Category: Medicine
Sweden, Medicare, and what really matters
Tino writes:
Medicare was introduced 1965 in the US. Public health coverage for the elderly existed by 1950 in Sweden, but full universal coverage dates to 1955 in Sweden (a public health insurance was founded in 1891, and public municipal public health existed for even longer).
In 1950, before Medicare, and before Universal coverage in Sweden the difference was +2.6 at birth and +0.3 at 65. In 2001-2005 the difference between the Sweden and US was +2.7 at birth and +0.3 years at 65. Identical!
First, regarding the life expectancy at birth we can note that 50 years of different health policy, labor mark policy, welfare state coverage seems to have had zero effect on total outcome.
And:
Last note: around 1900, before the expansion of the welfare state, the estimated life expectancy at birth was 54.0 years in Sweden and 47.3 years in the US, a difference of 5.3 years, twice the current gap.
If you scroll through Tino's blog, you will find various critiques of The Spirit Level. On the health care point, I would stress that Hansonian results also can be used to argue for the extreme exercise of monopsony power, so don't think the policy implications of this are so simple.
Good opening paragraphs
I’m sort of inured to pain by this point. Anesthetic is illegal for people like me, so we learn to live without it; I’ve made scalpel incisions in my hands, pushed five-millimeter diameter needles through my skin, and once used a vegetable knife to carve a cavity into the tip of my index finger. I’m an idiot, but I’m an idiot working in the name of progress: I’m Lepht Anonym, scrapheap transhumanist. I work with what I can get.
Here is more. I thank David Cassel for the pointer.
Haiti fact of the day
Victims like her could eventually bring the number of Haiti's quake-related amputees to as many as 150,000 – meaning almost 2% of the nation's 9 million people could be in that condition by year's end.
The source article is here. Here is one source on the problem:
Most previous amputees were like Verly Boulevard, 31, who lost a leg in a car crash and has spent years hobbling on crutches, unemployed. "In Haiti, if you're an amputee you don't exist," says Boulevard as he waits for water at a crowded and squalid tent camp in the Port-au-Prince suburb of Pétionville. "It will be difficult to change that, even after the earthquake."
Is health insurance good for you?
Kevin Drum follows up on recent debates. Apart from mortaility, he mentions:
…preventive care, pain reduction, life improvement, employability, stress reduction, medical bankruptcies, etc.
One way of measuring the value of health insurance is by its market price and by that standard many of the current uninsured just don't value health insurance very much. That's why they don't buy it. I don't mean to rule out paternalism a priori, but it's odd not to mention the price of insurance as a bound of its value.
There is a more-than-defensible line of argumentation that the value of a poor man's life is not measured by his money. But again, that has more force for when someone gives him health insurance (Medicaid) than when we make him buy it. In the latter case we're also taking away something he values and the scope of that value, all things considered, also may well go beyond its monetary measure.
It's also the case that market data can prove misleading. It could be that government provision can get the poor health insurance more cheaply, without the private sector mark-up. That possibility militates in favor of a Medicaid expansion but not the mandate. When it comes to the mandate, policy doesn't avoid the private sector mark-up on the insurance and there's also a loss from the relatively low valuation of the insurance. Even with the subsidies, a lot of the poor would be worse off having to buy the product. Those that are better off won't be better off by so much.
It's one thing to count up "lives saved from insurance" but a lot of those lives are, in ex ante terms, actually made worse off from the mandate. Some recent research indicates that an economic downturn saves the lives of a lot of lower-middle class individuals by limiting their consumption of cigarettes. Surely the first question is whether the downturn makes those individuals better off — doubtful — and not whether it saves some of their lives.
Another way to value health insurance, especially govrernment-supplied health insurance, is to look at differences across states. Texas is skimpy with Medicaid benefits but New York is much more generous. If you're considering moving across state lines, how big a draw is this? Can any of you refer me to a paper on the implicit hedonic value of Medicaid benefits or other forms of insurance? I would be interested in understanding this data.
I've read many blog posts on this topic in the last week but they are skimpy on the ordinal approach, which in my view further favors Medicaid expansion over the mandate.
Health insurance and mortality follow-up
On health insurance and mortality, you'll find Megan's further thoughts (which I agree with) here (and now here). Neither of us is saying the real net effect is zero. Also check out Matt, Ezra, Austin Frakt, all of whom make good points.
Overall I'd like to see more numbers in the health care debate. If the Obama plan spends $90 billion extra a year on coverage and saves/extends 10,000 lives a year (a plausible estimate, in my view), that is $9 million a life, a rather underwhelming rate of return. That's a very gross comparison because life extension is not the only benefit and the $90 billion is not the only cost. Still, as a starting point for analysis I don't think it makes the plan look better. Keep also in mind that many of the newly covered people are bumping others back into the queue, since the overall supply of medical care isn't going up and may even be declining.
