Category: Uncategorized

That was then, this is now, Robin Hanson edition

Robin Hanson, who joined the movement and later became renowned for creating prediction markets, described attending multilevel Extropian parties at big houses in Palo Alto at the time.  “And I was energized by them, because they were talking about all these interesting ideas.  And my wife was put off because they were not very well presented, and a little weird,” he said.  “We all thought of ourselves as people who were seeing where the future was going to be, and other people didn’t get it.  Eventually — eventually — we’d be right, but who knows exactly when.”

That is from Keach Hagey’s The Optimist: Sam Altman, OpenAI, and the Race to Invent the Future, which I very much enjoyed.  I am not sure Robin’s supply of parties has been increasing out here in northern Virginia…

The military culture that is German

Strict data protection laws are hindering Germany’s efforts to swell the ranks of the armed forces of Europe’s largest nation, its reservists’ association has warned.

Patrick Sensburg, head of the Reservist Association of the German Armed Forces, said tough German and EU privacy rules meant it could not keep in contact with close to a million people who might help boost the country’s reserve forces as it seeks a stronger role in European defence and security.

Sensburg said that when Germany suspended conscription in 2011, it also stopped keeping track of former conscripts.

“We have lost their contacts,” he said in an interview with the Financial Times. “It’s crazy.”

…He said it was absurd that the body responsible for collecting Germany’s annual television fee could contact citizens a few weeks after they had moved house, while he had no way of tracking down people whose names were in the association’s records.

Here is more from the FT, via Shruti.

Tuesday assorted links

1. Berlin cybermarkets in everything ugh.

2. o3 list of nuanced, rigorous thinkers.

3. The Web Fiction Canon.

4. How much does overconfidence drive conspiracy theorizing?

5. Are the Nordics backpedling on their plans for a cashless society?

6. The menopause penalty.

7. UAE will offer free ChatGPTPlus to all of its citizens.  And Korea fact of the day: “ChatGPT’s growth here has been off the charts—weekly users grew over 4.5x last year, and Korea is now our top country for paid subscribers after the US!”

8. Marina von Neumann Whitman, RIP.

9. MIE: audiobook for Reasons and Persons (!).

10. Authoritarian-friendly crypto?

Monday assorted links

1. Lydia Laurenson.

2. More from Galen Strawson.

3. “But the lawsuit claimed the NYT’s original story had “portrayed the Marubo people as a community unable to handle basic exposure to the internet, highlighting allegations that their youth had become consumed by pornography”.”  Link here.  This likely means the tribe is overall happy to have the internet connection, right?

4. “His primary message for those people, he told me, is that “theocracy” isn’t a scary concept.

5. “Canada has more measles cases right now than any other country in the Americas.

6. “The Conservative Leader in the House of Commons says he “can absolutely advocate for a united Canada,” but won’t specifically condemn a possible referendum on Alberta separation.

7. A veo 3 video.

New data on the political slant of AI models

By Sean J. Westwood, Justin Grimmer, and Andrew B. Hall:

We develop a new approach that puts users in the role of evaluator, using ecologically valid prompts on 30 political topics and paired comparisons of outputs from 24 LLMs. With 180,126 assessments from 10,007 U.S. respondents, we find that nearly all models are perceived as significantly left-leaning—even by many Democrats—and that one widely used model leans left on 24 of 30 topics. Moreover, we show that when models are prompted to take a neutral stance, they offer more ambivalence, and users perceive the output as more neutral. In turn, Republican users report modestly increased interest in using the models in the future. Because the topics we study tend to focus on value-laden tradeoffs that cannot be resolved with facts, and because we find that members of both parties and independents see evidence of slant across many topics, we do not believe our results reflect a dynamic in which users perceive objective, factual information as having a political slant; nonetheless, we caution that measuring perceptions of political slant is only one among a variety of criteria policymakers and companies may wish to use to evaluate the political content of LLMs. To this end, our framework generalizes across users, topics, and model types, allowing future research to examine many other politically relevant outcomes.

Here is a relevant dashboard with results.

China espionage and the Fed

Prosecutors say Rogers was a logical target for Chinese espionage, with an important-sounding title at the Fed and a growing affection for China. In 2018, he married a Shanghainese woman whom he met through a Chinese matchmaking service. FBI agents would later find a note on his iPad, dated December 2018 and addressed to “Dear Chinese People,” in which he expressed admiration for China.

