Public employee pension and municipal insolvency

This paper studies how governments manage public employee pensions and how this affects insolvency risk. I propose a quantitative model of governments that choose their savings and risk exposure by borrowing/saving in defaultable bonds, borrowing in non-defaultable pension benefits, and saving in a pension fund that earns a risk premium. In insolvency, the government can receive transfers from households who may differ from the government in their preferences for public services and private consumption. I match the model to a panel of CA cities and a hand-collected record of fiscal emergencies. The model predicts that governments are highly vulnerable to another stock market bust. A hypothetical shock to pension funds in 2015 produces twice as many fiscal emergencies as the original 2008-10 shock. In the quantified model, the government undersaves and take excess risk relative to what households would choose. Savings requirements that limit spending to essential services plus 0.3% of cash-on-hand produce large welfare gains for households. Requiring the pension fund to invest more in safe assets decreases household welfare because the lower average return discourages the government from saving.

That is from the job market paper by Sean Myers of Stanford University.

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