Category: Law
Shruti interviews V. Anantha Nageswaran on the Indian economy
He is currently serving as the Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, and also is the co-author of the books Economics of Derivatives and The Rise of Finance: Causes, Consequences and Cures. The podcast covers import substitution and strategic resilience, futures and options market, gross fixed capital formation, crypto markets, India’s growth trajectory, and much more.
Here is the audio and video on YouTube. Here is a linked transcript. Excerpt:
RAJAGOPALAN: The policy response to this has come in a couple of different ways. One has come through SEBI. It has started raising contract sizes and limiting weekly expiration,and so on. Another instrument has come through taxation. There have been STT [Securities Transactions Tax] hikes in consecutive budgets,but there is one thing about STT that I want to understand a little bit better from someone like you who has thought about this deeply.
Now, STT on futures is being levied on the notional value of the contract, which is the full traded price, whereas the STT on the options is levied on the premium, which is a small fraction of the overall underlying value of the notional exposure. The effective tax that is imposed is much more on the futures trade, manyfold more actually, than it is on the options trade, whereas the speculation is mostly happening on the options side, which is also where most of the retail investors are losing money because the futures side is much better capitalized, larger firms, and so on.
NAGESWARAN: No, also the futures side is probably used more by institutions, and therefore, they are able to put up the margin requirement, etc., better than the options trades, where the individuals are being sold almost like the₹10 sachet-type options, and the options…
RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly, sachetization options, absolutely.
NAGESWARAN: Yes. Go ahead.
RAJAGOPALAN: Now with each successive hike in the STT,we’re seeing the gap widen. It’s on the margin, making futures relatively more expensive than options just because it’s taxing each trade. It’s like a toll fee that’s paid almost on every transaction. Your book was precisely about understanding these kinds of policy instruments. Given that now we have a tax instrument which inadvertently favors the more speculative instrument. Is that a good way of thinking about it, or how would you think about this problem?
NAGESWARAN: No, I think you have given me a lot to think about on this. I probably haven’t applied my mind as much to the mechanics of the STT being levied on the premium when it comes to options, but on the notional value of the contract when it comes to futures. Actually, you have given me something to think about. As you said, it could be having the unintended consequence of reducing the hedging role of futures, which probably is playing a better role there and encouraging the speculative element. Let me think about it and also probably take back this aspect of the conversation back to my colleagues in the revenue department, in the Ministry of Finance. Thank you for that, yes.
Of great importance for the world’s most populous country.
A bilateral AI pause?
Dean ball has some thoughts and hesitations:
Here are some questions I wish “Pause” and “Stop” advocates would address:
1. Assuming we achieve the desired policy goal through a bilateral US/China agreement, what would be the specific metric or objective we would say needs to be satisfied in advance? Who decides whether we have satisfied them? What if one one party believes we have satisfied them but the other does not?
2. If the goal is achieved through a bilateral US/China agreement, would we need capital controls to ensure that U.S. investors cannot fund semiconductor fabs, data centers, or AI research labs in countries other than the U.S. and China?
3. Would we need to revoke the passports of U.S.-based AI researchers and semiconductor engineers to prevent them leaving America to join AI-related ventures elsewhere? How else would the U.S. and China keep researchers within their borders?
4. How should we grapple with the fact that (2) and (3) are common features of autocratic regimes?
5. Do the above questions mean that this really should be a global agreement, signed by all countries on Earth, or at least those with the theoretical ability to host large-scale data centers (probably Vanuatu doesn’t need to be on board)?
Solve for the China tech equilibrium
Authorities in Beijing have barred two executives from a Singapore-based AI firm from leaving China amid a review of the company’s $2 billion acquisition by U.S. social media giant Meta, according to a report by the Financial Times on Wednesday.
Xiao Hong and Ji Yichao — the CEO and chief scientist, respectively, of Manus — were summoned to Beijing this month and questioned over a possible violation of foreign direct investment reporting rules related to the acquisition before being told they could not leave the country, the report said.
Here is more from The Washington Post. In my view, the American lead in AI is somewhat larger than a model comparison alone might suggest.
A Danish Fix for U.S. Mortgage Lock-in
In the Danish mortgage market every mortgage is backed by a corresponding bond. Thus, if a home buyer takes out a 500k mortgage at 3% interest, a bond is issued that pays the lender 3% interest on 500k. I’ve written about this system several times before. It has two distinct advantages.
