.

Here is an excerpt:

COWEN: Just predictively, what do you think the United States will do with its fiscal position?

ROGOFF: That is a darn good question. Looking way forward, I would just say we’re on an unsustainable path. We will continue to have our debt balloon. Eventually — not necessarily in a planned or coherent way — I think we’re going to have another big inflation soon, next five to seven years, maybe sooner with what’s going on, and that’s going to bring it down just like it did under Biden. It brought the debt down. Then the markets are, fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, no, we’re raising the interest rate, and then we’ll have to make choices.

I think in the United States, a lot of the choices, I’m sorry to say, probably point towards higher taxation because we’re hardly running a welfare state. All due respects — and I’m not sure I have any due respects to DOGE — there’re not that many things to cut in the United States compared to many other countries. I don’t know what the choice will be. I probably won’t be here, and you might not be either, when we’re making the choices, but if actually we’ll —

COWEN: Oh, I think we’ll both be here.

ROGOFF: It could happen much sooner. On the other hand, it’s hard to know what’s going through Trump’s head. I presumed he was going to blow up the deficit, like everybody else. We’ll see.

COWEN: When you say big inflation, how big is big?

ROGOFF: Last time we probably had a bonus 10 percent inflation over the 2 percent target cumulatively, maybe 12 percent. I think this time, it’ll be more on the order of cumulatively over the 2 percent target, 20 percent, 25 percent. There’s going to be an adjustment. I don’t think the debt is going to be the sole contribution to that. There are many factors. You have to impinge on Federal Reserve independence. Probably, there’ll be some shock, which will justify it. I don’t know how it’s going to play out.

I know that for years, people have said the US debt is unsustainable, but it hasn’t come to roost because we’ve lived through this post-financial crisis, post-pandemic era of very, very low and negative real interest rates. That is not the norm. There’s regression to mean.

You know what? It’s happened. Suddenly, the interest payments start piling up. I think they’ve at least doubled over the last few years. They’re quickly on their way to tripling, of going up to $1 trillion. Suddenly, it’s more than our defense spending. That’s the most important macro change in the world, that real interest rates appear to have regressed more towards long-term trend.

COWEN: What’s the most plausible scenario you can imagine where the US does not have to make any major adjustment? I’m not saying you’re predicting it. I’m not saying you think it’s very plausible, but you have to come up with something. What is it?

Recommended.  And I am happy to also recommend Ken’s new book Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider’s View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance, and the Road Ahead.

What Should Classical Liberals Do?

My little contretemps with Chris Rufo raises the issue of what should classical liberals do? In a powerful essay, C. Bradley Thompson explains why the issue must be faced:

The truth of the matter is that the Conservative-Libertarian-Classical Liberal Establishment gave away and lost an entire generation of young people because they refused to defend them or to take up the issues that mattered most to them, and in doing so the Establishment lost America’s young people to the rising Reactionary or Dissident Right, by which I primarily mean groups such as the so-called TradCaths or Catholic Integralists and the followers of the Bronze Age Pervert. (See my essay on the reactionary Right, “The Pajama-Boy Nietzscheans.”)

I do not think Mr. Rufo would disagree with me on this point, but he has not quite made it himself either (at least not as far as I know), so I will make it in my own name.

The betrayal, abandonment, desertion, and loss of America’s young people by conservative and libertarian Establishmentarians can be understood with the following hypothetical.

Imagine the plight of, let us say, a 23-year-old young man in the year 2016. Imagine that he’s been told every single day from kindergarten through the end of college that he’s racist, sexist, and homophobic by virtue of being white, male, and heterosexual. Further imagine that he was falsely diagnosed by his teachers in grade school with ADD/ADHD and put on Ritalin because, well, he’s an active boy. And then his teachers tell him when he’s 12 that he might not actually be a boy, but rather that he might be a girl trapped in boy’s body. And let us also not forget that he’s also been told by his teachers and professors that the country his parents taught him to love was actually founded in sin and is therefore evil. To top it all off: he didn’t get into the college and then the law school of his choice despite having test scores well above those who did.

