Category: Uncategorized
My very interesting Conversation with Daron Acemoglu
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
Daron Acemoglu returns for his second appearance with a new book, What Happened to Liberal Democracy?, which Tyler reads as an attempt to redefine and revitalize liberalism for our times. Where Daron’s first visit was about how states and societies contend for the narrow corridor in which liberty survives, this one asks what liberals themselves got wrong, and the answer implicates the educated elite—that is to say, you.
Tyler and Daron discuss what’s wrong with social contract theories and Rousseau’s general will, whether Acemoglu is more objectivist than Rorty, why he blames left liberalism’s own establishment power for its collapse, what standard is left once you refuse to have a book of higher values, nondomination versus noninterference, who counts as working class, why automation alone will not lead to widespread prosperity, how he can call himself a free speech absolutist while wanting to regulate social media, why he worries we’ve given up on educating Americans, whether teachers’ unions need to be reconstituted, what the life expectancy for an educated twenty year old is today, whether open-source models undercut the centralization worry, what pro-worker AI actually means, why the fertility crisis leaves him strangely close to a real business cycle position, whether AI will raise his own already prodigious paper output, why Armenia has disappointed economically, what he wants to learn next, and more.
For an excerpt, let us start from near the beginning:
COWEN: Richard Rorty had a consensus-based defense of liberal democracy. Is your view the same as his, or are there some metrics along which it’s different? Are you more objectivist in some way?
ACEMOGLU: I wouldn’t say it’s more objectivist. I think my commitment in my mind has always been that it’s impossible for us at any point in time not just to know what’s really the absolute truth, but also to have a clear map of what is the right stance. In the same way that I think many people would agree science makes gradual and sometimes uncertain progress toward some better understanding, I think morally, philosophically, we also have to have gradual uncertain evolution toward what we agree on. Objectivism, in some sense, is too strict.
COWEN: Say we’re not evolving toward greater agreement.
ACEMOGLU: No, sometimes we go back.
COWEN: Today, it seems we’re not evolving toward greater agreement, right?
ACEMOGLU: We’re not. Absolutely not. I think you can blame that on reactions to globalization, reactions to technology, better authoritarian challenges. This is the most uncomfortable part because I see myself firmly within the left liberal tradition. I think it’s partly because of the failure of left liberalism. In some sense, if you think of why did Rome fail or collapse, we can tell a story about the barbarians were really too strong. No, really, Rome collapsed because internally it had problems that opened up weaknesses against outside invaders as well as some inside problems.
It’s the same with left liberalism. I think it became quite influential throughout much of the Western world and some of the emerging economies as well over the last 70, 80 years. It did not use that establishment power just in the right way, creating its own weaknesses that made it much more vulnerable to outside attacks. That’s why I think we are now going back because we are at an interregnum period in which ideas are battling again. In some sense, it’s just like the early 19th century where you had all these very different ideas and they were trying to get a toehold in the imagination of people. I think we are going through a period like that, except that there are really many more confusing ideas out there.
COWEN: Say when we’re not evolving toward greater consensus, what’s the external standard you introduce to judge which are the correct ideas and which not? Like Rorty, you need one, though.
ACEMOGLU: I don’t have one.
COWEN: Then why believe in what you believe?
ACEMOGLU: Okay. I think what I believe is, first of all, not as an external standard—I don’t know whether external standard or internal standard is the right word—but that we have to defend some degree of individual freedom because everything starts from that, both in terms of our meaningful lives, but also any kind of improvement in the human condition requires individual initiative, and that individual initiative is impossible without some amount of freedom, a meaningful freedom, not just saying, “Okay, you have the freedom to pray, but you cannot express that idea with others or you cannot turn it into action.” Some meaningful freedom.
That is the only starting point that we need to have. Around that, we need to build things with some sort of consensus within society. That’s what I think liberalism has to recognize, that you have to enshrine those rights, but then give enough elbow room to people to form their own community-level agreements.
COWEN: You present some different values in the book. One is nondomination. Another is noninterference. There’s others. When they clash, what’s the metric you introduce to decide how to resolve that clash?
ACEMOGLU: I wish I had a perfect answer for that. I don’t.
COWEN: You have an imperfect answer.