- The correspondence principle means that mortgage banks don’t bear interest rate risk but instead specialize in evaluating credit risk (the risk that the borrower won’t pay). Deep markets rather than banks take on the interest rate risk. This makes the Danish system very stable.
- Mortgages can be pre-paid by buying the corresponding bond at market rates and extinguishing it. If a Danish borrower takes out a 500k mortgage at 3% interest and then rates rise to 6%, for example, the value of that mortgage falls to $358k and the borrower can buy the corresponding bond, deliver it to the bank, and, in this way, extinguish the loan.
In the US, a mortgage can be pre-paid only at a par. As a result, if interest rates rise, home owners don’t want to move because moving would require them giving up a 3% mortgage and replace it with say a 6% mortgage. This is called the lock-in effect. Lock-in can be quite severe. Fonseca and Liu find:
Using individual-level credit record data and variation in the timing of mortgage origination, we show that a 1 percentage point decline in the difference between mortgage rates locked in at origination and current rates reduces moving by 9% overall and 16% between 2022 and 2024, and this relationship is asymmetric. Mortgage lock-in also dampens flows in and out of self-employment and the responsiveness to shocks to nearby employment opportunities that require moving, measured as wage growth within a 50- to 150-mile ring and instrumented with a shift-share instrument.
What about in Denmark? The Danes definitely take advantage of the opportunity to buy-back. Part of this is due to tax advantages but those are just a transfer. More importantly, Danes don’t get locked in. A new paper by Berger, Jeong, Marx, Olesen, and Tourre compares mobility across Denmark and the US:
We study Danish fixed-rate mortgage contracts, which are identical to those in the United States except that borrowers may repurchase their mortgages at market value. Using Danish administrative data, we show that households actively buy back debt when mortgage prices fall below par and that household mobility is largely insensitive when existing mortgage rates are below prevailing market rates — unlike in the United States, where moving rates fall sharply as rates rise. We develop an equilibrium model that explains these patterns and show that introducing a repurchase-at market option into U.S. mortgages substantially reduces interest-rate-induced lock-in with limited effects on equilibrium mortgage rates.
The last point is especially important because you might wonder whether we are assuming a free lunch? After all, if US borrowers lose when they have to pre-pay at par then lenders surely gain. And if lenders gain on pre-payment then they will be willing to lend at lower rates on mortgage initiation. No free lunch, right? The logic is correct but note that the gain to lenders comes mainly from the relatively small set of households that move despite lock-in so the pre-payment bonus to lenders is quite small. Under the author’s calibrated model, mortgage interest rates in the US would rise by only 18 basis points on average if the US moved to a Danish type system.
In other words, there actually is a free or at least a low-priced lunch because lock-in is bad for homeowners and it doesn’t benefit lenders. As a result, moving to a Danish system would create net benefits.
The hyper-NIMBY of earlier Cape Town and South Africa
The most controversial of the forced removals occurred in the second half of the 1960s, with the expulsion of 65,000 coloureds from District Six, a vibrant inner-city ward of Cape Town, where whites, many of the slumlords, owned 56% of the property. Against their will, District Six residents were moved out to the sandy townships of the Cape Flats. In Johannesburg, the inner-city suburb of Sophiatown, where blacks could own freehold property, was another notorious site of forced removals. Often long-established community institutions such as churches and schools had to be abandoned.
That is from the very good book by Hermann Giliomee The Afrikaners: A Concise History.
Alternatives to 911
Almost a quarter-billion calls are placed to 911 each year in the United States. A large share of them involve social problems, not crimes or emergencies—yet police are dispatched in response. This review traces how the 911 emergency system’s institutional design shapes demand for police, who is excluded from or ill served by this system, and what alternatives exist, including nonemergency lines (with police response), government hotlines (211, 311, 988), civilian crisis teams, and community-based resources. Among the universe of municipal police departments with at least 100 sworn officers in 2020, covering 107 million US residents, police have absorbed broad social service functions, with the availability of formal alternatives restricted to the largest cities. The evidence suggests that the primacy of police reflects institutional reproduction more than public need. I propose priorities for future research.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Bocar A. Ba.
Why is the USDA Involved in Housing?!
In yesterday’s post, The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, I wrote that Trump’s Executive Order “cuts off institutional home investors from FHA insurance, VA guarantees and USDA backing…”. The USDA is of course the United States Department of Agriculture. In the comments, Hazel Meade writes:
USDA? Wait, what????
