Category: Political Science

Can a Nobel Peace Prize make peace harder to achieve?

David Axelrod spoke:

“I’d like to believe that winning the Nobel Peace Prize is not a political liability,” said David Axelrod,
a senior adviser to Mr. Obama. “But this isn’t something I gave a
moment of thought to until today. Hopefully people will receive it with
some sense of pride. But I don’t know; it’s uncharted waters.”

Putting aside domestic responses, can holding a Peace Prize make it harder to bring about peace?  I believe the answer is yes.  The positive scenario is that holding the Prize signals strength and induces other bargainers to jump aboard your winning bandwagon, for fear of being locked out of an eventual agreement.  The more negative scenario arises when the Prize holder is expected to pressure Country X, Ruritania.  If the Prize holder secretly wishes to favor Ruritania in negotiations, a President without a Prize can to some extent feign or credibly signal weak bargaining power: "I'm sorry, Ruritania just won't budge; you'll have to move closer to their position."  It's harder for the Prize holder to send this same signal, since everyone expects him to get Ruritania to budge (if not, the Prize holder also doesn't have any bargaining advantages either).  The Prize holder may find it harder to deal with truly intransigient nations; fortunately we don't have many of those in the world right now. 

Related arguments are that a Prize can make it harder to practice strategies of "creative ambiguity" or "low expectations."

David Frum suggests the Prize makes it harder for Obama to be hawkish

China committee of the day

Today's Financial Times writes about the Central Organization Department of China:

To glean a sense of the dimensions of the organization department's job, conjure up a parallel body in Washington.  The imaginary department would oversee the appointments of US state governors and their deputies; the mayors of big cities; heads of federal regulatory agencies; the chief executives of General Electric, Exxon-Mobil, Walmart and 50-odd of the remaining largest companies; justices on the Supreme Court; the editors of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post; the bosses of the television networks and cable stations; the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities and the heads of think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.

All equivalent positions in China are filled by people appointed by the party through the organization department.

I would not want to be on the bad side of the Central Organization Department.  The full article, which is interesting throughout, is here.  It's also related to why I don't see China just evolving into a normal democracy.

“Too big to take a pay cut”

Here is my latest column.  It's about how politicization is behind the financial crisis (in part), why we haven't learned very much from the financial crisis, why we are treating the health care sector just as we have been treating the banks, and why Atlas Shrugged is selling so many more copies.

Excerpt:

We should stop using political favors as a means of managing an
economic sector. Unfortunately, though, recent experience with health care reform
shows we are moving in the opposite direction and not heeding the basic
lessons of the financial crisis. Finance and health care are two
separate issues, of course, but in both cases we’re making the common
mistake of digging in durable political protections for special
interest groups.

One
came over the summer when it was reported that the Obama administration
had promised deals to doctors and to pharmaceutical companies under the
condition that they publicly support health care reform. That’s another
example of creating favored beneficiaries through politics.

If these initial deals are falling apart, it is only because reform
met with unexpected resistance. Even after Mr. Obama’s speech Wednesday
night, we’re still at the point where the medical sector is enshrined
as “too big to take a pay cut,” which is not so far removed from the
banking motto of “too big to fail.” In finance and health care, a
common political dynamic has created similar trends, namely,
out-of-control costs, weak accountability, and the use of immediate
revenue patches to postpone dealing with fundamental problems.

Even
worse, these political deals threaten open discourse. The dealmaking
may be inhibiting some people in health care from speaking out in
opposition to the administration’s proposals. Robert Reich, who served
as secretary of labor in the Clinton administration, deserves credit
for complaining about this arrangement, but not enough people are asking where such dealmaking might stop.

The banking sector has been facing similar constraints; if bankers criticize the Treasury
or the Fed, they risk losing their gilded cages and could get a bad
deal when the next bailout comes. When major economic sectors can be
influenced in this way, are we really very far from the nightmare
depicted by Ayn Rand in “Atlas Shrugged”?

The conclusion is this:

In short, we should return both the financial and medical sectors and,
indeed, our entire economy to greater market discipline. We should move
away from the general attitude of “too big to take a pay cut,”
especially when the taxpayer is on the hook for the bill. If such
changes sound daunting, it is a sign of how deep we have dug ourselves
in. We haven’t yet learned from the banking crisis, and we’re still
moving in the wrong direction pretty much across the board.

The French carbon tax

France is finding is hard to pass a stiff carbon tax, though of course they already use lots of (non-carbon) nuclear power:

Details are finally emerging about the country’s planned “carbon tax,” to be put in place next year. And the idea is anything but popular.

