Category: Education
Emergent Ventures winners, 45th cohort
Anya Singh, Hawthorne, CA/YC, to help protect IP.
Patrick Murphy, Limerick, travel grant.
Daryna Hrybchuk, 18, Lviv, general career support.
Ari Shtein, Ann Arbor, Michigan/Yale, 17, general career support.
Vadzim Rayinchick, Belarus/SF, “Confessions”.
Garret Thomas Molloy, Dublin/Stanford, travel and study grant.
Jon Cooper, UK and Stanford, AI and historical archives.
Jerusalem Demsas, general career support for new projects.
Manuel Martin Morante, Extremadura, to visit MIT, eventual biotech start-up.
Jal Patel, 16, Regina, Canada, general career support for AI and biotech.
Ayana Farooq, Mississauga, brain neurons.
Adria Moret, Barcelona, AI and philosophy, so LLMs understand animal welfare better.
GPT-5, a short and enthusiastic review
I am a big fan, as on my topics of interest it does much better than o3, and that is saying something. It is also lightning fast, even for complex queries of economics, history, and ideas.
One of the most impressive features is its uncanny sense of what you might want to ask next. And it has a good sense for when to give you a (sometimes interactive!) chart or diagram. It is a much better writer than o3.
I have had early access, and love to just keep on asking it, asking it, asking it questions. Today I was asking about Irish coinage disputes from 1724 (Swift) and now about different kinds of Buddhism and their historical roots. It was very accurate on cuisine in northern Ghana.
It is the best learning tool I have. Furthermore, it feels fun.
Here is a review from Ethan Mollick.
New data on tenure
Tenure is a defining feature of the US academic system with significant implications for research productivity and creative search. Yet the impact of tenure on faculty research trajectories remains poorly understood. We analyze the careers of 12,000 US faculty across 15 disciplines to reveal key patterns, pre- and post-tenure. Publication rates rise sharply during the tenure-track, peaking just before tenure. However, post-tenure trajectories diverge: Researchers in lab-based fields sustain high output, while those in non-lab-based fields typically exhibit a decline. After tenure, faculty produce more novel works, though fewer highly cited papers. These findings highlight tenure’s pivotal role in shaping scientific careers, offering insights into the interplay between academic incentives, creativity, and impact while informing debates about the academic system.
Here is the paper. That is by Giorgio Tripodi, Ziang Zheng, Yifan Qian, and Dashun Wang, via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Genius, Rejected: Emergent Ventures Versus the System
Quanta Magazine has a good piece on a 17-year-old student who disproved a long-standing conjecture in harmonic analysis:
Yet a paper posted on February 10(opens a new tab) left the math world by turns stunned, delighted and ready to welcome a bold new talent into its midst. Its author was Hannah Cairo(opens a new tab), just 17 at the time. She had solved a 40-year-old mystery about how functions behave, called the Mizohata-Takeuchi conjecture.
“We were all shocked, absolutely. I don’t remember ever seeing anything like that,” said Itamar Oliveira (opens aof the University of Birmingham, who has spent the past two years trying to prove that the conjecture was true. In her paper, Cairo showed that it’s false. The result defies mathematicians’ usual intuitions about what functions can and cannot do.
…The proof, and its unlikely author, have energized the math community since Cairo posted it in February. “I was absolutely, ‘Wow.’ This has been my favorite problem for nigh on 40 years, and I was completely blown away,” Carbery said.
Here is the abstract to the paper:
I can’t speak to the mathematics but this is Quanta Magazine not People Magazine and Cairo is not coming out of nowhere. As the article discusses, she has been taking graduate classes in mathematics at Berkeley from people like Ruixiang Zhang. So what is the problem?
I was enraged by the following:
After completing the proof, she decided to apply straight to graduate school, skipping college (and a high school diploma) altogether. As she saw it, she was already living the life of a graduate student. Cairo applied to 10 graduate programs. Six rejected her because she didn’t have a college degree. Two admitted her, but then higher-ups in those universities’ administrations overrode those decisions.
Only the University of Maryland and Johns Hopkins University were willing to welcome her straight into a doctoral program.
Kudos to UMD and JHU! But what is going on at those other universities?!! Their sole mission is to identify and nurture talent. They have armies of admissions staff and tout their “holistic” approach to recognizing creativity and intellectual promise even when it follows an unconventional path. Yet they can’t make room for a genius who has been vetted by some of the top mathematicians in the world? This is institutional failure.
