The 2014 Nobel Laureate in economics is Jean Tirole

A theory prize!  A rigor prize!  I would say it is about principal-agent theory and the increasing mathematization of formal propositions as a way of understanding economics.  He has been a leading figure in formalizing propositions in many distinct areas of microeconomics, most of all industrial organization but also finance and financial regulation and behavioral economics and even some public choice too.  He is a broader economist than many of his fans realize.

Tirole is a Frenchman, he teaches at Toulouse, and his key papers start in the 1980s.  In industrial organization, you can think of him as extending the earlier work of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson with regard to opportunism and recontracting, but applying more sophisticated and more mathematical forms of game theory.  Tirole also has been a central figure in procurement theory and optimal contracts when there is asymmetric information about costs.  The idea of mechanism design runs throughout his papers in many different guises.  Many of his papers show “it’s complicated,” rather than presenting easily summarizable, intuitive solutions which make for good blog posts.  That is one reason why his ideas do not show up so often in blogs and the popular press, but they nonetheless have been extremely influential in the economics profession.  He has shown a remarkable breadth and depth over the course of the last thirty or so years.

His possible pick had been heralded for some numbers of years now, this award should not be considered a surprise at all.  You will note that the Swedes mention Jean-Jacques Laffont, who died a decade ago, and who co-authored many of the key papers in this area with Tirole.  Such a mention is considered a nod in the direction of implying that Laffont, had he lived, would have shared in the prize.

Here is Tirole’s home page.  Here is Tirole on Wikipedia.  Here is a short biography.  Here is Tirole on  Here is the press release.  Here is background from the Swedes.  Here is the 54-page document on why he won, one of the best places to start.  Here is the Twitter commentary.

One idea of Tirole’s I use frequently has to do with renegotiability.  Let’s say a regulator and a monopolist agree to a scheme of regulation and provision, creating some surplus for both parties.  As time passes, will each side of that bargain stick with the original agreement?  A simple example here is the defense contractor.  After a procurement contract is written, sometimes the supplier has the incentive to conduct a hold-up, to report that costs are higher than expected, and to ask for more money in return for timely fulfillment of the contract.  Of course this is a contract breach, but if no other supplier can step in and do the job, it may be optimal for the government to give in to these demands to some degree.  The question then is: how should the contract best be designed in advance, so as to prevent this problem from popping up later on?  Or should the renegotiation simply be allowed?  Anyone wishing to tackle these questions likely would start with the papers of Tirole on this topic.  For one thing, these papers help explain why a second-best optimal contract may offer some rents to agents and appear to give the agent “too good a deal.”

Some of his key papers focus on asymmetric information about costs.  Say a firm knows its costs and the regulator can only guess.  Ideally the regulator would likely to make the firm price at marginal cost, but the firm will pretend marginal cost is higher than it really is.  The regulator and the firm thus play a game.  Tirole figured out with rigor which principles govern how this game works and what a second-best regulatory solution might look like.  With Laffont, here is his key paper in that area.  David Baron made contributions to this area as well.  Again, there is a potential argument for an “agent rent,” to limit the incentive of the agent to lie too much about costs, for fear of losing that rent if the cooperative relationship breaks down.

Tirole, writing sometimes with Rey, wrote some important papers on vertical agreements and how they can be used to extend market power, for instance when can buying up parts of a supply chain help extend monopoly power?  His paper with Oliver Hart figures out some of the conditions under which vertical acquisitions can help foreclose a market.  With Rey, Tirole surveys the literature on vertical relations and foreclosure.

This early 1984 paper, with Drew Fudenberg, laid out the conditions when firms should overinvest in capacity to deter competitive entry, or when firms should instead look “lean and mean” for entry deterrence.  The underlying analysis has shaped many a business school discussion.

I am a fan of this 1996 paper on how we can think of firms as credible ways of carrying reputations in a collective sense.  For instance the existence of a firm called “Google” transmits real information about the qualities of the people you deal with when you are transacting with members of the Google firm.  This was an important addition to the usual Coasean vision of thinking of a firm in terms of economizing transaction costs.

He has written some key papers on financial intermediation, collateral, and the agency problems associated with lending, here is one well-cited paper by him and Holmstrom. Here is a non-gated version (pdf).  A key argument is that a decline in the value of the collateral in a lending relationship can lower efficiency and also output, and this can help explain some features of business cycles.  This 1997 paper was well ahead of its time and it remains one of Tirole’s most widely cited works.  Arguably it is relevant for recent financial crises.

