Category: Data Source
The chimera of universal coverage in a large, diverse country
Our findings suggest that policies intended to subsidize health insurance of higher income groups, for example, the enhanced premium subsidies, are far less efficient than policies intended to further expand public insurance to low-income groups, for example, in non-expansion states.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
UK facts of the day
At the peak, the year to March 2023, almost 1.5m immigrants came. The Office for National Statistics thinks that far fewer people left, so net migration amounted to 944,000.
…Net migration to Britain last year amounted to 171,000—the lowest level since 2012, if the pandemic years are excluded. The human haul will probably be even lower this year, largely because the number of economic migrants continues to fall fast…James Bowes of Warwick University thinks net migration might even turn negative in 2026…
The government’s attempt to filter for highly desirable immigrants is not working in practice. As expected, the number of visas given to care workers has plunged. But the number of visas given to IT professionals has also fallen, from about 28,000 in 2022 to 10,000 last year.
According to The Economist, most Britons still think immigration to the country is rising. And it seems economically productive immigrants are being restricted too?:
Regardless of whether he or she arrived with a work visa or by other means, the average India-born employee in Britain earns £32,400 a year, whereas the average Nigeria-born employee earns £34,000. British-born people lag behind both, with average earnings of £30,900…
The Migration Observatory, a think-tank, has shown that people who arrive from outside the EU often earn little at first. Yet the wages of recent migrants have quickly exceeded the national average…
One of my fears is that, for informational and public choice reasons, it is unduly hard to crack down on unproductive immigrants only.
Are we undermeasuring inflation for lower earners?
We document a new source of fluctuations in inflation inequality. When the cost of upstream inputs rises, varieties within a product category tend to have similar absolute price increases. However, the same absolute price increase constitutes a larger percentage change for low-price products, resulting in excess inflation at the low end (“cheapflation”). Since low-income households tend to buy lower-priced varieties, the inflation rates they face are disproportionately sensitive to upstream costs. Using data on food-at-home purchases, we show that this mechanism generates cycles in inflation inequality and excessive volatility in inflation for low-income households relative to high-income households. This channel parsimoniously accounts for observed fluctuations in inflation inequality over time, including surges in cheapflation and inflation inequality during both the Great Recession and the 2021–2023 post-pandemic inflation. Official statistics mask these within-category differences in inflation and thus understate the differences in inflation experienced by low- and high-income households by 70–90 percent. We provide evidence that this mechanism applies to a range of consumption categories beyond food at home. The same mechanism also leads to systematic differences in inflation across cities and import price inflation across countries in response to nationwide and global cost shocks.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Kunal Sangani.
How Much Has Shale Gas Saved U.S. Consumers?
It may seem like a distant memory now, but as of the mid-2000s, U.S. natural gas production had been flat for a decade, and the U.S. was importing liquefied natural gas (LNG), with plans to import much more. Then shale gas happened. Advances in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling caused U.S. natural gas production to increase significantly, and the U.S. went from being a net importer of natural gas to being the world’s largest exporter. This paper calculates how much shale gas has saved U.S. natural gas consumers. Using price differences between the United States, Europe and Japan, we calculate that U.S. natural gas consumers have saved $3.1-$4.3 trillion between 2007 and 2025, equivalent to $164-$227 billion annually. Access to low-price U.S. natural gas has been particularly valuable during major supply shocks such as the war in Ukraine, and the benefits of shale gas have been experienced broadly across sectors and states.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Lucas W. Davis.
AI in gdp
- Quality-adjusted AI production in the United States grew at over 2,000 percent per year in 2024 and 2025, driven by three compounding forces: expanding data-center capacity, hardware efficiency gains, and—the largest of the three—algorithmic progress.
- Treating the AI sector as a coherent economic entity yields preliminary estimates of nominal AI GDP at approximately $250 billion in 2025, growing at roughly 2,600 percent per year in quality-adjusted real terms.
