The author is Cecilia Heyes, and the subtitle is The Cultural Evolution of Thinking, published by Harvard/Belknap. It is not always a transparent read, but this is an important book and likely the most thoughtful of the year in the social sciences.
From the book’s home page:
…adult humans have impressive pieces of cognitive equipment. In her framing, however, these cognitive gadgets are not instincts programmed in the genes but are constructed in the course of childhood through social interaction. Cognitive gadgets are products of cultural evolution, rather than genetic evolution. At birth, the minds of human babies are only subtly different from the minds of newborn chimpanzees. We are friendlier, our attention is drawn to different things, and we have a capacity to learn and remember that outstrips the abilities of newborn chimpanzees. Yet when these subtle differences are exposed to culture-soaked human environments, they have enormous effects. They enable us to upload distinctively human ways of thinking from the social world around us.
The key substantive points from this are malleability and speed of evolution, and overall in her theory there is a much lower reliance on cognitive instincts and thus a fundamentally different account of social evolution: “In contrast, the cognitive gadgets theory applies cultural evolutionary theory to the mechanisms of thought — the mental processes that generate and control behavior.”
And “…social interaction in infancy and childhood produces new cognitive mechanisms; it changes the way we think.”
The chapter on imitation is the best appendage to Girard on memesis I know. One interesting point is that most people find it quite hard to imitate how they look to others when say they tell a joke or make love. To imitate successfully, you need to develop particular sensorimotor capacities. Otherwise, you can be thwarted by a kind of “correspondence” problem, not knowing how the objective and subjective experiences of imitation match up properly. This too we learn through cultural gadgets.
Mindreading is also a mental gadget, it must be learned, and it is surprisingly similar to print reading. In an odd twist on Julian Jaynes, Heyes suggests that humans five or six thousand years ago may not have had this capacity very strongly. And as with print reading, there is cross-cultural diversity in mindreading. There is no mindreading instinct and we all must learn it, autistics too.
What about language? Rather than Chomsky’s Universal Grammar, there are instead “domain-general processes of sequence learning.” This in turn leads to a complex and quite interesting take on how, while non-human animals do also have language, it is quite different from ours (p.187).
Most generally, if someone is trying to explain X, maybe both genetic/instinct and cultural evolution accounts of X are wrong — try a cultural gadget approach! And think of this book as perhaps the best attempt so far to explain the weirdness of humans, relative to other animals.
Note also that in this view, humanity is relatively vulnerable to cultural catastrophes, as we cannot simply bounce back using enduring instincts. Furthermore, social media may indeed matter a great deal, and in revisionist terms some parts of Marx are not as crazy as they may seem (my point this latter one, not hers).
I need more time (years?) to digest the contents of this book, and decide how much I agree. It is somehow neither hard nor easy reading, but most MR readers should be able to make their way through it. Highly recommended, it is likely to prove one of the most thought-provoking books of the year.