He has a 1994 book with Mathias Dewatripont on the prudential regulation of banks and how to apply the proper incentives to make sure banks do not take too much risk at public expense.  Obviously this also has since become a much more important topic.  How many of you know his 1996 paper with Rochet on “Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk“?  They show the contradictions which can plague a “too big to fail” policy and the attempts of central banks to maintain a “creative ambiguity” about what kinds of bailouts will occur, using rigorous game theory of course.

With Rochet, he has a well-known paper on platform competition, laying out the basics of how these “two-sided” markets work.  Think of internet or payment portals which must get both sides of the market on board.  What are the efficiency properties of such markets and what are the game-theoretic issues?  In this setting, how do for-profits compare to non-profits?  Competition to monopoly?  Rochet and Tirole laid out some of the basics here, here is their survey piece on the field as a whole.  Alex’s post above has much more on these points, and Joshua Gans covers this area too, here is Vox.

In public choice economics, he and Laffont have an important paper on when regulatory capture is actually likely to occur.  I have yet to see the insights of this paper incorporated into the rest of the literature adequately.  His paper on the internal organization of government considers the relative appropriateness of high- vs. low-powered incentives as applied to government employees, among other matters.  His 1999 paper with Mathias Dewatripont, “Advocates,” shows in game-theoretic terms why something like the Anglo-American system of competing lawyers might make sense as the best way of discovering information and adjudicating the truth.  This paper shows how career concerns affect bureaucratic incentives and what is the optimal degree of specialization within a government bureaucracy.

He has thought very deeply about the nature of liquidity and what is the optimal degree of liquidity in a securities market.  There can be some side benefits to illiquidity, namely that it forces parties to stay committed to an economic relationship.  This must be weighed against the more obvious benefits of liquidity, which include having better benchmarks for measuring managerial performance, namely stock price (see this paper with Holmstrom).  This kind of analysis can be applied to the question of whether the shares of a firm should stay privately traded or be put on a public exchange.  This 1998 paper, with Holmstrom, is a key forerunner of the current view that the global economy does not have enough in the way of safe assets.

Here is his paper on vertical structure and collusion in bureaucracies (pdf).  Here is his very useful survey article, with Holmstrom, on the theory of the firm.

His textbook on Industrial Organization is a model of clarity and remains a landmark in the field, even though it came out almost thirty years ago.

He has written a book on telecommunications regulation (with Laffont) although I have never read that material.

In finance he wrote this key 1985 paper, deriving the conditions under which you can have an asset bubble in a market with rational expectations.  The problem of course is that the price of the asset tends to keep rising, relative to the size of the economy as a whole, and eventually it becomes impossible to keep on buying the asset.  This has to mean an eventual crash, unless the growth rate of the economy exceeds the general rate of return on assets.  This paper helped us think through some issues which recently have resurfaced with the work of Thomas Piketty.  His earlier 1982 paper on speculation is also relevant to this topic.  Most economists think of Tirole as game theory, finance, and industrial organization, but his contributions to finance are significant as well.

Just to show his breadth, here is his paper with Roland Benabou on incentives and when they undermine the intrinsic desire to do a good job.  For instance if you pay kids to get good grades, will that backfire and kill off their own reasons for wanting to do well?  Alex covers that paper in more detail.  This other paper with Benabou, “Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation,” is a great deal of fun.  It analyzes the benefits of overconfidence, namely greater motivation, and shows how to weigh those benefits against the possible costs, namely making more mistakes.  It shows Tirole dipping a foot into the waters of behavioral economics and again reflects his versatility in terms of fields.  I like this sentence from the abstract: “On the supply side, we develop a model of self-deception through endogenous memory that reconciles the motivated and rational features of human cognition.”  Again with Benabou, here is his paper on willpower and personal rules, very much in the vein of Thomas Schelling.

Here is Tirole on intellectual property and health in developing countries, with plenty on policy.

It’s an excellent and well-deserved pick.  One point is that some other economists, such as Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom, may be disappointed they were not joint picks, this would have been the time to give them the prize too, so it seems their chances have gone down.