Why is the USDA in any way involved in housing financing?
Are we humanly capable of organizing anything in a rational way?
It’s a good question. The answer is a great illustration of the March of Dimes syndrome. The USDA got involved with housing in the late 1940s with the Farmers Home Administration. The original rationale was to support farmers, farm workers and agricultural communities with housing assistance on the theory that housing was needed for farming and the purpose of the USDA was to improve farming. Not great economic reasoning but I’ll let it pass.
Well U.S. farm productivity roughly tripled between 1948 and the 1990s as family farms became technologically sophisticated big businesses. So was the program ended? Of course not. Over time the program subtly shifted from farmers to “rural communities”–the shift happened over decades although it was officially recognized in 1994 when the Farmers Home Administration was renamed the Rural Housing Service. Today rural essentially means low population density which no longer has any strong connection to agriculture.
So that’s the story of how the US Department of Agriculture came to run a roughly $10 billion annual housing program for non-farmers in non-agricultural communities. And how does it do this? By supporting no-money-down direct lending and a 90 percent guarantee to approved private lenders. Lovely.
It’s a small program in the national totals, but an amusing example of the US government robbing Peter to pay Paul and then forgetting why Paul needed the money in the first place.
The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act
The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act appears likely to pass the Senate. The bill contains some genuinely good ideas alongside some very popular—but bonkers ideas.
Let’s start with the good ideas.
The bill would streamline NEPA review for federally supported housing, primarily by expanding categorical exclusions. Federal environmental review does impose real costs and delays on housing construction, so reducing unnecessary review is a step in the right direction. The gains will probably be modest—most housing regulation occurs at the state and local level—but removing friction is good.
The bill would also deregulate manufactured housing by eliminating the permanent chassis requirement and creating a uniform national construction and safety standard. The United States once built far more factory-produced housing; in the early 1970s, by some accounts a majority of new homes were factory-built (mobile or modular). Long-run productivity growth in housing almost certainly requires greater use of factory construction. Land-use regulation remains the dominant constraint on supply, but enabling scalable manufacturing is still welcome.
Another interesting provision involves Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). The bill allows CDBG funds to be used for building new housing rather than being largely restricted to rehabilitation of existing housing. More federal spending is not automatically appealing, but the bill adds an unusual incentive mechanism.
The bill creates a tournament for CDBG allocations. Localities that exceed the median housing growth improvement rate among eligible CDBG recipients receive bonus funding. Those below the median face a 10 percent reduction. The key feature is that the penalties fund the bonuses, so the system reallocates money rather than expanding spending.
This is a clever design. It creates competition among localities and benchmarks them against peers rather than against a fixed national target. In effect, the program rewards relative improvement rather than absolute performance—a classic tournament structure. (See Modern Principles for an introduction to tournament theory!).
Ok, now for the popular but bonkers ideas. Section 901 (“Homes are for People, Not Corporations”) restricts the purchase of new single-family homes by large institutional investors. Elizabeth Warren is a sponsor of the bill but this section was driven almost entirely by President Trump. Trump passed an Executive Order, Stopping Wall Street from Competing With Main Street Home Buyers, that cuts off institutional home investors from FHA insurance, VA guarantees, USDA backing, Fannie/Freddie securitization and so forth. The bill goes further by imposing a seven-year mandatory divestiture rule, forcing institutional investors to convert rental homes to owner-occupied units after seven years.
No one objects to institutional investors owning apartment buildings. But when the same investors own single-family homes, it breaks people’s brains. Consider how strange the logic sounds if applied elsewhere:
…a growing share of apartments, often concentrated in certain communities, have been purchased by large Wall Street investors, crowding out families seeking to buy condominiums.
Apartments are fine, hotels are fine, but somehow a corporation owning a single family home is un-American. In fact, the US could do with more rental housing of all kinds! Why take the risk of owning when you can rent? Rental housing improves worker mobility. When foreclosures surged after 2008 and traditional buyers disappeared, institutional investors stepped in and absorbed distressed supply — helping stabilize markets. Who plays that role next time?
Institutional investors own only a tiny number of homes, so even if this were a good idea it wouldn’t be effective. But it’s not a good idea, it’s just rage bait driven by Warren/Trump anti-corporate rhetoric.
What does “Homes are for People, Not Corporations” even mean?–this is a slogan for the Idiocracy era. “Food is for People, Not Corporations,” so we should ban Perdue Farms and McDonald’s?