The center-right French government wants to levy a tax of 14 euros per ton of carbon dioxide starting in 2010; carbon taxes are popular with many economists and business leaders because they are seen as easier to implement than carbon-trading plans, which France also belongs to.

In reality, France’s carbon tax is basically just a gasoline tax–and a tiny one at that. The electricity sector, overwhelmingly powered by emissions-free nuclear power, isn’t part of the plan [TC: Duh!], Prime Minister Francois Fillon told Le Figaro. The tax will basically fall on liquid fuels–raising pump prices 3 euro cents a liter (that’s roughly 15 U.S. cents a gallon).

In theory it will be revenue-neutral but most French voters are nonetheless opposed to the measure.  Here is further information:

Large CO2 emitters, such as oil refiners and steel makers, will be exempted from paying the new tax. The government will propose special compensations for fishermen, farmers and truckers…

What is conservatism?

I've already done What is Progressivism? so here is another installment.  This isn't what conservatives today necessarily believe, it's a retranslation of a mishmash of conservatism into a language which I can understand and, in part, present to others.  Here goes:

1. Evil is real and there exist evil nations in the world; the relatively virtuous Western powers require strong states to fend off such evils.  This distinct from "big government" in the sense advocated by modern liberals. 

2. In international affairs, in the twentieth century, the United
States in particular has been unselfish to a remarkable degree.  We
therefore should trust the United States with unprecedented power.  In
fact we have no alternative.  Some cultures really are better than
others.

3. The spread of nuclear weapons, and other forms of WMD, to irrational, evil and undeterrable
powers is the number one foreign policy issue.  It runs the risk of
equalizing the balance of power between virtuous and evil agents in the
world.

4. On the domestic front, education is the keystone issue.  Societies succeed if strong family structures support an emphasis on learning and acculturation.  While this does not rule out public sector education, if public sector education works the credit is not to be found in the public sector.

5. When in doubt, side with the laws and customs that have, over time,
been associated with the Western powers and their growth into powerful
and durable societies.  It's hard to judge a lot of customs using pure,
unadulterated reason, as Oakeshott and Hayek have suggested.  Defending traditional values is an enterprise which itself requires a mix of law and custom.  If you're focused mainly on "policy proposals," you are missing the point.

7. We do not have either the resources or the norms to remake society in the direction of a fully-comfortable-for-everyone social democracy.  We do need welfare states to keep a polity in running order, but we should be modest about what such regimes can accomplish.  They cannot overcome a fundamental lack of proper values as found in many poor or disadvantaged communities.

8. Fiscal conservatism is part and parcel of conservatism per se.  A state wrecked by debt is a state due to perish or fall into decay.  This is a lesson from history.  States must "save up their powder" for true crises and it is a kind of narcissistic arrogation to think that the personal failures of particular individuals — often those with weak values — meet this standard.

9. For conservatism, small government is a means, not an end.  It is a means to the values which lie behind Western civilization and it is a means toward the prosperity we need to live well and defend ourselves.  Capitalism is important but capitalism itself relies upon particular values held by the citizenry.

10. Responsibility is a more important value than either liberty or equality.

Here is Julian Sanchez on what such exercises might mean.  I don't know exactly what they mean.  For me they are a means of thinking through ideas.

Addendum: Arnold Kling comments.

What if John Kerry had won?

A loyal MR reader writes to me:

I love when you think through counterfactuals, so here’s
one that’s been on my mind.  Imagine John Kerry wins in 2004.  What are
the implications for the 2006 midterms and more importantly the 2008
presidential election?  We probably pull out of Iraq without ever attempting the
surge, and leave the country in chaos.  But more importantly, the housing
bubble collapses on a Democrat's watch, not [a] Republican's.  Regardless of what
anyone says, the housing bubble was going to burst.  Maybe the collapse takes a
different path under Kerry than Bush, but it still happens, leaving his administration
to deal with it.  Does he win re-election?  Is McCain still the Republican
candidate?  And what becomes of a little known back bencher named Barack Obama?

I am sorry to disappoint such an excellent reader but I genuinely do not know what would have happened, if say Kerry had been more personally appealing to more voters (that counterfactual more or less holds constant other factors which are more directly political).  I do know this is a reason why I think it is very hard to forecast the net impact of a single election.  Do you remember the furor and then the agony from 2004?

Will there be another Milton Friedman?

