Category: Political Science

First, war.  War is the antithesis of the libertarian philosophy of
consent, voluntarism and trade.  With every war in American history
Leviathan has grown larger and our liberties have withered.  War is the
health of the state. And now, fulfilling the dreams of Big Brother, we are
in a perpetual war.

A country cannot long combine unlimited government abroad and limited
government at home. The Republican party
has become the party of war and thus the party of unlimited government.

With war has come FEAR, magnified many times over by the governing party. Fear is pulling Americans into the arms of
the state. If only we were better at
resisting. Alas, we Americans say that
we love liberty but we are fair-weather lovers.  Liberty will flourish only with peace. 

Have libertarians gained on other margins in the past eight years? Not at all. Under the Republicans we have been sailing due South-West on the Nolan
Chart – fewer civil liberties and more government, including the largest new
government program in a generation, the Medicare prescription drug plan, and
the biggest nationalization since the Great Depression. Tax cuts, the summum bonum of Republican
economic policy, are a sham. The only
way to cut taxes is to cut spending and that has not happened.

The libertarian voice has not been listened to in Republican politics for a
long time. The Republicans take the libertarian wing of the party for granted
and with phony rhetoric and empty phrases have bought our support on the
cheap. Thus – since voice has failed – it is  time for exit.  Remember that if
a political party can count on you then you cannot count on it.

Exit is the right strategy because if there is any hope for reform it is by
casting the Republicans out of power and into the wilderness where they may
relearn virtue. Libertarians understand better
than anyone that power corrupts. The
Republican party illustrates. Lack of
power is no guarantee of virtue but Republicans are a far better – more libertarian –
party out-of-power than they are in power. When in the wilderness, Republicans turn naturally to a critique of
power and they ratchet up libertarian rhetoric about free trade, free
enterprise, abuse of government power and even the defense of civil liberties.  We can hope that new leaders will arise in
this libertarian milieu.

No country with a McDonald’s outlet, the theory contends, has ever gone to war with another….

Thomas
Friedman, who invented the theory in 1996, said people in McDonald’s
countries "don’t like to fight wars. They like to wait in line for
burgers."…

The Russia-Georgia conflict has finally blown this theory out of the water.

From the Guardian.  Clearly the theory was over-identified.  Perhaps no two countries with Taco Bell’s every go to war with one another.

Hat tip to Chris Blattman.

Ezra Klein channels Andrew Gelman:

…small states tend to be more approving of their governors. Why? Gelman
has some theories: "In a large state, there will be more ambitious
politicians on the other side, eager to knock off the incumbent
governor; small states often have part-time legislatures and thus the
governor is involved in less political conflict; small states (notably
Alaska) tend to get more funds per capita from the federal government,
and it’s easier to be popular when you can disburse more funds; large
states tend to be more heterogeneous and so it’s harder to keep all the
voters happy. As the graphs show, the pattern isn’t perfect, but it
looks real to me."

I have an additional hypothesis.  People from small states, especially atypical small states, sometimes have an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the other states or regions.  Taking pride in their politicians is one way of compensating for that.  Furthermore there is often less to do in underpopulated states and is not pride sometimes a substitute for action?  New Yorkers are not in fact so proud of the Metropolitan Opera, but in parts of Wisconsin the Green Bay Packers are king.

Find it here.  Here is Ezra’s version of Markets in Everything.

The classic paper is Buchanan and Faith, AER 1987.  Here is a recent extension of this classic work, with a dash of economic determinism:

Secessionist movements present themselves to the global public as analogues of colonial liberation movements: long-established identities are denied rights of self-determination by quasi-imperial authorities. Self-determination is presented as the solution to the challenge of peaceful coexistence between distinct peoples. The global public not only accepts this message but reinforces it: both Hollywood and diasporas relay it back to populations in developing countries. In this paper, we will argue that the discourse of secessionist movements cannot be taken at face value. We will suggest that a more realistic characterization of secessionist movements is that their sense of political identity is typically a recent contrivance designed to support perceived economic advantage, if the secession is successful, and facilitated by popular ignorance.

There are, of course, plenty of successful secessions.  Slovakia has been successful nation because of a language and a desire to be free of Czech rule, backed by EU free trade, EU largesse and political precommitment.  Or secession can help you break free of an evil empire, such as when Georgia left the former Soviet Union.  The most likely American state to make a success out of secession is, I think, Texas (or offer up your pick in the comments).  A Texan nation is hardly a good idea, but at least the state is big, has a diversified economy, has an outlet to the water, has a history of independence, and has a border with another nation, namely Mexico. 

The least likely American state to make a success of secession is, I think…Alaska.  The state takes in lots of federal money, has only a small natural population base, and is not too far from Russia.  Here are some data on which states receive the most on net from the federal government.  According to these numbers, only the state of New Mexico benefits more in (proportional) fiscal terms.  The states which fare the worst from federal transfers are New Jersey, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Minnesota and Illinois.