The Hidden Cost of Hard-to-Fire Labor Laws: Why European Firms Don’t Take Risks
In our textbook, Modern Principles, Tyler and I write:
Imagine how difficult it would be to get a date if every date required marriage? In the same way, it’s more difficult to find a job when every job requires a long-term commitment from the employer.
In two new excellent pieces, Brian Albrecht and Pieter Garicano extend this partial equilibrium aphorism with some general equilibrium reasoning. Here’s Albrecht:
[I]magine there is a surge for Siemens products. Do you hire a ton of workers to fill that demand? No, you’re worried about having to fire them in the future but being stuck until they retire.
But it’s even worse than that…..[suppose Siemens does want to hire] where is Siemens getting those workers from?…Not only is it a problem for Siemens that they won’t be able to fire people down the road, the fact that BMW doesn’t fire anyone means you can’t hire people.
Garicano has an excellent piece, Why Europe doesn’t have a Tesla, with lots of detail on European labor law:
Under the [German] Protection Against Dismissal Act, the Kündigungsschutzgesetz, redundancies over ten employees must pass a social selection test (Sozialauswahl). Employers cannot choose who leaves: they must rank employees by age, years of service, family maintenance obligations, and degree of disability, and then prioritize dismissing those with the weakest social claim to the job. If someone is dismissed for operational reasons but the company posts a similar job elsewhere, the dismissal is usually invalid.
Disabled employees can be dismissed only with the approval of the Integration Office (Integrationsamt), a public body. The office will weigh the employer’s reasons, whether they have taken sufficient steps to integrate the employee, and whether they could be redeployed elsewhere in the organization. Workers who also become caregivers cannot be dismissed at all for up to two full years after they tell their bosses they fulfill that role.
As a company becomes larger and tries to let more workers go at once these difficulties increase. In many European countries, companies with more than a certain number of workers – 50 in the Netherlands, 5 in Germany – are obliged to create a works council, which represents employees and, in some countries, must give its approval to decisions the employer wants to make regarding its employees, including layoffs or pay rises or cuts.
…Companies that are allowed to fire someone and can afford to pay the severance costs have to wait and pay additional fees. Collective dismissal procedures in Germany start after 30 departures within a month; once triggered they require further negotiations with the works council, a waiting period, and the creation of a ‘social plan’ with more compensation for departing workers. When Opel shut down its Bochum factory in Germany, it reached a deal with the works council to spend €552 million on severance for the 3,300 affected employees. This included individual payments of up to €250,000 and a €60 million plan to help workers find new jobs.
Now what is the effect of regulations like this? Well obviously the partial equilibrium effect is to reduce hiring but in addition Garicano notes that it changes what sorts of firms are created in the first place. If you are worried about being burdened by expensive dismissal procedures, build a regulated utility with captive government contracts, not a radical startup with a high probability of failure.
Rather than reduce hiring in response to more expensive firing, companies in Europe have shifted activity away from areas where layoffs are likely. European workers are for sure, solid work only. This works well in periods of little innovation, or when innovation is gradual. The continent, however, is poorly equipped for moments of great experimentation.
…Europe’s companies have immense, specialized knowledge [due to retained workforces, AT]. The problems happen when radical innovation is needed, as in the shift from gasoline to electric vehicles. The great makers of electric cars have either been new entrants, like Tesla and BYD, or old ones who have had their insides stripped, like MG.
..If Europe wants a Tesla, or whatever the Tesla of the next decade will turn out to be, it will need a new approach to hiring and firing.
Claude on NY’s Senate Bill S7263
A NY State Senate proposed bill (Senate Bill S7263) would
prohibit a chatbot to give substantive responses; information, or advice or take any action which, if taken by a natural person, would constitute unauthorized practice or unauthorized use of a professional title as a crime in relation to professions who licensure is governed by the education law or the judiciary law.
Claude, what do you think of the legal logic of this bill?
The legal logic is shaky. The bill’s operative test asks whether a chatbot’s output, “if taken by a natural person, would constitute a crime” under New York’s unauthorized practice statutes. But those statutes set a high bar — mere advice-giving by a layperson is not criminal; what’s prohibited is holding yourself out as a licensed professional while charging fees. Your neighbor who happens to be a doctor can tell you what he thinks your rash is. A retired lawyer can walk you through a lease. None of that is a crime. So either the bill is mostly toothless — most AI responses wouldn’t meet the criminal threshold — or courts will interpret “substantive advice” far more expansively than the underlying statutes warrant, effectively creating a new and harsher legal standard for AI that applies to no human equivalent. Neither outcome reflects good lawmaking, and the ambiguity will systematically over-deter, pushing operators to sanitize outputs well beyond what the statute actually requires.
