Category: Uncategorized

Wednesday assorted links

1. NYT on Morton Feldman.  Is he the most important American composer?

2. Transcript and video of Cass Sunstein lecture on Hayek at Mercatus.

3. Baseball cards for talents.

4. Why Scotland succeeded.

5. Regulating AI agents.  And traps for AI agents.

6. How the Iranian government uses patronage to stay in power (WSJ).  And how the Iranian economy is surviving wartime pressures (FT).

Economists on AI and economic growth and employment

We completed the most comprehensive study of how economists and AI experts think AI will affect the U.S. economy. They predict major AI progress—but no dramatic break from economic trends: GDP growth rates similar to today’s and a moderate decline in labor force participation. However, when asked to consider what would happen in a world with extremely rapid progress in AI capabilities by 2030, they predict significant economic impacts by 2050:

• Annualized GDP growth of 3.5% (compared to 2.4% in 2025)

• A labor force participation rate of 55% (roughly 10 million fewer jobs)

• 80% of wealth held by the top 10% (highest since 1939)

That is from this very good and very detailed Twitter thread, worth reading in its entirety.  Note this:

Only 5.2% of the variance is between scenarios—attributable to disagreement about AI capabilities themselves…

Here is the full paper, over 200 pages long, I will be reading through it.  The list of authors is impressive, with Ezra Karger in the lead, also including Kevin Bryan, Basil Halperin, and many more.  For some while this will stand as the best set of estimates we have.  Here are the related forecasts of Seb Krier.

Tuesday assorted links

1. “… presenting Economics as empirical and socially relevant may broaden the profile of those who consider the field.”  But it does not get more people interested.

2. Youth happiness has been rising in many places, possibly most.

3. The NIH as an implicit regulatory body.

4. The Lebron critique of prediction markets.

5. Adam Tooze: “It is a truism of the moment that China is the last adult in the room.”

6. Quantum breakthroughs? And another account.  Will the Satoshi wallet remain safe?

7. Shall we organize scientific literatures around claims rather than papers?

Monday assorted links

1. Was there a great Philadelphia cheese steak stagnation?

2. David French on the enemies of free speech (NYT).  And yes it is Indonesian censorship, nothing to celebrate.

3. Profile of Hussein Aboubakr.  Good piece on one of today’s best thinkers and writers.  Link to Twitter and Substack.  Unlike many writers on these topics, it is not about your opinion of Israel, rather each piece is interesting and substantive.  Try his essay on Mahfouz.

4. Lab Leak is somewhat declining in plausibility.

5. “China is cracking down on families who opt to bury their dead in empty high-rise properties — known as “bone ash apartments” — rather than pay skyrocketing costs for cemetery plots.” (FT)

6. Do developing countries still need to industrialize?

7. JFV on education and AI.

Do Parents Propagate Inequality Among Children?

The subtitle of the piece is “Evidence From Chinese and Swedish Twins.”  Abstract:

Economists have long studied how parental behavior shapes within-family inequality, yet empirical findings remain mixed. Using twins data from China and Sweden, we examine the predominant mechanisms reported in the literature. Parents in both countries invest similarly during childhood. Inter vivos transfers, however, differ: Chinese parents reinforce income inequality, whereas Swedish parents distribute wealth equally; the reinforcing pattern reflects exchange motives. Bequests are divided equally in both countries. Parental education plays a key role: less educated parents reinforce income inequality, whereas more educated parents transfer wealth equally. Cross-country differences in parental education may thus help explain the mixed findings.

By Aiday SikhovaSven OskarssonRafael Ahlskog.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

Claudia Goldin and the WNBA

After Claudia Goldin became the first woman to win a solo Nobel in economics in 2023, she received hundreds of invitations and requests. She accepted just three.

One of them was advising the WNBA players union as the women prepared to negotiate a new labor deal with the league.

When Goldin replied via email to Terri Carmichael Jackson, executive director of the players union, “I remember just reading it and screaming,” Jackson said. Goldin had one requirement: She refused to be paid.

This month, the two sides reached a collective bargaining agreement that gave Women’s National Basketball Association players a nearly 400% raise. Starting this season, players’ average salary will top $580,000.

It isn’t just the biggest pay increase in U.S. league history. It is, as far as Goldin is aware, the biggest increase any union anywhere has ever negotiated.

“It’s astounding,” the 79-year-old Harvard economist said.

Mike Bass, a spokesman who represents both the National Basketball Association and the WNBA, called the deal “transformational.”

…More recently, as the pay negotiations stretched on, Goldin said she stayed focused not on the countless separate points in the typical lengthy labor deal but on one central equation: the fraction of league revenue going to players’ salary and benefits.

Goldin’s calculations had a calming effect on the players, said Jackson, the union’s executive director.

Here is more from the WSJ.  Via Anecdotal.