ACEMOGLU: I have an imperfect answer. I think noninterference by itself isn’t enough because, at least as read or as interpreted by some philosophers and economists, it is just about being left alone from higher authority or typically state-level authority, although it could be some other authorities as well. We do also need opportunities and some way of actualizing our intentions and our freedom. That’s what the idea of nondomination, which goes back to Roman Republican times, recognizes.
It is not, in my mind, an extremely interventionist philosophy. It doesn’t say the state knows it best or that the state should always have an opportunity to override individual or group-level decisions. It does emphasize that providing people some amount of protection against those who have much greater physical or other power relative to them is something that cannot be done at the individual level. It has to have a community-level component.
COWEN: That’s a good answer, but is it an answer to the question? If we’re Sidgwick, we might say, when values clash, we look to utility, or maybe it’d be cost-benefit analysis to decide which gets priority. You’re not willing to say that, so why not? What’s wrong with that answer?
Very much interesting throughout.
Mistakes in financial economics
I feel like this is almost deliberately missing the point. My median expectation is that AI boosts the economy enormously, so shorting things would be a terrible idea. But non-trivial tail risk is that it kills everyone. So shorting things would be pointless.
That is from Tom Chivers. It is easy enough to say buy seriously out of the money puts, and be long with the rest of your portfolio. But few (if any) of the worriers are doing that. I should note also that many (most? almost all?) of the bad scenarios have intermediate points of great worry and catastrophe where you can cash in on your puts well before everyone dies. No leverage required, just spend 5k or 10k a year on this, and if you are wrong consider it a mistaken insurance policy. If you do not know much about finance, the AGI will guide you in this endeavor.
Or some are saying “Markets are bad at pricing long-term idiosyncratic risk.” If so, all the more reason to spend on those puts.
You will find many, many mistakes in financial theory when people try to rebut the presumption that, given their views, they should in some way or another be short the market. And do not just tell me which long positions you hold, those are easy bets, as you can be totally wrong and the long positions still will offer normal, risk-adjusted rates of return. It is your shorts, whether explicit or implicit, that reveal your true soul. You may recall that Victor Niederhoffer thought an investor should never go net short on an asset. I am reluctant to use the word “never,” but my own view is not so different.
Is it really so hard to say (and do): “Thank you, Tyler, I just went out and bought those puts!”?
Apparently so. And perhaps that is because, deep down, your own intuitions realize that, while some significant costs from AI will appear, it really won’t be that bad after all.
Words to live by.
Wednesday assorted links
1. The cheese collateral in Italian banks is melting.
2. Denmark fact of the day: “…half of Denmark’s growth has been due to essentially one company”
4. Noah is right.
How much will cybersecurity costs rise?
Here is one (partial) estimate of the higher cyber costs. I am not sure how many incidents they have in mind, but this seems to me realistic as an estimate but also rather modest relative to the Angst I am seeing? Not quite “a Gilda Radner thing,” but if nothing else shows the usefulness of trying to be concrete. Here is an estimate of $100 billion extra for the world annually. That is estimated as a twenty percent increase in cyber costs. Brad Carson uses AI agents (hurrah!) to produce estimates. He thinks I disagree with him, but I do not. I just want to see exact numbers, and presented as a share of gdp, and then everybody can calm down just a wee bit. And here are some superforecaster estimates.
On this topic, I am seeing so many mistakes in financial economics across social media, but I will not go through them all. It suffices to note that very smart people have their minds turn to mush when this topic comes up, especially the “sell short” side of the matter.
There is also the “beware isolated demands for rigor” response. I should not have to demand anything. If you are pretty worried about AI, you should be dying (yes pun intended) to provide that rigor, whether or not it is provided elsewhere.
How about a new policy?: “All AI safety expressions of despair, grief, panic, anger, or insinuations thereof, with or without gifs, shall be accompanied by an estimated percentage of gdp footnote.” Would inject some real sanity into the discussion and drain out some of the all too rampant emotions.
Tuesday assorted links
Who enters Congress?