If you did a simple cost-benefit comparison, the Obama plan vs. a simple extension of Medicaid, more R&D through the NIH, and some targeted public health expenditures, I believe the latter would win hands down. And the latter seems more politically feasible too. It avoids the mandate, the unworkable and ridiculously low penalties for those who don't sign up for insurance, and the awkwardly high implicit marginal tax rates imposed by the subsidy scheme. It probably involves fewer corporate and "back room" deals.
In its favor, the Obama plan makes it easier to become an entrepreneur without losing health insurance coverage. I doubt if that's enough to swing the balance, but in any case it's worth thinking about.
Please don't argue that the Obama plan saves money. Even if you believe that (I don't), here we are talking about the marginal impact of one subcomponent of the overall plan. That subcomponent does cost money.
When it comes to the Obama plan, the easy targets are stupid or hypocritical Republicans. The hard target is why the plan should beat the alternative reforms I've outlined above or perhaps other ways of spending the money. I'd like to see more people take on the hard target rather than the easy.
Clarification on health care
Over at Twitter, Matt Yglesias asks:
Do rightwingers really believe that US health insurance has no mortality-curbing impact?
I don't speak for "right-wingers," but I'll say this:
1. I genuinely don't know what to believe. And I often toy with the idea of an "innovation-maximizing" health care policy, so that future coverage is more effective.
2. I am commonly excoriated by people (not Matt) for not supporting government-subsidized universal health insurance, yet few if any of these people grapple seriously with the best evidence.
3. I live in a country where the extension of health insurance is a major issue, and a major budgetary issue, yet much of the discussion is in an evidence-free zone.
4. I don't view it as incumbent on me to come up with the final answers in this debate or even a provisional stance. It's incumbent on the people pushing coverage plans to make the case for what they are doing and so far they haven't. I do recognize that medical bankruptcy is a separate set of issues and that greater coverage will significantly lower financial risk. That said, the appropriate response on the health issue is not to change the topic and start talking about bankruptcy.
My original post is here.
How many people die from lack of health insurance?
Megan McArdle has an excellent post on that question and here is her column. Here is one startling bit:
To my mind probably the single most solid piece of evidence is this: turning 65–i.e., going on Medicare–doesn't reduce your risk of dying. If lack of insurance leads to death, then that should show up as a discontinuity in the mortality rate around the age of 65. It doesn't. There are some caveats–if the effects are sufficiently long term, then it's hard to measure, because of course as elderly people age, their mortality rate starts rising dramatically. But still, there should be some kink in the curve, and in the best data we have, it just isn't there.
And this:
The possibility that no one risks death by going without health insurance may be startling, but some research supports it. Richard Kronick of the University of California at San Diego’s Department of Family and Preventive Medicine, an adviser to the Clinton administration, recently published the results of what may be the largest and most comprehensive analysis yet done of the effect of insurance on mortality. He used a sample of more than 600,000, and controlled not only for the standard factors, but for how long the subjects went without insurance, whether their disease was particularly amenable to early intervention, and even whether they lived in a mobile home. In test after test, he found no significantly elevated risk of death among the uninsured.
I agree with her conclusion:
Intuitively, I feel as if there should be some effect. But if the results are this messy, I would guess that the effect is not very big.
Yet another Haitian worry
Most of the sanatorium’s several hundred surviving patients fled and are now living in the densely packed tent cities where experts say they are probably spreading the disease. Most of these patients have also stopped taking their daily regimen of pills, thereby heightening the chance that there will be an outbreak of a strain resistant to treatment, experts say.
There is a tuberculosis clinic in Port-au-Prince, but of the 20 doctors and 50 nurses who worked there, only one nurse is showing up for work. The others have either died, are injured, are dealing with family problems, fear the collapse of the building, or they fear the heavy work burden and the chance of infection. The full story is here.
Medicare vouchers
Ross Douthat surveys and evaluates the debate over Paul Ryan's "Medicare vouchers" plan. Here Ezra interviews Ryan.
I am very interested in voucher plans but here is one source of my unease. Let's say you are given a voucher for a health insurance plan and there is no legal requirement that the plan cover Parkinson's. Many people buy plans which do not cover Parkinson's. Some of those people get Parkinson's. Are we pre-committing to ignore the woes of those people? If so, how exactly do we do this?
I'm not ruling this alternative out (there are plenty of cases where we let people die), I just want to know what are the surrounding institutional structures, what happens if these people show up at emergency rooms, and also whether this wouldn't, eventually, give rise to a new "second tier" of lower-quality public sector institutions to handle cases not covered by insurance.
That is indeed one possible reform: a UK-like system for those who gamble and lose, with higher quality care for those who buy the more comprehensive or the more balanced policies. (Maybe lots of people will buy gold-plated care for heart disease and nursing homes but go uncovered for neurological disorders, just to state one possibility.) You'll notice, however, a tension. The better the second-tier public-owned institutions, the more people will gamble with low or unbalanced levels of coverage. The UK-like system might take over large parts of health care, with a private insurance-based system for some subset of maladies only.
