Category: Education

American vs. Russian notions of friendship

Not long ago I attended an evening-long discussion group on this topic, comprised mostly of Russian emigrants and their spouses.  The Russians were generally keen to argue that they have deeper and closer friendships than do the Americans.  They also dislike that Americans will call their acquaintances “friends.”  In response I noted that:

1. Relative to Americans, Russians are far more concerned with defining who is truly a friend, or not.  (Though Google+ may change this.)

2. Russians are far more likely to conduct purges of their friends.  (“A future enemy” is one good Eastern European definition of a friend, or so the joke goes, thanks to BC.)

3. American geographic mobility has been falling for some time and so we might move back toward some closer and more durable notions of friendship; social networks play a role here too.

Since that evening, I’ve formulated a new version of the question in my mind.  Putting aside the so-called “intelligentsia” (a Russian phrase, not one which comes quickly to my tongue), are Russian lower-middle class friendships so much more “life and death” than American lower-middle class friendships, especially among the immobile?  What if seven guys grow up together in Somerville, MA, never go to college or leave town, work in auto parts stores, and end up reminding you of characters in a Clint Eastwood movie?  Maybe they’re pretty tight, albeit with grudges and perhaps even purges along the way.

The new question is then this: why does the “treatment” of greater education have so much less affect on the nature of Russian friendships, relative to American friendships?  Are there other dimensions along which the treatment of education influences Russians less?  (Examples would be child-bearing age, taste in sports, taste in food, etc.)  Influences Americans less?  Other groups?

The Russian intelligentsia will be the first to insist how much education matters in their circles, but perhaps they doth protest too loud.

Signaling your ability to signal

Robin Hanson writes:

…people in business signal to each other all the time. In fact, most of the on-the-job business learning that employees do soon after college, such as how to dress well, how to give presentations, how to write memos, how to talk with clients, etc. might be skills that are mainly useful to signal innate features to bosses, co-workers, clients, etc. So employers might pay more for students with prestigious degrees because such degrees signal an ability to learn how to send later business signals. And this extra pay for top degrees could be entirely an investment in signaling, even if after hiring someone no one ever knew of or mentioned their degrees.

Bottom line: If much of human interaction is signaling, then much of human investment is in ways to better signal. Businesses that signal are also willing to invest in better signals.  The fact that a boss is willing to pay more for an employee who went to a better school, even after that boss knows this employee’s “real” abilities, does not show that school isn’t all about signaling.

One way of wording this (which Robin may or may not accept) is that the signaling and learning hypotheses are not always directly opposed.

When are signaling and human capital theories of education observationally equivalent?

Going as far back as Andrew Weiss’s survey paper, there are various attempts to argue that the two theories make the same predictions about earnings and education.  A randomly elevated individual will earn more money but is this from having learned more or from being pooled with a more productive set of peers?

To explore this, let’s pursue the very good question asked by Bryan Caplan:

Our story begins with a 22-year-old high school graduate with a B average.  He knows an unscrupulous nerd who can hack into Harvard’s central computer and give him a fake diploma, complete with transcript.  In the U.S. labor market, what is the present discounted value of that fake diploma?

If he can fake a good interview (a big if, but let’s say), and if certification from recommenders is not important in the chosen sector (another big if), he may get a Harvard-quality job for his first placement.  If you believe in the signaling theory, however, his marginal product is fairly low, much lower than the wage he will be paid.  They will fire him.  He’ll come out a bit ahead, if he is not too demoralized, but within a few years he will be paid his marginal product.

In most jobs they figure out your productivity within two or three months after training, if not sooner.

In a one-shot static setting, signaling and human capital theories might have the same empirical implications because the learning and pooling effects can produce similar links between education and wages (again assuming someone can fake an interview).  But not over time and of course the wage dispersion for an educational cohort does very much increase with time.  The workers don’t keep on receiving their “average marginal product” for very long.

Do not be tricked by those who serve up one-period examples to establish the empirical equivalence of signaling and human capital theories!

To tie this back to the academic literature, if IV-elevated workers enjoy an enduring wage effect comparable to that of the other degreed workers, you should conclude they learned something comparable at school unless you wish to spin an elaborate and enduring W > MP story.

