Category: Science

Was Achilles Conscious?

Homer’s Greeks had no inner life. That’s the title of a recent introduction to Julian Jaynes’s bicameral theory of mind. To recap: in The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Jaynes argued that intelligent behavior preceded introspective consciousness. People could speak, learn, farm, build cities, and solve problems without mentally representing themselves as an “I” deliberating within an internal world.

In Jaynes’s theory, routine behavior followed habit but difficult or unfamiliar situations triggered “command hallucinations,” voices experienced as gods, ancestors, or rulers giving instructions. One part of the mind issued commands; another obeyed—hence “bicameral.” Increasing complexity, migration, and the breakdown of established authority undermined the bicameral mind. Starting around 1200 BC, roughly between the Iliad and the Odyssey, people increasingly began imagining alternatives and narrating their own actions within an internal mental space, in short, they became conscious. Consciousness was thus not a biological given but a product of cultural and linguistic evolution.

I used to dismiss Jaynes’s theory completely, The idea of otherwise normal but unconscious human beings seemed absurd. Today, I am not so sure. If you think AIs are not conscious, then a central premise of Jaynes’s theory becomes much more plausible: namely, a civilization of thinking, talking doing, but unconscious beings. The AIs are an existence proof. That said, I still find the evidence for a sharp break around the Homeric era weak. Linguistic differences between the Iliad and later texts are a weak reed for such a big claim and can be explained in other ways. The case for a near-universal transition in a few centuries is thin. On Occam’s-razor grounds I favor continuity. The fact that some animals appear conscious pushes in the same direction.

AIs also undermine Jaynes’s theory in one way. Jaynes bases part of his theory on a change in the way people spoke—moving from describing their actions in terms of following commands to describing their actions in terms of deliberation and “I.” But if AIs are not conscious, then non-conscious beings can describe what they are doing in conscious terms. Of course, AIs have human culture as a foundation, which the early non-conscious humans would not have had, so I don’t think this is a strong hit on the theory.

Still, Jaynes’s theory is that until very recently most humans lacked introspective consciousness. Does this mean that they couldn’t suffer or didn’t deserve moral consideration? I would think not, but it raises the question of what kind of consciousness are we looking for in AIs? Are AIs as conscious as Jaynes’s Achilles? If we can debate whether Homeric era humans were conscious, it’s no surprise that we have difficulty deciding whether AIs are or could be conscious.

In What Did We Learn from Torturing Babies I wrote about the era when doubts about babies’ capacity to feel pain helped justify surgery without anesthesia. Babies certainly behaved as if they felt pain, but a theory overrode the plain observations. That seems crazy if you take behavior seriously as evidence of experience—a broad Turing-test approach. But taking that approach seriously also suggests AIs might well be conscious.

Ultimately, the issue is not whether Jaynes was right or wrong but the fact that there is any debate at all is telling. We don’t have a good test for consciousness whether applied to the past, to other animals, or to machines. If we are unsure whether Achilles had an inner life perhaps we should be unsure whether Claude has an inner life.

Starship

My favorite commentary on SpaceX’s historic catching of Starship was this:

…we may be certain of this: for all but a vanishingly brief instant near the dawn of history, the word ‘ship’ will mean ‘spaceship.’

Arthur C. Clarke (1965).

Yesterday, this became vividly real to me.

Hat tip: @amdreaesposito

Addendum: Good post on why catching Starship was a super leap over catching Superheavy.

Coffeehouses and the Scientific Revolution

Abstract Historians have long credited coffeehouses, venues for conversation where strangers met across social ranks, with fostering scientific contacts and activity during the Scientific Revolution. We test this claim in seventeenth-century London. Relying on newly geocoded records and a staggered event study across parishes, we find that the opening of the first coffeehouse in a parish is followed by a persistent increase in applied scientists and scientific instrument shops. Effects are concentrated among applied scientists with weak family ties to Oxford and Cambridge. Social connections that link craft skill to theory increase, and new shops turn toward experimental instruments. Across European cities in the seventeenth century, we similarly find that the numbers of applied mathematics titles and scientific instrument makers rise after a city’s first coffeehouse, relative to cities of similar size and growth. In a quantitative urban model calibrated to our parish- and city-level estimates, coffeehouses account for 31 percent of London’s applied scientists in the half century after the first one opened in 1652. These findings show that social institutions can raise the production and use of knowledge by broadening access to intellectual exchange beyond formal academic networks

That is a recent paper by Monir Bounadi and Jens Oehlen, noting that Bounadi is on the job market this year.