Overall I think of Tirole as in the tradition of French theorists starting with Cournot in 1838 (!) and Jules Dupuit in the 1840s, economics coming from a perspective with lots of math and maybe even some engineering.  I don’t know anything specific about his politics, but to my eye he reads very much like a French technocrat in terms of approach and orientation.

Jean Tirole is renowned as an excellent teacher and a very nice person.


Well done Tyler, you predicted him in 2008 and 2009. His Wikipedia page indicates he's won a stack of prizes in the meantime, but we haven't heard much about him in the blogosphere. Has the blogosphere become irrelevant in the meantime? (Just a side swipe)

Silly question, the blogosphere was never relevant in the first place!

The econ blogosphere is mostly about debating current events, primarily macro, with varying degrees of quality (MR is on the high end of the quality spectrum). For better or worse (I'd say worse), this micro stuff doesn't attract large audiences.

I'd also add that Tirole's work is quite theoretical, technical, and mathematical.

For micro in general, a lot of the more interesting stuff is about what happens when you start removing the assumptions that make Econ 101 so easy. One not-uncommon result is that the market outcome sometimes sucks (in terms of efficiency, welfare, etc.) For the chunk of the econ blogosphere that hold ideological priors about the perpetual awesomeness of the free market, this leads to a lot of fingers being stuck in ears and cries of "la la la, I can't hear you!" That is to say, it's not something they're going to write about. But mainly, the models get really complicated, requiring a lot of math. The general public doesn't want to read long posts proving various theorems and lemmas.

The math is often complicated enough that many economist have trouble understanding it, let alone distilling it down to a short and easy to understand statement the average reader of these blogs could follow.

Interesting comment from Monsieur Brad DeLong in 2009:

"A Harvard prediction pool, started in 1982, points to Jean Tirole of the Toulouse School of Economics as the most likely winner of the Bank of Sweden Prize for Invisible Handymen in Memory of Alfred Nobel this year. Mr. Tirole is a wide-ranging economist whose work spans from game theory to finance to industrial organization to behavioral economics. Second in the Harvard pool is Stanford’s John Taylor, famous for the “Taylor rule,” which dictates where a central bank should set interest rates based on gross domestic product and the rate of inflation."

So why wasn't the pick John Taylor this year? Europeans don't like *rules*?

"A simple example here is the defense contractor. After a procurement contract is written, sometimes the monopolist has the incentive to report a hold-up, to report that costs are higher than expected, and to ask for more money in return for timely fulfillment of the contract."

Is that what's going on with the F-35?

Why did the government allow Lockheed to merge with so many other defense contractors?

Monopolies are like protectionism, they work in practice but not in theory.

Which is why Forbes has given up trying to find billionaires for its lists: all monopoly profits get competed away.

"Monopolies are like protectionism, they work in practice but not in theory."

If only the Lockheed board of directors could have availed themselves of your insight!

Lockheed, like the vicious playing fields of Eton or the excessively Lovelacian duel-happy fraternities of mittelEuropa, is a holding tank for people who may be militarily useful in the future.

Richard Cheney brokered the mergers of the legacy arms contractors at a famous dinner in 1993:

"The Last Supper"

I'll be waiting to hear how and why Jean Tirole is not linked in any way at all with the French 'regulation theory' (characteristically left wing in the work of for example Michel Aglietta or Robert Boyer) and therefore is the winner as opposed to a modern version of the fantastic 'regulation theory' of basically right wing USA (I think, or at least anglo) economists like Peltzman, Becker, Posner, Joskow and Noll, Peltzman, Owen and Braeutigam, Wenders, Shmalensee. No doubt I'm completely out of date since all these authors were quoted in my 1990 PhD on Telecommunications...

Good question, Michael

En France personne ne semble établir ce lien :

Tirole est absent. Totalement...Curieux ?

Ensuite, les Français ont la mémoire courte!

Jean Tirole Live :


Jean has nothing to do with regulation theory. Regulation theory is a French "unorthodox school of thought". Jean's work is on the econonomics of regulation, how do you go about regulating sectors with natural monopoly. He uses, brilliantly, innovative methods and tools from economics to study this.

Wise reframing.

