Updating our views of nuclear deterrence, a short essay by o3 pro

I asked o3 pro how very recent events should update our perspectives on Schelling’s work on nuclear deterrence.  I asked for roughly 800 words, here is one excerpt from what I received:

…Deterrence models that ignore domestic legitimacy under‑predict risk‑taking.

6. The United States is both referee and participant

American destroyers shooting down Iranian missiles create a blended deterrence model: extended defense. That blurs the line between the traditional “nuclear umbrella” and kinetic participation. It also complicates escalation ladders; Tehran now weighs the prospect of an inadvertent clash with the U.S. Fifth Fleet every time it loads a Shahab‑3. The war thus updates Schelling’s idea of “commitment” for the 21st‑century alliance network: digital sensors, shared early‑warning data, and distributed interceptors knit allies into a single strategic organism, reducing the freedom of any one capital to de‑escalate unilaterally.

7. Lessons for non‑combatant nuclear states

New Delhi and Islamabad will notice that an opaque Israeli arsenal backed by high‑end defenses delivered more bargaining power than Iran’s half‑finished program. Pyongyang may conclude the opposite: only a tested, miniaturized warhead guarantees respect. Meanwhile European leaders should ponder how much of their own deterrent posture rests on aging U.S. missiles whose effectiveness presumes no adversary fielding Israel‑grade intercept layers. The Israeli‑Iranian conflict is therefore less a regional exception than a harbinger.

Here is the full “column.”