Addendum: There is a less drastic scenario than the one outlined by Bryan.  Let’s say there are fourteen classes of workers and a class nine worker is randomly elevated to class seven credentials.  He might use that momentary good fortune to learn from smarter peers, work hard to establish a foothold, and so on.  His lifetime earnings might end up as roughly those of other class seven workers, despite being of initial type nine.  The higher earnings are still based on learning effects (not mainly pooling), though pooling gave that worker temporary access to some new learning and advancement opportunities.  In most regards this works like the learning model, not the pooling model, although the period of learning extends beyond schooling narrowly construed.

And Arnold Kling comments.

Inconsistent Stories

Yglesias on the inconsistent stories told by the teachers unions.

[there] is a huge consistency problem in the messaging coming out of teachers unions. Sometimes I hear from union-affiliated folks that it’s unfair to attribute differences in student learning to differences in teacher skill, because everyone knows that socioeconomic and home environment factors drive a lot of this. Other times I see the American Federation of Teachers building a messaging program around the idea that its members are Making A Difference Every Day. To me this leads to the obvious conclusion that while socioeconomic and home environment factors do drive a lot of student learning, teachers are also making a difference every day. And it makes a lot of sense to ask which teachers are making the most difference. The teachers who are in the top 20 percent of difference-makers are playing a vital role to the future of America, and we ought to pay them more money and make sure they don’t leave the profession. But the teachers who are in the bottom percent of difference-makers are doing us little good, and we should try to replace them with other people.

Read the whole thing,  he makes a number of good points.

Signaling vs. credentialism

From Arnold Kling:

The relationship between education and earnings is not entirely market driven. Within the government sector, pay grade is affected by education levels. Government also has educational credentials that affect many professions, including teaching, health care, and law. That is why I do not look to signaling as the explanation for the returns to schooling. For signals of ability, there are alternatives available. But strict credential requirements leave no alternative.

There is more at the link.  While I trust the best individual researchers in the area, I share Arnold’s fear that the macro-organization of the education field is not structured to produce totally objective results.  Still, a natural experiment showing a high signaling premium would yield accolades to its author and I still would like to see your nominations for the best work — and I do mean natural experiments — pointing in this direction.

Does the returns to education literature really test the signaling model?

Here is a comment by Matt, and also by ArnoldBryan’s response argues that the returns to education tests consider “ability bias” but not “signaling.”  For a lot of the tests that is a distinction without a difference, and indeed you can see this on the first two pages of Angrist and Krueger, which discuss “omitted variables that are correlated with educational attainment and with earnings capacity.”  The tests still discriminate against the signaling model, even if signaling and ability bias differ in other regards.  In a nutshell, artificially or randomly elevated workers fare better in the longer run than the signaling model predicts.

Here’s a parable to illustrate.  Imagine a market situation with wages and different education levels observed for two classes of workers — call the locale Honduras.  Now compare that to another setting — Nicaragua — where education is handed out on some subsidized, randomized basis.  In the latter case some of the low ability group will be induced to get more schooling, and the pool of the educated will contain more low ability individuals in Nicaragua, compared to Honduras.

Now measure the long term earnings and compare.

If the signaling model is correct, the average long-term wage rates of return for the subsidized/elevated group in Nicaragua will be noticeably below the average wage rates of return of the educated group from the separating equilibrium in Honduras.  After all, the subsidy-elevated group adds many more “low ability individuals” to the Nicaraguan mix of the educated than one would find in Honduras.  According to the signaling model, in Nicaragua eventually the lower skill level of the elevated group will be discovered and their wage rates of return won’t stay so high forever.

But the wage rates of return for the elevated groups do not plummet back to earth and generally they are robust over time.  That measures the real learning which went on in school, or so it would seem.  Education is good for more than getting a good first job offer right off the bat.

The modern liberal interpretation (which may or may not be true) is that these poor people were waiting for a helping hand up the ladder, and then they took good advantage of it when it came.  And if the elevated group in Nicaragua has higher long-term wage rates of return than the educated Hondurans (a result which does sometimes pop up in the data), that is because their lower initial margin of education made them an especially potent investment.

The actual tests are more complicated than this, and I use the country names to make the example easy to follow, not out of verisimilitude.  But this example is one way to see some of the intuitions behind why the data do not treat the signaling model so kindly.

One empirical implication is that crude OLS measures of the return to education are much better than they may at first appear.  These results are also one reason why most modern labor economists might object to the arguments of Charles Murray.

Here is a recent Brookings piece on the return to education, I have not had time to go through it.

