Category: Uncategorized

Simulations and the Fermi paradox

If we are living in a simulation, does that resolve the Fermi paradox?  I would think so.  The “aliens” would be here, we just would not “see” them as such.  But in fact we would be looking at nothing but the alien products, namely the creators of the simulation.

Should we expect to find alien civilizations in a simulation?  The priors are not so clear: do the simulation creators want full Bayesian realism?  Is the universe run by an alien version of Daniel Kahneman?  The simulation has not excluded animals, but it has (so far) excluded self-replicating von Neumann probes or the use of supernovae as alien corporate advertisements.  The simulation still might have alien civilizations turn up in ways which do not make Bayesian sense, but which add to the drama.  For the time being, we are still in a “no aliens” do loop.

I thank Jim Olds for a conversation related to this topic.  In any case, the Fermi paradox raises the likelihood that we are living in a simulation.

Addendum: Robin Hanson comments, as does Jim Olds.

This is bad news for we the people

The origin of multicellular life, one of the most important developments in Earth’s history, could have occurred with surprising speed, US researchers have shown. In the lab, a single-celled yeast (Saccharomyces cerevisiae) took less than 60 days to evolve into many-celled clusters that behaved as individuals. The clusters even developed a primitive division of labour, with some cells dying so that others could grow and reproduce.

It suggests that “the filter” lies ahead of us rather than behind us.  The difficulties of producing multi-cellular organisms have been one of the main responses to the Fermi Paradox (“where are they?”).  If it’s not so hard after all, there must be some other obstacle to lots of self-reproducing von Neumann probes.

The link is here.  Speaking of bad news, here is a bad news argument about Chinese real estate.

Why economic mobility measures are overrated

By mobility I mean whether people are crossing into different income quintiles or deciles than the ones they were born into, or the ones they enjoyed at an earlier period of life.

1. If the general standard of living is rising (and I am more than willing to admit problems in this area for the United States), mobility takes care of itself over time.  I find it more useful to focus on slow growth, if indeed that is the case.  Just look at income growth for non-wealthy families and that is more useful than all the mobility measures put together.

2. Measured mobility in the United States does not seem to be falling, or at least not falling much, as shown by Scott Winship.

3. For a given level of income, if some are moving up others are moving down.  Do you take theories of wage rigidity seriously?  If so, you might favor less relative mobility, other things remaining equal.  More upward — and thus downward — relative mobility probably means less aggregate happiness, due to habit formation and frame of reference effects.

4. Why do many European nations have higher mobility?  Putting ethnic and demographic issues aside, here is one mechanism.  Lots of smart Europeans decide to be not so ambitious, to enjoy their public goods, to work for the government, to avoid high marginal tax rates, to travel a lot, and so on.  That approach makes more sense in a lot of Europe than here.  Some of the children of those families have comparable smarts but higher ambition and so they rise quite a bit in income relative to their peers.  (The opposite may occur as well, with the children choosing more leisure.)  That is a less likely scenario for the United States, where smart people realize this is a country geared toward higher earners and so fewer smart parents play the “tend the garden” strategy.  Maybe the U.S. doesn’t have a “first best” set-up in this regard, but the comparison between U.S. and Europe is less sinister than it seems at first.  “High intergenerational mobility” is sometimes a synonym for “lots of parental underachievers.”

5. How much of immobility is due to “inherited talent plus diminishing role for random circumstance”?  Is not this cause of immobility very different — both practically and morally — from such factors as discrimination, bad schools, occupational licensing, etc.?  What are you supposed to get when you combine genetics with meritocracy?  I do not know how much of current American (or other) immobility is due to this factor, but I find it discomforting that complaints about mobility are so infrequently accompanied by an analysis of this topic.

6. I am more than willing to hear arguments than a less mobile society is a less stable society, or otherwise a society which makes worse political decisions.  But I haven’t seen serious arguments here.  By “serious arguments” I mean those which take endogeneity into account and go beyond noting that Denmark is a better polity than Brazil, and so on.

7. I would like all measurements in this area to take into account the pre-migration incomes of incoming entrants.  Denmark, which doesn’t let many people in, is a much less upwardly mobile society once you take this into account.  Sweden deserves more praise, and in general this factor will make the Anglo countries look much, much more supportive of mobility.

Addendum: Here is more from Scott Winship.

What is the price of “going short volatility?”

I’ve wondered about this question for a while.  Let’s say that bank manager/CEOs can play a profitable moral hazard game by risking that the lower left tail of the returns distribution won’t happen.  Write some far out-of-the-money naked puts, or more generally synthesize that position.  If you are a sports fan, imagine betting against the Washington Wizards to win an NBA title every year.  Most years you earn some above-normal profits.  Every now and then you go bankrupt.  From the manager’s point of view there are bonuses in the good years and in the bankruptcy year the worst that can happen is getting fired.  You might even be rehired rather quickly, if shareholders like such strategies too, at the expense of bondholders or taxpayers.  Think of that as a private arbitrage opportunity, albeit one with negative social value.

The question is, what happens to the price of that strategy?  Does it adjust to choke off more “going short volatility” at the margin? I see at least two options:

1. The return from writing a naked put (and related synthetic positions) falls somewhat, as many banks play that strategy or would play that strategy if the prices of the relevant bets did not adjust.  What is then the story for the market as a whole?  Are some of the “moral hazard gains” shared with those who buy naked puts?  Why should the “tax incidence” problem stop there?  Where exactly in the system do those gains come to rest?  For sure there are gains to the early users of this moral hazard strategy, but once market prices are adjusting where do the gains go?  Can excess returns be seen in observed securities prices?

Of course that there are *many* synthetic ways of writing the naked put or shorting volatility.  Do the prices of all of them adjust, over time, as the early users of the strategy scurry from one opportunity, see it closed off by price shifts, and then move on to the next?

The cynic will think that hedge funds are doing well on this one.

2. Perhaps some banks play this strategy but their trades, relative to liquid markets, are not big enough to push around the price.  Or maybe arbitrage is too strong and it keeps securities prices in line with standard theory.

Imagine that the fundamental value of a security was $40, but a beautiful woman would give a trader a kiss every time he bought the security, bringing his net private return to $41.  Due to arbitrage and short sales, the price of the security will remain at $40, although the private gains will persist from the purchases.

In the latter case banks can’t raise enough liquidity to budge the market price, relative to the power of the other side of the market.  Along related lines, legal and institutional constraints may limit the “short volatility” strategy and also blunt the effect of those strategies on market prices.

Which case is better/worse for the world as a whole?  Does it matter for financial regulation which case is true?

I thank an anonymous hedge fund manager for a conversation on this topic, Interfluidity as well.