My excellent Conversation with Terence Tao

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Tyler opens by asking Terence what it feels like to contemplate Euler’s identity, quantum mechanics, the Riemann hypothesis, and Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, before moving into why mathematical history gets stripped out of classrooms, whether abstract math is a lottery ticket or a unified whole, string theory’s beauty versus its lack of confirmation, why real analysis arrived so late, why zero took until the 7th century to be invented, game theory, the Black-Scholes model, Bostrom’s simulation argument, and Newcomb’s paradox, math education and the case for teaching more statistics, Tao’s view that AI has pushed mathematics from an era of “proof scarcity” into “proof abundance,” what that means for the research paper, why video talks may become more valuable than papers themselves, Tao’s favorite Hong Kong action movies, his unconventional path through an Australian university at age 13, his most unusual work habit, his verdict on the Collatz conjecture, and more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: When you look at mathematical economics over the last two decades, is it interesting to you as math, or is it just a bunch of people doing something different that, to you, is low level?

TAO: Oh, yes, I was always fascinated by economics. I love game theory, and actually often there are pure math problems where it’s actually good to think in game theory terms. In analysis, you have all these complicated statements, like for every ε, there exists a δ, blah, blah, blah. It looks very intimidating, but if you phrase it as a game, your opponent is giving you an ε, you need to counter that ε with a δ of your own. If you view it as a game, then actually you can talk about strategies and who’s ahead, who’s behind. It actually activates really good modes of thinking.

I’ve used economic thinking in my own work. We talk about cost functions and minimizing loss. There are lots of concepts. Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage, I use that to run my life. There are so many things I can do. What do I choose to spend my time on? It’s actually a very useful principle: comparative advantage.

Economics, I find it’s a very good arena to understand the difference between models and reality. Physics, we’re spoiled because we’ve had these great physicists who’ve created these very accurate models of the real world, classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, and they’re very well tested and very accurate. You can just go to town exploring their consequences and still predict reality. Economics is a much more mixed situation where you have models, and sometimes they predict the real world very well, but sometimes they don’t.

In addition to doing the math, you also have to do the modeling, and you have to understand the limits of when a model starts breaking down and what you need to do to adjust it. I find that fascinating. It’s somewhere between the hard sciences and the social sciences. There’s enough hard models that you can do math, but there’s also enough real-world messiness that you have to also grapple with the subjectivity. As an outsider, I find it a really fascinating subject.

COWEN: When you looked at the Black-Scholes model, were you shocked when the probability doesn’t matter? Was that beautiful to you?

TAO: Yes, yes, yes. There is a special feature of Gaussian fluctuations that you can price options just by knowing risk. There is one algebraic miracle that makes this work. Normally, predicting future costs of anything is just an intractable problem, and there just happens to be this miracle. If you have Gaussian fluctuations, then it is beautiful. This is actually a really good example of when you need to know when the models work and when they don’t work. If you don’t have Gaussian fluctuations, then actually Black-Scholes is somewhat dangerous to use, especially if you compound it into derivatives over and over again. Again, that’s an old story. You know what happened in 2009.

Self-recommending, and of interest throughout.  There is some on AI, but he has spoken so much on that topic lately I decided not to emphasize it.  And Terry does have a new book out, namely Six Math Essentials.

Checking the AI audit of Saez and Zucman’s research.

From SaneCite:

We checked the anonymous AI audit of Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman’s research that Marginal Revolution featured on 28 Oct: all 147 problems it calls serious enough to change a headline number, against the papers, their sources and the authors’ own data. The audit’s facts hold up: for 131 of the 147, every fact we could check was right, and none had its core facts wrong. 21 of the 147 change a headline number; 98 depend on a disputed choice of method; 20 change no number; 8 we could not check on that question. A second pass graded the 99 flags we first counted as depending on a disputed choice of method: 11 standard, 70 defensible, 11 questionable, 6 we could not grade, and 1 contested. It found one, No. 54, that does change a headline number, which is why the counts are now 21 and 98. Saez and Zucman were sent our findings on 29 Oct and did not reply by 6 Nov.

Here is the audit of the audit, open code and data, kudos to the authors.  Here was the original AI audit.  Here is the October 30 revision of that audit.

Addendum: And a revised version with less jargon.

Are economists declining in status?