- National economic statistics accounts were not designed to track this kind of activity. Statistics agencies should begin developing AI-focused satellite accounts now, before the measurement gap becomes a policy gap.
Here is much more from Anton Korinek and Patrick McKelvey. Via the excellent Samir Varma.
*How to Win a Trade War: An Optimistic Guide to an Anxious Global Economy*
That is the new Soumaya Keynes book, out today. I was happy to have blurbed this book, and here is an essay, on export restrictions, based on the book.
India fertility facts of the day
Ten notable facts from India’s new SRS Statistical Report 2024 published two days ago:
1) India’s total fertility rate (TFR) has dropped to 1.88 (rounded up to 1.9 in the figures) in 2024 from 1.92 in 2023.
2) This drop is roughly the historical speed of the last few decades. India’s TFR was 4.3 in 1985 and it has been falling around 0.06 per year since then.
3) For those who think “smartphones are the reason for the fall of TFR,” there is not much change in India’s TFR after their introduction. Of course, this might only apply to India.
4) India’s sex ratio at birth continues moving toward natural levels. It has grown from 907 girls per 1000 boys in 2018-2020 to 918 in 2022-2024. Without sex selection (e.g., selective abortions), it should be around 952.
5) Nonetheless, this bias still means that India’s replacement rate is around 2.15, not 2.1 as in other advanced economies.
6) Hence, India is already 0.27 children below the replacement rate and the gap continues growing.
7) However, this figure hides large regional differences. Kerala is at 1.3, well below the U.S. and approaching Italian and Spanish levels (Delhi is even lower, at 1.2, but it is a peculiar case), while Bihar remains at 2.9.
8) In terms of the rural/urban divide, rural India is at 2.1 and urban India at 1.5.
9) From everything I can see, India’s TFR will continue to fall, and it should reach 1.57 (the current level of the U.S.) around 2031 unless something significant changes.
10) Having said that, India’s data has a non-trivial margin of error, and a new Census might change our reading of the situation. In summary, India is following the same path as everyone else. No Indian fertility Sonderweg!
That is all from Jesús Fernández-Villaverde.
Tajikistan fact of the day
Tajikistan’s remittances are worth nearly half the country’s GDP—
In Tajikistan, remittances — the money sent or brought back by migrants — amounted to 48% of GDP in 2024. The chart places this figure in context by comparing it with other countries with data for the same year. Nicaragua and Honduras receive remittances worth around a quarter of their GDP — high by global standards, but still far below Tajikistan’s level. Remittances here include two types of flows: money migrants abroad send home to their families, and money cross-border workers bring home from short-term jobs abroad.
Both of these flows play a role in Tajikistan, where most remittances come from labor migrants in Russia. In addition to the roughly 400,000 Tajiks settled there, hundreds of thousands more cross the border for seasonal and short-term work.
According to a report from the International Organization for Migration, about 1.2 million Tajiks were in Russia in mid-2024, which is more than a tenth of Tajikistan’s total population.
The World Bank’s latest Tajikistan Economic Update says that much of the country’s recent rapid economic growth (above 8% since 2021) was supported by these remittance inflows.
That is from Our World in Data, with a picture at the link.
Who is losing out in marriage market competition?
Over the past half-century, U.S. four-year colleges have shifted from enrolling mostly men to enrolling mostly women, while the economic position of non-college men has weakened markedly. We examine how these changes correspond with the evolving structure of marriage markets across cohorts and places. As college men have become increasingly scarce, college women have maintained stable marriage rates by marrying high-earning non-college men. This shift—combined with the broader economic decline of non-college men—has sharply reduced the pool of economically stable partners available to non-college women: the share of non-college men who earn above the national median and are not married to college women has fallen by more than 50%. Cross-area evidence shows that education gaps in marriage are smaller where non-college men face lower rates of joblessness and incarceration. Taken together, the evidence suggests that deteriorating outcomes for men have primarily undermined the marriage prospects of non-college women.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Why I am skeptical on the relationship between smart phones and fertility
That is from Alex Nowrasteh. And for some country by country graphs:
Here is that link. There might be some connection to smart phones, but it just does not seem that strong? Perhaps the phones give a fillip and a modest acceleration to an already in place trend? And are Kenya’s phones really all that “smart,” even today?