More on the returns to education

First, apologies to Arnold, I missed his post when traveling and so he does discuss natural experiments, contrary to my previous claim about EconLog bloggers.  That said, I’m not so happy with his analysis.  He’s taking a few of the papers he sees as the weakest and he explains why they are weak.  I would rather he dissects the strongest pieces and compares them to the strongest pieces, using natural experiments, showing very low rates of return to education.  The Joshua Angrist papers (often with Alan Krueger) for instance are quite sophisticated and do not run afoul of Arnold’s objections.  In works such as this (later versions seem to be gated), Angrist and Krueger perform exactly the natural experiment which Arnold requests and they find high (marginal) returns to education.  Or see this piece by Card.

Here is Bryan’s response to my post.  Focus on his #2, which is the crux of the matter:.  He cites the signaling motives for education and concludes: “Here, the evidence Tyler cites is simply irrelevant.”  This is simply not true and indeed these papers are obsessed with distinguishing learning effects from preexisting human capital differences.  That is what these papers are, so to speak.  In that context, “ability bias” in the estimates doesn’t seem to be very large, see for instance the Angrist or Card pieces linked to above.  This paper surveys some of the “adjusting for ability bias” literature; it is considered quite “pessimistic” (allows for a good deal of signaling, in Caplan’s terminology) and still it finds a positive five percent a year real productivity gain from an extra year of schooling.

What’s striking about the work surveyed by Card is how many different methods are used and how consistent their results are.  You can knock down any one of them (“are identical twins really identical?, etc.), but at the end of the day which are the pieces — using natural or field experiments — standing on the other side of the scale?  The Card results are also consistent with theory, namely that models which emphasize signaling imply large unrealized gains from trade; it’s not that hard for an employer to administer an implicit IQ test as Google and Microsoft do all the time.  As a separate (and here undocumented) point, I would argue the Angrist and Card results are consistent with the bulk of results from sociological and anthropological investigations.

There really does seem to be a professional consensus.  Maybe it’s wrong, and/or dominated by biased pro-education specialists, but I’m not seeing very strong arguments against it.  For the time being at least, I don’t see that there is much anywhere else to go with one’s beliefs.  If Arnold or Bryan (or David) suggests a good paper with a natural experiment showing a low marginal ROR for education, I am happy to read the paper and report back and compare it to the preponderance of evidence on the other side.

The real puzzle is how large measured marginal returns to education are consistent with the continuing observed failures of the American educational system.  Why does the low-hanging fruit persist or is it low-hanging at all?  The traditional liberal view is that further educational subsidies are needed, but a possible alternative is that some people simply do not wish to step across to the other side of the divide to a “better life,” at least as defined by middle class values and income statistics.  Or is there some other hypothesis?  Whichever way you cut it, a big improvement in this area does not seem about to happen and arguably we are moving in the opposite direction.  Whatever gains are there “in the data,” we don’t seem able or willing to capture them.

Natural experiments and the return to schooling

Cowen’s First Law: There is a literature on everything.

Responding to queries from Kling and Caplan and Henderson, let us turn the microphone over to Andrew Leigh and Chris Ryan:

How much do returns to education differ across different natural experiment methods? To test this, we estimate the rate of return to schooling in Australia using two different instruments for schooling: month of birth and changes in compulsory schooling laws. With annual pre-tax income as our measure of income, we find that the naıve ordinary least squares (OLS) returns to an additional year of schooling is 13%. The month of birth IV approach gives an 8% rate of return to schooling, while using changes in compulsory schooling laws as an IV produces a 12% rate of return. We then compare our results with a third natural experiment: studies of Australian twins that have been conducted by other researchers. While these studies have tended to estimate a lower return to education than ours, we believe that this is primarily due to the better measurement of income and schooling in our data set. Australian twins studies are consistent with our findings insofar as they find little evidence of ability bias in the OLS rate of return to schooling. Together, the estimates suggest that between one-tenth and two-fifths of the OLS return to schooling is due to ability bias. The rate of return to education in Australia, corrected for ability bias, is around 10%, which is similar to the rate in Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States.

There are many other papers in this genre, such as by Joshua Angrist, and they yield broadly similar results.  Here is an Esther Duflo paper on Indonesia.  There is an excellent David Card survey on the causal returns to education, from 1999, but more recent results have shown the same.  Card’s conclusion:

Consistent with earlier surveys of the literature, I conclude that the average (or average marginal) return to education is not much below the estimate that emerges from a standard human capital earnings function fit by OLS. Evidence from the latest studies of identical twins suggests a small upward “ability” bias – on the order of 10%. A consistent finding among studies using instrumental variables based on institutional changes in the education system is that the estimated returns to schooling are 20-40% above the corresponding OLS estimates.