Dan Klein, guest-blogging at AustrianEconomists, poses the question and says no, there will not be a classical liberal advocate of comparable stature.  At least not anytime soon:

With
the postwar re-awakenings, bold thinkers defied the cultural ruts of
their times. They rediscovered pieces of the liberal understanding.
Mises, Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, Tullock, Rothbard, Kirzner, Alchian,
Sowell, Coase, Bauer, Simon and Demsetz developed new statements of
parts of liberal wisdom. Because it had been dead and buried, it now
seemed fresh and original. They earned status as epic figures by fresh
pioneering and academic kudos. But what they formulated and taught to
all of us was the low-hanging fruit of all that had been forgotten.  I’m
not saying that everything they teach had been taught 150 years prior.
But a lot of it had, and the basic verities pretty much all had….

I don’t think that a clone of Milton Friedman could today become Milton Friedman. To get on in Econ he’d have to do a lot more math, and identify with “normal scientists.” Back in the day, Hayek, Coase, and Buchanan could eschew math and still end up with Nobel prizes. Not today.

Normal scientists won’t embrace you academically if you don’t seem like their
kind. You would have to become their kind. You wouldn’t develop liberal
vision and motivation. Or, if you did you wouldn’t become first among
your peers at a top department (even, that is, if you had the
endowments of a Milton Friedman).

The culture generally is becoming more fragmented, because of technology. But technology is making the academic discipline more integrated and monolithic, even at the international level. There is no “freshwater” vs.
“saltwater” and so on. It is like the baseball player market, one big
pyramid. The top departments are alike and the rest strive to maintain
their standing in the pyramid.

Regardless of academic standing, how is the modern clone of Milton Friedman to cut
a figure? The low-hanging fruit has been plucked and digested by the
liberal movement. A new young brilliant dynamo could write a nice book
like Free to Choose or Road to Serfdom, but who would care? It’s all available in another dozen books that have appeared since 1960.

There is more at the link and of course you can see the link to David Hume's ideas about the posts of honour being filled.  I agree with Dan.

How to deal with power-addicted politicians

This has been a fruitful dialog.  Two days ago Matt Yglesias made a list of how progressives should respond to the public choice critique of big government:

– This is why it’s important to be a civil libertarian and to be much
more skeptical than the political/media mainstream is of the idea that
what’s at stake in these debates is really a “balance” between a
“security” imperative and some airy “values.” It is overwhelmingly
likely that various secret police powers are simply going to be abused,
rather than put to some productive-but-liberty-infringing use.

– This is also a reason to be skeptical of ideas about discretionary regulatory fine-tuning. You always could
improve outcomes by abandoning rigid rules (with “do what you want”
counting as a rigid rule) but in practice you probably won’t.

– I think this also counts on a reason to prefer systems that rely more on career civil servants
and less on political appointees. Bureaucrats have their own
distinctive psychopathologies, but they’re different, and it’s helpful
to have them in more tension and balance than exists in the United
States.

– It’s also important to have in place systems for effective
monitoring of elected officials. A Canadian voter elects one federal
official–a Member of Parliament. An American elects four–a President,
two Senators, and one Representative. Americans don’t have four times
as much time as Canadians to pay attention to what politicians are
doing or to learn the issues; our politicians are just being monitored
less. When you consider the proliferation of things like independently
elected school boards, district attorneys, sheriffs, etc. keep in mind
that this diffusion of responsibility is a good way for the egomaniacal
to evade responsibility.

– If that leaves us with too few veto points, the thing to do is not to have additional houses of legislature, but Swiss-style (as opposed to California-style) direct democracy, where the actions of a unicameral legislature can be checked by the voters.

I agree with much of the list (for one thing, however, I think voting for a fewer number of politicians will have a very small beneficial effect in terms of voter attention); the question is what should be added to it.  "Smaller government" is a question-begging answer even if you favor that outcome.  It's a list of what will get you to better governmental outcomes, whatever you think those might be.

The addictions of fame and power

Matt Yglesias writes:

At the same time, I’ve come to be increasingly baffled by the high degree [of] cynicism and immorality
displayed in big-time politics. For example, Senators who genuinely do
believe that carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to a global
climate crisis seem to think nothing of nevertheless taking actions
that endanger the welfare of billions of people on the grounds that
acting otherwise would be politically problematic in their state. In
other words, they don’t want to do the right thing because their
self-interest points them toward doing something bad. But it’s
impossible to imagine these same Senators stabbing a homeless person in
a dark DC alley to steal his shoes. And what’s more, the entire
political class would be (rightly!) shocked and appalled by
the specter of a Senator murdering someone for personal gain. Yet it’s
actually taken for granted that “my selfish desires dictate that I do
x” constitutes a legitimate reason to do the wrong thing on important
legislation.

