Category: Political Science
Paul Romer doesn’t think a charter city in Haiti can work (now)
The post is here, excerpt:
Contrary to what some have suggested, a charter city in Haiti is simply not an option at this time. A charter city can only be created through voluntary agreement. Under the current conditions, the government and people of Haiti do not have the freedom of choice required for any agreement reached now to be voluntary.
He has another idea:
There are clear limits on the number of Haitian immigrants that nearby jurisdictions are currently prepared to accept. But if nations in the region created just two charter cities, they could accept the entire population of Haiti as residents. There are many locations close to Haiti where these new cities could be built, but for now, Haiti itself is the one place we should not consider.
Here is an offer for repatriation to Senegal:
Presidential spokesman Mamadou Bemba Ndiaye told reporters that Mr Wade had shared his plans with senior aides, and they involved offering voluntary repatriation and plots of land to any Haitian who wanted “to return to their origin”.
“Senegal is ready to offer them parcels of land – even an entire region. It all depends on how many Haitians come. If it’s just a few individuals, then we will likely offer them housing or small pieces of land. If they come en masse we are ready to give them a region,” he said.
The political economy of earthquakes
Here's a paper by Nejat Anbarci, Monica Escaleras, and Charles Alan Register:
In our theoretical model, we show that as per capita income decreases and the level of inequality increases, different segments of society are less likely to agree on the distribution of the burden of the necessary collective action, causing the relatively-wealthy simply to self-insure against the disaster while leaving the relatively-poor to its mercy. We then evaluate 269 large earthquakes occurring worldwide (1960-2002), taking into account other factors such as an earthquake's magnitude, depth and proximity to population centers. Using a Negative Binomial estimation strategy with both random and fixed estimators, we find strong evidence of the theoretical model’s predictions.
I haven't read it yet but wanted to pass it along; here are varying drafts, go through JSTOR (gated) and Journal of Public Economics for the final version. By the way, the model predicts bad news for Haiti.
For the pointer I thank the excellent Daniel Sutter, who has done a good deal of work on the economics of natural disasters.
Geopolitical speculations about Haiti
Haiti is about the size of Maryland and a big chunk of the population lives in or near Port-Au-Prince, maybe a third of the total, depending on what you count as a suburb. So the collapse of Port-Au-Prince is a big, big deal for the country as a whole. It's a dominant city for Haiti. Plus Jacmel seems to be leveled. From the reports I have seen, my tentative conclusion is that the country as a whole is currently below the subsistence level and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Hundreds of thousands of people have died, the U.N. Mission has collapsed, the government is not working (was it ever?), and hundreds of thousands or maybe millions of people are living in the streets without reliable food or water supplies. The hospitals and schools have collapsed. The airport is shut down. The port is very badly damaged. The Haitian Penitentiary has collapsed and the inmates — tough guys most of them – are running free for the foreseeable future. There is no viable police force or army.
In other words, it's not just a matter of offering extra food aid for two or three years.
Very rapidly, President Obama needs to come to terms with the idea that the country of Haiti, as we knew it, probably does not exist any more.
In what sense does Haiti still have a government? How bad will it have to get before the U.N. or U.S. moves in and simply governs the place? How long will this governance last? What will happen to Haiti as a route for the drug trade, the dominant development in the country's economy over the last fifteen years? What does the new structure of interest groups look like, say five years from now?
Is there any scenario in which the survivors, twenty years from now, are better off, compared to the quake never having taken place?
Why is Haiti so poor?
I'm not interested in talking about Greg Clark or making comparisons to the West; if need be compare it to other black Caribbean nations, such as Jamaica or Barbados. It's much worse and in terms of social indicators it is also worse than many places in Africa. Why? Here a few hypotheses (NB: I don't endorse all of them):
1. Haiti cut its colonial ties too early, rebelling against the French in the early 19th century and achieving complete independence. Guadaloupe and Martinique are still riding the gravy train and French aid is a huge chunk of their gdps.