Martin Feldstein and John Taylor reassure us:

And by maintaining strong control over the growth of government spending, Mr. McCain will bring the budget into balance. His long record of fighting against excessive government spending, his plans to veto earmarks and reverse the spending binge of the past few years, and his strong commitment to balancing the budget can make this goal a reality.

Here is the full article, hat tip to Greg Mankiw.

This article claims that goldfish are as smart as mice.

Palin has an outside, straight talker, pro-reform, true blooded
American, take no prisoners image much as Perot did.  (A second point of comparison is Arnold Schwarznegger, with some obvious differences.)  And she has only begun to cultivate that image.  Do
you recall how much impact Perot had on the American people? 

Of
course if Perot actually had had the chance to be President, the
results probably would not have been pretty.  He would have been forced
to act like "just another politician," as has been the case with Arnold because in fact the job revolves around knowing how to govern. 

There is one biographical fact about Palin’s life that the critics
(Drum, DeLong, Yglesias, Klein, Sullivan and Kleiman are among the ones I read)
are hardly touching upon.  I mean her decision to have a Downs child
instead of an abortion.  This is the fact about her life and it will be viewed as such from now through November and perhaps beyond. 

If only for this reason, she will be seen as a candidate who stands on principle.  I don’t think the critics are sufficiently appreciating how tired the American people are of candidates who say one thing and do another and who abandon their principles at the first provocation.  This is a deep and very strong current and it runs through virtually every group of American political voters.  Because of her decision to have a Downs child, many voters will not view Sarah Palin in a cynical light, no matter what the critics say.  No story about firing a state trooper will break that seal.

In my jaded view, "politicians who break their word, violate their ideals, and do not follow through on their promises" is not one of the major problems in American politics.  In fact it’s often good that political promises are forgotten in the light of the realities.  So the American obsession with political promise-keeping does not resonate with me.  But the American people have been hungry for a "promise keeper, ideals believer" for decades and when was the last time they actually got one?

By the way, my mom’s first reaction to the nomination (hi mom!) was
that other mothers of "different" children (what exactly is the right word here?) would very much identify
with Palin and view her life as validating theirs and thus support her.

Go away and watch a Frank Capra movie and think about Palin again.  Larry Ribstein gets it.

I do recognize and indeed emphasize that this analysis requires that she is good on TV.  I give that p = 0.63.  I’ll also give p = 0.13 that she ends up off the ticket, but most of that chance comes from her deciding she needs to spend the time with her kids.

Addendum: The best argument against the pick is this, although it does not much revise my priors.

Around the blogosphere you will see many left-wing writers criticizing Palin for lack of experience.  Maybe this criticism is correct, but these commentators are falling into The Trap.  Most American voters do not themselves know much detail about foreign affairs and their vision of an experienced leader does not require such knowledge.  Was it demanded from Reagan?  Doesn’t everyone agree that Cheney and Rumsfeld knew plenty?  Rightly or wrongly, many American voters will view Palin’s stint as mayor of small town, her background in sports, her role in a beauty contest (yes), her trials raising teenage children, and her decision to stick with her priinciples and have a Downs Syndrome baby as all very valuable and relevant forms of experience.  The more the word "experience" is repeated, no matter what the context, the more it will hurt Obama.  Palin needs to appear confident and capable on TV and in the debates, but her ticket is not going to lose votes if she cannot properly spell Kyrgyzstan or for that matter place it on a map.

Addendum: Here is early response over at The Clinton Forum.

Trying to appear moderate is not always the best strategy for capturing votes during an election, reveals a new study. Extreme positions can build trust among an electorate, who value ideological commitment in times of uncertainty.

Here is the full story, with a hat tip to Eduardo Pegurier.  And here’s Robin Hanson:

In a TV game show, pretty contestants were not better or more cooperative players, but other contestants seemed to act as if they were.

I don’t know much about the substance or qualifications of Sarah Palin, but I believe that Democrats should be a little worried right now.  The otherwise-expected Romney and Pawlenty gifts have been taken off the table.

Addendum: Here’s Palin talking economics with Larry Kudlow.

Now over 80 percent in the betting markets.  And here is the gossip behind that.  Electorally this is a very effective pick I think (if indeed it is true), though it is hard for me to imagine a President with five (young) kids.

Addendum: No, that wording isn’t quite right.  How should I put this…?

Second addendum: Her stock in the market is now plummeting, now down to about 35, as there is a report she is still in Alaska.  I am told that last night Pawlenty was up to about 85 but then fell dramatically as well.  It has been a wild ride in this market.  And now Palin is back up again, etc.  Whatever.  Now it’s at 96.  Now confirmed.

More: Credible signals, in one link or less.