We trace the family origins of Members of Congress (MC) born between 1830 and 1950, linking each MC, their parents, and their brothers to the complete-count censuses. Future MCs have always been economic outliers. By 1940, close to 60 percent of MCs aged 18–40 held a college degree, against under 5 percent of comparable young men outside Congress. In the 19th-century censuses, MCs as adults held roughly three times the wealth of demographically matched controls. They also come from economically elite families: their fathers earn more, attain more education, and hold more wealth. The brothers of future MCs sit between the population and the MCs themselves. Across the socioeconomic measures we compare, we calculate that roughly half of an MC’s adult premium is shared with his brother and the other half is his own. Even as the American economy and political system have changed, the family background gap has widened over the last century and a half. Wealth, household servants, and four separate occupation-based scores all show the gap holding or growing across cohorts. We study four Progressive-Era reforms in a triple-difference design—women’s suffrage, the secret ballot, direct primaries, and the direct election of senators—and none produce detectable shifts in who reaches Congress. Our results document a Congress drawn from the most fortunate families in American society in every cohort we observe.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Monday assorted links
1. Tax land more heavily than structures.
3. Francesco Cabella conversation with (an older) Victor Niederhoffer.
4. New homes in Tatu City, Kenya.
5. Bill Goichberg, RIP (NYT). America’s greatest chess organizer, he was always very nice and encouraging to me.
Do Faculty Affect Student Partisanship?
We study whether Democratic college professors make their students more liberal. We link voter data to salary records from 33 state flagships and show that faculty skew Democratic, especially in the humanities and social sciences. We then use student transcripts from one flagship to estimate causal effects. Students become more liberal during college regardless of major and sort toward ideologically similar instructors. Exploiting plausibly random variation in when instructors teach courses, we find no effect of faculty partisanship on student partisanship. Text analysis shows exposure to liberal topics reflects student demand rather than instructor supply, leaving little room for indoctrination.
That is from a new paper by Micah Baum, Joaquín Endara, and Annaliese Paulson. Via Jay Fan Bavel.
Act like it is science
I am seeing so many doom prognostications, or least severe worries, due to the OAI/HuggingFace incident and related stories. But virtually all of these I find underargued to say the least.
So I have a simple request. If you are worried, and wish to persuade the doubters, try the methods of science. I would like to see the following:
1. Your outline of how, say two or three years from now, we might estimate the additional cybersecurity costs from the AI break-ins. I am convinced that number is not zero, but give me your method please. If it helps, here is an estimate of past cybersecurity costs, done by top economists.
2. Your current numerical estimate of what those costs might end up being, of course to be tested against what actually happens over time. Obviously, you can do this for a few different regulatory/safety scenarios. This is one simple way to prove yourself largely correct, albeit with a lag. (NB: you do not have to take this as a substitute for your preferred safety measurres. But please try to be specific in your predictions.)
3. A list of what stocks or other assets you have shorted, now. Obviously if your answer to #2 is sufficiently low, you could answer here zero, as I would do. I expect costs, but not so high that we cannot muddle through and have expected positive stock returns.
This would all help to make the discourse more scientific and less like an extended exercise in personal anxiety management.
If it is all so important, surely this exercise is worth the effort?
Sunday assorted links
1. African use of Chinese AI (NYT). And what happened to Talenti gelato? (NYT) And the NIMBY brutalists who live in the Barbican (NYT).
2. Modernist Gothic in Copenhagen.
3. AI-generated Odyssey in Vietnam.
5. Time magazine has a special version that only the AIs can read.
6. Tymofiy Mylovanov has a good summary of my greatest fear.
JFK’s AI Voice
From Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural:
- “Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.”
- “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”
- “United, there is little we cannot do… Divided, there is little we can do.”
- “If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.
and from the 1962 moon speech at Rice University;
- We choose to do these things not because they are easy but because they are hard.
and from Lyndon Johnson’s inaugural speech:
- John Kennedy’s death commands what his life conveyed—that America must move forward.
- On the 20th day of January, in 1961, John F. Kennedy told his countrymen that our national work would not be finished ‘in the first thousand days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet.’ But, he said, ‘let us begin.’ Today, in this moment of new resolve, I would say to all my fellow Americans, let us continue.
Sound familiar?
Were John F. Kennedy’s speeches written by an AI? Probably not. But were AI’s trained on the speech writer Ted Sorensen? It would appear so. Or to be more accurate, AIs have absorbed the Sorensen toolkit: symmetry, parallelism, antithesis, repetition, and the neatly turned reversal.