2. Haiti was a French colony in the first place and French colonies do less well.
3. Sugar cane gave Haiti some early characteristics of "the resource curse," dating back to the 18th and 19th centuries.
4. Haiti was doing OK until the Duvaliers destroyed civil society, thus putting the country on a path toward destruction. It is a more or less random one-time event which wrecked the place.
5. Hegel was correct that the "voodoo religion," with its intransitive power relations among the gods, was prone to producing political intransitivity as well. (Isn't that a startling insight for a guy who didn't travel the broader world much?)
6. For reasons peculiar to the history of the slave trade, Haitian slaves came from many different parts of Africa and thus Haitian internal culture has long had lower levels of cohesion and cooperation. (The former point about the mix is true, but the cultural point is speculation.)
7. Haiti has higher than average levels of polygamy (but is this cause or effect?)
8. In the early to mid twentieth century, Haiti was poorly situated to attract Chinese and other immigrants, unlike say Jamaica or Trinidad. It is interesting that many of the wealthiest families in Haiti are Lebanese, such as the Naders.
Overall I don't find this set of possible factors very satisfactory. Is it asking too much to wish for an economics profession that is obsessed with such a question?
If you are looking for some cross-sectional variation to ponder, consider the fate of Haitians in Suriname (they make up a big chunk of the population there), Haiti vs. Santiago, Cuba, pre-Castro of course, or why early Haitian migrants to Montreal have done better than later migrants to Miami and Brooklyn.
Response on the Chait-Manzi debate
My original post is here. In the comments, "some guy" offered this perceptive comment/quotation:
1. For this debate, "levels" are more important than growth rates.
8. Countries have to start from where they're at.
Anybody else see a problem?
I'll add this:
1. Canada is big on the map but most of it is empty and the population is clustered on the border of you-know-where. Canada also has no legacy of slavery and requires stronger educational and professional credentials from its immigrants.
2. Matt asks me to come right out and say that Manzi was wrong. TC: "Manzi was wrong." That said, many of the other debate contributors made false or misleading statements as well. I deliberately tried to write my post to avoid remarks directed at raising or lowering the relative status of the commentators, a good overall habit (which I don't always follow and which hardly any commentators on other blogs seem to follow).
3. I would genuinely like to know whether the U.S. or Europe has supported more beneficial immigration over the last twenty years. The answer is not obvious to me, when you consider the Italians who move to Switzerland, the Greeks who move to Germany, and so on, not to mention the Algerians who move to France and the Turks who move to Germany.
4. For this debate, "levels" are more important than growth rates. I'm still not seeing that admission in the secondary commentary and note that "levels" provide an initial advantage to the United States, though Europe might fight back with security and leisure time. If growth rates mattered more, that would mean China is the place to copy and it isn't. By the way, in a lot of simple models, the poorer Europe should be enjoying "catch-up" growth and growing at rates higher than that of the United States, as many other countries are doing.
Levels, levels, levels. Here is the Ducktales moon level song played backwards.
Addendum: If you do wish to look at growth rates, adjusted for the relevant variables, here is one place to start. Overall it's consistent with my point about levels.
Peter Leeson update
He is now the North American editor of Public Choice, replacing Michael Munger and of course we all congratulate him. I have a modest proposal for how he should referee submitted papers, let's see if he uses it.
A world without nuclear weapons?
Thomas Schelling — who remains a master of cool, insightful analysis, has a new essay on this question. Such a world would not be a picnic. Here is one good excerpt:
In summary, a "world without nuclear weapons" would be a world in which
the United States, Russia, Israel, China, and half a dozen or a dozen
other countries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild
nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer delivery systems, and would
have prepared targets to preempt other nations' nuclear facilities, all
in a high-alert status, with practice drills and secure emergency
communications. Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could
become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets
the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous
world.
Hat tip goes to www.bookforum.com.
Why hasn’t the Fed been targeting two or three percent inflation?
