Some people at least. Daniel Rees writes to me:
…we find that college football games are associated with sharp increases in crime. For instance, assaults increase by about 9% when a community hosts a college football game, vandalism increases by about 18%, and DUIs increase by about 13%. We also find evidence that upsets result in larger increases in crime than games that do not produce an upset. For instance, an upset loss at home is associated with a 112% increase in assaults and a 61% increase in vandalism. We discuss these results in the context of psychological theories of fan aggression.
Addendum: Here is some outside coverage, see also Justin Wolfers at Freakonomics blog as well.
A compromise is that a draw offer should remain valid for some fixed period,
say ten moves. This will allow the person who has been offered a draw to test
whether the offer was truly justified, e.g. by trying a daring line which may
or may not be refuted by the opponent. If it is he can claim the draw on his tenth move, even if his position is losing. The limitation to ten moves avoids the potential problem of people playing on interminably after a draw offer, waiting for their opponents to blunder or overstep the time.
That is John Nunn, here is more. A draw, of course, is a form of trade, albeit one with some negative social externalities (a quick draw makes chess more boring for the spectators). If you want to limit trades in some markets, a similar rule could be contemplated. If you offer to buy a currency at a particular price, you have to keep a similar offer open for one week to some number of other market participants. Solve for the resulting equilibrium, and see how it matters.
[Economist Ray Fair] asked… Which players have exhibited the most unusual age-performance profiles? Specifically, are there any players who got better with age?
entire period between 1921-’04, Fair found only 18 hitters who appear
to have defied Mother Nature, logging four or more seasons after the
age of 28 in which their OPS (on-base plus slugging average) exceeded
their age-specific expected level by more than one standard error.
And you know what? Except for good ol’ Charlie Gehringer (1939), they all come 1987 or later. Goodness gracious! Who would have thought? Check here for the list and further discussion, and thanks to John de Palma for the pointer.
I don’t usually recycle posts but this one is from the early days of MR, and my view on steroids hasn’t changed much. Excerpt:
Note that the Olympics probably prosper more from competitive balance
than from a single dominant country. Was it really so much fun for the
rest of the world to watch the Soviets win all those medals? This would
predict that the Olympics should take special care to ban
performance-enhancing drugs, which is indeed the case.
Baseball is again thrown under a cloud, and one obvious question is how much we have close substitutes for our increasingly damaged pride in the sport. The likely eventual outcome is a long-run equilibrium where all performance enhancements are allowed, thereby placing an inefficient tax on amateurs and performers who don’t need to be the very best. Unless you think real enforcement is possible, the publicness of today’s not-even-surprising revelations means the game has no other way to go. Common knowledge does matter. So even if some of you think it might be more efficient to simply allow steroid use and then look the other way, that is not obviously an attainable equilibrium.
In Discover Your Inner Economist the economist and blogger Tyler Cowen provides quirky and insightful advice for life based on his signature urbane style of economic reasoning. On his blog, MarginalRevolution.com, Cowen offers economic advice in his periodic "Dear Trudie" posts. Presumably Cowen offers good economics. But dare one take an economist’s advice? Emily Yoffe, author of Slate‘s popular "Dear Prudence" advice column, will advise. Please join us for an advice-off, as Trudie meets Prudie to discuss the practical benefits of economic reasoning (or lack thereof) in everyday life.
Here are my previous Trudie posts.
Robert, a loyal MR reader, asks:
I was recently
reading about ARod’s decision to leave the Yankees. The article
mentioned "superagent Scott Boras." It’s widely believed in the sports
community that Boras has the ability to increase the salaries beyond
what they would get with a regular agent. Considering that there are
only 30-odd teams that might want a player, I find it hard to believe
that an agent could make such a big difference.
I know more about Mark Alarie than ARod, but super-agents may matter through the following mechanisms:
1. The super-agent manages an otherwise incompetent or unruly player. The agent is about improving the quality of the player as much as extracting surplus from the team.
2. A super-agent, especially if he has repeat business with teams, may credibly certify the unobservable qualities of players, even star players.
3. Boras may be very good at marketing his players to management and getting owners to open up their pocketbooks.
4. If Boras represents multiple stars, clubs will be reluctant to cross him. The equilibrium here is tricky. But if the agent has discretionary power to steer a player to one equal offer or the other, and the club reaps surplus from each player, a club may overbid for one player to stay on the agent’s good side and receive favorable discretionary treatment later on. Repeat dealings with the agent also mean that the club is more likely to follow through on its implicit commitments to both the player and the agent.
5. Robert suggests that some (non-super) agents may in fact be in league with the owners, not the players.
Can you think of other possible mechanisms?
The Economist will import its highly regarded debate series into America. The first debate is November 10, in New York City.
The debators? Will Wilkinson and myself against Jeffrey Sachs and Betsey Stevenson. Here are the details. The proposition is: "America is failing at the pursuit of happiness."
I hope to see some of you there. Can you guess which side I am on?
ESPN Magazine lists their list of the Nine Behind-the-Scenes Power Brokers in Sports. Reprinted in Business Week here. Includes one rather unexpected name.
I spent last Saturday at a very interesting conference on Sports Statistics, run by the Sports Stats section of the American Statistical Association. It was a fun day, involving academics, sports journalists, and those Moneyball-inspired quants working for various sports teams.
But at some point I asked myself: Why do economists work on sports?
- Sports provide unique opportunities to test economic theories. Cribbing from a New York Times article, this is the Thaler defense:
“‘My justification for doing this is that it’s the one really
high-stakes activity where you get to watch all of the decisions,”
Thaler said. ”If Bill Gates invited me to watch all of his decisions,
I’d talk more about that.”