Making it all the odder, the level of self-interest at stake isn’t
all that high. Selling the public good down the river to bolster your
re-election chances isn’t like stealing a loaf of bread to feed your
starving children. The welfare rolls are hardly stocked with the names
of former members of congress. Indeed, it’s not even clear that voting
“the wrong way” poses particularly serious threats to one’s
re-election. But even if it did, one might assume that people who
bother to dedicating their lives to securing vast political power did
so because they actually wanted to accomplish something and get in the history books, perhaps, as one of the big heroes of their era.

I don't intend any particular point about cap and trade, but viewed more generally it's stunning how true this is.  (In fairness, note that the title of this post is my framing, not necessarily Matt's.)  Many people — especially those who become politicians — really do want fame and power and it is amazing what they will talk themselves into to get there and to stay there.  They don't even want fame in the sense of being recognized, in the longer run, for having done the right thing.  They want more personal influence and power now.

An unwelcome thought

Are blogger attacks on the Republicans counterproductive at this point, at least from a "left" point of view?  Is not the relevant signal telling Obama he can safely move to the center without losing much support?  The blogger voices are in essence signaling that a broader public must stand behind these attacks, or that a broader public is being convinced by these attacks, and therefore that Obama need not fear defections and he can continue to ignore campaign promises.

An alternative scenario is that the attacks turn some of the still-undecideds against the Republicans and bring them into the Democratic camp.  Is that a relevant margin?

At this point, how many people say the following: "You know what honey, I was just reading those blogs this morning.  I used to like Sarah Palin but this time she has really gone over the edge.  I don't know about her any more.  Maybe we should think about voting Democratic."

How about: "Honey, they've called off the death panels.  We can support the mandates now."?

The funny thing is, a lot of people do think like that, I'm just not sure they are the ones reading blogs.

The general point is that if you are not a pivotal voter, announcing your true preferences and views does not necessarily help you get what you want.

Those who blog about primary challenges to Democrats from the left, or the need to deliver concrete results before the next election, may be serving up better rhetorical strategies.  But of course that is also less fun.

Bill Maher unleashes his inner Bryan Caplan

Bill Maher at the Huffington Post:

Or take the health care debate we're presently having: members of Congress have recessed now so they can go home and "listen to their constituents." An urge they should resist because their constituents don't know anything. At a recent town-hall meeting in South Carolina, a man stood up and told his Congressman to "keep your government hands off my Medicare," which is kind of like driving cross country to protest highways.

I'm the bad guy for saying it's a stupid country, yet polls show that a majority of Americans cannot name a single branch of government, or explain what the Bill of Rights is….

Nearly half of Americans don't know that states have two senators and more than half can't name their congressman. And among Republican governors, only 30% got their wife's name right on the first try.

Sarah Palin says she would never apologize for America. Even though a Gallup poll says 18% of Americans think the sun revolves around the earth. No, they're not stupid. They're interplanetary mavericks….

People bitch and moan about taxes and spending, but they have no idea what their government spends money on. The average voter thinks foreign aid consumes 24% of our federal budget. It's actually less than 1%….

And I haven't even brought up America's religious beliefs. But here's one fun fact you can take away: did you know only about half of Americans are aware that Judaism is an older religion than Christianity? That's right, half of America looks at books called the Old Testament and the New Testament and cannot figure out which one came first.

And these are the idiots we want to weigh in on the minutia of health care policy?

Very funny. If only it were not true.

Paul Romer, ask and ye shall receive

For a man who likes the Kentucky Colonels, is that not how it ought to be?  Reality now brings Caribbean Charter Islands:

The UK has resumed day-to-day control of the Turks and Caicos
islands amid ongoing allegations of widespread corruption in the
British overseas territory, the Foreign Office said tonight.

Local
government in the islands, which lie 500 miles south-east of Florida in
the Atlantic, will be suspended for up to two years while their affairs
are put back in "good order", according to the FCO.

The Islanders themselves are divided over the idea.