I've been thinking about this question more and I've come up with a speculative possibility. Right now banks are earning their way back into profitability by playing the spread. They're paying close to zero on deposits and earning fair sums on long-term loans. Perhaps this term structure is sustainable because people are expecting little inflation in the short run but moderate inflation in the longer run, plus there is some risk on the loans. (These inflationary expectations may be changing; if you wish pretend I am writing this six months or a year ago.)
So let's say we move from zero expected short-term inflation to three percent short-term expected inflation. The nominal short rate rises to three percent and the real short rate remains more or less constant. Long rates would go up a bit but not much, since beyond the short run there is already an expectation of moderate inflation. In sum, the spread between short and long rates might narrow.
Here is the key point: from the bank's point of view, what is the correct measure of the real rate of interest? Is it defined by the nominal rate relative to the expected growth in the CPI? I doubt it. When you're near the bankruptcy or nationalization constraint, it's often nominal profits that matter (relative to fixed nominal liabilities, accounting standards, capital standards, etc.), not "real profits" defined relative to the CPI.
In sum, maybe three percent expected inflation conflicts with the desire to rapidly recapitalize banks through maintaining a wide interest rate spread. Maybe we need that zero nominal short rate or at least the Fed thinks we do.
I don't wish to push too hard on this hypothesis, it is speculative rather than confirmed by evidence. And propositions about the term structure of interest rates do not always run the way you think they will or should. I'm aware of other problems. What kind of zero profit condition is imposed on the banks? Given the odd objective function of the banks, how exactly does the Fisher effect work in the short run? Or is it imposed from without by competition from non-bank lenders? I'm not sure on these questions and they suggest possible holes in the above speculation.
I also regard this as a somewhat gruesome hypothesis. It means that "Main Street" is paying for "Wall Street" (forgive me the use of those awful terms) in at least two ways: high unemployment and inability to earn much on one's savings. Risk on the Fed balance sheet is also paying some big part of the bill, since presumably that is helping to maintain the interest rate spread.
The term structure also implies that the market is expecting rising short rates, so if the bank mess isn't cleaned up soon, heaven forbid. The spread, as a means of restoring bank profitability, won't last forever.
Christmas Bonuses for Fannie and Freddie
The Obama administration tried to sneak this one under the radar by making it official on Christmas Eve. The Washington Post did a good job catching the story:
The Obama administration pledged Thursday to provide unlimited financial assistance to mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, an eleventh-hour move that allows the government to exceed the current $400 billion cap on emergency aid without seeking permission from a bailout-weary Congress.
…But even as the administration was making this open-ended financial commitment, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac disclosed that they had received approval from their federal regulator to pay $42 million in Wall Street-style compensation packages to 12 top executives for 2009.
The compensation packages, including up to $6 million each to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's chief executives, come amid an ongoing public debate about lavish payments to executives at banks and other financial firms that have received taxpayer aid. But while many firms on Wall Street have repaid the assistance, there is no prospect that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will do so.
More on the economics of the decisive Senator
There's been a lot of moralizing about the holdout strategies of Lieberman and Nelson, but under some game-theoretic accounts it is a blessing in disguise, a blessing for Obama at least. For instance Rahm Emanuel can now say to the House: "look, we just can't renegotiate this any more or the coalition will fall apart. You'd better get on board with the Senate version of the bill" A lot of these legislative games don't otherwise have a core, or it takes so long to find the core that the deal falls apart in the meantime.
The holdout behavior of one decisive Senator decreases the need to cut bargains with other members of Congress. The key words here are "credible precommitment to no further renegotiation." The more anxious or wavering Nelson and Lieberman were/are, the more credible this precommitment.
Often it's easier to trade with one or two guys than to suffer death by a thousand cuts by having to appease the larger group, yet again. Keep in mind that Obama probably needs this bill more than do most of the Democrats in the House, so he can't just stonewall and win the staredown. In addition to his other roles and effects, Lieberman arguably serves as Obama's "bad cop" enforcer.