It should be noted in his defense that despite everything the unorthodox Robert Boyer (of regulation theory) has contributed some exceptionally rich discussion on Schumpeterian long cycles, one of the few domains of economics where the differences between right and left become irrelevant, noting for example that "the twin" of regulation is crisis, and that "cyclical" crises are the main feature of a "stabilised" regulation (the ideal calm crisis perhaps, but is it the calm before the storm?), whereas Schumpeterian crises are "structural" crises "during which the very functioning of regulation comes into contradiction with existing institutional forms which are then abandoned, destroyed, or bypassed". France under the socialists is currently largely resisting and closing its eyes to the great structural crisis. The 30-hour week is symbolic over-regulation, it should have been swept away instantly in 2008. But as Jean-Louis pointed out (via the parfait video) Jean Tirole stands explicitly for a lighter touch regulation (perhaps/hopefully general rules rather than rampant discretion) and urges the French to get over their traditional distrust of markets. One problem with game theory is the limited focus on individual decision making even in situations where the market/technology structural forces DO sweep away the individual even while he/she is playing his/her games. There we are, playing our games, and we forget to feel the force of the tremors.

But, admits Boyer (of the regulation school) "the economist is rarely modest, whatever the content of his theory his aim is to derive general results from very basic principles, and as few as possible". What I see of Tirole indicates he is unusually modest for an economist. Obviously a genuine guy. On the other hand, judging from the way the interviewers et al are framing their questions (they are stupidly ignorant about the different types of "regulation", for example parametric and pervasive regulation) I'd be concerned that maybe surprisingly little of enormous importance will be learned in the aftermath of this particular prize.

A survivable long run solution to a structural crisis (once it is upon you) requires not fine 'individualistic' gaming distinctions between for example banking, railway, and telecommunications regulation but rather simpler lessons, ironically/reassuringly like the ones Tirole emphasised in the live interview -- a "lighter State" and a deep questioning of the "French exception" with its deep "distrust vis-à-vis the markets."

Tirole wants "an economic culture that must be learned in schools." Make that culture Schumpeterian please. Perhaps Tirole and Boyer could have a chat about it... Wouldn't it be supremely ironic if the next French sensation to hit the world were a truly Schumpeterian *regulation* experiment with creative destruction and market-guided adjustment. Kiss goodbye to 'too big to fail'. Let the anglo-saxon and Italian Keynesians who dominate international debate, defend debt, artificially stimulate economies, and in other ways ignore the need for market-led supply side corrective-institutional exits from crisis, yes... let them be washed away into oblivion by a new wave of French regulation theory... plus ça change.

Sorry for hogging. Nobel provides the excuse for venting big ideas.

His book on the Theory of Corporate Finance is also a great synthesis of the literature.

In the FT: "Tore Ellingsen, chairman of prize committee, said after the announcement that Prof Tirole’s award was “not really a political prize”.
“Like an engineer, he offers a toolkit for problem solving that is applicable no matter what your political preference,” he said."

Man, I remain impressed at the continuing dominance of Americans in winning Nobel prizes - even Rijsbank sponsored ones.

As long as we ignore this year (any takers on whether the high point of American research prowess was reached back in the American Century?).

Post Chicago Industrial Organization with Game Theory.

It's been a good year for the French.

LOL indeed I thought Piketty had won when I saw a quick headline.

As for this guy, the French love to try and formalize things with math (Google 'Nicolas Bourbaki', which failed). As for his contribution to IP, I read the paper TC linked and here are my comments:

His words:

"...populist sentiments may deter politicians in rich and poor coun-tries, as well as multilateral organizations, from trying to find solutions. I have already mentioned the equivocal stance of rich countries, which argue in favor of low prices for poor countries while being unwilling to foot the bill and opposing tiered pricing. "

" the midst of the anthrax scare, Health and Human Services Sec-retary Tommy Thompson threatened Cipro manufacturer Bayer with com-pulsory licensing 17 and forced it to slash prices (ironically, in the same way South Africa forced Merck, Bristol-Myers, and others to cut prices on AIDS treatments, generating a protest from the American government). "

"First, the prohibition of parallel imports or exports is of the utmost importance."

"The prize system, in which the innovator receives a lump sum for deliv-ering an invention with specified characteristics, and thereby forfeits any IPR, has a long history but was not employed much through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Lately, though, its principle has made a comeback with proposals by the World Bank, the WHO, and the Clinton administration"

WISE WISE WISE! While I could have made these points and more, it's very wise that this economist picks up on this simple stuff like: prohibit grey market goods for patented medicines (contrary to a US Sup.Ct. ruling), and, prohibit compulstory licensing against individual firms as a negotiation tactic, which has a chilling effect, and, subsidize rare tropical disease research, and, offer a prize fund, lump sum for new inventions.