Charter Cities

Paul Romer's TED talk on charter cities is up and Romer is now writing more about the idea at his Charter Cities Blog.  In the TED talk and on the blog Romer gives a "fanciful" example of how a charter city might work:

Imagine
that the United States and Cuba agree to disengage by closing the
military base and transferring local administrative control to Canada…

To
help the city flourish, the Canadians encourage immigration. It is a
place with Canadian judges and Mounties that happily accepts millions
of immigrants. Some of the new residents could be Cuban émigrés who
return from North America. Others might be Haitians who come work in
garment factories that firms no longer feel safe bringing into Haiti…

Initially,
the government of Cuba lets some of its citizens participate by
migrating to the new city. Over time, it encourages citizens to move
instead to a new city that it creates in a special economic zone
located right outside the charter city, just as the Mainland Chinese
let its citizens move into Shenzhen next to Hong Kong.

With
clear rules spelled out in the charter and enforced by the Canadian
judicial system, all the infrastructure for the new city is financed by
private investment. The Canadians pay for the government services they
provide (the legal, judicial, and regulatory systems, education, basic
health care) out of the gains in the value of the land in the
administrative zone. This, of course, creates the right incentives to
invest in education and health. Growth in human capital makes income
grow very rapidly, which makes the land in the zone even more valuable. 

It's interesting to compare charter cities to Patri Friedman's concept of seasteading (Alex, Tyler). 
Both charter cities and seasteading are motivated by the desire to
break out of conventional political arrangements and create a system
with much greater scope for innovation in rules.

Romer wants
charter cities built on uninhabited land (of which there is plenty),
seasteading is cities built on the sea (even more plentiful).  Aside
from the obvious advantage of building on land, charter cities allow
current elites to buy-in and gain from the charter city (ala Shenzhen and in other ways)
and thus probably have a better chance of getting "on the ground." 
Charter cities also address a key question about seasteading – will
governments regulate or takeover a successful seastead?  A charter city
is an agreement between governments – Cuba agrees to let Canada
import Canadian rules onto a small portion of Cuban property.  Cuba
could renege on the deal but it's going to be much harder for Cuba to
renege on Canada than for the U.S. government to regulate or otherwise
control seasteading.

By the way, the fact that Romer wants charter cities built on uninhabitated land with plenty of immigration from the charter nation goes some way to reducing the problem of nationalism that concerns Tyler and also the problem of transplanting legal institutions that concerns Arnold Kling.

We don't have many examples of charter cities in action but Hong Kong is a promising example.  Despite nationalism, the agreement with Britain was accepted for over 100 years and it worked.  Contra Tyler, we shouldn't think of what happened in 1997 as China
taking over Hong Kong but rather as the final element of Hong Kong taking
over China.

Seasteading does have one big advantage over charter
cities.  Seasteading is more radical but it is more open, less
tied to elites, and more flexible so, if it works, it is a better design for what Romer
calls innovation in rules formation.

Matt Yglesias outlines an intelligent version of libertarianism

Picking up my previous request, Matt responds:

I think libertarianism is best understood as a kind of esoteric
doctrine. There’s strong evidence to believe that people who
overestimate their own efficacy in life wind up doing better than those
with more accurate perceptions. It follows that it’s strongly desirable
for society to be organized so as to bolster myths of meritocracy. This
will lead to individual instances of injustice and to a lot of
apparently preventable suffering, but over the long-term the aggregate
impact of growth (which, of course, compounds) on human welfare will
swamp this as long as we can maintain the spirit of capitalism.

A separate issue is the welfare of the world’s poorest. Progressive
internationalists have this kind of dopey vision of trying to make
trade and immigration policy win-win-win for everyone by using
redistributive taxation to ensure that everyone shares in the benefits.
That sounds nice, but it means that in addition to trying to conquer
people’s racist and nationalistic instincts you’re also
engaged in a fight to pry wealth out of the hands of the wealthy and
powerful. As a political strategy, it doesn’t really make much sense.
Why not simply join forces with the wealthy and powerful so
as to create a political coalition that’s plausibly capable of
overwhelming xenophobia and creating borders that are relatively open
to the flow of goods and labor?

That is exactly the kind of response I was hoping for and both points make sense to me.  Here is a related Matt post on progressivism and America.

I would add that Matt's description is consistent with my belief that the United States should be less progressive than the polities of north and western Europe.  For better or worse, most Europeans are more skeptical of claims of capitalist meritocracy and thus it is harder for them to realize gains by internalizing such an ethic.  Furthermore the non-progressive nature of many aspects of America — by encouraging economic dynamism — helps Europe to be as progressive as it is.  That's an argument for American capitalism that both libertarians and progressives ought to feel slightly uncomfortable with, yet in my view it is compelling.