- Sports shapes broader national debates. Sports is a microcosm of our broader society and our national narrative on the important issues, from drugs, to race, to cheating, to sexual harrassment often play out on our sports pages. In honor of a particularly compelling example, let’s
call this the Jackie Robinson defense.
- Professional sports are an important part of the economy. I call this the Dog defense, not as a dyslexo-religious statement, but simply because dogs raise an important question: aren’t pets a bigger part of the economy than professional athletics? If so, why are there so many papers on professional sports and so few on the economics of dogs?
- Sports participation is an important activity. It seems important to learn whether sports make us happier, healthier or more productive. For instance, it is important to learn, say, what the broader effects of Title IX were. Under this view, research on sports is part of the human capital agenda, leading me to call this the Gary Becker defense.
- Sports provides a useful teaching metaphor. Many of those teaching Sabermetrics-inspired courses argue that sports provides a useful vehicle for teaching something far more important – basic quantitative reasoning. When I teach my class on behavioral economics, I do so by analyzing anomalies in sports betting markets.
- Doing research on sports is fun. It was no mistake that the conference I attended was on a Saturday. Many of the academics in attendance were giving up leisure, not more important work. But for some, sports provides a chance to mix work with leisure; of course, if non of the above arguments holds, then it is just a chance to mix leisure with leisure.
Let me now translate this into advice, because I often hear from students wanting to write a thesis on sports. My first response is always: Don’t. Too often, we find our sporting heroes more interesting than other people do. (Yes, I have been guilty of breaking this rule.)
But if you must work on sports, make sure you have a defense to this charge. I find the Thaler and Becker defenses most compelling, because they speak to the broader economic issues or yield policy implications. The Jackie Robinson defense is also important, but not applicable often enough. The Dog defense is often raised, but rarely compelling; neither pets, nor professional sports, are really a big part of the economy (estimates to the contrary usually turn out to be more applicable to the Becker defense).
Here’s how to sound like an expert: Research tells us that prediction markets yield accurate forecasts. Indeed, a prediction market forecast is likely smarter than any expert. Simply point your browser to your favorite prediction market, and make the following observations confidently around the water cooler:
- Note that the American League looks much stronger than the National League. (HT: Mike Giberson at Midas Oracle.)
- Sigh, while you say that "Once again the American League race looks like being the Red Sox or the Yankees."
- State emphatically that "the National League is anyone’s race. Heck, even the come-from-behind Phillies are a chance." (Say this as though you didn’t already know they were the betting favorites)
That’s it. You are now an expert. (How else do you think an Aussie can keep up a conversation about U.S. sports? I’ve been faking it for years… but shhh, don’t tell David Stern.)
Former British champion Bill Hartston once observed, "Chess doesn’t drive people mad. It keeps mad people sane." Morphy and Fischer’s behavior became truly bizarre only after they retired from the game.
That is from Paul Hoffman’s King’s Gambit: A Son, A Father, and the World’s Most Dangerous Game. I loved this one, it’s one of the few great chess books. It’s also a tale of how Manhattan has changed, how sons become independent, the nature of psychological warfare, and why obsession never really dies. Note that author Hoffman is also editor of Discover magazine, which I enjoy as well.
"My only weirdness is you."
Here are previous installments in the series.
Legalizing wagering on which team wins or loses a particular game,
while banning all bets on immaterial outcomes like point spreads, would
destroy the market for illegal bookmakers and make sporting events less
corruptible by gamblers.
Point shaving may be widespread enough to have occurred in around 1 percent of N.C.A.A. basketball games.
Here is the full argument, and thanks to Chris F. Masse for the pointer; Chris also points me to this new and possibly very important study (a senior thesis by Jonathan Gibbs, at times the link isn’t working) of point shaving in the NBA.
Female tennis players play more conservatively and commit more
unforced errors when playing critical points. Does this explain the
upper-echelons wage gap?
Here is the fact in more detail:
Women are significantly more likely to hit unforced errors at the most
crucial stages of the match, while men exhibit no significant variation
in performance. Specifically, about 30% of men’s points end in unforced
errors, regardless of their placement in the distribution of the
importance variable. For women, about 36% of points in the bottom
quartile of the importance distribution end in unforced errors, but
unforced errors rise to nearly 40% for points in the top quartile of
the importance distribution. What is remarkable is not the difference
in the levels (men are more powerful and therefore more likely to hit
winners at any stage). The interest lies in the differences in the way
men and women respond to increases in competitive pressure.
Here is the full article.
1. The “I know your name, but I’m blocked” dodge:
“I keep wanting to call you "David," but I know that’s not right.”
2. The “Of course I know you — in fact, I want all your information” dodge:
“Hey, I’d love to get your card.”
3. The “The tip of my tongue” dodge:
“I know I know your name, but I’m blanking right now.”
4. The “You’re brilliant!” dodge:
“Wow, you have a terrific memory. I can’t believe you remember my name
from that meeting six months ago. I can’t remember the names of people
I met yesterday! So of course I have to ask you your name.”
5. The “Sure, I remember you” dodge:
“Remind me – what’s your last name?” If you ask a person for his last name, he’s likely to repeat both names. “Doe, John Doe.”
6. The “One-sided introduction” dodge:
“Hey,” you say to the person whose name you can’t remember, “let me
introduce you to Pat Smith.” You introduce the two and say the name of
the person whose name you remember. Almost always, the nameless person
will volunteer his or her name.
I have tried asking the person how his or her name should be spelled (if the name is too simple that one can backfire), or "when you publish articles, how much of your full name do you give?"
Do you all have better ideas?