In other words, what this oppressed and depressed young man has experienced his whole life is a cultural Zeitgeist defined by postmodern nihilism and egalitarianism. These are the forces that are ruining his life and making him miserable.

Let’s also assume that said young man is also temperamentally some kind of conservative, libertarian, or classical liberal, and he interns at the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, or the Institute for Humane Studies hoping to find solace, allies, and support to give relief to his existential maladies.

And how does Conservatism-Libertarianism Inc. respond to what are clearly the dominant cultural issues of our time?

Well, the Establishment publishes yet another white paper on free-market transportation or energy policy. The Heritage Foundation doubles down on more white papers on deficits and taxation policy. The Cato Institute churns out more white papers on legalizing pot and same-sex marriage. The Institute for Humane Studies goes all in to sit at the cool kids’ lunch table by ramping up its videos on spontaneous order featuring transgender 20-somethings.

Is it any wonder that today’s young people who have suffered the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune are stepping outside the arc of history yelling, “stop”? At a certain point, these young people let out a collective primal scream, shouting “I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take it anymore.” And when the “youf” (as they refer to themselves online) realized that Establishment conservatives and libertarians did not hear them and lacked the vocabulary, principles, power, and courage to defend them from their Maoist persecutors, they went underground to places like 4chan, 8chan, and various other online discussion boards, where they found a Samizdat community of the oppressed.

Having effectively abandoned late-stage Millennials and Gen Z, Conservatism and Libertarianism Inc. should not be surprised, then, that today’s young people who might be otherwise sympathetic to their policies have left that world and become radicalized. News flash: Gen Z is attracted to people who are willing to defend them and attack social nihilism and egalitarianism in all their forms.

Hence the rise of what I call the “Fight Club Right,” which calls for a new kind of American politics. Gen Z rightism is done with what they call the Boomer’s “fake and ghey” attachment to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the institutions of the Constitution. In fact, many young people who have migrated to the reactionary Right have openly and repeatedly rejected the principles of the American founding as irrelevant in the modern world.

More to the point, this younger generation is done with the philosophy of losing. They’re certainly done with the Establishment. They also seem to be done with classical liberalism and the American founding. (This is a more complicated topic.) Instead, what they want is political power to punish their enemies and to take over the “regime.” They want to use the coercive force of the State to create their new America.

…Conservatism and Libertarianism Inc. seemed utterly oblivious to the fact that the Left had pivoted and changed tactics after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. By the 1990s, the Left had abandoned economic issues and the working class and was doubling down on cultural issues. Rather than trying to take over the trade-union movement, for instance, the postmodern Left went for MTV and the Boy Scouts, while the major DC think tanks on the Right went for issues too distant from the lives of young people such as the deficit, taxation, and regulatory policy.

While socialism continues to be the end of the Left, the means to the end is postmodern nihilism. That’s where the Left planted its flag and that’s the terrain that it has occupied without opposition, whereas conservative and libertarian organizations such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute were fighting for ideological hegemony in the economic realm. Between 2000 and 2025, cultural nihilism and its many forms and manifestations is where the action is and has been for a quarter century. So powerful has postmodern nihilism become that even some left-wing “libertarian” organizations have simply become left-wing.

The Political Economy of Protective Labor Laws for Women

From a new NBER working paper:

During the first half of the twentieth century, many US states enacted laws restricting women’s labor market opportunities, including maximum hours restrictions, minimum wage laws, and night-shift bans. The era of so-called protective labor laws came to an end in the 1960s as a result of civil rights reforms. In this paper, we investigate the political economy behind the rise and fall of these laws. We argue that the main driver behind protective labor laws was men’s desire to shield themselves from labor market competition. We spell out the mechanism through a politico-economic model in which singles and couples work in different sectors and vote on protective legislation. Restrictions are supported by single men and couples with male sole earners who compete with women for jobs. We show that the theory’s predictions for when protective legislation will be introduced are well supported by US state-level evidence.

That is by Matthias Doepke, Hanno Foerster, Anne Hannusch, and Michèle Tertilt.