Saturday assorted links

1. New data on non-competes.

2. Carl Schmitt in Miami?

3. “The gesture establishes a hierarchy in which Tyler Cowen determines the hierarchy.”

4. How the spreadsheeet reshaped America.

5. What works of literature were written by the elderly?

6. The Anglosphere is ahead on AI adoption.

7. NYT obit of Trivers.

8. Aliens, demons, whatever.

9. Austin Vernon on Hormuz and its resolution through economic means.

A bilateral AI pause?

Dean ball has some thoughts and hesitations:

Here are some questions I wish “Pause” and “Stop” advocates would address:

1. Assuming we achieve the desired policy goal through a bilateral US/China agreement, what would be the specific metric or objective we would say needs to be satisfied in advance? Who decides whether we have satisfied them? What if one one party believes we have satisfied them but the other does not?

2. If the goal is achieved through a bilateral US/China agreement, would we need capital controls to ensure that U.S. investors cannot fund semiconductor fabs, data centers, or AI research labs in countries other than the U.S. and China?

3. Would we need to revoke the passports of U.S.-based AI researchers and semiconductor engineers to prevent them leaving America to join AI-related ventures elsewhere? How else would the U.S. and China keep researchers within their borders?

4. How should we grapple with the fact that (2) and (3) are common features of autocratic regimes?

5. Do the above questions mean that this really should be a global agreement, signed by all countries on Earth, or at least those with the theoretical ability to host large-scale data centers (probably Vanuatu doesn’t need to be on board)?

My excellent Conversation with Paul Gillingham

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is the episode summary:

Tyler calls Paul Gillingham’s new book, Mexico: A 500-Year History, the single best introduction to the country’s past—and one of the best nonfiction books of 2026. Paul brings both an outsider’s eye and ground-level knowledge to Mexican history, having grown up in Cork — a place he’d argue gave him an instinctive feel for fierce local autonomy and land hunger —earning his doctorate on the Mexican Revolution under Alan Knight at Oxford, and doing his fieldwork in the pueblos of Guerrero.

He and Tyler range across five centuries of Mexican history, from why Mexico held together after independence when every other post-colonial superstate collapsed, to why Yucatán is now one of the safest places on earth, what two leaders from Oaxaca tell us about Mexican politics, how Mexico avoided the military coups that plagued the rest of Latin America, what Cárdenas’s land reform actually achieved versus what it promised, whether the ejido system held Mexico back, why Mexico worried too much about land and not enough about human capital, how Mexico’s fertility rate fell below America’s, why Guerrero has been violent for two centuries, why the new judicial reforms are a disaster, where to find the best food in Mexico and Manhattan, what a cache of illicit Mexican silver sitting on a ship in the English Channel has to do with his next book, and more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: Now, after independence in 1821, why did not the rest of Mexico fragment the way Central America did a few years later, where it splits off from the Mexican empire? What determines the line? What sticks together with Mexico, and what does not?

GILLINGHAM: That’s a very good question because it’s one of the things that really makes Mexico stand out in that period, those histories, is that after independence, the rest of the Americas, you get a series of super-states. You get Gran Colombia, which is most of the Andes, and going across what’s now Venezuela. You get the United Provinces of the Rio Plate. These are huge, very difficult to conceive of super-states, and they fail within a decade. Elsewhere, you look at other post-colonial states, thinking particularly of India, within a couple of years, you’re fragmented and failed. Mexico doesn’t. Mexico actually stands up with the exceptions you put of Central America, which is formally part of it, in fact, but leaves within short order.

It’s one of these questions of what Álvaro Enrigue calls the miracle that Mexico exists. To explain it is a paradox. To make a try at it, I think that there is a common theme in Mexican history, which runs across most of those five centuries, which is a remarkable degree of hands-off government. It’s imposed. Mexico has a lot of mountains. It’s very difficult to rule from any central pole. Savvy governments, or governments with no choice, which are quite often the same thing, are very hands-off. Federalism is built into Mexico’s soul. I think that’s one of the reasons, from early on, Mexico actually out-punches the rest of the Americas in terms of sticking together as a territorial unit.

COWEN: As you know, in the early 19th century, there are rebellions in Yucatán, the Caste Wars, but Yucatán does not split off from Mexico. What keeps that together?

GILLINGHAM: Yucatán has always felt itself to be a different country, effectively, and that runs through to the present. You can see the cultural reasons, obviously, and the Maya and the other great, sophisticated urban culture of the 16th century and before. It makes sense that they should feel themselves very different from the rest of what becomes Mexico. In fact, it comes through in small but revealing ways. Back in the 20th century, people find themselves being asked whether they want a Yucatán beer or a foreign beer, and a foreign beer being anything in Mexico outside Yucatán.