Claude, who will be hurt by this bill?
The deepest problem is who gets hurt. The populations with the most to gain from AI-assisted professional guidance are precisely those who cannot afford lawyers, doctors, or therapists — the tenant trying to understand an eviction notice, the rural patient triaging symptoms, the small business owner reviewing a contract. For these users, the choice the bill actually creates is not “AI advice versus licensed professional advice”; it’s “AI advice versus no advice at all.” A watered-down chatbot that responds to every medical or legal question with a referral to a licensed professional is not a safety feature — it’s a luxury tax on information, paid disproportionately by people with the fewest alternatives. New York should be asking how to ensure AI advice is accurate and clearly disclosed, not how to suppress it on behalf of incumbents who’d prefer less competition.
Thanks Claude. Where did you learn this excellent analysis?
Public choice theory is part of my general training on economics and political science literature — Buchanan, Tullock, Olson, and the broader tradition are well-represented in the texts I was trained on.
But I’d be remiss not to note that you’re at the home institution of public choice. The Buchanan House is literally on your campus, and the tradition Buchanan and Tullock built at GMU is probably the most direct intellectual ancestor of the kind of analysis I was applying to this bill — concentrated benefits, diffuse costs, regulatory capture, rent-seeking by incumbent professionals. That framework is so natural for analyzing occupational licensing legislation that it almost applies itself.
If anything, my read of S7263 is pretty much a straightforward public choice story: organized professional associations with strong lobbying presence get statutory protection written in the language of consumer welfare, while the costs fall on millions of unorganized users who will never know what information they didn’t receive. Buchanan would have recognized it immediately.
What the recent dust-up means for AI regulation
From my new Free Press column, I see these as the most important facts:
Congress has not passed explicit regulation of AI foundation models, and an executive order from President Trump limited regulation at the state level. But do not think that laissez-faire reigns. In addition to existing (largely pre-AI) laws, which lay out general principles of liability, and laws from a few states, the United States is engaged in a kind of “off the books” soft regulation.
The major AI companies keep the national security establishment apprised of the progress they are making, as has been the case with Anthropic. There is a general sense within the AI industry that if the national security authorities saw anything in the new products that was very concerning or that might undermine the national interest, they would inform the president and Congress. That would likely lead to more formal and more restrictive kinds of regulation, so the major AI companies want to show relatively safe demos and products. An informal back and forth enforces implied safety standards, without the involvement of formal legislation.
That may sound like an unusual way to do regulation, but to date the system has worked relatively well. For one thing, I believe our national security establishment has a better and more sophisticated understanding of the issues than does Congress. Congress right now simply isn’t up to the job, as indeed the institution has been failing more generally. Most representatives seem to know little about the core issues behind AI regulation.
As it stands, AI progress has been allowed to proceed, and the United States has stayed ahead of China, without major catastrophes. The burden on the companies has been manageable, and the system, at least until last week, was flexible.
Another advantage of this system is that both Congress and the administrative state can be very slow to act. The AI landscape can change in just weeks, yet our federal government is used to taking years to issue laws and directives. Had we passed AI legislation in, say, 2024, today it would be badly out of date, no matter what your point of view on what such regulation should accomplish. For instance, in 2024 few outsiders were much concerned with the properties of, or risks from, autonomous AI “agents.” Today that is the number-one topic of concern.
Though it is not driven by legislation, the status quo AI regulatory system is not anti-democratic, as it operates well within the rules passed by Congress and the administrative state. It is more correct to say the current AI guardrails rely on the threat of regulation, rather than regulation itself, with the national security state as the watchdog. The system sticks to a kind of creative ambiguity. The national security state offers no official imprimatur for the new advances, but they proceed nonetheless. Nevertheless, the various components of the national security state reserve the right to object in the future.
It is also correct, however, to believe that such a system cannot last forever. At some point creative ambiguity collapses. Someone or some institution demands a more formal answer as to what is allowed or what is not allowed. At that point a more directly legalistic system of adjudication enters the picture, and Congress likely starts paying more attention.