“I love your kindness, your generosity, and your humbly hard working, high-achieving society,” the note said. “I love you unconditionally, Shanghai.”

…In one case in 2019, Chinese authorities allegedly held a Fed economist in a hotel room during a trip to Shanghai and threatened to imprison him unless he agreed to provide nonpublic economic data, according to the Senate committee report. Chinese officials allegedly told him they had been monitoring his phones, including conversations about his divorce, and would publicly humiliate him if he didn’t cooperate. The economist reported the incident to Fed officials after being released, the report said.

China’s Foreign Ministry denounced the report, calling it “political disinformation.”

Here is more from the WSJ.  While I do in general have a high opinion of Fed staff, China…I really do not think you can learn very much from these people!  Perhaps they can tell you about the Lucas critique.

My visit at Universidad Francisco Marroquin

Again, I had a great time, here is the background I posted not long ago.  My hosts sent me these links, note the first two speeches are quite short:

Sunday assorted links

1. The rise of causal empirical methods in economics.

2. How to find ancient Assyrian cities using economics.

3. Can a corporation be pardoned?

4. The “dark leisure” theory of AI gains.

5. “In the first quarter of 2025, there were six murders on [South African] farms, of which one was a white farmer and the rest Black people, according to police figures.”  FT link.

6. Davies and Farrell criticize crypto (NYT).

The 3.5 percent remittance tax

Trump has been talking about this.  I am not sure what version of the idea we might end up with, but let’s consider the idea in its abstract form.  Let’s also put aside money laundering issues, and talk about “simple remittances.”

The United States has a partial monopsony power over Latino (and often other) migrants, as there are few comparable places to go.  Some may switch to Spain, or stay in their home countries, but many will have to pay the tax, though of course they may send less money back home.

If elasticities were zero (unlikely), the US government would pull in 3.5 percent of the relevant flow of remittances.  More likely, funds sent will decline, and tax revenue earned will decline as well.  The former effect will strengthen the dollar against the Latin currencies, while the latter effect may weaken the dollar through the indirect mechanism of domestic output being lower.  I think most economists would expect the dollar to strengthen on net, as in essence the tax makes it costlier to sell dollars.  (As a side effect, the tax might accelerate a transition to weirder, harder to tax forms of crypto?)

So US exporters suffer a modest amount from the stronger USD, and US consumers gain from modestly cheaper imports.  Family members back home in the receiving countries are worse off, as they are receiving less in terms of real transfers, due to the tax.

It is less clear how much the receiving countries are worse off on net.  This is easiest to see in the case of El Salvador, which has dollarized.  If fewer remittances are sent to El Salvador, other dollar holders in the country may be better off.  In this regard remittances have a partial zero-sum component.  It is not right to say they are purely zero-sum, because the remittance is “the market” sending funds to where the demand to hold those funds is highest, and furthermore El Salvador as a whole has greater net command over imports.  Still, from another point of view it is a kind of domestic inflation for El Salvador and it taxes their cash balance holders.

In any case, you also can think of this as a funny, quite indirect way of auctioning off the right to come and send money back to your family.  Gary Becker once suggested a more direct auction of entry rights, an idea broadly popular with many economists.  This particular form of the auction maintains an ongoing tax on the margin, rather than a once and for all payment up front, and thus might involve higher distortions. (on the other hand it eases credit constraints, since you do not pay up front)  As a side note, this particular form of the auction mechanism also might discourage most of all the more altruistic and family-oriented migrants to a modest degree, or encourage some to try harder to bring their families with them.  Those could be pretty small effects, but substitution effects are always worth noting.

As someone with broadly libertarian sympathies, I am strongly opposed to this tax.  I think often the best way to analyze a tax is not with traditional deadweight loss tools, but rather to ask “does this allow the government to get its paws on a whole new source of revenue?”  If it does, be very suspicious.

But if you are not libertarian in that manner, I do not see why you should hate this tax.  It harms migrants and their relatives back home, but without necessarily harming those countries on net.  And international trade economics, and economics more generally, has a long tradition of “nationalistic” points of view that focus on maximizing domestic welfare, not global welfare.  I see those pop up all the time — for decades — without people screaming bloody murder (I am myself more Parfitian on these issues of course.)

Most Democrats I know really want to raise taxes.  Many centrists feel the same way, though perhaps less strongly.  So why should they hate this tax hike so much?  My views on taxes differ, though I recognize that sometimes you have to raise taxes.

