There is nothing magical about independence that makes for low-inflation.
…The primary reason that independent central banks are better at controlling inflation is that absent direct political control the default selection mechanism favors bankers, i.e. lenders, people whose interests make them more favorable towards lower inflation.
Thus, independence is a political decision that favors lenders in the decisions of monetary policy. Now, depending on the alternatives, there may be good reasons for making this choice but we should not fool ourselves into thinking that we have depoliticized money. We should not be surprised, for example, that “independent” central banks tend to make lender of last resort decisions that protect banks and bankers.
Joseph Stiglitz recently made similar remarks
“[The crisis] has shown that one of the central principles advocated by Western central bankers- the desirability of central bank independence-was questionable at best…In the crisis, countries with less independent central banks-China, India, and Brazil-did far, far better than countries with more independent central banks, Europe and the United States. There is no such thing as truly independent institutions. All public institutions are accountable, and the only question is to whom.”
From Business Insider, which adds:
[Stiglitz] believes that in the run-up to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve was accountable only to Wall Street, and singles out New York Fed President William Dudley for some especially harsh criticism. He claims Dudley was “a model of bad governance” because of his inherent conflict of interest: he bailed out the very banks he was supposed to regulate – the very same banks that enabled him to gain his position.