Month: March 2025

Elon recently re-opened the perennial debate about whether Social Security is a ponzi scheme. Here’s my, lightly edited post from 2011.

Elon is in good company calling social security a ponzi scheme. First up is Nobel prize winner Paul Samuelson who wrote:

The beauty of social insurance is that it is actuarially unsound. Everyone who reaches retirement age is given benefit privileges that far exceed anything he has paid in — exceed his payments by more than ten times (or five times counting employer payments)!

How is it possible? It stems from the fact that the national product is growing at a compound interest rate and can be expected to do so for as far ahead as the eye cannot see. Always there are more youths than old folks in a growing population. More important, with real income going up at 3% per year, the taxable base on which benefits rest is always much greater than the taxes paid historically by the generation now retired.

…A growing nation is the greatest Ponzi game ever contrived.

Samuelson wrote that in 1967 riffing off his classic paper of 1958. By “as far as the eye cannot see” he apparently meant not very far because it soon became clear that the system could not count on waves of youths or rapid productivity growth to generate the actuarially unsound returns that made the program so popular in the early years.

Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson rarely agreed on much but Friedman also called social security a Ponzi scheme. In fact, he called it The Biggest Ponzi Scheme on Earth but perhaps Friedman is too partisan so let’s go for a third Nobel prize winner who recognizes the Ponzi like nature of social security, none other than…..Paul Krugman (writing in 1996):

Social Security is structured from the point of view of the recipients as if it were an ordinary retirement plan: what you get out depends on what you put in. So it does not look like a redistributionist scheme. In practice it has turned out to be strongly redistributionist, but only because of its Ponzi game aspect, in which each generation takes more out than it put in. Well, the Ponzi game will soon be over, thanks to changing demographics, so that the typical recipient henceforth will get only about as much as he or she put in (and today’s young may well get less than they put in). (ital added, AT)

Of these, I agree the most with Krugman. Social Security is not necessarily a Ponzi scheme but it only generated massive returns in the past because of its Ponzi-like aspects. The Ponzi-like aspects are now over and social security is turning into what is essentially a forced savings/welfare program with, as Krugman recognizes, crummy returns for average workers. Social security is thus a Ponzi scheme which has not gone bust but it has gone flat.

Robert Higgs coined the term regime uncertainty to illustrate the challenge faced by business under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, when a flurry of unpredictable legislation such as the expansive and often unclear mandates of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), attempts at court packing, abrupt tax increases, and shifting labor policies, meant businesses couldn’t reliably forecast returns or risks. Uncertainty magnified bad policy causing investment to collapse and remain unprecedently low.

For the eleven-year period of 1930 to 1940, net private investment totaled minus $3.1 billion. Only in 1941 did net private investment ($9.7 billion) exceed the 1929 amount.

The data leave little doubt. During the 1930s, private investment remained at depths never plumbed in any other decade for which data exist.

Real options theory explains why uncertainty can reduce investment even more than predictable but unfavorable policies. Suppose you’re deciding whether to build a factory in North Carolina or South Carolina. Both locations are viable, but one of the Carolina’s might offer a tax concession—though the decision won’t be announced for six months. Even if investing immediately would still be profitable without the concession, you might choose to delay building the factory. The potential benefit of waiting (the real option) only needs to offset the costs associated with waiting. Thus, even modest uncertainty can incentivize investors to delay big investments. Recent studies confirm Higgs’ insights: spikes in uncertainty strongly correlate with declines in private investment.

Ok, so where do we stand? We are now at a greater level of uncertainty than anything over the last 40 years, barring the worst weeks of the 2008 financial crisis  (updated graph as of today!). Investment has begun a modest decline. Some, very preliminary data (take with a grain of salt) are already predicting a recession.

Tariff policy is especially bad because it is uncertainty about bad events. Here are comments from the latest ISM survey (h/t Joe Weisenthal).

Much of the Trump administration’s agenda promises long-term benefits, but chaos and uncertainty threaten its success. Tariff policy, in particular, is bad economics and even worse foreign policy. Even if Trump’s tariff strategy stabilizes, global responses—and their ripple effects—remain unpredictable and with potentially severe downsides. This uncertainty could spark an economic downturn, jeopardizing the administration’s otherwise strong policies.

All of this is unnecessary. We need to get back to the best case for a Trump Presidency.