I think, at least in this case, that the broadly libertarian principles are the relevant factor here.  I do not want the US federal government getting its paws on remittances as a revenue source.  In turn, I hope other opponents of this policy — and I suspect there will be many — join me and become slightly more libertarian, and slightly more willing to focus on the question “does this allow the government to get its paws on a whole new source of revenue?”

We will see.

New results on Facebook advertising

There has been so much misinformation about this topic, much of it still persists.  Here is a new paper by many researchers, Hunt Allcott and Matt Gentzkow are the first two names.  Here is the abstract:

We study the effects of social media political advertising by randomizing subsets of 36,906 Facebook users and 25,925 Instagram users to have political ads removed from their news feeds for six weeks before the 2020 US presidential election. We show that most presidential ads were targeted toward parties’ own supporters and that fundraising ads were most common. On both Facebook and Instagram, we found no detectable effects of removing political ads on political knowledge, polarization, perceived legitimacy of the election, political participation (including campaign contributions), candidate favorability, and turnout. This was true overall and for both Democrats and Republicans separately.

Here is the full link.

Saturday assorted links

1. Who benefits from Uber surge pricing?

2. The Way of Code, a new on-line product, some might call it a book, adapted by Rick Rubin and based on Lao Tzu.

3. What is wrong with Sanskrit?

4. Price quiz for auctioned artworks (NYT).  I do not find this to be the reductio the NYT seems to think it is.  By the way, the Dumas I do not like and it is not such a great Baselitz.  The Joan Mitchell is clearly better than the Hans Hoffman, pity to those who cannot see that.

5. It seems there are no actual signs of life on that distant planet (NYT).

6. Corporate expense accounts — renaming arbitrage!

So many mistakes

Scott Alexander claims “I often disagree with Marginal Revolution, but their post today made me a new level of angry…”  The topic is US AID.

I think when Scott is angry (much less “a new level of angry”) he does not think straight.  First, someone should tell him that Emergent Ventures overhead is typically two percent, five percent for dealing with screwier banking systems.  (That is one reason why I won the recent Time magazine award for innovation in philanthropy.)  I am well aware there are various ways of calculating overhead, but there are now more than one thousand Emergent Ventures winners, and all of them can testify to how radically stripped-down the process is.

This sentence is also wildly off:

But it [o3] estimated that if the federal government gives a dollar of research funding to Mercatus, about 40% would go to combined university and Mercatus overhead – higher than the average USAID charity.

For one thing, Scott could have simply asked me how it works.  It is also the case that we do not receive or seek federal government research funding, but if we did the overhead going to GMU would be zero (are you listening o3?).  Depending on the exact source of the funding, very likely we would make a lot of money on such grants because we would receive significant “overhead” payments for what would not be actual overhead expenses.  That is one big problem with the system, I might add.  We at Mercatus have made the judgment that we do not wish to become institutionally/financially addicted to such overhead…and I wish more non-profits would do the same.

Scott takes me to be endorsing Rubio’s claim that the third-party NGOs simply pocket the money.  In reality my fact check with o3 found (correctly) that the money was “channelled through” the NGOs, not pocketed.  Scott lumps my claim together with Rubio’s as if we were saying the same thing.  My very next words (“I do understand that not all third party allocations are wasteful…”) show a clear understanding that the money is channeled, not pocketed, and my earlier and longer post on US AID makes that clearer yet at greater length.  Scott is simply misrepresenting me here.

There was an earlier time when US AID did much less channeling through American third party NGOs.  That was in my view a better regime, though of course Congress wanted to spend more money on Americans, and furthermore parts of the Republican Party, often in the executive branch, viewed the NGO alternative as more flexible and also more market-friendly.  That created a small number of triumphs, such as PEPFAR, and a lot of waste, and I am happy to clear away much of that waste.  Doing so also will improve aid decision-making in the future.  It is right to believe that US AID can operate on another basis, and also right to wish to stop a system that allows spending on ostensible “democracy promotion.”  I find it a useful discipline to have an initial approach to the problem that starts with this question “if you can’t find poverty-fighting domestic institutions in a country to fund directly, with sufficient trust, perhaps you should be giving aid elsewhere.”  I also find it plausible that doing a lot of initial and pretty radical clearing away of NGO relations is the best way to get there, though I agree that point is debatable.