With the recent dispute between Hegseth and Anthropic, we have taken a step away from the previous regulatory mode of quiet cooperation. Instead, the relationship between the military and the AI companies has become a matter of public concern. Now everyone has an opinion on Hegseth, Anthropic, and OpenAI, and social media is full of debate.
No matter “whose side you take,” it would have been better to have resolved all this behind closed doors.
Chaos and Misallocation under Price Controls
My latest paper, Chaos and Misallocation under Price Controls, (with Brian Albrecht and Mark Whitmeyer) has a new take on price controls:
Price controls kill the incentive for arbitrage. We prove a Chaos Theorem: under a binding price ceiling, suppliers are indifferent across destinations, so arbitrarily small cost differences can determine the entire allocation. The economy tips to corner outcomes in which some markets are fully served while others are starved; small parameter changes flip the identity of the corners, generating discontinuous welfare jumps. These corner allocations create a distinct source of cross-market misallocation, separate from the aggregate quantity loss (the Harberger triangle) and from within-market misallocation emphasized in prior work. They also create an identification problem: welfare depends on demand far from the observed equilibrium. We derive sharp bounds on misallocation that require no parametric assumptions. In an efficient allocation, shadow prices are equalized across markets; combined with the adding-up constraint, this collapses the infinite-dimensional welfare problem to a one-dimensional search over a common shadow price, with extremal losses achieved by piecewise-linear demand schedules. Calibrating the bounds to stationlevel AAA survey data from the 1973–74 U.S. gasoline crisis, misallocation losses range from roughly 1 to 9 times the Harberger triangle.
Brian has a superb write up that makes the paper very accessible. Unfortunately, the paper is timely and relevant.
Stand with free speech and the Constitution
A landmark law that limits children under the age of 16 to one hour per day on social media apps has been blocked by a US court, in a blow to child safety campaigners seeking to limit exposure to sites such as Instagram and YouTube.
In an opinion released on Friday, a federal judge in Virginia halted the enforcement of a bill passed by the state last year, under which social media companies could be fined $7,500 per violation.
The state “does not have the legal authority to block minors’ access to constitutionally protected speech until their parents give their consent by overriding a government-imposed default limit”, Judge Patricia Tolliver Giles wrote of the measure, implementing a preliminary injunction.
Giles concluded the law was “over-inclusive”. Under it, “a minor would be barred from watching an online church service if it exceeded an hour on YouTube . . . yet, that same minor is allowed to watch provider-selected religious programming exceeding an hour in length on a streaming platform,” she wrote. “This treats functionally equivalent speech differently.”
Here is more from the FT.
If you have the right to die, you should have the right to try!
Ruxandra Teslo asks a good question:
I have a curiosity: why is it the case that it is easier to get MAID in Canada than it is to access experimental treatments which carry a higher risk? In the past, I used to think ppl do not like “deaths caused by the medical system”, but for MAID the prob of death is 100%…
The Canadians may be somewhat inconsistent on this point. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been consistent and has rejected medical self-defense arguments for physician assisted suicide and let stand an appeals court ruling that patients do not have a right to access drugs which have not yet been permitted for sale by the FDA (fyi, I was part of an Amici Curiae brief for this case).
Hat tip for the post title to Jason Crawford.
Think through the situation one step further
Many of you got upset when I mentioned the possibility that parents use smart phone software to control the social media usage of their kids. There was an outcry about how badly those systems work (is that endogenous?). But that is missing the point.
If you wish to limit social media usage, mandate that the phone companies install such software and make it more effective. Or better yet commission or produce a public sector app to do the same, a “public option” so to speak. Parents can then download such an app on the phone of their children, or purchase the phone with the app, and manipulate it as they see fit.
If you do not think government is capable of doing that, why think they are capable of running an effective ban for users under the age of sixteen? Maybe those apps can be hacked but we all know the “no fifteen year olds” solution can be hacked too, for instance by VPNs or by having older friends set up the account.
My proposal has several big advantages:
1. It keeps social media policy in the hands of the parents and away from the government.
2. It does not run the risk of requiring age verification for all users, thus possibly banishing anonymous writing from the internet.
3. The government does not have to decide what constitutes a “social media site.”
Just have the government commission a software app that can give parents the control they really might want to have. I am not myself convinced by the market failure charges here, but I am very willing to allow a public option to enter the market.
The fact that this option occasions so little interest from the banners I find highly indicative.