That is the theme of my latest Free Press article.  Excerpt, which offers the beginning of the story:

If we look at the 1960s, the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson administrations brought James Tobin, Robert Solow, Kenneth Arrow (all three later Nobel laureates), Arthur Okun, Walter Heller, Gardner Ackley, Otto Eckstein, and Walt Rostow into government. Those were all names with significant academic heft who could count among the world’s leading macroeconomists. Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson served as a consultant to the government. Heller and some of the others helped to shape the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut of 1964.

That cluster of talent and its influence should come as no surprise. This was an age of elites, of love for science, of the moon landing project, and of network news shows with an establishment bent. Americans were used to deferring to elites, who had won World War II for them, and who were not out there making fools of themselves on the internet. With the Cold War raging, Americans felt their government had to get it right…

Most of this respect was still in place by the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan appointed Martin Feldstein to chair his Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), Feldstein being a Harvard professor and one of the leading market-oriented economists of his time. Two of the junior economists working for Feldstein were Paul Krugman and Lawrence Summers—before they became famous, but the intellectual firepower was already there. Michael Mussa and William Niskanen were other notables in the administration, and Milton Friedman and Friedrich A. Hayek were standing sources of inspiration.

And this:

On top of those political trends, there are further mechanisms at work pushing down the social status of economists. The Trump administration is proposing to eliminate social sciences funding at the National Science Foundation, and there are declining enrollments on the horizon for American colleges and universities. Academia is now seen as more politicized and left-leaning than used to be the case. Our best AI models are often better economists than the humans, just as they are proving theorems that human mathematicians cannot. All of those trends, even if you might consider some of them good news overall, are reinforcing a declining status for economists.

Worth a ponder.

Can Artificial Intelligence Forecast Treatment Effects in Economics?

I use LLMs to forecast treatment effects of research studies pre-registered on the AEA RCT Registry and the Open Science Framework. I focus on studies whose results were first publicly released in 2026 and elicit forecasts from models whose training or knowledge cut-off dates were before the relevant set of papers was released. First, LLM models extract forecasting questions from the pre-registrations or pre-analysis plans. These questions elicit forecasted treatment effects; not all resolve in the subsequent papers, but those that do can be used to consider forecast accuracy. Forecasts were elicited for 889 treatment effects from 39 papers with results disclosed in January 2026 or later, or 673 from 33 papers after screening. Forecasts were elicited in raw units but I focus on those that could be standardized and therefore compared across papers. Currently, the median absolute forecast error is 0.054 SD for the best model, the average absolute error is 0.093 SD, and the MSE is 0.0218. The AI forecasts perform substantially better than benchmarks forecasting 0 effect or forecasting the mean effect of other papers’ results in that time period. Overall, these results suggest considerable scope for forecasts to be of value in informing policy and research.

From the excellent Eva Vivalt.  As I have been predicting, so much of economics (and science) is going to change, and radically.  Here is Eva’s thread on the paper.  Perhaps we should dispense with many of the more mundane inquiries, and as Eva notes: “But can we not shift to working on those projects that have particularly high uncertainty and upside potential?”

She is one of the best young economists in the world, and this stands some chance of being the most important paper of the year.

AI dominates human peer reviews

We show that AI-generated article reviews are now better, by every measure we could construct, than reviews written by well-compensated human experts and judged to be of unusually high quality by journal editors and authors. We then discuss how this result may inform journal policy choices, with concerning downsides as well as potential paths to increase publication speed and quality; reduce adversarial interactions; improve the experience of editors, reviewers, authors, and readers; and advance science.

By Gary King and Steven Worthington, not even using what are now the very best models, rather based on Claude Opus 4.8.  The details of the dominance, as outlined in the paper, are striking.  It is not close.

On my Saez and Zucman post, I find it striking that some people are complaining all of a sudden.  Yet I have been offering, citing, and linking to commentary on published papers for twenty-four years now (and every single day).  Sometimes it might just be a casual offhand remark from me, whether positive or negative.  Typically this is simply taken in stride.  It is when you pull out the bazookas, and offer oodles of high-powered analytics, more astute than human referees, and combined with the ability to pursue follow-up inquiries, that people start getting worried.  Model that.

You can pick at individual criticisms from the AIs all you want, but the most damning observation is that the errors go in the ideological direction of the authors 97% of the time.  That is exactly what (the human) Phil Magness said years ago, based on an extensive canvassing of their work.  Basically we already knew that was true, and the AIs confirmed the human estimate.