Sorensen is considered a great stylist, and these are iconic lines. The problem with AI voice is not the techniques themselves. It is the overuse of them—their deployment to describe a trip to 7-Eleven with the same rhetorical flourishes once used to send men to the moon.
I suspect that will be an easy problem to fix, so don’t expect AI voice to continue.
Hat tip: murgh
Pressure
Who would have thought that someone could make a gripping movie about predicting the weather? Nevertheless, Pressure delivers. To be sure, it’s predicting the weather for D-Day. Excellent cast. Hews very close to the truth. The two camps really did divide on theory versus past prediction and the weather was as portrayed. After the war, John F. Kennedy asked Eisenhower what gave the Allies the decisive advantage during the D-Day invasion, Eisenhower replied, “We had better meteorologists than the Germans.”
I agree with Tyler’s earlier review: A truly excellent movie, one of the best of the year. Specifically, it concerns the meteorological forecasts (!) leading up to the D-Day invasion. Thematically, it is about the differences between Americans and Brits, how bureaucracy operates, the nature of leadership, and the proper role of science in government. It is like an old-style Hollywood movie. Most of the action takes place in only a few rooms, and with superb dialogue and performances. Although you all know how D-Day turns out, the movie still generates suspense on some of the major plot points.
Saturday assorted links
1. Possibly AI-written pieces that have won literary awards.
2. HuggingFace co-founder on what happened, very good post.
3. What do private insurers want from a Hormuz agreement?
4. GPT Pro on burrito price worries.
6. Do people listen to female economists more?
7. North Korea might be growing at 3.5% (Bloomberg).
*Restoring Childhood: How to Set Kids Free in the Age of Anxiety*
That is the new book by Peter Gray, and it is very much a whole philosophy of child-rearing and also antidote to the current panic over social media. Excerpt:
In preparation for this chapter, I spent weeks poring over the research literature pretaining to smartphones, social media, and teen mental health. It is clear to me that there is something close to a consensus among scientists most immersed in this research, which includes the following three conclusions: (1) Extensive research refutes the theory that effects of smartphones and social media account for a meaningful portion of the decline in teen mental health in the years following 2010. (2) Smartphones and social media can have both beneficial and harmful effects on teens’ mental health, which tend to cancel out when averaging. (3) Future research should focus on understanding better the ways teens use these tools and how to help them maximize the benefits and minimize the harm.
Note that teen suffering also hit a peak around 1990 by many measures, yet that cannot have been caused by phones or social media. And European teen suicide rates were falling just as those in the United States were rising. This evidence is considered in further detail of course.
Recommended, it is both easy to read and substantive.
What I’ve been reading
1. Mike Jay, Wireheads: An Unnatural History of Technology in the Brain. Much of this story is told through the lens of the accompanying science fiction and non-neuro trends in other parts of science. An excellent book, substantive on every page, and it will make you want to read some of the works he cites.
2. Vasily Grossman, From the Front Line, Stalingrad-Treblinka-Berlin 1941-1945. Self-recommending, the best third of this volume is just stunningly good. You do not have to read the whole thing, as there is some degree of repetition.
3. Forough Farrokhzad, Let Us Believe in the Beginning of the Cold Season. She died in a car crash in 1967 at the age of thirty-three, but it turns out she was an amazing poet. I usually do not enjoy poetry in translation, but this is so fiery and full of passion that I am happy to recommend it. Surely in the original Farsi it is better (and quite different?) yet.
4. André Breton, Nadja. It is short, and fun enough to read. But one learns most books from the past are not masterpieces, and that surrealism as a movement — most of all in painting — was more important than the literary outputs of surrealism. Nadja, to me, sounds like a drag. Which is fine. But. What does Breton really think he is immortalizing here? At the end he writes “Beauty will be CONVULSIVE or not at all.” I do appreciate Breton for his understanding of Mexico, and for his cultivation of Haitian art.
5. Emma Southon, Servus: How Slavery Made the Roman Empire. A very good and aggressively readable book about how terrible slavery was in the Roman Empire. A useful corrective to other sources as well. While my general view is that interpretative disputes over antiquity are difficult to resolve, I find her interpretations more intuitive and more convincing than the other side of the debate.