We saw similar failures during COVID: researchers at Yale’s School of Public Health, working on new tests, couldn’t get funding from their own billion-dollar institution and would have stalled without Tyler’s Fast Grants. But the problem isn’t just speed. Emergent Ventures isn’t about speed but about discovering talent. If you wonder why EV has been so successful look to Tyler and people like Shruti Rajagopalan and to the noble funders but look also to the fact that their competitors are so bureaucratic that they can’t recognize talent even when it is thrust upon them.
It’s a very good thing EV exists. But you know your city is broken when you need Batman to fight crime. EV will have truly succeeded when the rest of the system is inspired into raising its game.
Emergent Ventures winners, 44th cohort
Adelya Makhanova, Stanford, AI for minerals exploration.
Gleb Razgar, London, brain emulation.
Stephen Webb, London, former civil servant, to write a book on how British government could work better.
Dima Yanovsky, MIT, robotics.
Aakarsh Vermani, Berkeley, summer support to live in Berkeley, computational biology.
Kristine Petrov Pashin, Stanford, to ease the patent process.
Eviella Sefu, 16, Congo/South Africa/Elkhart, Indiana, to attend a rationality meeting.
Aristotle Ronyak, Tucson, to explore and present what it is like to grow up with autism.
Justyna Przyborska, Limerick, to visit YC in SF.
Michael Muthukrishna, LSE/NYU, progress studies center at LSE, and also NYU.
Amrita Ghag, 16, Brampton, to attend a conference in Switzerland.
Lynetta Wang, Dublin/Imperial College London, “self-aware therapeutics.”
Ethan Glueck and Sasha Phoebe Zhang, Stanford, to spread 3-D printers in rural Taiwan.
Sofiia Lipkevych, MIT/Ukraine, translating online course material into Ukrainian.
The Indian Wedding
Another great piece by Samir Varma on Indian marriages—where deep traditions endure, even as subtle revolutions unfold around the edges.. It starts with this kicker:
When I told my mother I was marrying my girlfriend, an Italian Jew, she called all my friends in the US asking them to break us up.
When that failed, she faxed my future father-in-law threatening to disinherit me and never speak to me again. When that failed, she tried to get my PhD advisor to “tell us to break up.” (Luckily, he was relaxed enough to laugh about it with me, though it was embarrassing and deeply unpleasant.) Then she invited my girlfriend to India to “meet the family,” where my girlfriend paid a significant fraction of her yearly income as a starting engineer to fly over.
The pièce de résistance? My mother threw a party to “introduce her to everyone” — and spent the entire time complaining about her to all the guests. About 100 of those guests came to talk to me afterward, apologizing profusely, saying Indians aren’t like this and I should explain so she doesn’t think all Indians are nuts.
At my wedding, I had exactly zero relatives present. We didn’t speak for three years.
The Tragedy of India’s Government-Job Prep Towns
In Massive Rent-Seeking in India’s Government Job Examination System I argued that the high value of government jobs has distorted India’s entire labor market and educational system.
India’s most educated young people—precisely those it needs in the workforce—are devoting years of their life cramming for government exams instead of working productively. These exams cultivate no real-world skills; they are pure sorting mechanisms, not tools of human capital development. But beyond the staggering economic waste, there is a deeper, more corrosive human cost. As Rajagopalan and I have argued, India suffers from premature imitation: In this case, India is producing Western-educated youth without the economic structure to employ them. In one survey, 88% of grade 12 students preferred a government job to a private sector job. But these jobs do not and cannot exist. The result is disillusioned cohorts trained to expect a middle-class, white-collar lifestyle, convinced that only a government job can deliver it. India is thus creating large numbers of educated young people who are inevitably disillusioned–that is not a sustainable equilibrium.
The Economist has an excellent piece on the lives of the students including Kumar who is studying in “Musallahpur Haat, a suburb of Patna where dozens of coaching centers were concentrated, and the rent was cheap.”
…About half a million students are currently preparing for government exams in Musallahpur….For most government departments the initial tests are similar, and have little direct bearing on the job in question. Would-be ticket inspectors and train-drivers must answer multiple-choice questions on current affairs, logic, maths and science. They might be asked who invented JavaScript, or which element is most abundant in the Earth’s crust, or the smallest whole number for a if a456 is divisible by 11. Students have no idea when their preparations might be put to use; exams are not held on a fixed schedule.
