How is the Russian war economy doing?

Here is a gloomy account from Vladimir Mirov:

Ruble depreciation will contribute to inflation even further, as Russia is continued to be heavily reliant on imports – this is a kind of self-sustaining spiral. I also strongly disagree with those who say that cheaper ruble is “good” for exporters and the budget. Exporters have yet to make good use of devaluing ruble – which they can’t do, because Russia is under all sorts of embargoes, and China and other Global South countries are not opening their markets to most Russian goods. As to the budget, the effect is much more complex than many consider: on one hand, budget gets more rubles from export revenues due to ruble depreciation, while minimizing ruble-nominated costs. On the other hand, though, higher inflation and costlier imports will, in my view, more than offset these budget-positive effects.

I think we have to look at the situation in a more complex way. Sharp ruble depreciation is a mere illustration of Russia’s deepening economic woes. Nearly three years since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian economy is stranded. No new sustainable economic model has been found. Import substitution is not working. China is only buying our most basic commodities at heavy discounts, while keeping its market closed for other Russian goods. There’s no investment or technology coming into Russia from China and other Global South countries. Everything is dependent on state subsidies – but the government’s financial reserves are running thin. if you listen to industry and business speakers at the most recent economic fora, there’s an endless stream of begging – we won’t survive with state subsidies for this, state support for that, we haven’t got technology, haven’t got investment, haven’t got profitability, haven’t got workforce. etc. Makes one wonder – what have you got then?

There is much more at the link, bearish throughout.

Comments

Comments for this post are closed