How to limit filibusters
Requiring fifty rather than sixty votes is one obvious response, but let's say that either isn't possible or is for other reasons undesirable. That is, you still might want a high threshold for new legislation, yet without so empowering the sixtieth legislator or for that matter the fiftieth legislator.
One (non-practical) option is to randomize the number of votes held by each Senator, with the number being revealed only after the vote is held. That way Joe Lieberman wouldn't know in advance that he is the decisive Senator. One problem of this is that to ensure passage of the now-riskier bill you might have to spread around pork more generally.
Another (non-practical) solution is to give more votes to Senators who precommit in advance to supporting (or opposing) whatever comes out of the process. Of course that can also backfire, by making it harder for the non-Liebermans to threaten defection.
Then there is bribery and log-rolling and yet more pork.
What other options are there for limiting holdouts, either practical or purely theoretical?
Civil war exposure and violence
That's a new paper by Edward Miguel, Sebastian Saiegh, and Shanker Satyanath and here is the abstract:
In recent years scholars have begun to focus on the consequences of individuals’ exposure to civil war, including its severe health and psychological consequences. Our innovation is to move beyond the survey methodology that is widespread in this literature to analyze the actual behavior of individuals with varying degrees of exposure to civil war in a common institutional setting. We exploit the presence of thousands of international soccer (football) players with different exposures to civil conflict in the European professional leagues, and find a strong relationship between the extent of civil conflict in a player’s home country and his propensity to behave violently on the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. This link is robust to region fixed effects, country characteristics (e.g., rule of law, per capita income), player characteristics (e.g., age, field position, quality), outliers, and team fixed effects. Reinforcing our claim that we isolate the effect of civil war exposure rather than simple rule-breaking or something else entirely, there is no meaningful correlation between our measure of exposure to civil war and soccer performance measures not closely related to violent conduct. The result is also robust to controlling for civil wars before a player’s birth, suggesting that it is not driven by factors from the distant historical past.
One question is whether such behavior occurs because the player's psyche has somehow been brutalized or whether it is a deliberate affect aimed at a violence-expecting audience back home. It's related to which variables might best predict the propensity of an NBA player to pick up technical fouls; would that be correlated with urban upbringing, the nature of the audience (home vs. away, TV vs. live crowd, etc.) or perhaps correlated with early brushes with the law?
If you wish to skim the results, start with p.25. The Colombian players pick up a lot of yellow cards.
*The End of Influence*
The subtitle is What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money and the authors are Stephen S. Cohen and Brad DeLong. Here is an excerpt:
The Asian export-led growth model must — over time — transform itself to domestic consumption and prosperity models. The American borrow-and-import model will also have to shift — again, this takes considerable time — to a model of consumption-at-the-level-you-produce. And the need to keep the confidence of those who have the money that their money is well placed in the United States serves as a constraint on U.S. policy in a way that it has never been before.
In the last three paragraphs of the book the authors describe the various stimulus attempts as something that will "buy time," but will not be sufficient to alter this basic trajectory.
Cato dialog on Tom Palmer’s new book
Here is a YouTube of Tom Palmer presenting his new book, with yours truly commenting, at the Cato Institute. David Boaz summarizes part of my comment. Here is my previous post on Tom's new book and the book, Realizing Liberty, is available for purchase on-line, Tom points us to this podcast of him criticizing me; his comment reflects some of the differences in our points of view.
One question in the dialog was to what extent an adherence to liberty — at the level of an entire polity — is likely to be culturally specific. I see pro-liberty ideas as more likely to be Anglo-American than Tom does or at least more northwestern European. It is for this reason, I think, that he favors free immigration whereas I, although very pro-immigration relative to the political debate, favor legal limits in many cases, including the United States, Switzerland, and Iceland.