…Kumar made his way to the bare, windowless room his friend had arranged for him to rent and started working. Every few days, he’d check the Ministry of Railways website to see if a date had been set for the exams. The days turned into weeks, then months. When the covid pandemic erupted he adjusted his expectations – obviously there would be delays. The syllabus felt infinite and he kept studying, shuttling between libraries, revision tutorials and mock test sessions. Before he knew it he’d been in Musallahpur nearly six years.
As his 30s approached, Kumar began to worry about running out of time. There is an upper age limit for the railway exams – for the ones Kumar was doing it was set at 30. As a lower-caste applicant he was allowed to extend this deadline by three years. His parents urged him to start thinking about alternative careers, but he convinced them to be patient. His father, who was struggling to keep up the allowance, reluctantly sold some of the family’s land to help support him, and Kumar studied harder and longer.
In my post, I emphasized the above-average wages and privileges, which is true enough, but even by Indian standards many of the jobs aren’t great and The Economist puts more focus on respectability and prestige (the sad premature imitation I discussed):
Indian society accords public-sector jobs a special respect. Grooms who have them are able to ask for higher dowries from their brides’ families. “If you are at a wedding and say you have a government job, people will look at you differently,” said Abhishek Singh, an exam tutor in Musallahpur.
Railway jobs in particular still have a vestigial glow of prestige.
…[Kumar] had been preparing for junior engineer and assistant train-driver jobs, but decided to apply for the lowest rung of positions too, the Group D roles, to increase his chance of getting something. An undergraduate degree and six years studying in Patna could lead to him becoming a track-maintenance worker. “I never imagined it would come to this,” he said sadly.
And yet he wouldn’t trade it. A short drive from his room in Musallahpur, a glitzy mall has just been built. There are jobs going there which pay close to what he might earn in a Group D role. But Kumar baulked at the suggestion he might become a barista. “I am educated with a technical degree,” he said. “My family hasn’t sacrificed so much for me to work in a coffee shop. People only work there if they have no other choice.” No one from his parents’ generation would respect a barista. But they admired, or at least understood, a job on the railways.
India’s government job system squanders talent, feeds on obsolete and socially-inefficient prestige hierarchies, and rewards years of sterile preparation with diminishing returns. It’s inefficient, of course, but behind the scenes it’s devastating to the young.
Hat tip: Samir Varma.
A household expenditure approach to measuring AI progress
Often researchers focus on the capabilities of AI models, for instance what kinds of problems they might solve. Or how they might boost productivity growth rates. But a different question is to ask how they might lower cost of living for ordinary Americans. And while I am optimistic about the future prospects and powers of AI models, on that particular question I think progress will be slow, mostly though through no fault of the AIs.
If you consider a typical household budget, some of the major categories might be:
A. Rent and home purchase
B. Food
C. Health care
D. Education
Let us consider each in turn. Do note that in the longer run AI will do a lot to accelerate and advance science. But in the next five years, most of those advances may not be so visible or available. And so I will focus on some budgetary items in the short run:
A. When it comes to rent, a lot of the constraints are on the supply side. So even very powerful AI will not alleviate those problems. In fact strong AI could make it more profitable to live near other talented people, which could raise a lot of rents. Real wages for the talented would go up too, still I would not expect rents to fall per se.
Strong AI might make it easier to live say in Maine, which would involve a de facto lowering of rents, even if no single rental price falls. Again, maybe.
B. When it comes to food, in some long run AI will genetically engineer better and stronger crops, which in time will be cheaper. We will develop better methods of irrigation, better systems for trading land, better systems for predicting the weather and protecting against storms, and so on. Still, I observe that agricultural improvements (whether AI-rooted or not) can spread very slowly. A lot of rural Mexico still does not use tractors, for instance.
So I can see AI lowering the price of food in twenty years, but in the meantime a lot of real world, institutional, legal, and supply side constraints and bottlenecks will bind. In the short run, greater energy demands could well make food more expensive.
C. When it comes to health care, I expect all sorts of fabulous new discoveries. I am not sure how rapidly they will arrive, but at some point most Americans will die of old age, if they survive accidents, and of course driverless vehicles will limit some of those too. Imagine most people living to the age of 97, or something like that.