Here are some of her votes.  Her ACU voting lifetime record is 91 percent.  She is strong on free trade and seems to be a relatively conservative and corporatist Republican on economic issues.  She’s way up in the betting markets for the Republican VP spot, about 30 percent last I looked.  Note that she is not pro-life according to conservatives.  She has been very pro-drilling and very active on energy issues.  Since picking Mitt Romney would violate all known economic models of rational choice, and picking a woman would pop the Democrats’ post-convention bounce, I suppose this is a rumor to be taken seriously.  Here is her Wikipedia page.

Ezra wins:

…the campaign against Obama has metastasized into a variant of class
warfare. It’s the resentment of the meritocracy. What the GOP realized
was that Obama did come across different than the average American, but
not so much because he was black as because he was effortless. The very
set of supercharged talents and qualities that allowed Obama to
levitate past the boundaries of race and class make him different than
those who haven’t rocketed upward on the strength of their intelligence
and charisma and charm. After all, if you’re a fumbling, struggling
individual out in suburban Ohio, how can you believe that this guy who
doesn’t look to have struggled a day in his life cares about your
pathetic problems? Obama, in other words, is elite. As in "A group or
class of persons enjoying superior intellectual, social, or economic
status." Obama isn’t an economic elite, but he is a social and
intellectual elite. And it’s that creeping sense that he’s different,
that he’s better and knows it, that McCain is trying to exploit.

The Obama campaign, similarly, has realized that McCain is an elite,
and that voters won’t believe that a guy who has so many houses that he
can’t keep track of them will care if they lose the small condo they
call home. This election, in other words, is becoming a contest to
decide which type of elite voters hate — or fear, or mistrust — more:
A social elite or an economic elite?

Here is the first Google Images entry for "mediocre."

Obama has many good qualities but this does not prevent the circulation of massive amounts of "Obama insecurity," as evidenced by some of the comments on a recent post.  (It’s not about disagreeing; note how the tone changes.)  For some people no comment on Obama, other than the purely laudatory, is anything other than a hackish right-wing attempt to forge an alliance of lies with Karl Rove and his ilk.  But an election need not be framed as a war where all remarks must be strategically proper and in line with the objective of electing a preferred candidate; a blog is a discourse first and foremost.

The mood on Obama reminds me of the response of some MR commentators to Eric Lyon on Radiohead.

I cannot imagine how devastated and hopeless the Democratic left would feel if Obama loses.  That response would be a big mistake but in part it explains "Obama insecurity."  The left is uneasy that so many of their hopes are pinned on this man and as Paul Krugman points out he is somewhat unknown.  There is a secondary fear that Obama is in fact committed to the notion of America as a center-right country or at least is unwilling to challenge that idea. 

"Obama insecurity" hurts his electoral chances and hurts the intellectual future of the left as a corrective force in American politics.  There’s not a convincing or credible path toward painting his enemies as immoral, even if that is what you believe.  Some campaign lies are painting Obama as weak, inexperienced, and non-American or even anti-American.  Responding with a dose of "Obama insecurity" only plays into the hands of those who would turn this into a race of emotions and innuendo. 

Brought to you by Aghion, Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer, this is one of the best papers so far this year.  It’s so good I’ll give you a longer than usual quotation from the opening pages:

In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document, and try to explain, this highly significant empirical correlation.  The correlation works for a range of measures of social capital, from trust in others to trust in corporations and political institutions, as well as for a range of measures of regulation, from product markets, to labor markets, to judicial procedures. 

We present a simple model explaining this correlation. The model turns on the idea that investment in social capital makes people both more productive and more civic (e.g., Coleman 1990). Compared to people who have invested in social capital, those who have not are both less productive and impose a negative externality on others when they produce (e.g., pollute).  The community (whether through voting or through some other political mechanism) regulates production when the expected negative externalities are large. But regulation itself must be implemented by government officials, who are corrupt if they have not invested in social capital. As a consequence, when production is restricted through regulation, investment in social capital may not pay off.  In this model, when people expect to live in a civil community, they expect low levels of regulation, and so invest in social capital. Their beliefs are justified, as lack of investment leads to incivility, high regulation, high corruption, and low production.  The model has two Pareto ranked equilibria.

…The model predicts, most immediately, that distrust influences not just regulation itself, but the demand for regulation…distrust fuels support for government control over the economy.  What is perhaps most interesting about this finding, and also consistent with the model’s predictions, is that distrust generates demand for regulation even when people realize that the government is corrupt and ineffective; they prefer state control to unbridled production by uncivil firms.

…We take evidence on the demand for regulation as supportive of causality running from distrust to regulation.  To test the reverse causality, we look at the experiment of transition from socialism, which we interpret as a radical reduction in government regulation in low trust societies.  Our model predicts that such a reduction should lead to 1) a reduction in output, 2) an increase in corruption, 3) an increase in demand for government control at a given level of trust, and 4) a reduction of trust in the short run.