A second question is to what extent ideas about liberty can be supported without encouraging "the paranoid style" in American politics. Too often advocacy of individual liberty ends up bundled with the paranoid style of reasoning and overly simple good vs. evil narratives. I have yet to see a good explanation for why.
Overall I am more suspicious of "ideology" than is Tom. He sees ideology as having driven many very beneficial social movements, such as the abolition of slavery. I accept that point but still fear that ideological reasoning is likely to end up biased away from an emphasis on abstract concepts. That will mean ideology is often useful for ending very concrete social injustices, but that ideology is unlikely to bring people to a deep understanding of "better economics," especially when the distinction between the seen and unseen is important. The strongest ideologies also tend to be nationalistic.
Will Medicare cost reductions stick?
The graph above, which portrays Medicare as a percentage of gdp, is from this SSA piece. In contrast, Matt Yglesias, Kevin Drum, and others have touted a new short essay as evidence for the claim that the Obama health reform plan will succeed on the cost control front, or at least offer a reasonable chance of succeeding, or at least offers some components which will not be reversed. Here is one key paragraph:
Virtually all of the Medicare cuts enacted in 1990 and 1993, which accounted for a significant portion of the savings in those large deficit-reduction packages, were implemented. And most of the savings enacted in 1997 other than the SGR cuts – nearly four-fifths – were implemented as well.
Given that Medicare spending growth slowed significantly more than was anticipated after 1997 – in 1999, for the first time ever, it was actually lower than the previous year’s level – and the budget was balanced in 1998 for the first time in 28 years, it is surprising that Congress did not scale back even more of the savings enacted in 1997. There is little likelihood that the positive budgetary outlook that encouraged some easing of the 1997 cuts will return in coming years.
See also Box 2 in the piece (which starts slowly, so skip ahead to the meat I am citing). If you're wondering about discrepancies between these numbers and the SSA graph, the latter is as a percentage of gdp.
My view is this: the aggregate data show that Medicare expenditures, as a percentage of gdp, have expanded at a healthy clip for every medium-run period you can find since 1973. I don't doubt that the future — like the past — may well show some shorter periods which look better than others but cost control has never worked in the past on anything but a temporary basis. Citing a bunch of short periods of time doesn't convince me; they didn't stick! And only one three-year batch of cost controls showed up, as a success, in the aggregate historical data at all. (Would you believe a worsening alcoholic who pointed to many days or even weeks where his rate of drinking was declining and also mentioned that he drank less for a few years starting in 1993? Or maybe this reminds you ever so slightly of the debates over recent global cooling and short vs. long-term trends? Most progressives recognize that a few years of cooling do not contradict the evidence about the long-term trend and yet here is an odd flip of emphasis on a few short-term improvements.)
In Figure D you'll also see that the savings from the 1993-1996 partially period are offset by later, more rapid increases in Medicare spending as a percentage of gdp.
Three additional points are worth consideration:
1. The period of Medicare cost savings, in the early to mid 1990s, coincides roughly with a more general period of cost savings in health care, due to managed care. This was soundly rejected by the American public, both in their roles as consumers and voters.
2. There will be more and more older voters in the years to come.
3. We should give at least some consideration to a "mean reversion" theory, by which current cost savings increase the pressure for future splurges. I don't want to push this view too hard, but the aggregate data, as I eyeball them, seem to imply "do not reject" for this hypothesis.
On the other side of the ledger, you might argue, pro-Obama, that the very act of passing the legislation represents a countervailing force against this long-run trend of rising costs.
You can still argue for the bill on this basis: "Congress will increase future spending on Medicare as much as it can. Any other expenditures in the meantime serve a "stuff the beast" function and slow down the future rate of growth on Medicare expenditure. We'd rather spend the money on extra coverage now, realizing that the threat of future fiscal crisis will force later Medicare cuts."
That's not my point of view, but it's what I think the debate on cost control boils down to. The best case scenario for the bill is that it won't much help cost control, may not hurt it, but by pre-emption will result in more money spent on coverage and less money spent on old people.