In terms of human welfare, that is a wonderful outcome. Still, there will be a lot more treatments, maybe some of them customized for you, as is the case with some of the new cancer treatments. Living to 97, your overall health care expenses probably will go up. It will be worth it, by far, but I cannot say this will alleviate cost of living concerns. It might even make them worse. Your total expenditures on health care are likely to rise.
D. When it comes to education, the highly motivated and curious already learn a lot more from AI and are more productive. (Much of those gains, though, translate into more leisure time at work, at least until institutions adjust more systematically.). I am not sure when AI will truly help to motivate the less motivated learners. But I expect not right away, and maybe not for a long time. That said, a good deal of education is much cheaper right now, and also more effective. But the kinds of learning associated with the lower school grades are not cheaper at all, and for the higher levels you still will have to pay for credentialing for the foreseeable future.
In sum, I think it will take a good while before AI significantly lowers the cost of living, at least for most people. We have a lot of other constraints in the system. So perhaps AI will not be that popular. So the AIs could be just tremendous in terms of their intrinsic quality (as I expect and indeed already is true), and yet living costs would not fall all that much, and could even go up.
The Rising Cost of Child and Pet Day Care
Everyone talks about the soaring cost of child care (e.g. here, here and here), but have you looked at the soaring cost of pet care? On a recent trip, it cost me about $82 per day to board my dog (a bit less with multi-day discounts). And no, that is not high for northern VA and that price does not include any fancy options or treats! Doggie boarding costs about about the same as staying in a Motel 6.
Many explanations have been offered for rising child care costs. The Institute for Family Studies, for example, shows that prices rise with regulations like “group sizes, child-to-staff ratios, required annual training hours, and minimum educational requirements for teachers and center directors.” I don’t deny that regulation raises prices—places with more regulation have higher costs—but I don’t think that explains the slow, steady price increase over time. As with health care and education, the better explanation is the Baumol effect, as I argued in my book (with Helland) Why Are the Prices So Damn High?
Pet care is less regulated than child care, but it too is subject to the Baumol effect. So how do price trends compare? Are they radically different or surprisingly similar? Here are the two raw price trends for pet services (CUUR0000SS62053) and for (child) Day care and preschool (CUUR0000SEEB03). Pet services covers boarding, daycare, pet sitting, walking, obedience training, grooming but veterinary care is excluded from this series so it is comparable to that for child care.
As you can see, the trends are nearly identical, with child care rising only slightly faster than pet care over the past 26 years. Of course, both trends include general inflation, which visually narrows the gap. When we normalize to the overall CPI, we get the following:
Over 26 years, the real (relative) price of Day Care and Preschool has increased 36%, while Pet Services have risen 28%. If regulation doesn’t explain the rise in pet care costs–and it probably doesn’t–then regulation probably doesn’t explain the rise in child care costs either. After all, child and pet care are very similar goods!
The similar rise in the price of child day care and pet day care/boarding is consistent with Is American Pet Health Care (Also) Uniquely Inefficient? by Einav, Finkelstein and Gupta, who find that spending on veterinary care is rising at about the same rate as spending on human health care. Since the regulatory systems of pet and human health care are very different this suggests that the fundamental reason for rising health care isn’t regulation but rising relative prices and increasing incomes (fyi this is also an important reason why Americans spend more on health care than Europeans).
Thus, my explanation for rising prices in child care and pet care is that productivity is increasing in other industries more than in the care industries which means that over time we must give up more of other goods to get child and pet care. In short, if productivity in other sectors rises while child/pet care productivity stays flat, relative prices must rise. Another way to put this is that to retain workers, wages in stagnant-productivity sectors must rise to match those in (equally labor-skilled) high-productivity sectors. That means paying more for the same level of care, simply to keep the labor force from leaving
But rising productivity in other sectors is good! Thus, I always refer to the Baumol effect rather than the “cost disease” because higher prices are not bad when they reflect changes in relative prices. As with education and health care the rising price of child and pet care isn’t a problem for society as whole. We are richer and can afford more of all goods. It can be a problem, however, for people who consume more than the average quantities of the service-sector goods and people who have lower than average wage gains. So what can we do? Redistribution is one possibility.
If we focus on the prices, the core problem is that care work is labor-intensive and labor has a high opportunity cost. One solution is to lower the opportunity cost of that labor. Low-skill immigration helps: when lower-wage workers take on support roles, higher-wage workers can focus on higher-value tasks. As I’ve put it, “The immigrant who mows the lawn of the nuclear physicist indirectly helps to unlock the secrets of the universe.” Same for the immigrant who provides boarding for the pets of the nuclear physicist.