That's not the end of the world but perhaps it should be evaluated as such. You might already be thinking that parts of the nursing home and mental health sectors operate this way under the status quo.
There's also a longer-run question, namely whether the seniors would prefer to capture those resources in the form of social security benefits — cash — and take their chances with the publicly owned institutions to a greater degree. Maybe yes, maybe no, but those are the issues I think about when it comes to this kind of voucher plan.
At the other end of the spectrum, the law can mandate that the voucher-funded insurance plans cover lots and lots of conditions. Mandates don't stay modest, etc. In that case, is there really competition between the private insurance plans? What's the advantage of having private participation here if the insurance companies are regulated like public utilities and forced into a common price/quality mode?
It seems to me that the first set of alternatives are the relevant comparison.
One proposal for health care reform is to stipulate a total (fixed) budget for social security and Medicare together and then create a commission — controlled by Congressmen from Florida — to allocate the funds as is seen fit. I wonder what the resulting equilibrium would look like. Is that a politically acceptable way to institute a de facto voucher program?
Henry Aaron writes to me
James Kwak's calculation of the value of tax exclusion is incomplete. He leaves out the exclusion from the payroll tax, worth 15.3 percent to the person in his example and to most people, and 2.9 percent (at the margin) for the rest who earn more than the OASDI taxable maximum. The correct math is that the gross wage is 1 + .0765 = 1.0765 to allow for the employer's payroll tax cost. The take home pay that could be used, after both payroll and income tax for someone in the 15 percent bracket is 1 – 0.0765 – 0.15 = 0.7735. That means that the tax wedge is equivalent to a subsidy of 1- [.7735/1.0765] =.7185. That is a 28.15 percent subsidy.
For filers in the 28 percent bracket, which is easy to reach for a couple each of whom earns, say, $75,000, the subsidy is a bit over 40 percent.
How much does tax-subsidized health insurance matter for health care costs?
James Kwak gives us his back-of-the-envelope estimate:
The median family household had income of $62,621 in 2008, which means it has a marginal tax rate of 15%. (We’re pretty close to the 25% threshold, so I’ll use 20% in what follows.) So without the exclusion, the typical family plan would cost about $16,000 in pretax dollars, not $13,000; the exclusion gives the median family a discount of 20%. Only about 60% of people get health insurance through an employer plan, so the average discount across the population is only 12%. Given that the price elasticity of health care is almost certainly a lot less than one (if you double the price, demand won’t fall in half), the overconsumption due to the tax exclusion must be less than 12%. Yet our per-capital health care expenditures are more than 60% above those of any other advanced country.
In other words it matters, but not as much as many people claim.
Addendum: Here is Henry Aaron's correction.
Perspectives
A three minute TED talk on changing perspectives. Enjoyable.
More criticisms of comparativeness effectiveness research
There is a growing awareness among researchers, including advocates of quality measures, that past efforts to standardize and broadly mandate "best practices" were scientifically misconceived. Dr. Carolyn Clancy of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the federal body that establishes quality measures, acknowledged that clinical trials yield averages that often do not reflect the "real world" of individual patients, particularly those with multiple medical conditions. Nor do current findings on best practices take into account changes in an illness as it evolves over time. Tight control of blood sugar may help some diabetics, but not others. Such control may be prudent at one stage of the malady and not at a later stage. For years, the standards for treatment of the disease were blind to this clinical reality.
Orszag's mandates not only ignore such conceptual concerns but also raise ethical dilemmas. Should physicians and hospitals receive refunds after they have suffered financial penalties for deviating from mistaken quality measures? Should public apologies be made for incorrect reports from government sources informing the public that certain doctors or hospitals were not providing "quality care" when they actually were? Should a physician who is skeptical about a mandated "best practice" inform the patient of his opinion? To aggressively implement a presumed but still unproven "best practice" is essentially a clinical experiment. Should the patient sign an informed consent document before he receives the treatment? Should every patient who is treated by a questionable "best practice" be told that there are credible experts who disagree with the guideline?
That's Jerome Groopman, the full article is here, interesting throughout, and I thank someone — alas I have mislaid the email address – for the pointer. My apologies to the person who sent this in.
A betting market for the health care plan
It opened not long ago, find it here, as I write it's at 33.9 for passage before July and it has been rising from 20 or so. Bernanke, by the way, is back up to 93.
Health care: where to go from here?
Megan McArdle recommends:
Raise the Medicare tax by half a percentage point, and eliminate the tax-deductibiity of health insurance benefits for people making more than $150K a year in household income, $100K for singles. Then make the federal government the insurer of last resort. Any medical expenses more than 15% or 20% of household income, get picked up by Uncle Sam.
Ezra Klein recommends:
Medicare buy-in between 50 and 65. Medicaid expands up to 200 percent of poverty with the federal government funding the whole of the expansion. Revenue comes from a surtax on the wealthy.
And that's it. No cost controls. No delivery-system reforms. Nothing that makes the bill long or complex or unfamiliar.
My earlier thoughts are here.