When I read from the well-informed Charlie Robertson that “My data suggests US AID flows in 2024 were equivalent to: 93% of Somalia’s government revenues, 61% in Sudan, just over 50% in South Sudan and Yemen” I get pretty nervous.  Don’t you?  I do see this can be argued either way (can we really countenance immediate collapse?), but I am hardly shocked or outraged by the skeptical attitude of the American people here.  I say spend the money where it can be put to good use, and also where those uses are politically sustainable.  I do understand that this will reallocate aid toward what are on the whole wealthier countries.  In those places you still can do a great deal of good for poorer people.

Scott writes: “When Trump and Rubio try to tar them [US AID] as grifters in order to make it slightly easier to redistribute their Congress-earmarked money to kleptocrats and billionaire cronies, this goes beyond normal political lying into the sort of thing that makes you the scum of the earth, the sort of person for whom even an all-merciful God could not restrain Himself from creating Hell.”  Is that how the rationalist community should be presenting itself?  In a time when innocent Americans are gunned down in the streets for their (ostensible) political views, and political assassination attempts seem to be rising, and there even has been a rationalist murder cult running around, does this show a morally responsible and clear thinking approach to the post that was published?

More generally, I wonder if Scott ever has dealt with US AID or other multilaterals, or the world of NGOs, much of which surrounds Washington DC.  I have lived in this milieu for almost forty years, and sometimes worked in it, from various sides including contractor.  A lot of people have the common sense to realize that these institutions are pretty wasteful (not closedly tied to measured overhead btw), too oriented toward their own internal audiences, and also that the NGOs (as recipients, not donors) “capture” US AID to some extent.  As an additional “am I understanding this issue correctly?” check, has Scott actually spoken to anyone involved in this process on the Trump administration side?

There are a bunch of other things wrong with Scott’s discussion of overhead, but it is not worth going through them all.

I am all for keeping the very good public health programs, and yes I do know they involve NGO partners, and jettisoning a lot of the other accretions.  That is the true humanitarian attitude, and it is time to recognize it as such.  Better rhetoric, better thinking, and less anger are needed to get us there.  It is now time for Scott to return to his usual high standards of argumentation and evidence.

Friday assorted links

1. More on Alberta separatism (NYT).  And Polymarket.

2. It does not work when only a single university institutes post-tenure review.

3. “The Journal earlier reported that the device won’t be a phone, and that Ive and Altman’s intent is to help wean users from screens.

4. Sholto Douglas podcast on Claude 4.

5. Alasdair Macintyre, RIP.  And a remembrance, a wonderful piece.

6. What happens when your customers come from GPT?

Economics coauthorships in the aftermath of MeToo

We study changes in coauthorships in economics, after the MeToo movement, using NBER and CEPR working papers between January 2004 and December 2020. We identify three main shifts in collaboration patterns. First, compared to pre-MeToo levels, collaborations across genders in an author’s seniority group increased: we estimate a 12.3% increase of women coauthors per 100 men-authored papers. Second, coauthorship shares of senior with junior economics declined by 3.0%, indicating a shift towards sorting of collaborations by seniority. Third, shares of new coauthorships declined by 5.4%, driven by drops in senior economists’ shares of new junior and new junior women by 18.4% and 48.0%, respectively. The results are robust to different specifications.

That is from a new paper by Noriko Amano-Patiño, Elisa Faraglia, and Chryssi Giannitsarou.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.  And here is a related paper on who receives credit for cross-gender co-authorships.

No Evidence of Effects of Testosterone on Economic Preferences

There is conflicting evidence on whether testosterone affects economic preferences such as risk taking, fairness and altruism, with the evidence suggesting significant effects coming from correlational studies or small underpowered testosterone administration studies. To credibly test this hypothesis, we conducted a large pre-registered double-blind randomized controlled trial with = 1,000 male participants; 10–20 times larger than most previous randomized controlled studies. Participants were randomly allocated to receive a single dose of either placebo or intranasal testosterone. They thereafter carried out a series of economic tasks capturing social preferences, competitiveness and risk preferences. We fail to find any evidence of a treatment effect for any of our nine primary outcome measures, thereby failing to conceptually replicate several previous studies reporting positive findings that used smaller sample sizes. In line with these results, we furthermore find no evidence of an association between basal testosterone and economic preferences, failing to also conceptually replicate previous correlational studies.

By Anna Dreber, et.al.