THIS MAN IS A GENIUS. A real step above the usual "make everything into a commodity" college econ professor.


While Bourbaki might never have been finished, it's not exactly considered "failed" here, either - it just became a somewhat anachronistic project after some time. Take any introductory maths book made for the French engineering school's preparatory classes or universities, and you'll see that the strict formalism and thematic organisation owes very much to Bourbaki. E.g. take a book like Warusfel's "tout-en-un" for MPSI/PCSI, which is very popular for preparatory classes. If that's a good or a bad thing is another issue, but a nonchaland "failed", withouth very specific qualifications, is hardly the right word given its massive influence.

@Martin, thanks for the reply, your points are well taken, but under the "appraisal" section of the Wikipedia entry you can see the severe faults of the Bourbaki school. Further, as an ideology, though not mentioned by Wikipedia I think technically the project did indeed fail due to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, proved sometime after the group.

Tirole certainly did not extend Williamson, together with Laffont, his analysis of regulatory contract is directly opposite to that of Williamson. See Steve Tadelis and Patrick Bajari's 2001 paper in the RAND Journal.

I've taken a quick look at the paper. I'm not sure how it shows that Williamson is directly opposite to Laffont and Tirole regarding his analysis of regulatory contract.

Re Laffont and Tirole, the paper just discusses the asymmetric info problem, which I don't think W would disagree with.

It's an interesting point though.

Overall I think of Tirole as in the tradition of French theorists starting with Cournot in 1838 (!) and Jules Dupuit in the 1840s, economics coming from a perspective with lots of math and maybe even some engineering.

That's because he trained as an engineer with pure maths at the École Polytechnique, like Maurice Allais. The French educational system is heavily maths-oriented (the French are tied with the U.S. for most Fields Medal winners, despite having 1/5 the population), and Polytechnique even more so. When I was there in the early 90s, our classes in microeconomics under Nicolas Curien were a calculus of variations fest, and even the token humanities classes had a formal bent (the one I took was a study of Knuth's stable marriages algorithms).

Maths is not a word. Use math or mathematics.

Ah, the pedants come out. In (British) English (or French), as opposed to American, it is "maths", not "math", and plural.

Correct ! In india where the Zero was "invented" it is Maths for the same reason.

And I thought pretentiousness was supposed to be a French thing.

Haha too quick for me Fazal.

Yeah, Maurice Allais once said that "the fundamental Anglo-Saxon quality is satisfaction with the accumulation of facts. The need for clarity, for logical coherence and for synthesis is, for an Anglo-Saxon, only a minor need, if it is a need at all. For a Latin, and particularly a Frenchman, it is exactly the opposite." You see that all over the place, the English/Americans are empiricists, the French are rationalist; Bacon vs. Descartes; the analytical philosophers versus the continental ones; etc. Its a difference in approach that seems to be culturally grounded. (Of course, we should not take this too far; the differences are not insurmountable).

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I prefer intelligent protectionnism than narrow-minded economic liberalism. Protectionnism contributes to local consumption; Civilization has the duty to restrict the polluting goods importing from far; fuck the globalisation contributing to global warming : air pollution by planes, truck traffics, ocean pollution because of ship unballasting that speads unballasted waters to another ocean (big problem only mentioned by scientists such as G. Leboeuf). Liberalism fucks the Earth because of its wasting and its destructive predation; liberalism despises social justice, liberalism serves the richer; liberalism is cynical. Mankind's dignity needs to organize a more intelligent economics against social and environmental barbarics.

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An interesting sentence from one of the paper's linked in the post: "Despide the sharp difference in interpretation, the extortion model is mathematically identical with the basic corruption model." (Collective Reputation article).

I suppose this is one of the "it's complicated" aspect Tyler was pointing out. (Note, I'm not trying to detract from Triole or his getting the prize -- I likes his text book and look forward to reading through a number of the piences mentioned by both Tyler and Alex.) I"m not sure if this points to the difficulties of model specificaiton in micro or that when you really get into the micro setting you're stuck with some of the same problems that exist in the macro settings.

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