On our side, we have taken steps, most of all the new MR archive, to make AI analysis of our work easier.  Soon you will be able to read on MR what the AIs think are our worst posts, respectively (Alex has prepared this).

In the meantime, I encourage the NSF, prize committees, universities, tenure committees, journals, and so on to do as many of their own AI-enabled audits as possible.  So far the world is not jumping at this opportunity.  You can model that too.

How is AI shaping economic research?

Does generative AI narrow or widen productivity gaps in research? We study the distributional effects of AI on research productivity in economics using evidence from three sources: NBER working-paper and publication records, text-based measures of LLM-assisted writing, and an original survey of 227 academic economists measuring AI use across research tasks. We first show that productivity gaps among NBER authors narrowed following ChatGPT’s release: authors without research assistants (RAs) published a larger share of papers in top-tier journals, while authors from smaller teams gained in working-paper output and publication speed. We then use the survey to examine how individual AI use affects research productivity. We find weak evidence that AI affects working-paper output on average, but there is substantial heterogeneity. Triple-difference estimates show that greater AI exposure narrows the output gap between researchers with and without RAs but widens the gap between senior and junior researchers. Selection into AI use follows a different pattern: junior researchers use AI more intensively and are more likely to use agentic tools. Thus, these differential productivity effects reflect differences in the returns to AI rather than selection into AI use. A model with diminishing returns to execution, increasing returns to conceptual capacity, and complementarity between the two explains how AI can alleviate disadvantages in research support while amplifying the returns to accumulated expertise. Over time, however, early convergence may give way to divergence as execution constraints recede and AI’s conceptual capabilities improve.

That is from Tianyu Jiang, who is this year a job market candidate from the University of Michigan.  The paper is co-authored with Yuqing (Claire) Wang.

I guest host an NYT podcast with Michael Kratsios, Trump science advisor

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is one excerpt:

Cowen: Talk me out of this worry: So we agree science is an ecosystem, and there’s always a temptation to want to fund the most dynamic, most productive parts of the ecosystem. And right now, that would probably be A.I.

But if you need the whole ecosystem to be working well, arguably you should be funding, at the margin, the less productive parts, which need the aid. That will sometimes be universities, but there’s plenty of other inefficient parts of our ecosystem.

So is this plan not putting more resources into the parts that are working well, but we get stuck with bottlenecks if the parts that are not working well end up with fewer resources?

Kratsios: Well, luckily, we’re not investing all of our money for the federal government into S.I. for science. It’s a portfolio approach. And obviously one ——

Cowen: But it’s a net shift toward artificial intelligence, right?

Kratsios: Well, I would argue — and I think this is a very important distinction — it’s not investing in superintelligence, it’s investing in superintelligence for science.

So the question is, I think a lot of people argue: Oh, why would the federal government want to invest more in superintelligence when billions, if not trillions, of dollars are being invested in the private sector into superintelligence? And I would agree with that statement. We shouldn’t be doing that.

The government isn’t funding how to create a next frontier model. That’s something that our great American companies are working on.

But applying those models to scientific discovery is still in its early stages. And as you know, if you think about the trend or the path by which we’ve gotten to this place with L.L.M.s — we started first with being able, essentially, to scrape the whole corpus of the internet, to use that to train a large language model.

The next chapter of that was around coding, where the model builders realized: Oh, we have really good coding data, and we can actually train these models to be good at coding. So then we had this rise of Anthropic and OpenAI Codex and all this stuff.

And I think, to me, the next chapter is around science, and the data that you need to train these large language models for science is still one that we’re working on a lot. And we were very proud to announce 190 federal data sets being made public in order to help train these science models.

But ultimately, you’re going to be applying this superintelligence to everything from material science to chemistry to math to physics, and we have to be in a position to actually leverage that.

Definitely interesting throughout, pretty much entirely we are discussing the Trump administration science plan, authored by Michael.

*This Beautiful Country*

The author is Edward Cutler and the subtitle is How Italy’s Nature Shaped its Culture and Civilisation.  This is an excellent book on how “the Italy you know” has been shaped by its natural environment, such as its mountains, rivers, geology, and so on.  Ever wondered why Sardinia is different?  The book is good at sticking to specifics.  Excerpt:

This extraordinary overlap has made Italy the continent’s botanical crossroads and one of its greatest arboreal sanctuaries.  Within Europe, few countries host such a variety of native trees: at least 140 species, more than almost anywhere west of the Balkans.  Some, like the Sicilian fir, Lobel’s maple and the Etna birch, are totally unique.  The structure of Italy’s forests is equally diverse — dense, high-altitude canopies, open oak pastures, cork scrub and coastal maquis, each shaped by centuries of disturbance and renewal.  This is the legacy of a land that sreved first as Europe’s refuge during the Ice Ages and later as its great corridor of return, where northern, eastern and African floras met and mingled in perpetual exchange.