Another solution is capital substitution—automation, AI, better tools. But care jobs resist mechanization; that’s part of why productivity growth is so slow in these sectors. Still, the basic truth remains: if we want more affordable day care—for kids or pets—we need to use less of what’s expensive: skilled labor. That means either importing more people to do the work, or investing harder in ways to do it with fewer hands.
My first students
To continue with some biography…
My first full-time teaching job was at UC Irvine in 1988, a school with very good undergraduate students, including in economics. I was fortunate enough to be assigned Honors Intermediate Micro for my very first class.
(My general view is that the second time I teach a given class is the best, but the very first time is the second best version of the class. After that, unless I have a break of years, some of the material starts to feel too familiar to me, and I explain it less well and with less enthusiasm.)
I used the Nicholson text, as it had been pre-assigned, but I wished it had more economic intuition.
In any case I had seventeen students, and sixteen of them were Asian or Asian-American. None of them were south Asian. That was UC Irvine in those days (and perhaps still now?).
All but perhaps one were very good students.
That first year in my first class I was lucky enough to teach Stephen Jen. Stephen, as you may know, later received a PhD from MIT, working with Paul Krugman. He is these days a famous and highly respected currency analyst (among other things), and you will see his name often in the Financial Times. He lives in London, and he and I had dinner but a few weeks ago.
Stephen at first was going to do electrical engineering, but it turned out economics was his true love. I encouraged him to apply to graduate school, and wrote a very positive letter for him to MIT. The rest is history, as they say.
I spent a good bit of time with Stephen outside of class, and even played basketball with him several times. The summer of 1988 I also stayed with his family in Taipei, during a long Asia trip that I will write about some other time.
Most recently, Stephen has been known for having an early and very good call that the USD is going to decline, as indeed it did.
My second year at UC Irvine I taught the same class again. I was lucky enough to have Jeffrey Ely in my class, and of course he did very well. Jeff ended up studying for an economics PhD at UC Berkeley.
These days Jeff is a very well-known game theorist at Northwestern, arguably the number one school for game theory. He took a more traditional academic path, whereas Stephen started at the IMF and then worked his way up through the world of finance.
Jeff for a while even had a presence in the blogosphere, and still you will find him on Twitter, though he has not posted in the last year. In game theory, Jeff is highly creative and he approaches all problems by thinking like an economist.
As a person, he was always a bit more “hippie” than was Stephen, and I recall him giving me a tape of the Bob Dylan song “Million Dollar Bash,” from The Basement Tapes.
At George Mason, my best undergraduates often have been Chinese, but in terms of professional impact those are my two most successful undergraduate students ever. Getting to know and teach them was one of the very best things about being at UC Irvine. My colleagues were great too, but that is the subject of another post.
Tom Lehrer, RIP
China kindergarten fact of the day
The number of children in Chinese kindergartens has fallen by a quarter in four years, prompting the closure of tens of thousands of preschools in the country as a precipitous drop in births hits the education system.
Enrolments in China’s kindergartens have declined by 12mn children between 2020 and 2024, from a peak of 48mn, according to data from the country’s ministry of education. The number of kindergartens, serving Chinese children aged 3-5, has also fallen by 41,500 from a high of nearly 295,000 in 2021.
Here is more from the FT.
Horseshoe Theory: Trump and the Progressive Left
Many of Trump’s signature policies overlap with those of the American progressive left—e.g. tariffs, economic nationalism, immigration restrictions, deep distrust of elite institutions, and an eagerness to use the power of the state. Trump governs less like Reagan, more like Perón. As Ryan Bourne notes, this ideological convergence has led many on the progressive left to remain silent or even tacitly support Trump policies, particularly on trade.
“[P]rogressive Democrats like Senator Elizabeth Warren have chosen to shift blame for Trump’s tariff-driven price hikes onto large businesses. Last week, they dusted off—and expanded—their pandemic-era Price Gouging Prevention Act. While bemoaning Trump’s ‘chaotic’ on-off tariffs, their real ire remains reserved for ‘greedy corporations,’ supposedly exploiting trade policy disruption to pad prices beyond what’s needed to ‘cover any cost increases.’