Why doesn’t Yucatán leave? I think that it came extremely close. In fact, there’s a moment in the 1840s when Mexico and Texas form an alliance, and Texas is chartering warships out to Yucatán to try and prevent any naval incursions. Why on earth does Yucatán stay? I think it’s because of the absence of an alternative capital, because Yucatán is profoundly racially divided. It’s one of the few places in Mexico where you could say that really is a fairly stark racial divide. You have a plantocracy, in some ways, like the US South before the Civil War.

You’ve got a relatively small white plantocracy centered in Mérida. They have no interest whatsoever in leading an independent struggle. While the Maya achieve an underestimated level of sophistication as a state, it’s still not at the point where you would get, for more than a couple of years, a really joined-up independence movement spanning all races, all areas, and the entire peninsula.

Recommended, interesting and substantive throughout.  In the United States at least, Mexico remains a greatly underdiscussed nation.

What is economics these days?

From The Marginal Revolution: Rise and Decline, and the Pending AI Revolution:

The day before drafting this paragraph, I blogged a paper on confidence gaps between men and women. It was a paper written by economists, published in the prestigious American Economic Review, the profession’s number one journal. Is this actually sociology, or personality or social psychology, or part of some gender studies field? No one in the economics profession cares to discuss that anymore. It is not that there is a dogmatic attachment to what used to be called “economic imperialism,” rather the view is that if the paper is good enough … it is good enough to publish. I also recently read a paper on using cell phone data to estimate how many people actually were attending church. Freakonomics guru Steve Levitt wrote and published well-known papers on the choice of baby names and corruption in Sumo wrestling116See Exley and Nielsen (2024), and on cell phones see Pope (2024)..

The dirty little secret is that what distinguishes economics as a field, right now, is a mix of higher standards, harder work, better math, and higher IQs. That is the real (dare I say marginal?) contribution of “empirical economics today,” not marginalism per se, though of course contemporary models typically are consistent with marginalist reasoning…

One modest sign of all these changes is how many advisors, when speaking to individuals considering economics graduate school, recommend math or even computer science as a possible background undergraduate major. While most are still undergraduate economics majors, if only because that is where their interest in economics came from, no one seems to mind if they are not. These days, a background in mathematics or computer science is at least as useful for the graduate work to come. Once you get to graduate school, you will have to learn plenty of math and programming anyway, so why not start off in those fields? The prevailing attitude is that the economics you can figure out along the way, or for some topics you may not need to know much of it at all. How complicated are all those economic principles anyway? General skills of apprenticeship and plain ol’ hard work are growing in importance too, as top graduate programs increasingly want their incoming students to have done a “predoc” with an accomplished researcher somewhere along the way.

That is from the chapter on the future of economics in a world with advanced AI.

Addendum: On The Marginal Revolution book, I would most of all like to thank Jeff Holmes for the great job he did on the project, all of the actual work (other than the writing) is from him.  He is also producer of CWT, I owe much to him!

What should I ask Katja Hoyer?

Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with her.  Here is Wikipedia:

Hoyer was born in Wilhelm-Pieck-Stadt GubenBezirk CottbusGerman Democratic Republic (GDR), where her mother was a teacher and her father an officer of the National People’s Army. She received a Master’s degree from the University of Jena and moved to the United Kingdom in about 2010.

Hoyer is a visiting research fellow at King’s College London and has published two books about the history of Germany. She is also a journalist for The Spectator, The Washington Post, Times Literary Supplement, UnHerd, and Die Welt.

Her first book, Blood and Iron, about the German Empire from 1871 to 1918, was well reviewed, even though some reviewers suggested that she had played down the negative aspects of the period and of Otto von Bismarck‘s legacy. Her second book, Beyond the Wall, about the history of the GDR from 1949 to 1990, was well reviewed in the United Kingdom, but less well received in Germany.

She also has a new, forthcoming book on the history of the city of Weimar, namely Weimar: Life on the Edge of Catastrophe.  So what should I ask her?

Ryan Hauser interviews me in print

Here is the link, here is one excerpt:

What was your path into AI, and what are you working on now?

I first became interested in AI when I saw the chess computer Tinker Belle wheeled into a New Jersey chess tournament in I think 1975. I followed the Kasparov matches closely, and the more general progress of AI in chess. I read chess master David Levy telling me that chess was far too intuitive for computers ever to do well. He was wrong, and then I realized that AI could be intuitive and creative too. That was a long time ago.

In 2013 I published a book on the future of AI called Average is Over. I feel it has predicted our current time very accurately. I also taught Asimov’s I, Robot – a work far ahead of its time – for twenty years.

Right now I am simply working to keep afloat and to stay abreast of recent AI developments. I blog and write columns on the topic frequently, and have regular visits to the major labs. I encourage universities to experiment with AI education.

I mention William Byrd and Paul McCartney as well.