Recommended to all those with an interest in Italy.

The archaeology tranche of Emergent Ventures

  • Björn Öste is building Arkhub, an AI-powered platform that analyzes remote-sensing and other archaeological data to identify potential ancient sites in the Amazon and enable further investigation by citizen scientists.
  • J. Cameron Monroe is leading the Allada Regional Archaeology Project, using lidar, remote sensing, and archaeological fieldwork to reconstruct the historical landscape of the Kingdom of Allada and strengthen cultural heritage preservation in Benin.

Previously reported grantees include:

  • Benjamin Arbuckle is combining archaeology and ancient DNA analysis to reconstruct entire ecosystems of ancient cities, with the goal of understanding how human societies can thrive in balance with their environments.
  • Jesse Casana, an archaeology professor at Dartmouth, is developing drone-based radar imaging methods to detect and map archaeological sites buried beneath desert sands. His work combines advanced remote-sensing technologies with efforts to preserve endangered cultural landscapes.
  • Leila Character is developing drone-based imaging and AI tools to detect hidden archaeological sites, making discovery faster, cheaper, and more accessible to researchers worldwide.
  • Bryce Hoenigman is developing an AI tool to help date ancient cuneiform tablets by analyzing how written symbols evolved over time, with the goal of making archaeological research faster and more accurate.

With thanks to Yonatan Ben Shimon for his generosity in support of this.  We do still have funds remaining in this tranche…

New Matt Faherty study of the NSF

From the Executive Summary:

  • Therefore, the NSF, NIH, and the federal government should put far more resources and effort into developing metascience. With proper metascience efforts, the NSF could run experiments on science funding reform proposals, such as shifting to a people-over-projects funding model or directly funding replication efforts, and determine which reforms will most improve NSF outcomes. The NSF’s September 2026 announcement of an Office of Metascience is a welcome step toward this goal. This report’s recommendations can help guide the office’s development, its experimental agenda, and the evaluation of its results.
  • On July 21, 2026, Michael Kratsios, the director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, released “Science: A New Golden Age,” a report for the President that, if fully enacted, might constitute the greatest overhaul of federal science policy since World War II. Based on my interviews and research, I strongly support most of the report’s recommendations and conclusions, and I believe the wider science community should as well.

Here is the entire study, of interest throughout.  Here is an earlier Matt Faherty study on improving the NIH.

Astra Held Its Ground (Truth)

TheoPhysEval: We present a suite of 50 unpublished research-level theoretical physics problems with verifiable answers. Without AI assistance, a typical problem in our collection could be solved by a world expert in about a day or less but would take considerably longer for experts in adjacent specialties. We test the ability of off-the-shelf AI agents to tackle these problems autonomously, without human hints. When given access to tools available in a realistic setting, including the ability to search the literature and write scripts for numerical and symbolic work, the best-performing agent, GPT-6-Astra harnessed in Codex, obtains the final answers with a near-perfect accuracy of 98% at an average cost under USD 3 per problem.

Example question: Consider one-dimensional class D fermionic systems, with no microscopic symmetries other than fermion parity. Restrict to the trivial phase and to free-fermion models. Using the suspension construction, construct a two-parameter Hamiltonian corresponding to a fermion parity pump. What is the central charge of the critical theory at the diabolical point? Under free-fermion perturbations, what does the diabolical point destabilize to?

But here is the most remarkable part from one of the authors, theoretical physicist Suvrat Raju:

Our initial evaluation suggested that GPT-6-Astra’s score was in the late eighties followed closely by Opus 5.5 But, as we started to investigate the mistakes that the models might have made, the models, especially Astra, insisted that they were right and that it was the expert-supplied answers that were erroneous. When we went back to the experts it turned out, in multiple instances, that the experts found some subtle errors buried deep inside their calculations. As they revised their answers, Astra’s score started to inch up and it finally ended up with 98% (49/50).

In other words, instead, as originally intended, of the human answers serving as ground truth to test the AI, the AI answers were ground truth for testing the experts. As I commented on twitter, we are at “the fuck” level.

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