…The Democrats’ 2025 gouging bill is broader than ever, creating a standing prohibition against ‘grossly excessive’ price hikes—loosely suggested at anything 20 percent above the previous six-month average—but allowing the FTC to pick its price caps ‘using any metric it deems appropriate.’
…Instead of owning the pricing fallout from his trade wars, President Trump can now point to Democratic cries of ‘corporate greed’ and claim their proposed FTC crackdown proves that it’s businesses—not his tariffs—to blame for higher prices.
If these progressives have their way, the public debate flips from ‘tariffs raise prices’ to ‘the FTC must crack down on corporate greed exploiting trade policy reform,’ with Trump slipping off the hook.”
Trump’s political coalition isn’t policy-driven. It’s built on anger, grievance, and zero-sum thinking. With minor tweaks, there is no reason why such a coalition could not become even more leftist. Consider the grotesque canonization of Luigi Mangione, the (alleged) murderer of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson. We already have a proposed CA ballot initiative named the Luigi Mangione Access to Health Care Act, a Luigi Mangione musical and comparisons of Mangione to Jesus. The anger is very Trumpian.
A substantial share of voters on the left and the right increasingly believe that markets are rigged, globalism is suspect, and corporations are the real enemy. Trump adds nationalist flavor; progressives bring the regulatory hammer. The convergence of left and right in attacking classical liberalism– open markets, limited government, pluralism and the basic rules of democratic compromise–is what worries me the most about contemporary politics.
The Benefits of Scholastic Athletics
This paper uses longitudinal data to study the benefits of participation in scholastic athletics starting with high school participation and continuing with college athletics, including the benefits of intramural athletics. We study the impact of participation on a number of important life outcomes, including graduation from high school and college and wages after schooling is completed. Controlling for rich measures of cognitive and personality skills and social background, we find substantial benefits at all levels. Participation in athletics promotes social mobility for disadvantaged and minority students.
Here is the paper, by
Naveen Nvn’s ideological migration (from my email)
I started following American politics only in 2010/2011, which is two years after his [Buckley’s] death, and I was in India at that time.
Plus, I was very liberal at that time.
Around 2018-19ish, I was pushed into a centrist stance because I was appalled by wokeness, especially on campuses. I was in graduate school in the US at that time. Although I didn’t experience wokeness advocacy in the classroom except two or three incidents, I saw signs of wokeness on campus a lot. But even then, I was quite libertarian on how universities ought to handle campus politics.
I picked up God and Man at Yale around this time because wokeness was my primary concern.
I’ve always known that conservatives love that book. I assumed it would be a defense of free inquiry and against universities having a preferred ideology.
However, to my surprise, in the book, he argued explicitly that Yale was neglecting its true mission and it should uphold its “foundational values,” as he put it. I assumed he would be promoting a libertarian outlook on campus politics, but he was arguing the opposite.
He said Yale and other elite universities should incorporate free markets and traditional perspectives directly into the curriculum because they are betraying a contract that the current alumni and the administration have with the founders of the universities. It was a pretty shocking advocacy of conservatism being imposed on the students, and I didn’t like that at all.
But later on, around 2020-ish, I became a conservative (thanks to you; more on that in the link below). But even as late as early 2023, I still held a libertarian view on academic freedom and campus politics.
(You may be interested in a comment I left on your ‘Why Young People Are Socialist’ post yesterday, in which I shared how I was once a liberal, then turned centrist, and how I finally turned conservative. You are a major influence.)
But after Oct 7, all of that changed quite fast. Watching the pro-Hamas protests on campuses that started the very next day after October 7, before even one IDF soldier set foot on Gaza, I immediately thought about God and Man at Yale. I wanted to go back and re-read God and Man at Yale.
Everything I’ve witnessed after Oct 7 — Harvard defending Claudine Gay, Harvard explicitly stating they’re an “international institution” and not an American institution, DEI, anti-White, anti-Asian discrimination, etc. has convinced me that WFB Jr. was right.
Elite universities ought to be promoting free markets and pro-American, pro-Western views. I don’t believe we should have a completely libertarian approach to academic freedom. That’s untenable in this day and age. (Again, demographics is destiny, even within organizations.)
I’ve become significantly less libertarian on a wide range of issues compared to where I was just two years ago, and not just on academic freedom/university direction.
So yes, WFB Jr. has influenced me on this idea.