That last sentence is because the marginal student is especially in need of education.  The view that education is mostly about signaling is inconsistent with the established consensus on the returns to schooling and yet the writers at EconLog do not respond to this literature or, as far as I can tell, even acknowledge it.

Here is one of my earlier posts on education.  Here is my theory of (some) education.

The culture that is Sweden

Director Lotta Rajalin notes that Egalia places a special emphasis on fostering an environment tolerant of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people. From a bookcase, she pulls out a story about two male giraffes who are sad to be childless — until they come across an abandoned crocodile egg.

That’s a preschool, for children from ages one to six.  The school does everything possible to obliterate traditional gender roles, including a refusal to use the words “him” and “her” (that is, their Swedish equivalents).

…she says that there’s a long waiting list for admission to Egalia, and that only one couple has pulled a child out of the school.

Jukka Korpi, 44, says he and his wife chose Egalia “to give our children all the possibilities based on who they are and not on their gender.”

There is even a markets in everything angle:

To even things out, many preschools have hired “gender pedagogues” to help staff identify language and behavior that risk reinforcing stereotypes.

For the pointer I thank Daniel Lippman.

The unwrapped saltine cracker

Every now and then I give informal talks on how the economics job market operates.  I tell the listeners that they are like an “unwrapped saltine cracker.”  They are wasting assets, to borrow a phrase from options pricing theory.  If a day goes by and they did not accomplish something important, they decline in value.  For most candidates, holding steady is not a viable strategy.  You need either publications or some stellar letters from credible writers, preferably both.  (At the very top level, publications at the job market stage are less important because it is expected they will come and the recommendations are trusted more.)

Unwrap a saltine cracker, let it sit for months, and then try to eat it.  Will you even try?

Shimon Peres on Foreign Aid

Shimon Peres gave a press conference for a small group of bloggers. He was very impressive. When asked about foreign aid, specifically foreign aid to some Arab regimes he had this to say (again a paraphrase from my notes, the clever lines are his, the order may have changed somewhat and this is incomplete).

Look, the West can’t help everyone and the regimes would be insulted if we tried. But they don’t need our help. The greatest poverty in our time has been in China and India. Did these countries reduce poverty because of our help? No. They did it themselves.

Giving is problematic. We take money from poor people in rich countries and give it to rich people in poor countries. Aid sometimes creates corruption.

And suppose we gave people computers. Would computers help? No. There is no technology without civilization, civilization is the carriage of technology. It is a matter of institutions. If a country discriminates against women, for example, no computers will help. Do you know who are the greatest opponents of democracy in the Middle East? The husbands. As long as husbands discriminate against their wives the husbands will support the dictators.

Now, however, there is a young generation who are realizing that the glory is within. The glory [of civilization] it is within their power to grasp.

Peres was also great on science, a question I asked. More on that later.

In other news Dr. Ruth criticized social media, “I like to touch my friends.”

Anadolu University

It’s in Eskisehir, central Anatolia, a long way from home.  And yet the campus looks remarkably like George Mason University.  It has about the same number of students, the same kind of suburban feel, the same kinds of sculptures and fountains scattered around campus, the buildings use steps in a similar way, the cars are parked in similar configurations, there is similar signage, and there are related styles of architecture for the buildings.  Here are some photos.  All in all, it is quite unheimlich.

Both schools have women wearing Islamic head scarves, slightly more here.  The Anadolu campus was designed by an economist, unlike George Mason, and the school is a leader in distance education.

I would describe Eskisehir as the Curitiba of Turkey.  I am told it used to be much worse.

Here is a good recent piece on Eskisehir.

Bryan Caplan vs. Amy Chua debate

Here I am, sitting on a bench in downtown Budapest, reading the Guardian, when on p.20 I see a published debate between Bryan Caplan and Amy Chua.  If I have one wish, it is that Chua would put her anecdotal points in the form of a statistical argument.  Which assumption behind the twin adoption studies is she rejecting?  Or where are those studies engaged in too much aggregation?  I suspect she will never tell us.  Coming back to the hotel room, I now find Bryan’s commentary on the debate.  The two have very different senses of humor, and I bet she wouldn’t think that Bryan’s jokes are funny either.