Dwarkesh in the Datacenter
Dwarkesh tours one of Jane Street’s datacenters. It’s extraordinary how much compute goes into finance. (I once predicted that the finance AIs would be the first to become conscious, since they have the most compute.) More generally, however, this is a peek inside the remarkable economics, technology and physics of a datacenter. Did you know the electrical signal in a copper wire can travel faster than light in fiber…and that matters! Amazing.
South Korea facts of the day
When I was young, the South Korean model was generally lumped in with places like Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong as a case of “export-led growth”. Even in the early 1970s, South Korea was still poorer than the North. There was no consensus that East Asia would do better than Latin America (or indeed that America would do better than the Soviet Union.)
I hate the term “export-led growth”, as on its face it would seem to imply that South Korea got rich by running trade surpluses. But exactly the opposite is true. During the three and a half decades of near double-digit growth (roughly 1963-97), Korea ran almost nonstop trade deficits, apart from a few years in the 1980s. This graph is from an excellent Doug Irwin paper that discusses the Korean reforms of 1964-65…
Here is more from Scott Sumner.
Revealing Life Preferences Through LLMs
Here is some Weberian verstehen (or is it?), but from unexpected quarters:
Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained on a prodigious corpus of human writing and may reveal human preferences over characteristics of life courses, such as income, longevity, and working conditions. We present OpenAI’s GPT-5.4 and a broadly representative sample of Americans with pairs of life stories and ask them to choose the life they would prefer for themselves. A person’s choice is better predicted by the LLM’s choice than by another person’s choice over the same stories, and LLM valuations of several life attributes are similar to those derived from human responses. Our results suggest that LLM responses offer a scalable and cost-effective complement to existing methods for studying human preferences.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
One way to benefit adolescents
Have school start later:
We examine the impact of California’s Senate Bill 328 (SB 328), the first statewide mandate requiring later school start times for middle and high schools, on adolescent sleep, mental health, and academic outcomes. Using difference-in-differences and eventstudy designs across five data sources, we find that SB 328 increased the share of students sleeping at least 8 hours per night by 13%, meeting the CDC-recommended minimum for this age group. Average mental health effects are imprecisely estimated, but boys show significant reductions in sadness, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation, and Hispanic students, who experienced the largest sleep-timing shifts, show parallel reductions in difficulty concentrating; together these patterns are consistent with a dose-response relationship between sleep improvement and mental well-being. Math and English scores in grade 8 improved by approximately 0.08–0.10 standard deviations, with the largest gains among Hispanic and economically disadvantaged students. A within-state analysis using teachers’ commute arrival times as a proxy for pre-policy school start times corroborates these findings, and shows academic gains accumulating over 2023–2025 alongside a suggestive decline in high school dropout rates. The absence of effects on chronic absenteeism rules out an attendance-driven mechanism, pointing instead to the direct cognitive benefits of aligning school schedules with adolescents’ biological rhythms.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
The Impact of AI-Generated Text on the Internet
The proliferation of AI-generated and AI-assisted text on the internet is feared to contribute to a degradation in semantic and stylistic diversity, factual accuracy, and other negative developments. We find that by mid-2025, roughly 35% of newly published websites were classified as AI-generated or AI-assisted, up from zero before ChatGPT’s launch in late 2022. We also find evidence suggesting that increases in AI-generated text on the internet bring about a decrease in semantic diversity and an increase in positive sentiment. We do not, however, find statistically significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that an increased rate of AI-generated text on the internet decreases factual accuracy or stylistic diversity. Notably, our findings diverge from public perception of AI’s impact on the internet.
That is from a new paper by Jonas Dolezal, Sawood Alam Mark Graham, and Maty Bohacek. Via Glenn Mercer.